

From African Peer Review Mechanisms to African Queer Review Mechanisms?

Robert Gabriel Mugabe, Empire and the Decolonisation of African Orifices



EDITED BY
Artwell Nhemachena &
Tapiwa V. Warikandwa

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**Artwell Nhemachena &
Tapiwa V. Warikandwa**



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Foreword

While some scholars have characterised the world as a mask dance, which should be understood by changing positions, this book notes that imperially haunted African territories do not get settled. Haunted by enslavement and resilient colonial era crimes of dispossession, robbery, theft, plunder, looting and exploitation, Africa is finding it hard to get settled. While during the colonial era Africans were caricatured as traditional, savage, barbaric, atavistic and resistant to change, in contemporary Africa, Zimbabwe in particular, we have just witnessed neoimperialists' and colonialists' resistance to change – resistance to African demands for restitution, restorations and reparations. The question here is about why such resistance should not be considered savage, barbaric and atavistic as well? Because they control global media, imperialists have opportunistically depicted Robert Mugabe as more violent and virulent than colonialists who haven't only colonised Zimbabwe but the whole of Africa. Viewed from another angle, why not describe African resistance during the enslavement and colonial era as resistance to robbery, theft, looting, plunder, dispossession and exploitation? Why were Africans being caricatured for resisting colonial theft, plunder, looting, robbery, dispossession and exploitation? If Africans were not supposed to resist, then why is it that colonialists and their descendants are now resisting repossession of the resources which they stole from Africans? Why is it that Robert Mugabe and citizens of Zimbabwe are caricatured for demanding back their land which was stolen? And why are descendants of colonialists claiming compensation from African victims of their robbery and exploitation? Was it not enough that they stole and continue to steal African land, minerals, livestock and labour power from which they have benefited for centuries?

Although other scholars particularly those writing from Marxist perspectives have written about Africa's supposed dependency syndrome, this book would understand Africa as suffering not necessarily from dependency syndrome but dispossession syndrome. Africa is not necessarily dependent on Euro-America but it has been and is being dispossessed by Euro-America that depends on robbing Africans. In this respect, the book theorises Africa in terms of dispossession syndrome which the people of the continent are suffering since the eras of enslavement and colonisation. Theorising Africa in terms of dispossession syndrome, rather than dependency syndrome, makes it possible to see the fallacy of discourses about delinking. Delinking erroneously presupposes that colonialism and imperialism were essentially about linking or connecting Africa when in fact colonialism and imperialism were essentially

about theft, robbery, looting, destruction, plunder, dispossession and exploitation. Naturally, the logic here is, if the prosecution accuses someone who has robbed or stolen something and on the dockets they charge him/her of having “linked” or “connected” or “related” with the victim, the charge would not secure conviction for the crime of robbery/theft. In this regard, the book argues that in foregrounding dependency, Marxist dependency theorists missed crucial points about the realities of crimes of dispossession, robbery and theft which should be foregrounded in Africa. The solution to colonisation and imperialism is not simply delinking or disconnecting but it lies in restitution, restoration and reparation – this is why the charge has to be clear in the first instance.

Euro-Americans’ resistance to African restitution, restoration and reparations and repossession of material resources underscores the fact that it is Euro-America that depends on Africans – Africans do not depend on Euro-America because they have plenty of natural resources that Euro-Americans do not have. While Euro-American economies are often regarded as efficient and more productive, this book challenges these erroneous conventions. If Euro-American economies were really efficient and productive, the question is why is Euro-America failing to compensate Africans for enslavement and colonisation? If Euro-American economies have really grown and modernised then why are they failing to compensate those that they have robbed and exploited? If Euro-American economies are efficient and productive then why are they refusing even to return African artefacts which they looted and are keeping in their museums in Europe and America? The point here is that Euro-American economies do not depend on growth, efficiency and productivity in the conventional sense but they depend more on globalised dispossession, theft, robbery, looting, plunder and exploitation of other people. The fact that they cannot stop dispossessing, robbing and exploiting Africans is ample evidence that their economies do not depend on growth, efficiency and productivity. Construed from an Afrocentric point of view what is addressed as efficiency and productivity is actually theft and exploitation – because foreign corporations would want to steal and loot as much as possible before their crimes are discovered, this is unfortunately simplistically described as productivity. The logic is similar to an unmarried and sex-starved man who happens on a sexually liberalised married woman – he would want to maximise by having as much intercourse as possible within the shortest time, but one would not necessarily call it productivity or efficiency. Ideologies about economic growth, efficiency and productivity are just smokescreens for planetary robbery, dispossession and theft that have been in place since the enslavement and colonial eras. The book

takes note of the fact that empire hires not just economic hitmen but it also hires ideological hitmen.

In a world that is governed by criminocracy, ideological hitmen foreground facades of democracy. In a world where crimes of enslavement and colonisation would be resolved by restitution, restoration and reparations from empire, ideological hitmen foreground exigencies of criticising one's own African government and state, particularly those that demand restitution and reparations. In other words, where African men and women, boys and girls are supposed to focus their energies on demanding for restitution, restoration and reparations from empire, ideological hitmen foreground and emphasise simplistic freedoms of expression, freedoms of information, freedoms of the media, freedoms of conscience aimed at enhancing African state and government accountability. Yet, when they faced problems of poverty, Europeans did not simply criticise their governments and states but they enslaved and colonised Africans. The point here is that Africans will not get real freedom simply by deconstructing and criticising African states and governments. The ability to criticise African states and governments does not entail the realisation of freedom for Africans – the exercise of liberal freedoms helps empire that benefits from the attendant chaos/anarchy that obtains on the ground as African individuals hack one another down. Similarly, ideological hitmen foreground tricksters' democracy that does not speak to restitution, restoration and reparations. Instead of focusing on paying compensation and returning stolen resources to Africans, imperial ideological hitmen focus on accusing African leaders of stealing elections. In other words, those that have stolen, robbed, dispossessed and exploited Africans' materialities are now singularly accusing African leaders of stealing elections – and they make huge noises about that, loud enough to foreshadow the ongoing neoimperial theft of African materialities. Thus, instead of funding land redistribution programmes in Zimbabwe as promised at the Lancaster House Conference, Britain and U.S.A have instead shifted to sponsoring opposition parties and "civil" society organisations. Africans are made to celebrate human rights projects that are sponsored by inhumane corporations that dispossess, rob, and exploit them.

The problem with an emphasis on privatisation and liberalisation in Africa is that privatisation itself has roots in colonisation, dispossession, theft, robbery, exploitation and dehumanisation of Africans. Privatised during the colonial era, Zimbabwe was known as Rhodesia belonging to the British arch-imperialist and homosexual called Cecil John Rhodes. Similarly, privatised during the colonial era, Belgian Congo was considered to be privately owned by the Belgian king Leopold who treated Africans as animals or beasts for his private enrichment. With such colonial privatisation came dispossession, theft, robbery, plunder,

looting and exploitation of Africans who were treated as nonbeings, as indiscernible and indistinct from animals or beasts. In the contemporary era, privatisation of state enterprises is again sadly being promoted in a context where Africans are again suffering the second scramble. From state enterprises to sexuality, we have increasingly witnessed liberalised privatisation which effectively translates to susceptibility to invisible market forces which are in fact the invisible hand of neoempire. So much as there has been economic structural adjustment programmes in Africa, there is also the structural adjustment of African sexualities and orifices; much as there is structural adjustment of African sexualities and orifices, there is the consequence of prostitution wherein individual prostitutes think that they have ownership and control over their bodies when in fact neoimperialists are using their sexual organs as raw materials for the thriving global sex industry, which also serve as opium for the neoimperially oppressed and exploited. The problem with discourses on privatisation and liberalisation is that they do not tell us that even the market, which is depicted as autonomous, has been privatised by those that control its logics – the free and invisible hand of the market is in fact the invisible hand of empire. Thus, instead of focusing on the criminality of enslavement and colonialism, Africans are made to focus attention on the so-called invisible hand of the market such that they waste their lifetime fighting the figment of the invisible being called the invisible market. The logic is similar to a situation where a criminal who is visibly busy looting tells the victim that he/she is poor not because of the robbery that he/she is seeing but because of the invisible market forces/invisible hand of the market. But directly confronting and addressing the depredations of enslavement and colonisation, Robert Mugabe negated the imperial ideology around the invisible hand of the market – he refused to be made to focus on fighting the figment of the invisible being.

Reducing African poverty and suffering to demonic spirits, demonic leaders and invisible hand of the market forces, neoempire has managed to evade responsibility and accountability for the criminality of dispossession, robbery, theft, looting, plunder and exploitation on the African continent. Made to fight their forefathers who are depicted as demons of poverty on the continent, Africans' attention is detoured from demanding repossessing of resources. Naturally, those who steal African resources would always want Africans to forget about or to fight their forefathers and the elderly among them who are the original owners of the heritages. With fathers and sons fighting one another on the continent, Africans are not guaranteed of recovering their heritages; with husbands and wives fighting one another the continent is not guaranteed of recovering the stolen heritages. With African youths fighting the elderly, Africa is not guaranteed of recovery of the stolen heritages. Turned into neoimperial

proxies, Africans become shock absorbers for a neoimperial world order. Africans waste their time and energy fighting one another rather than focusing attention on demanding repossession of their property. Instead of merely throwing spanners on African independence, neoempire throws its human and nonhuman proxies on African independence and sovereignty. The major problem here is that some Africans think they will remain alive even after their heads are severed. The liberal notions of multiplicity, diversity and plurality hoodwink Africans who may even begin to count their toes and thumbs for alternative heads. Thus, from heads of households, to “traditional” leadership and African state leadership, one recognises clamours for beheading, for severing the African heads – some “civil” society organisations, international institutions and Euro-American foundations call for the beheading of African heads but they do not tell Africans that after the beheading there will no longer be life in the Africans.

While Zimbabweans have been consistently ideologically stirred, using human rights ideologies, towards Mugabephobia, Africans have not been told that the world is also being stirred towards posthuman, transhuman, postanthropocentric, biocentric, earthcentric and ecocentric (dis)order that will not consider human rights to be central. Although Mugabe has been accused of violence, the world is hardly informed about the neoimperial -inspired slow violence, slow death, structural violence and systemic violence – including the imperial economic structural violence that instantiates global necrocapitalism and necroeconomies. While Zimbabweans were stirred up to Mugabephobia wherein Mugabe was depicted as a global security threat, Africans are hardly informed about the dangers of ongoing Eurocentric desecuritisation discourses in a context where Africans are increasingly depicted as indistinct, indistinguishable and indiscernible from animals. There is an ongoing dangerous combination of discourses on posthumanism with animism, animalisation and desecuritisation of Africa. The era of posthumanism, desecuritisation and animalisation threatens to be a moment of letting Africans die – an era when Euro-American pretences of humanitarianism vanish. Having served to endear Africans to neoimperialism and away from their nationalist African leaders, humanitarianism would be stopped as the posthuman era, postanthropocentric era takes over – an era of letting dispossessed Africans die; of switching off the African life-saving machines. Mugabe constituted a threat to imperial designs because by repossessioning ownership and control over land and other resources, Zimbabweans would not continue to depend on the imperial life-saving machines. It would be difficult in future for empire to let autonomous Zimbabweans die or to threaten to switch-off life-saving machines because the Zimbabweans would be having their own autonomous and sovereign lives. The

problem that Mugabe realised was that some Africans have become so used to living on imperial life-saving machines that they cannot reimagine autonomy and sovereignty as realised through repossession, ownership and control over their own resources. Those that own and control the imperial life-saving machines have become gods and goddesses to which some Africans are willing to sacrifice themselves and their fellows.

If empire is serious about human rights abuses in Zimbabwe then why is there growing imperial discourses about posthumanism; if empire is serious about conserving natural resources for the future African generations, then why is empire preventing Africans from reproducing the future generations in any case, if empire is serious about conserving African resources for future African generations then why is empire encouraging African youths to focus on homosexuality, cybersex, humanoid robotic sex, ecosex, dildoes, virtual sex and so on? If empire is serious about pluralism, diversity and multiplicity then why does it prevent Robert Mugabe from exercising his convictions about the world and Zimbabwe in particular? In other words, if being sexually straight is not necessary then why does empire want Robert Mugabe to be economically and politically straight, in an imperial sense? The point here is that empire puts Robert Mugabe and other African leaders in political, juristic and economic straitjackets yet the same empire wants the Africans to believe that it champions multiplicity, diversity, inclusivity and pluralism. If empire is serious about the dangers of bloody diamonds, such as the Zimbabwean ones, then why is empire running a planetary bloody economy that is premised on dispossessing, exploiting, looting, plundering and robbing indigenous people? The point here is that it is not merely diamonds that are bloody but the entire Euro-American economic system is bloody. If empire is serious about the necessity of good governance including the separation of powers then why does empire meddle in African states and governments? Empire is more powerful than African executives, judiciaries and legislatures and so its presence unsettles the separation of powers in Africa. If empire is serious about the necessity of protecting rights to property then why did it not return stolen property back to Africans? In other words, why did it put in place property protection laws without first of all returning stolen property? If empire is serious about granting majority status to African men and women then why does empire continue to dictate to Africans as if they are imperial minors on their continent? If empire was serious about the necessity of power sharing among Africans then why is there no power sharing at the United Nations Security Council? Similarly, if empire is serious that African leaders must not stay long in power, then why does empire make Africans wait for too long before restitution, restoration and reparations?

The irony is that empire does not mind if Africans wait for too long for freedom and decolonisation but it worries a lot if Africans, like Robert Mugabe, live long. In this regard, Eurocentric thinkers, institutions, foundations, states and scholars got worried because Mugabe lived long enough to see the repossession and redistribution of land in Zimbabwe. Mugabe's age became central in Eurocentric discourses. There was impatience with Robert Mugabe's long life and this impatience was expressed including by people who still have the patience to keep what they stole from Africans. Robert Mugabe stayed long in power, as an elected president, but colonialists and their descendants stayed too long on stolen African land. If it is a question of overstaying welcome, colonialists and their descendants have overstayed their welcome by centuries. The real issue in Zimbabwe is neither about bad governance, nor democracy, nor human rights, nor the rule of law, nor about Mugabe's overstay in power – *the issue is that Robert Gabriel Mugabe demanded African land and other resources back from colonialists.*

Artwell Nhemachena & Tapiwa V. Warikandwa

Robert Gabriel Mugabe and the Global Criminocracy in the Age of Criminalocene: Theorising Imperial Fascination with Liberalising African Orifices – A Decolonial Introduction

Artwell Nhemachena & Tapiwa V. Warikandwa

The survival of the modern form of life depends on the proficiency and dexterity of the techniques for waste disposal of both kinds...From its outset modernisation has required territories, deemed the 'land of no one' and devoid of any sovereign administration (terra nullius), to provide dumping grounds for the human waste modernity itself creates...Settlers were surplus people transported from Europe and dumped into the colonies, and Indigenous people – here deemed non-people and so not entitled to legal recognition – had to be cast out to make space for them. It is estimated that colonisation has been responsible for the genocide of 80 per cent of the Indigenous peoples of the land settled by Europeans (Havemann 2005: 59).

Deimperialisation entails abandoning Eurocentrism and the spirit of the Western domination. It entails abandonment of the Western arrogance which breeds and perpetuates the idea that Europe and North America have everything to teach non-Europeans and nothing to learn from other people and their civilisations (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013: 349).

...the term 'postcolonial neocolonized world' captures a normalized abnormality whereby issues of African identity formation, nation-building and state-construction, knowledge production, economic development and democratization remain unfinished projects mainly because of their entrapment within colonial matrices of modern global power. African leaders are also entrapped within a disciplining colonial matrix of power and those who try to deviate and question the commandment from the powerful Euro-American world are subjected to severe punishments and in extreme cases even assassinations...the invisible entanglement and entrapment of the African continent within the complex colonial matrices of power in which full African decolonization remains a myth and African freedom is reduced to an illusion

(Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013: 11).

Introduction

Since the enslavement and colonial eras, Africa became an international crime scene for human trafficking, the enslavement of Africans, international robbery, looting, plunder, rape, murder, dispossession and theft. Afflicted with vices arising partly from the enclosure systems, Euro-Americans offloaded their problems onto Africans who suffered enslavement and colonisation as a result.

Thus, the privation and poverty that were supposed to afflict Europeans, as a result of their enclosure systems, were shifted to Africans who were subjected to colonial robbery, theft, dispossession and exploitation. The point here is that historically, Euro-America has tended to externalise its problems while at the same time internalising the glory and resources of others who have been subjects of enslavement and neocolonial robbery, plunder and exploitation. In this regard, we argue that Africa has been historically constituted not simply as a dependent to Euro-America, as postulated by Marxist dependent theorists; Africans' resources have not simply been alienated from them, as postulated by Marxist treatises on the alienation of resources. Rather Africans have been subjected to systematic robbery, theft, plunder, looting and criminality more broadly – a criminal does not alienate but he/she steals, robs, loots, plunders and so on. In this vein, we argue that Africa/ns is/are not simplistically dependent on Euro-America but they are victims of Euro-American enslavement and neocolonial robbery, dispossession, looting, plunder and exploitation. The solution that is needed is not one that simplistically addresses “dependence”, “alienation”, “underdevelopment” or supposed backwardness – the solution that is needed should address the problem of criminality that has been going on in and on Africa for centuries since the enslavement and colonial eras. The argument we seek to make here is that the use of wrong terms like “underdeveloped”, “alienation”, “dependence”, “underprivileged”, “subaltern”, “conquered”, “third world”, “developing” and so on in reference to Africa prevents Africans from seeing the facts about the theft, robbery, plunder, looting and exploitation that is going on on the continent – the dockets and summons in the [academic] courts need to be properly drafted using the most precise terms to describe what is going on in Africa. Africa does not benefit from ethics of ambiguity (de Beavours 1975) or ambiguation – it requires clear articulation of exactly what is going on or what is foundational to what is going on.

In the light of the foregoing, we argue in this book that the Berlin Conference was not just an ordinary conference but it was, more precisely, a meeting of those that wanted to coordinate their robbery and looting of African resources. Through colonisation, Europe and America managed to export criminality to Africa and other regions including Australia. Europe historically exported convicts to America, Australia and other colonies and these convicts became the colonialists in the territories where they dispossessed, robbed and exploited indigenous people who were treated as indistinct from animals or beasts (Aldrich 2013; Nhemachena 2017; Craig 18 February 2016). Similarly, Euro-America is dumping dangerous e-waste in Africa where jobless and unwary victims do not know they are being harmed as they mine the e-waste dumps (Bisschop 2016; Mhango 2018; Alam *et al.* 2015; Grossman 2006). Thus,

rather than introducing lawfulness, including the rule of law in Africa, colonialists and empire introduced chaos, anarchy and lawlessness. Often they also conscripted African proxies and forced them to rob, dispossess and exploit their kith and kin on behalf of the colonialists. Colonialists also formed chartered companies to assist them in looting, dispossessing and exploiting Africans. In this regard, transnational corporations are the contemporary manifestations of colonial era chartered companies in that they are also dispossessing, robbing and exploiting Africans. In view of the foregoing, we argue that since the enslavement and neocolonial eras, the world is ruled along criminocratic lines, by a minority global criminocracy. We characterise the eras of the enslavement, colonisation and neocolonisation, which saw the emergence of global criminogenesis, as criminalocene – this is an era ruled by the global criminocracy. We will argue that the age of the global criminalocene is not only ruled by the global criminocracy but it is also characterised by what other scholars have called necroeconomics and necrocapitalism, in reference to economies that profit from the dispossession, robbery, death and suffering of other people (Haskaj 2018; Banerjee 2008). In so far as they are based on global criminocracy, necroeconomics and necrocapitalism, we argue that the economies, since the enslavement and colonial eras, have not been rational when looked at from the point of view of the enslaved and colonised and their descendants. To say, as some scholars do, that Euro-American economies are rational is to ignore the irrationalities of enslavement and colonisation of Africans and other peoples of the Global South. We argue that to describe such economies as rational is to rationalise the violence and criminality that are foundational to them.

While Banerjee (2008) defines necrocapitalism as forms of accumulation that involve dispossession and the subjection of life to the power of death; Haskaj (2018: 1148) defines necroeconomics as follows:

The death of millions from war, genocide, poverty and famine are symptomatic of a crisis that extends beyond site-specific failures of governance, cultures or economies...a shift in both the global economy and logic of capital that posits death as a central activity of value creation. “Crisis”, then, is more than an accidental failure or inconvenient effect of either global economy or political reality, but pivotal to both...due to the extension of market logic, populations have been reconfigured and reconceptualised as “excess” – not only disposable but also fundamentally valued only in their negation. This devaluation of selected population is devalorization of living labor, thus creating a space for death as generalized commodity market and economic activity.

Because global necroeconomies are connected to global necropolitics, particularly with transnational corporations owning and controlling stolen resources in the world, the global necroeconomic base is conceived in this present book as determining the global necropolitical superstructure. The point here is that those that resist the ongoing dispossession and exploitation of indigenous people by transnational corporations are subjected to necropolitics, necroeconomies and necrocapitalism in a broader sense. In this sense, Zimbabwe has historically been subjected to imperial necroeconomies and necrocapitalism which witnessed the colonial dispossession, robbery, looting, plunder and exploitation for centuries. Yet colonialists also subjected Zimbabweans to imperial necropolitics including colonial political violence aimed at subjugating them. The issue here is that necroeconomies, necrocapitalism and necropolitics are not seen, in this book, narrowly as characteristics of the individual [African] states but they are global or neoimperial phenomena that are used to control the global population in a world where Euro-America is increasingly arrogating global sovereignty to itself. Instead of analysing sovereignty narrowly in terms of individual [African] states, we problematise the Euro-American arrogation of global sovereignty wherein, for instance in the United Nations Security Council, it dictates to the entire world. In this sense, Giorgio Agamben's notions of states of exception, bare life, and homo sacer (Agamben 1998; Cotula 2017) can be extended to the emergent global sovereigns that are also arrogating the power to define life and death, to except and configure bare life. The sense here is that in a world where African states and governments are sucked of their sovereignty and powers to govern their populations, they are increasingly becoming other than states and governments. In a context where Euro-America is usurping African states' sovereignty and powers of government, African states and governments are increasingly becoming mere local delegates and proxies acting on behalf of Euro-American sovereigns and principals that are sitting at the all-powerful global helm. Thus, in the sanctions that were imposed on Zimbabwe by Euro-America, we witness the Euro-American power to "let die" (Steinbock *et al.* 1994) or to indirectly kill those that are subjected to sanctions. In short, Euro-America has arrogated the power to define life and death not only within their national jurisdictions but across the whole world – in this regard, it plays worldwide necropolitics while transnational corporations play necrocapitalism and necroeconomics across the planet.

While incidences of violence occur in more localised spaces including within individual African states, it is difficult to figure out whether the perpetrators are acting on their own accord or as proxies of the global criminocracy that is inclined to necropolitics, necrocapitalism and necroeconomics. If the local spaces and people are subjected to Euro-American penetration, seemingly local

subjectivities can productively be explained in terms of such subjection to the distant, invisible, spooky and transnational forces. Empire has always used human and nonhuman proxies and extensions to fight for its interests. Historically, empire has used horses as well as Africans to fight imperial wars, including colonial wars and so-called World Wars I & II which were in fact Euro-American wars. Similarly, in a context where neoempire is increasingly deploying nonhuman agents in wars across the world, there is the Eurocentric popularisation of discourses about the agency/action and autonomy of nonhumans. Thus, we are witnessing the deployment of human proxies; robotic agents including robotic soldiers, drones, nanobots, chemical and biological weapons/agents and zombies (Wilcox 2017; Wilson *et al.* 2016; Spencer 2003; Erler 2011; Lavazza 2015; Knickerbocker 2015) that operate as proxies on behalf of their masters or principals. Although some scholars conceive them as mere agents or actors, we argue here that it is more appropriate to address them as proxies that are deployed and used on behalf of the global criminocracy that is ever keen to execute global necropolitics, necroeconomics and necrocapitalism while conveniently hiding behind the agency and actions of their human and nonhuman proxies. In this regard, even the earth, climate, weather, land, mountains, rivers, animals and so on are being conveniently depicted as animate and capable of playing autonomous politics, which is, as explained below, described by some as cosmopolitics. We argue that in a context where neoempire is keen to destabilise, disrupt and efface African human sovereignty, it is now seeking to bring in nonhuman entities to play its proxy politics. Because their much desired New World Order with a One World Euro-American Government can only be established on the ashes of African states sovereignty (Mathew 2008; Carroll 2016; Davies 1984), neoempire can only use human and nonhuman forces to infuse anarchy, chaos, destabilisation and effacement of the African states. In other words, because of the numerical inferiority of those that seek to establish the New World Order, the One World Government (Nhemachena & Warikandwa 2017) cannot be established on the basis of global elections but rather on the ashes of African states that will increasingly be subjected to chaos, anarchy and order in chaos. The point is that the envisaged cosmopolitics is not only a form of necropolitics but it is a politics of chaos and anarchy wherein humans and nonhumans will be deployed to “revolt” and efface African states and usher in a One World Government. Thus, while indigenous knowledge systems are employed to popularise and legitimise the idea of animism wherein mountains, land, trees, animals, minerals and so on are considered to be actors and to have agency, we argue that these popularisations of the political agency or action of nonhumans need to be understood in relation to the neoimperial connections of things in the internet of things, smart city landscapes, and suffusing of nonhuman entities with

artificial intelligence. If revolutions by human subjects have been frightening in the past, the envisaged postmodern, “posthuman”, “postanthropocentric” and “cosmocentric” revolutions are set to be apocalyptic for Africans and their nation states that will be cleared for the emergent One World Government run by a few humans using some humans and nonhumans as their proxies.

The upshot of the foregoing is that conceptualisations of democracy will change from “humanistic” democracy in the future so that it will become “postanthropocentric”, “posthumanistic”, “cosmocentric”, “ecocentric”, “earthcentric” and “transhumanistic” (Nhemachena, Warikandwa & Amoo 2018; de la Cadena 2010; Latour 2004). It will be a kind of democracy in which nonhuman entities including those that are infused with artificial intelligence will be deemed to constitute citizens together with humans. This kind of democracy will be a shift from the current electoral democracy that cannot be used to establish the projected One World Government: the global elites are outnumbered by the dispossessed and exploited citizens of the world so they will not be inclined to change the world on the basis of global elections or referenda but by fiat or enrolling, mobilising and employing humans and nonhuman proxies. The point here is that if Africans and other people in the Global South are affected by what happens in the broader world that is governed and ruled by Euro-America, then why is it that they are not availed with global referenda or elections? Why are elections and referenda confined to nation states yet the Euro-American world also profoundly affects citizens in African nation states? The issue here is that Euro-America is so afraid of global elections and referenda that while their decisions, policies and actions affect the entire world, they would not want to be similarly subjected to elections and referenda by the whole world. The question being raised here is why Euro-American policies, actions and decisions affect Africans who have not voted for the Euro-Americans in the first place?

Signposting the New World (dis)Order: Democracy, Decolonisation and Mugabephobia

Because they envisage a One World Government in a context where they are afraid of global referenda and elections, the route for the global elite is to use as many human and nonhuman proxies as possible in global politics. The idea is to popularise and promote symmetry between nonhumans and some human beings, to collapse the distinctions, binaries, dualisms or dichotomies between nonhumans and some humans so that it becomes possible to speak in terms of the participation or political agency/actions of humans and nonhumans in global politics. Considering nonhumans as political actors or agents helps to counterbalance the numbers of dispossessed and exploited

people in the world such that the global elite will not have to worry about their numerical minority position in the One World Government. Thus, just as empire infused its human proxies with its ideologies, neoempire is busy infusing software into nonhuman proxies, agents/actors so that they play politics according to the desired neoimperial scripts. Contemporary celebrations of agency/action of nonhumans speak to the projections of the new politics and democracy that will be more attuned to the project of the dictatorial One World Government. Actions/agency should not be celebrated without serious attention being paid also to the scripts that constitute the foundations of the agency/actions. The problem is that just as in the current versions of democracy and politics, African agency is celebrated but very little is said about the source of the neoimperial scripts for the agency/action in the democracy and politics – Africans are misled to believe that the democracy, human rights, rule of law and politics are coming from their own scripts. It is not only the agency/performativity/action that is important – the script is often more important than the action or agency. Instead of simply acting out often hidden scripts, Africans should be asking questions including whose script it is that they are required to act and why? Neoempire does not tolerate African political script-writing, it only celebrates African agency/action on the basis of the neoimperial scripts – the question here would be why this is so? Since the colonial era, Africans have acted out/performed imperial scripts/templates about civilisation, modernisation, development, economic growth, progress, human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance. So, why must they continue to be deemed mere actors, performers or agents who act out other people's scripts but cannot write their own scripts suitable to them and their contexts? Instead of celebrating theories on agency, action, performativity or vitalism, we need to theorise script writing in Africa because scripts come before action, agency, vitalism and performativity.

The idea behind the One World Government is less about establishing unity and peace than it is about cannibalising the heritages of the dispossessed, robbed and exploited peoples whose territories and nations are sadly considered open commons for global plunder. In other words, the One World Government is about sustaining or even increasing the momentum of plunder, looting, dispossession and robbery. In this vein, the assumption that underlies the One World Government is that the world is open to plunder, looting and robbery. Destroying not only African states but also African marriages, families, cultures, religions and economies constitutes efforts to open up Africa for savage global penetration and plunder. Eurocentric democracy has never been about ethics, morals, philanthropy or humanism – it has always been, *a fortiori*, about opening up spaces for the plunder of resources belonging to different indigenous peoples in the world. Democracy has always been about following the scripts imperially

generated by and in the interest of transnational corporations that want to plunder resources in the world that is increasingly privatised in the interest of the few global elites who own and control the transnational corporations. So far, there has not been any global democratisation of drafting the scripts for democracy – Africans have only been required to act out the scripts. In this sense, African heritages are increasingly being described as “world heritages”; even the heads and skulls of precolonial African leaders have been shipped to Europe and put in museums where only the Euro-American “public” has access to view them. Just as the current version of democracy is not about African humanism and ethics, the oncoming postanthropocentric, posthumanist, transhumanist and cosmopolitical democracy will be devoid of humanist ethics, morals, laws and etiquette– it will neither be premised on African scripts nor Afrocentric human rights. Current appearances of “humanitarianism and “philanthropy” are serving as baits to pull the entire world including the dispossessed, robbed and exploited towards the idea of One World Government. But within such a government, posthumanist, postanthropocentric and cosmocentric democracy would be violent particularly in so far as they assume that African human beings are not human enough to draft scripts for their own democracy. Deemed to be indistinct from animals and other nonhumans, Africans will not be treated with human rights ‘anymore’ but they will simply be expected to act out or perform scripts from the One World Government that will increasingly disrespect African national jurisdictions, territoriality and leadership.

Eurocentric democracy has always been criminocratic and criminogenic, and this is why there is no cessation of transnational plunder, looting, robbery and exploitation by the so-called beacons of democracy in the world. The problem here is that transnational corporations sponsor projects on human rights, democracy, good governance and rule of law yet the same corporations also dispossess, rob, loot, plunder, and exploit indigenous people and their resources. We argue therefore that Robert Mugabe was merely refusing to blindly follow the script of Eurocentric democracy that was designed elsewhere. He was refusing to be a mere political actor but he sought to design an African script of democracy that placed African ownership and control of their resources at the centre. It is because Robert Mugabe sought to draft a script for African democracy that he was depicted by some scholars, thinkers and media as controversial and dictatorial. In this respect, Euro-America and some “civil” society organisations that they fund chose not to see the controversies around homosexuals in Africa – rather, they preferred to see only the alleged controversies around Robert Mugabe. So, Euro-America chose to generate as much Mugabephobia as possible across the world and this they ironically did even as they dissuaded the world from engaging in homophobia. We argue that

Mugabephobia was generated by Euro-America because Mugabe unsettled the colonial/neoimperial property relation in Africa. On the other hand, homosexuals do not unsettle any colonial/imperial property relations and so the world is ironically dissuaded from engaging in homophobia even as it is encouraged to develop Mugabephobia. Depicted in Eurocentric scholarship and media as more controversial than homosexuals and queers, Robert Mugabe was subjected to globalised Mugabephobia, stigmatisation and demonisation, which also unfortunately translated to Afrophobia. Mugabephobia can be interpreted more broadly as phobia for Africans' repossession of their resources. In this sense, it is a restitutionphobia which struck Euro-America. Euro-America expects African presidents to act as safety valves or kinds of African prefects for the security of neoimperial property.

It is not their distaste for human rights abuses that motivated Euro-America to generate Mugabephobia because their own transnational corporations are still engaging in centuries-old abuse of African human rights; it is not because of absence of democracy in Zimbabwe that Euro-America generated so much Mugabephobia because their own transnational corporations and institutions operating in Africa are not democratic; it was not because of the absence of the rule of law that Euro-America generated so much Mugabephobia because Euro-American transnational corporations and institutions are not observing the rule of law on the African continent; it is not concern for good governance that motivated Euro-America because their own neoimperial system cannot underwrite good governance in the world. The point that we are making here is that Mugabe was ironically portrayed by Euro-American media and scholarship as more controversial than the colonialists and their descendants who continue to loot, plunder, dispossess and exploit Africans. Also, some transnational corporations that participated in the enslavement and colonisation of Africans continue to operate and to have power at a global level yet their controversial presence does not attract global attention. Indeed, other transnational corporations, Euro-American states and institutions are currently controversially grabbing African land and rendering African peasants landless (Nhemachena, Warikandwa & Mtapuri 2017). The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organisation are also controversial because they have destabilised African economies through economic structural adjustment programmes - yet controversies around them have not attracted as much condemnation from Euro-American media, thinkers and scholarship. Indeed, even some of the so-called international "civil" society organisations operating in Africa are controversial (Nhemachena & Bankie 2017) yet they focused on discourses about controversies around Mugabe. If Robert Mugabe deserved to be sent packing because he was controversial, we would have expected Euro-American institutions and organisations in Africa to

be also sent packing because they are controversial particularly on a continent that has suffered centuries of imperial dispossession, robbery, dispossession and exploitation by the same. When decolonisation is abnormalised, (re)colonisation becomes normalised.

Because the world is currently ruled by those who have long histories of robbing, dispossessing and exploiting Africans, we argue here that the world is ruled by a criminocracy, which is in fact worse than simple dictatorships. Criminalocene begins with the era of enslavement, and it runs through the colonial and neocolonial eras. It is an era marked by massive criminality at a planetary level. Africans continue to be dispossessed and exploited; transnational corporations continue to rob Africans of their land and other resources, Africans are exploited by transnational corporations that also evade paying taxes to African governments (Nhemachena & Dhakwa 2017). Disguised as “land deals” the incidences of robbing Africans of their land are a replication of the colonial era phony “friendship deals/treaties” that were meant to provide veneers of legitimacy to the robbery and theft. The criminocratic and criminogenic globalisation pretends to be humanitarian to the victims of dispossession, robbery and exploitation. It is a figure of a Janus-faced criminal who on the one hand commits crimes and on the other hand pretends to be humanitarian and philanthropic to the victims. Put in other words, we are living in an age not only of Anthropocene or Capitalocene (Moore 2016; Davies 2016; Lynch *et al.* 2018) but also we are living in an age of Criminalocene. In such an era, the victims of transnational dispossession, robbery and exploitation are not only oppressed but they are also ironically deemed to be indebted to those that have robbed and exploited them. Thus, the African victims of dispossession, robbery and exploitation are wrongly described as “highly/heavily indebted poor countries”, “third world countries”, “underdeveloped” countries and “developing” countries. Instead of referring to them as robbed and exploited countries/peoples, Euro-America uses terms which hide the neoimperial criminality that is going on in the world. Conversely, the states that rob and exploit others are wrongly referred to as “rich” nations, “developed” nations, “industrialised” nations, “first” world countries and so on (Nhemachena, Warikandwa & Amoo 2018).

The point in the foregoing is that in a criminocratic global (dis)order, even “democracy” becomes criminocratic if it is, as is the case, founded on proceeds from enslavement and neocolonial criminocracy. Unfortunately, the sources of the funds for “democracy” and “human rights” projects are hardly critically questioned. Arguably, some of the funds for projects on “good governance”, “modernisation”, “development” and “humanitarianism” emanate from transnational corporations and foundations that benefit from the dispossession, robbery, plunder and exploitation of Africans and other neocolonised peoples

(Beder 2010; Busse 2004). The upshot of the foregoing is that all these projects, though presented as progressive, are actually founded on global criminality. The point is that the Euro-American projects in Africa are not necessarily against criminality including theft, robbery, corruption and violence but they are themselves *ipso facto* premised on global criminality including dispossession and exploitation of neocolonised peoples. Similarly, some “civil” society organisations and Nongovernmental Organisations (NGOs) operating in Africa are not necessarily against global criminality including corruption, violence, robbery and theft but they are themselves funded from proceeds of enslaving and neocolonising, including dispossessing and robbing Africans. If the NGOs and “civil” society organisations were against criminality, they would have supported the restitution, to Africans, of resources including minerals and land; they would have vigorously supported the payment of reparations to descendants of enslaved and colonially dispossessed/exploited Africans. If the NGOs and civil society organisations operating in Africa were against global criminality, they would have been fighting or agitating for restitution, restoration and reparations to African victims of enslavement and colonisation. One would expect such NGOs and “civil” society organisations to desist from cosmetic concerns with empty-shell democracy, human rights, humanitarianism, good governance, modernisation, and globalisation. The solution to global criminality is not the extension, to victims, of empty-shell democracy, humanitarianism, human rights, good governance, modernisation, development or enlightenment – rather the solution to enslavement and colonial criminality is restitution and reparations. This is what global civil society organisations and NGOs should be fighting for if they are not themselves embroiled and imbricated in the global criminality and criminocracy.

Although Karofi *et al.* (2006) argue that the criminogenic effects of globalisation arise where people are pressed by impoverishment, marginalisation, political conflicts and socio-cultural change, we argue that the criminogenic effects do not merely arise from impoverishment, political conflicts and socio-cultural change but they arise from the continual dispossession, robbery, looting and plunder of Africans by transnational corporations, international institutions, foreign states and governments. The argument here is that the criminogenic globalisation does not only destabilise African cultures and customs (Findlay 1999); the genesis of the criminality lies in enslavement and colonial dispossession, robbery and exploitation of Africans. It is not merely cyberspace that enables global/transnational criminocracy and criminogenesis (Dolliver *et al.* 2015) - transnational criminals (Passas 1999) have always transcended national borders since the era of enslavement and colonisation. While Crosston (2016) argues that criminocracy actively undermines democracy, we argue that in fact Euro-American liberal democracy

thrives on transnational criminocracy including looting, robbery, plunder, theft and exploitation of other people including Africans. We argue herein that Eurocentric liberal democracy's fascination with spaces and openings, with creating open societies and opening up bodies, cultures, institutions, politics and geographies is reminiscent of the colonialists' fascination with opening up spaces for plunder, robbery, burglary and looting.

Resonating with John Locke's spurious assertions that Africa and the rest of the colonised territories were open (Nhemachena, Warikandwa & Mtapuri 2017), contemporary "civil" society organisations such as the Open Society Foundation promote the creation of open societies in Africa and the global south (Porter 2015). Consistent with John Locke's claims that precolonial societies were open, there are contemporary claims that Africa is open for business "investors" some of whom in fact loot Africans' resources (see Bond 2006). Thus, in the same way the continent was deemed to be open for colonial chartered companies, contemporary ideologies on openness of Africa to business "investors" underscore the logics of John Locke on the openness of colonised territories. So, Africa is deemed, in Eurocentric scholarship, to be so possessed of orifices that it supposedly constitutes the global commons open to wanton penetration, dispossession and exploitation. Similarly, discourses about homosexuality and ecosexuality presuppose repleteness with multiple orifices for penetration by the adventurous explorers/corporations. We argue that empire is not about penetration of the colonised through singular orifices, rather imperialism is about penetrating the colonised including via forbidden orifices. Thus, sexualised by European thinkers (Conrad 1990; Hallett 1965), Africa is regarded by Eurocentric scholars and thinkers to be open and lying flat and ready for penetration, through manifold orifices, at the instance of the imperialists.

From a Eurocentric perspective, Africa is not supposed to possess sovereignty and autonomy for otherwise it would refuse to lie flat and ready for neoimperial penetration. So, in Eurocentric scholarship, the continent is animistically portrayed as a Mother, as Gaia, as open, as without boundaries, as open and without morals, ethics, laws, states, and governments (Nhemachena, Warikandwa & Amoo 2018; Lovelock 1998). Much as African people have been historically portrayed as naked (Olson 2017), open, ever-ready for sex, empty, officialistic, as common terrain, contemporary Eurocentric scholarship portrays Africans as sexualistic, open, possessing liberal sexualities including homosexuality, prostitution, and bestiality and so on. Thus, deemed to be queers or monsters, Africans are deprived of their *boni mores*; they are deemed to be the embodiment of broken boundaries, confusion and chaos (Estok 2012) in many realms including the sexual one. Robert Mugabe's opposition to the liberalisation of orifices, including queer ones, has to be understood in terms of

his war against colonial and imperial penetration. He refused to lie flat for the penetration but neoempire had the cudgel of sanctions with which to beat him into admission. The point here is that neoempire would want African men and women to be equally orificial and penetrable whether via homosexual or heterosexual practices but Robert Mugabe refused to lie down for homosexual penetration. He refused to liberalise his anus for penetration by the neoimperial phallus.

Underscoring the logics of neoimperial penetration, Tampio (2005) observes that empire is the new sovereign power that governs the world – and empire consists of concrete institutions, that regulate global polity, like the United Nations, the U.S. military, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation, the International Monetary Fund etc. Because the claim to permanent sovereignty over natural resources was sadly transformed into the protection of foreign “investors” and the promotion of international law (Pahuja 2011), the African nation states have been put under siege. For this reason, the formulation of policies has shifted from the national context to an environment which embraces the regional and international dimensions, giving rise to what is called shared sovereignty (Capogrosso 2009; Krasner 2004). In the context where national policy making is increasingly being usurped by the transnational institutions, there is also increasing antipathy to the population of the colonised nations which is deemed to constitute surplus people in the world. Instead of conceiving African problems in terms of the problematics of enslavement and colonisation, neoempire would rather call for drastic reductions of the African population that is conveniently blamed for resource depletion, pollution, food and energy shortages, deforestation, global warming and so on. Similarly, instead of seeing the problems afflicting Africans as emanating from enslavement and the robbery, plunder, looting and theft during the colonial eras, Eurocentric scholarship is framing global problems as emanating from anthropocentrism, androcentrism, heteropatriarchy and capitalism (Helland *et al.* 2016). The point here is that in a world where Euro-America would want to justify the robbery and exploitation that began with the enslavement of Africans, it would naturally not want to be seen as criminal but as a retainer of life. As de Beauvoir (1975: 95-6) observes:

...the oppressor does not merely try to justify himself as a conserver. Often he tries to invoke future realizations; he speaks in the name of the future. Capitalism sets itself up as the regime which is most favourable to production; the colonialist is the only one capable of exploiting the wealth which the native would leave fallow. Oppression tries to defend itself by its utility...as long as the reign of the oppressor is a real benefit.

Thus, while Eurocentric media, scholars and thinkers have vehemently opposed Robert Gabriel Mugabe's land redistribution/restoration/restitution on the basis that it was causing unemployment or loss of jobs in Zimbabwe, the Eurocentric institutions and academies are ironically busy producing humanoid robots that would similarly take away jobs from [African] human beings – also causing widespread global unemployment (Harari 2018; Nhemachena *et al.* 2019; Nhemachena 2016). Harari (2018: 19 -33) notes that:

We have no idea what the job market will look like in 2050. It is generally agreed that machine learning and robotics will change almost every line of work...Some believe that within a mere decade or two, billions of people will become economically redundant. Others maintain that even in the long run automation will keep generating new jobs and greater prosperity for all...By 2050 a useless class might emerge...It is dangerous just to assume that enough new jobs will appear to compensate for any losses. The fact that this has happened during previous waves of automation is absolutely no guarantee that it will happen again under the very different conditions of the twenty-first century. The potential social and political disruptions are so alarming that even if the probability of systemic mass unemployment is low, we should take it very seriously

Salient in the foregoing is the hypocrisy in Eurocentric criticisms of Robert Mugabe's efforts towards land restitution and restoration to Black Zimbabweans. While Mugabe was criticised and demonised for allegedly causing high unemployment levels in Zimbabwe, the contemporary robotic industries and digitisation of labour are producing massive unemployment at a global level. Although discourses on decolonisation are increasingly popular even in the Global North, some Eurocentric scholars did not hesitate to demonise Robert Mugabe for decolonising land and other resources in Zimbabwe. One would have expected decolonial scholars from around the world to support the cause of the Zimbabweans, including Mugabe, in the restitution and restoration of land and other resources to Black Zimbabweans who are the original owners. Of course some thinkers and scholars may want to proffer versions of decolonisation and decoloniality that do not include restitution, restoration and reparations to Africans who were enslaved and colonised – dispossessed, robbed and exploited by colonialists. Instead of witnessing versions of decolonisation and decoloniality that aspire for restitution and restoration of resources to Africans, we see versions that seek to sidestep the imperatives of returning what was stolen back to the original African owners. Thus, we witness versions of decoloniality and decolonisation that speak to trivial issues such as participatory and electoral democracy rather than to the substantive democratisation of ownership and control of resources,

including via restitution and reparations. While there are promising discourses about equality, human rights, right to life, freedom of movement, freedom of conscience and right to dignity, the problem is that these discourses are taking place on a continent where indigenous people were/are dispossessed, robbed and exploited without remedy. In such a context, Africans can only be equal in their poverty and want; there is nothing substantive for them to own, control and share on their continent because the resources have been stolen and are being stolen. Equality, freedom of movement, freedom of conscience, right to life, human rights, right to dignity and so on cannot be achieved and sustained without imperatives of restitution, restoration and reparations. Without these imperatives, Africans will be perpetually on Euro-American life-support systems (otherwise called humanitarian aid). The problem with banking on such life-support systems is that it leaves room for Euro-America to simply withdraw support and “let Africans die” at some point.

The problem with some discourses on decolonisation/decoloniality is that they have tended to merely focus on critiquing and deconstructing “Euro-modernity”, “racialised” discourses, “racial” identity, “supremacy of Whites”, “White privileges”, and propose non-European ways of knowing, being and thinking (Asher 2013; Synman 2015). Decolonisation/decoloniality should be principally about restitution, restoration and reparations for enslavement and colonial crimes. Colonisation was essentially about dispossessing, robbing and exploiting Africans and so without remedies to these aspects, there will not be any meaningful decolonisation/decoloniality. We hold that colonisation was not narrowly about impositions of power, hierarchies, order, structures, domination, privilege, exclusions, dislocations and so on. In other words, colonisation was and is less about imposing structures, hierarchies and power than it is about the criminality of robbery, dispossession, theft and looting Africans’ resources. To be colonised is not necessarily to be subjected to order or structure as is presumed in some Eurocentric versions of decolonisation/decoloniality: rather to be colonised is to be subjected to the criminality of robbery, dispossession, looting, plunder and exploitation. Africans had their own forms of order and structures in the precolonial era so what characterised and marked colonisation was robbery, theft, looting and plunder. In fact colonialists destroyed order and structures in precolonial Africa, they introduced disorderly and amorphous frontiers because disorder was essential to moments of colonial robbery, looting, plunder and theft. Looting, theft and robbery become easier when the perpetrator first creates chaos, disorder and confusion among the victims – this is what colonialists did and this is what discourses on queerness, monstrosity, ambiguity, animism, ecocriticism, ecosophy, indiscernibility, indistinction and hybridity do. Colonialists brought disorder rather than order to Africa, they destroyed African structures. To argue that colonisation was about order,

hierarchy and structure is to repeat the wrong assumption that colonialists brought civilisation to Africans: what they brought was criminality and not order – criminality thrives in disorder and not in order and structure.

Instead of privileging forms of decoloniality/decolonisation that focus on deconstructing identity, emphasising openness, politics of allyship, politics of relationality, animism, action, agency, performativity, vitalism, inclusivity and so on (Almeida *et al.* 2018; Young *et al.* 2005; Mngxitama 2013), we support Tuck *et al.*'s (2012) argument to the effect that decolonisation should be about returning what was stolen. Decolonisation is not essentially about granting nativism to settler colonialists; it is not about becoming queer; it is not about nonnormativity; it is not about deconstructing binary systems and it's not about homosexuality. Decolonisation should not be about absolving neocolonialists from restitution, restoration and reparations; decolonisation should not be about granting colonialists the opportunities to hide behind environmentalism, sentimentalism or nostalgia for supposedly vanishing native ways; decolonisation is not essentially about multiculturalism. Decolonisation is about restitution, restoration and reparations for colonial crimes (Tuck *et al.* 2012; Hunt *et al.* 2015).

Decoloniality has been described in terms of antisystemic politics “beyond identity politics”, “antifoundationalism” and “antiessentialism”; it has been described in terms of “critical cosmopolitanism”, “beyond nationalism”, “subalternism” and it has been described in terms of “alternative political economy perspective” (Grosfoguel 2011). However, we argue that decoloniality has to focus on addressing enslavement and colonial robberies, theft, dispossession and exploitation. Some scholars have defined colonialism in terms of “humanism”, “conquest”, “individualism”, “White supremacy”, “hierarchical order” and “international division of labour” (Grosfoguel 2011). However, we contend that colonisation did not humanise Africans, it did not conquer but it robbed Africans; colonisation was not about individualism but it was about theft and looting sometimes in bands of colonialists such as the Pioneer Column in Zimbabwe. Although some scholars argue that it is the idea of “racial hierarchy” that organises the world (Grosfoguel 2011), we argue that it is the criminality of the enslavement and neocolonial eras that (dis)organise the world's population. What some scholars address as subaltern, underprivileged, marginalised, oppressed, dominated, underdeveloped and poor people are essentially the victims of enslavement and neocolonial crimes. While other scholars argue against essentialism and against nationalism (Grosfoguel 2011), we argue that the possession of essential identities, including national and pan African identities, is crucial for reclaiming reparations, restitution and restoration of what was stolen during the enslavement and neocolonial eras. So, while other scholars foreground “systematic racism” (Gordon 2017), we contend that the

core issues are restitution, restoration and reparations for enslavement and colonisation. We contend that those that seek restitution, restoration and reparations are not necessarily fundamentalistic – in any case fundamentalists are those that refuse to restore and make good their wrongs. Fundamentalists are defined here in terms of those that perpetrate necroeconomics and necrocapitalism on victims of enslavement and neocolonial dispossession. In this sense, the most dangerous and fundamentalistic religion in the world is ingrained in the belief that one has legal ownership over stolen resources and property. This is the religion that buttresses global criminocracy including global necropolitics and necroeconomics.

Because criminocracy benefits from ensuring that victims maintain openness rather than closure and exclusion, African states are forced to be open and to be as inclusive as to embrace those that have robbed and exploited Africans in the past. The religion of global criminocracy is so fundamentalistic that those African states that refuse to open up are subjected to sanctions, and the leaders are subjected to assassinations and coups (Nhemachena this volume). Thus, instead of condemning imperialists for neocolonising Africans, some Eurocentric scholars postulate theories about what they call internal colonisation or internal colonialism. Via the postulations about internal colonisation, they proceed to singularly demonise African states and leaders for alleged inability to deliver essential services to citizens, for inequalities on the continent, for domination, dictatorship, hierarchies, oppression, for absence of democracy, for alleged human rights abuses, for lack of innovation, for poverty and for lack of political will (Calvert 2001; Stone 2010; Turner 2017; Johnson 2015; Khumalo 2013). We argue that postulations about internal colonisation or internal colonialism are efforts by Eurocentric scholars and thinkers to pass on liability to African states and leaders who are already struggling to manage and govern citizens suffering the effects of enslavement and neocolonial dispossession, robbery and exploitation. As underlined above, colonisation is essentially about dispossession, robbery, theft, looting, plunder and exploitation of Africans by imperialists. Decolonisation is about restitution, restoration and reparations. The problem is that, in an effort to evade accountability for enslaving and colonising Africans, some Eurocentric scholars and thinkers define colonisation in different ways that conveniently allow them to transfer the responsibility to make good the colonial crimes. Other Eurocentric scholars even define colonisation simply as cultivation/farming such that a colony would refer simply to settled land and colonialists refer simply to farmers who settle on a piece of land in order to bring it into a state of cultivation (Van de Grift n.d.). In these definitions, the colonial crimes of robbery, theft, looting and plunder are absent yet it is common cause that colonialists perpetrated crimes on colonised Africans for centuries.

Discourses about internal colonisation or internal colonialism are counterproductive to Africans because they are meant to generate self-destructive tendencies. Suffused with ideologies about internal colonisation, Africans are destroying their own cultures, societies, politics, norms, values, morals, marriages and families on the presupposition that they are colonised by these internal institutions rather than by neoimperialism that is still busy dispossessing and exploiting Africans. Discourses and ideologies about internal colonialism wrongly presuppose that Africans are suffering self-colonisation for which they would need to decolonise the African self by deconstructing, decentring and destroying it. In other words, ideologies about self-colonisation are meant to generate self-pity, Afropessimism, self-blame, self-destruction and autophagy or cannibalisation of the African self. Seeking to deflect its culpability for colonisation, neoempire sponsors discourses and ideologies about internal colonisation and self-colonisation so that Africans suffer internal strife and crumble from within and stop demanding restitution and reparations from the imperial states and transnational corporations. Directing blows at one another in their marriages, families, communities and states where internal colonialism supposedly resides, Africans will destroy one another, destroy their own institutions and destroy their selves under the false impression that they are decolonising. As underscored above, colonialism was about dispossession, robbery, theft, looting, plunder and exploitation of Africans for which restitution, restoration and reparations are the outstanding remedies. Destroying African selves, destroying essential African identities, nation states, nationalism, communities, families and marriages is not a remedy for colonisation. In fact destroying Africans and their institutions was a key feature of colonialism and so Africans must not be used in the 21st century to destroy themselves under the impression that they are “decolonising themselves” or fighting “internal colonisation”. Destroying own institutions, destroying the African self and fighting one’s kith and kin after being colonially robbed, dispossessed and exploited conjures up the image of a family that destroys one another for having been victims of crime. Instead of demanding restitution, restoration and reparation from the criminals that have robbed, dispossessed and exploited them, the family becomes self-destructive as a result of the internal colonisation ideologies that work in the logic of sorcery or voodoo from the perpetrators. In other words, the African victims let the robber and exploiter escape while they are fighting one another over more trivial issues or nonissues even. This is what is happening in Africa and this is what neoempire is fomenting on the continent. The neoimperial motto that we see as underlying neocolonialism is “Make African men and women fight and destroy one another while we loot their resources. Employ discourses on internal colonisation/colonialism to make

Africans believe that they are colonised by their own institutions and leaders rather than by neoempire”.

We argue that colonialists were not merely settlers for they did not only settle on African land but they stole the land, livestock and minerals. We argue that colonialists were not merely farmers on African land. They were not merely cultivators but they dispossessed Africans of their land, livestock and minerals. Colonisation was not simplistically about racism but it was principally about the criminality of robbing Africans, and other people in the Global South, of their resources. In this regard, we hold that the invisible global imperial designs and colonial matrices of power that have been in place for centuries (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013) are in fact global imperial designs and colonial matrices of power to commit planetary criminal acts including robbery, theft, plunder, looting, dispossession and exploitation of Africans. It is not simply power to dominate, to oppress or enforce imperial order that colonialists exercised: it was power to commit crimes, including robbery, looting and theft around the world. Thus, a focus on defining colonisation and coloniality in terms of domination, hierarchical order, alienation and oppression would foreshadow the criminality of global imperial designs and coloniality of power – we hold that it is the criminality of colonialists and neoempire that should be foregrounded.

Wrongly defining colonisation in terms of the establishment of order and structure in Africa, Eurocentric scholars and thinkers wrongly define decoloniality and decolonisation in terms of deconstructing order and structure on the continent of Africa. For the vast majority of colonised Africans who [after having suffered colonial dispossession, robbery, theft, looting and plunder] are now living disorderly lives that are often defined simplistically as poverty, it would be spiteful to tell them that colonialism brought order, hierarchy and structure to Africa. As hinted above, colonialists did not bring structure and order to Africa but they brought disorder, chaos and anarchy – they destroyed precolonial African order and structures. In this sense, we argue that disorder, chaos and anarchy are in fact colonial in origin. The Hobbesian postulations about the state of nature with chaos, anarchy and disorder did not obtain in precolonial Africa where there were orderly and structured kingdoms and chiefdoms (Nhemachena 2017). In this regard, decolonisation and decoloniality need not be conceived essentially in terms of decentralisation, deterritorialisation, distributed governance, diffuseness, relations, networks, connections (Marshall 2006). We argue that decolonisation should be about setting up and fortressing African forms of order, structure and hierarchies that do not yield to neoimperial depredations – structures provide fortressing and so Africans need resilient structures to protect themselves from neoimperial plunder, looting and robbery.

Emphasising flatness, structurelessness, relationality or relational selves rather than autonomy, structure, order and sovereignty (Andersen *et al.* 2005; Chen *et al.* 2013; Kagitcibasi 2006; Steiner *et al.* 2009; Va'ai *et al.* 2017; Grieves 2008), would defeat the imperatives of restitution, restoration and reparations. Emphasising relationality or relational personhood/selfhood, heteronomy, shared sovereignty and shared authority (Steiner *et al.* 2009; Wijnants 2016; Campbell *et al.* 2010; Krasner 2004; 2005) takes away the autonomy and sovereignty that are crucial for the self-assertiveness in seeking restitution and reparations. Presumed to be in need of liberation from their own states, Africans are provided with technologies to challenge and deconstruct their own autonomy and state sovereignties even as the technologies are ironically embedding the [Africans] into ever expanding modes of global surveillance (Waterworth *et al.* 2013; Monahan 2008; Rogers *et al.* 2005; Adalgeirsson *et al.* 2010; Harari 2018). The point here is that neoempire wrongly assumes that Africans need freedoms and liberties from their own nation states more than they need them from neoimperialism. We argue that Africans are not necessarily merely oppressed and dominated by their own states but they are *a fortiori* suffering neoimperial dispossession, theft, robbery, plunder, looting and exploitation from neoimperial forces. Africans need their nation states to protect them from ravages of resilient neoimperial forces.

In a world that is keen to ensure that victims of enslavement and colonisation forget about the historical crimes, we witness the development of imperial technologies to edit, delete and manipulate [African] human memories. Simply presented as “enhancements” (Erler 2011; Lavazza 2015; Harari 2018), the technologies will enhance global surveillance of the surplus population. World “peace” is set to be achieved by editing or deleting African memories of enslavement and neocolonisation – that is, the “peace” will be premised on the deletion or editing of the memories of the wronged, the dispossessed and exploited. With the deletion or editing of African memories, we would witness the emergence of a post-truth world marked by inauthenticity, challenges of representation and shifts away from correspondence theories of truth. We argue that these developments are intended to conceal the criminality of the enslavement and neo-colonial eras – the concealments are achieved by editing and deleting the memories of the victims of plunder, robbery, looting, dispossession and exploitation. The problem here is that those that perpetrated enslavement and colonial era crimes are technologically enabled to manipulate the minds and brains of their victims, to edit and delete memories about the crimes such that a post-truth world is born and celebrated by the perpetrators.

A post-truth age with post-truth politics is already being celebrated (Carlson 2018; Waisbord 2018; Suiter 2016; Obscura 21 December 2016; Keyes 2004; Modreanu 2017; Stein 15 March 2017). Such a post-truth age will also be

characterised by fake news, contested positions of news, communicative chaos, misinformation, proliferation of false information and there will be erosion of distinctions between truth and falsehoods, scientific and unscientific knowledge, fact and fiction (Waisbord 2018). The post-truth age will rely on the digital revolution to disseminate sophisticated forms of falsehoods and disinformation; the age will also be marked by appeals to emotions and not facts, there will be more reliance on ambiguity and deceit (Waisbord 2018; Suiter 2016; Obscura 21 December 2016; Modreanu 2017). The constitution of post-truth societies will assist colonialists to evade the shame of being confronted to return stolen resources and properties. A post-truth society will erode the distinctions between stolen property/resources and legally acquired resources; it will erode the distinctions between the innocent and the culpable; the victims and the perpetrators, the past and the present, the indigenous and exogenous; insider and outsider. In other words, a post-truth world will be the open world that is desired by the global criminocracy – it is already being crystallised in the academies through the deconstructions of Cartesian binaries, dualisms and dichotomies. We argue that the problem for Africans is not necessarily about Cartesian dualisms, dichotomies and binaries, rather the problems for Africans lie in the enslavement and neocolonial dispossession, theft, robbery, looting, plunder and exploitation. In this regard, discourses about the need to erode binaries, dichotomies and dualisms do not help Africans if there is no restitution, restoration and reparations for enslavement and neocolonial era robbery, theft, looting and exploitation. Because resolving binaries and dualisms between stolen property and legally acquired property, between criminal and victim, between indigenous people and exogenous people will help neoempire evade the imperatives of restitution, restoration and reparations, there is already a proliferation of Eurocentric discourses about resolving the binaries. It is not surprising therefore that a lot of Eurocentric scholarly attention is presently directed towards “resolving” binaries/dichotomies/Manichean dualisms – this helps neoempire evade the challenges of having to return stolen property/resources and having to pay reparations for enslaving and exploiting other people in the world..

So, while some scholars have argued that notions of shame and honour are old fashioned and inapplicable to western societies (Moxnes n.d.; Mbuvi 2010), we argue that honour and shame apply even to contemporary Euro-American societies that are keen to present their ancestors as honourable notwithstanding the history of enslaving and colonising other people around the world. Neoimperial efforts to evade shame have also been made by engaging in humanitarianism, exporting “democracy”, “human rights”, “development”, “modernisation”, “rule of law” and “good governance” to the victims of enslavement and colonisation.

Building on anthropological studies that show that rituals, including rituals of rebellion, play central roles in renewals of political power and in defusing tensions (Gluckman 1954; Muir 1997; Orr 2014; Nicholson 2017; Keisalo 2016; Williams 2000), we hold that similar rituals of renewal are being performed at the neoimperial level, designed to renew and retool the empire. Eurocentric democracy has become a ritual, in Africa, that is periodically performed even when it does not lead to improvements in the lives of the subjects – it is a ritual primarily and latently designed to defuse tensions that would otherwise build up against neoempire that dispossessed, robbed and exploited Africans. With the periodic ritualised performance of “democratic” elections, there arise erroneous presuppositions that the development of Africa is a matter of who they vote for rather than a matter of reparations, restitution and restoration for enslavement and colonisation. In other words, ritualised electoral democracy serves – as a ritual of rebellion – to defuse tensions against empire; they serve to divert attention from neoimperial crimes that are hampering African development. They serve to wrongly and singularly focus attention on the failures of the African states and elected leaders. In this regard, scholars like Gluckman (1954) note that in some anthropological societies, people were allowed to periodically sing songs in hate and rejection of the King; princes were allowed to periodically behave to the King as if they coveted the throne; women were allowed to periodically dress as men, do men’s work and behave with lewdness – yet all these rituals were intended to produce cathartic effects of instituted protests that would bring about the renewal of the political system. In the contemporary world, it is Europe that has Kings and Queens who rule the world under the veil of democracy, rule of law, good governance and human rights. We argue herein that discourses and practices about Eurocentric human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance are part of the contemporary rituals of rebellion and renewal in so far as they allow the neoimperial system to retool, reposition and avoid restitution, reparations and restorations for enslavement and colonial wrongs. Rituals of rebellion generate catharsis in a world ruled by European monarchies and in a world run by transnational corporations at the helm of necrocapitalism and necroeconomies. Rituals of rebellion also create the illusion that the monarchies are merely ceremonial and territorial, and that it is the subjects of the world that have the power. In this regard, many who do not know that the English Queen/monarch heads the Commonwealth would think that the monarchy is merely territorial and limited to Britain’s geographical jurisdiction.

Just like in a carnival, Eurocentric democratic elections act as safety valves for tensions against neoempire. While electoral rituals often produce tensions and violence within the individual African nation states, the latent functions of the rituals of electoral democracy are to insulate empire against claims for

restitution, restoration and reparations. Latently serving to divert attention from neoimperial failure to restitute, restore and pay reparations for crimes of colonisation and enslavement, rituals of electoral democracy also subtly shift the blame to elected African leaders who are then often singularly demonised for failures in Africa. For this reason, electoral democracy says a lot about the need for fairness, accountability and transparency of elections and the elected leaders but it says nothing about the ongoing transnational corporations' looting, plunder, robbery and dispossession on the continent. In this regard, rituals of democratic elections are similar to cyclic carnivals that let out excess steam when pressure builds up in a criminogenic and criminocratic globalisation. We argue that Africans whose resources are being plundered, robbed and stolen by transnational corporations would need to let off the steam in the carnivalesque democratic electoral rituals which also serve to subtly transfer blameworthiness from the transnational robbery and exploitation to the elected African leaders. As Keisalo (2016) observes, rituals of reversal entail switching to the opposite of what constitutes the normal order, yet for comedic figures, such as clowns and tricksters, reversals are part of their semiotic techniques. The point that we make here is that Eurocentric democratic electoral rituals reverse the normal order – instead of transnational corporate criminals becoming the targets of African steam, elections ensure that it is elected African leaders who become the targets of bouts of frustration by victims of transnational corporate robbery on the continent. Thus, Muir (1997: 90 - 98) writes:

...rituals of rebellion. Such rituals allow subjects to express their resentment of authority but do not change anything...The absurdity, paradox, extravagance, and illicit behaviour of rituals of rebellion provide an emotional release...Carnival images of food, defecation, sex, and violence elaborate in a comic way processes associated with the lower body. Even fights, blows, curses, and insults bring the adversary down either literally to the ground or figuratively in public esteem...In fact, the dominant participation of youths in the festivities, the positive emphasis on youthfulness in Carnival images, and the negative depictions of the old and authoritarian in Carnival lampoons conveyed the sense that the work of nature is always in the process of replacing the old with the young...At its simplest it involved the defamation of a couple or individual in public by means of mocking songs and a noise made by beating pots and pans...Usually the jesters formed a procession, sometimes in costume or masks, and subjected their victim to a dunking in water, a humiliating serenade, or a parade backwards on an ass. The mood was usually carnivalesque, full of laughter and rough parody, and it all went according to the typical ritual script...If the ritual took a different turn, it could end in quarrels, fist fights, even murder.

Thus, elections in contemporary Zimbabwe have followed the script of the carnival. Some Zimbabweans have rejected the authority of Robert Gabriel Mugabe but of course rejecting Robert Mugabe does not amount to rejecting the criminogenic and criminocratic world order whose strictures and scripts put African leaders in straitjackets in the first place. To depose Robert Mugabe is not the same as deposing the criminocratic world order – deposing Mugabe is merely a ritual of rebellion that releases the steam arising from pressures in the neoimperial world order. Rituals of rebellion do not change world order but they simply periodically release steam such that soon after the carnival, participants wake up to the same old world order which continues to cannibalise them. Encompassing illicit sex, including rape, prostitution, homosexuality and incest, carnivals, as rituals of rebellion, are intended to release steam for global subjects that then experience sexual catharsis. Because carnivals generate catharsis for world order to continue, it is not surprising that some Euro-American funded NGOs, “civil” society organisations and foundations sponsor the liberalisation of sex and sexuality including homosexuality and queer sex. It is not surprising that Robert Mugabe was lampooned and caricatured in the global media that is owned and controlled by the criminogenic and criminocratic transnational corporations – subjecting Robert Mugabe to globalised mockery, humiliating songs, laughter and noise similar to the beating of pots and pans. Such carnivals are a way to generate catharsis through the imperially-inspired rituals of rebellion. Thus Orr (2014: 116 - 127) notes that:

Ritual concerns the repeated pattern of everyday life, in this case of recurrent electoral activity. Law...plays a role in opening up space for, constraining or guiding that ritual elements...First, the candidates declare or announce themselves, separating or distinguishing themselves and entering a period of ‘masquerades’, which includes the primary season. Then comes a period of social abnormality: the general election campaign inverts the normal order of politics, which is compromise and give – and – take.

While Euro-American democracy is considered to be inclusive and pluralistic, we argue that it is in fact exclusive and parochial in that it forecloses variants of democracy that foreground ownership and control of resources by indigenous people. Also, Euro-American democracy subjects the Global South to sanctions which ironically negate inclusivity and pluralism. Africans like Robert Mugabe are subjected to shaming parties by global media, they are ostracised and stigmatised in ways that negate inclusivity and pluralism in the world. Robert Mugabe was so democratic that he sought to pluralise ownership and control of land and other resources in Zimbabwe – he wanted to be inclusive enough to let indigenous Zimbabweans own and control their

resources. For being so democratic, in an African way, Robert Mugabe was headhunted, in metaphorical and real senses, on spurious allegations of breaching democracy, breaching the rule of law, breaching good governance and so on. Headhunting is not merely part of the traditions of South East Asian rituals of grief and mourning, pivoting on rage and catharsis (George 1995), headhunting African leaders for assassinations and coups is an old mournful imperial strategy adopted each time its interests are threatened with African demands for restitution and reparations. In this regard, we urge African anthropologists not only to study African mourning rituals, death rituals, rage and rituals of grief – it will also be interesting if anthropologists study imperial mourning, death, rage and grieving rituals particularly because empire gets into grief and rage ritual modes each time its interests are threatened by African nationalisation and repossession of resources. And of course empire expects everyone, including its victims, to join during its mourning, death and grieving rituals.

Instead of neoimperialists becoming outcasts in a postcolonial era, neoempire has constructed Africans and their leaders as outcasts, as pariah – Africans and their leaders are sanctioned, ostracised, become scapegoats, stigmatised and headhunted (Hellquist 2018; Zippelius 1986; George 1995; Williams 2000). The point here is that neoimperialists have sought to transfer their guilt and crimes to other beings including Africans who will bear them on their behalf (Williams 2000; Nicholson 2017). The preliminary rituals of castigation, stigmatisation and demonisation of Mugabe, through various media, served, as Nicholson (2017) underscores, to separate him from the Zimbabwean and international community before the sacrifice – separation ensures that the scapegoat or substitution victim has an identity far enough removed to not cause enemies with their death - yet close enough to stand for the community tensions. In this regard, we disagree with Williams' (2000) contention that sacrifice, scapegoating and ostracism have only characterised traditional societies where "savage" minds mistakenly thought guilt could be transferred – like a block of wood or stones – from the backs of westerners to the backs of Africans. However, on another note, Williams (2000: 76-77) rightly proceeds thus:

Sacrificial substitution...its vitality as an institution depends on its ability to conceal the displacement upon which the rite is based. It must never lose sight entirely, however, of the original object, or cease to be aware of the act of transference from that object to the surrogate victim; without that awareness no substitution can take place and the sacrifice loses all its efficacy...the sacrificial process requires a certain degree of misunderstanding. The celebrants do not and must not comprehend the true role of the sacrificial act...The victim...is a substitute for all the members of the community, offered up by the members

themselves. The sacrifice serves to protect the entire community from its own violence...The elements of dissension scattered throughout the community are drawn to the person of the sacrificial victim and eliminated at least temporarily, by its sacrifice.

Thus, all elements of dissension within and beyond Zimbabwe were brought to the person of Robert Mugabe. Problems about the Gukurahundi, which also emanated from the apartheid South African destabilisation of postindependence Zimbabwe, were brought to the person of Mugabe who was singularly blamed for the Gukurahundi in spite of the presence of South African intelligence officers in the matrix of the conflict (Scarnecchia 2006). In spite of the presence of economies of patronage and corruption at the global level, corruption and patronage were brought to the person of Robert Mugabe who was accused of using land and control over Zimbabwean resources to garner support (Alexander *et al.* 2013). In spite of Euro-American “partisan” allocation of financial aid in the world, the problem of partisan allocation was brought to the person of Robert Mugabe; notwithstanding the global challenge of the presence of Euro-American militaries on the African continent, the problem of the presence of the military on the African (Zimbabwean) streets was brought to the person of Robert Mugabe (Nhemachena & Mtapuri 2017). In spite of the global challenge of surveillance by intelligence agencies including from Euro-America, the problem of surveillance was brought to the person of Robert Mugabe whose army and central intelligence officials were singularly blamed for surveillance and for thereby limiting human freedoms. In spite of interference by the IMF and World Bank, the problems of the economy in Zimbabwe were singularly brought to the person of Robert Mugabe who was accused of economic mismanagement, of creating uncertainties over land and of aggressive removal of White farmers from agricultural land; he was accused for the outbreak of communicable diseases and the collapse of basic services (Cumming 2011; Fisher 2010; Sachikonye 2007; Pilosof 2008). In a context where countries like Britain have shirked from agreements to fund land redistribution in postindependence Zimbabwe (Gono 2008), Mugabe was singularly blamed allegedly for breaching his earlier pronouncements of reconciliation with Whites (Fisher 2010). In a context where Blacks have been actually doing the farming as farm labourers, Black farmers are ironically portrayed as incapable of farming (Pilosof 2008) without White masters and mistresses. Even as they ironically demonise indigenous farmers as incapable of farming, descendants of colonialists consider themselves to be becoming indigenous, often on the premise that they were born in Africa, have stayed in Africa for a long time and that they have [colonial] genealogies in Africa (Fisher 2010). Ironically this happens even as Eurocentric scholars dismiss African indigeneity, African

genealogies and African longevity. In fact, African genes are set to be technologically edited and deleted (Ogaugwu 2019; Nicholson *et al.* 2016) in ways that negate the long genealogical histories of African citizens – such editing and deletions of genes also serve to erase African claims to their heritages that are based on genealogies. The intention is to ensure that Africans possess short genealogies in their continent – this will make it difficult for Africans to claim primacy of their heritages in the face of ongoing neoimperial dispossession, robbery, looting and plunder.

Thus, while ironically demonising Robert Mugabe for staying and living long, descendants of colonialists justify their own citizenship and belonging on the premise that they have been in African for a long time. Similarly, when Robert Mugabe collapsed (Withnall 5 February 2015; Shearlaw 5 February 2015) due to age and long life, he was mocked by descendants of colonialists that ironically justify their own belonging and citizenship on length of stay in Africa. What also escaped their attention was that as colonialists/descendants, they were also collapsing [with the repossession of land in Zimbabwe] because they had lived long on a continent in which they dispossessed and exploited Africans. The paradox here is that colonialists/descendants mocked Mugabe when he collapsed due to long life and age but they did not realise that they were also collapsing in Zimbabwe because of long life in the midst of citizens whom they dispossessed and exploited for centuries. The point here is that if aging necessitates deposition then colonialism and imperialism, which have been in Africa for centuries, also need to be deposed. Mugabe is obviously much younger than colonialism and imperialism – imperialists and colonialists are often as hypocritical as to prop up, renew and recycle old colonial and imperial figures and ideologies but they are quick to demonise Africans that age and get old or refuse to die.

From the perspective of neoempire, Africans are not supposed to be patriotic to their families, kin groups, communities and nation states – they are supposed to revolt, protest and demonstrate against their own institutions, structures, heroes and forms of order. Neoempire does not only stir postmodern revolutions in Africa, such as in the Arab Spring, but it also demonises African states, heroes and governments that propagate and instil patriotic history among their citizens (Ranger 2004). While neoempire supports the postmodern revolutions, it paradoxically dissuades African youths from celebrating their revolutionary nationalist liberation war heroes. Dissidents against African states and governments are celebrated in Eurocentric media and scholarship, and described as furthering the ends of democracy (Alexander 1998; Kaseke 24 June 2016; Alao 1994). African nation states are not only described as imagined, constructions, illusions and fabrications (Hirschi 2012) but they are also summarily demonised for propagating patriotic history via the

television, print media, textbooks, speeches and eulogies (Ranger 2004). In a critique of patriotism, Hirschi (2012: 51- 61) argues that:

The basic goal of patriotic propaganda is to convince citizens or subjects that there is a bigger family which they belong to and which deserves an even stronger dedication than their own...In ancient Greece and Rome, the principal addressee of patriotic propaganda was the *kyrios* or *pater familias*, the male head of the family who bore the legal responsibility for the wellbeing of his dependants and for the defence of his house and land...Aristotle expected sacrifice, but not selflessness, from a great man. His patriotic act would not go unrewarded; on the contrary, an excellent person 'will both help himself and benefit others by doing fine actions...the keynote of patriotic language was (and is) defence, based on the image of a free man's task to shelter his home and family; the patriot is portrayed as a guardian of women and children, a protector of the poor and weak, a champion of the just cause...prevalent distortion produced by the language of patriotism is the depiction of political power as service and of power holders as servants. To qualify as a patriot, a ruler or officeholder has to present himself as someone who never sought power and influence for his personal advancement, but only for the common good; the execution of his office has to appear as a sacrifice for his people.

Ironically, while African leaders are criticised for instilling nationalism and patriotism, other scholars and thinkers argue that countries like the United States could do with more patriots and fewer nationalists (Cohen 25 March 2018). In fact, Cohen (25 March 2018) argues that:

The United States could do with more patriots and fewer nationalists...Patriotic history does not have to cover the dark pages of American past – the cruelties and suffering of slavery and Jim Crow, the violence and injustice of the Trail of Tears or the massacre at Wounded Knee, the corruption of Tammany Hall, the follies of the Red scares...But patriotic histories have a way of reminding us of what there is to celebrate in the American past...Above all, patriotic history provides us heroes...All of us, but young people especially, need heroes, including the really complicated ones, and particularly these days, when character is in such short supply. Knowledge of what real heroes put up with makes it less likely that one will fall for the kind of nonsense purveyed by a stylish hysteric...To know what heroes look like is also to know what craven or spineless or obsequious or merely unserious persons are.

Although the Zimbabwean government was criticised by some Eurocentric NGOs and “civil” society organisations for passing or enacting the Public Order and Security Act that would prosecute promoters of hostility towards the

President and state; although the government was demonised for enacting the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act that required all media to register with government (Arnold *et al.* 2007), it is hardly noted that even the U.S.A enacted worse laws at about the same time when POSA and AIPPA were enacted. Enacting the U.S.A Patriot Act on 13 November 2001, after the terrorist attack, the U.S.A government empowered the security agencies to wiretap conversations, the Act expanded the government's right to engage in electronic surveillance, monitor private telephone conversations of individuals without demonstrating probable cause, the Act introduced military order in America with states of exception and authorisation of indefinite detention and trial of noncitizens by military commissions to protect the U.S.A from further terrorism (Agamben 2008; The Telegraph 1 June 2015; Turpin *et al.* 2007; Rackow 2002; Sherwood 2018). In fact, the CIA is noted as having spent \$100 billion to hack computers, smartphones, smart TVs and even smart cars to tap data to enable contemporary surveillance capitalism (Helbing 2017).

In the light of the foregoing, we argue that the Eurocentric demonisation of African patriotism is age-old. Loathesome to African heroes, imperialists and colonialists could not even grant hero status to Africans that fought in the World Wars on behalf of European powers (News24 3 December 2018; Mishra 10 November 2017). Mistaking the Zimbabwean celebration of repossession of land with the celebration of mere patriotic history and nationalist historiography, Ranger (2010) argues that the Zimbabwean government and war veterans should relinquish control of the education system which they allegedly used to instil patriotic history.

What is often ignored by Eurocentric scholars on Africa is that all states and governments in the world, including Euro-American ones, propagate and instil patriotism. Thus, retooling itself, Britain's curriculum dedicates plenty of attention to the violence of others including the Nazi Germany and the violence of the American Civil War; the British curriculum does not teach about British violence in Iraq and British colonial violence in Africa; in fact the Oxford Union considered it a good idea to serve a drink called "colonial comeback" during a 2005 debate on colonial legacy and reparations (Izzidien 30 August 2018; Independent 21 January 2016). The brutality of colonialism including massacres of Hindus and Muslims, torture, rape and arson of Kenyans during Mau Mau uprising are not taught in the British curriculum (Independent 21 January 2016). It is therefore noted that:

In 2005 a French law was passed which required teachers to only teach the "positive accounts" of colonialism. Though such law is non-existent in the UK, this echoes the fact that those who were involved in colonialism have not

acknowledged and recognised their own brutal past – even centuries after many of the worst atrocities happened (Independent 21 January 2016).

In the light of the foregoing, it is in bad faith that only African states and governments are demonised for propagating patriotic history. Writing about the social production of general and systemic ignorance or agnotology, some scholars have noted that information is often circulated to mislead because empire depends on the production of ignorance (Legate *et al.* 2015; Sullivan *et al.* 2007). The ignorance that is produced is intended to impact social and individual memory erasing the achievements of people of colour and the atrocities of White people; it is noted that empire thrives by manufacturing ignorance disguised as truth, it survives by manufacturing doubts (Sullivan *et al.* 2007; Stocking *et al.* 2009; Taylor 2007; Applebaum 2013). Apart from disseminating fake news for fake politics in an era of post-factuality (Berling *et al.* 2017; Farkas *et al.* 2017), empire attributes credibility deficits to members of the Black race – and this is part of the neoimperial social production of ignorance.

While African leaders are often demonised as undemocratic for allegedly staying too long in power – Mugabe has been roundly demonised for staying in power for close to 40 years – there is little attention to the fact that Europe itself is full of monarchs that head the states [ceremonially or otherwise] (Independent 1 August 2017; BBC News 27 June 2017; The Guardian 28 June 2016; The New York Times 4 June 2012). Across Europe, there are 14 monarchs such as Alibert – Prince of Thurn and Taxis – a German Prince; There is the Spanish Crown, The Queen of England, Danish Crown, Belgian Crown, Swedish Crown and Norwegian Crown all of which receive generous grants and earnings, including for their servants, “from their states” (Independent 1 August 2017; BBC News 27 June 2017; The Guardian 28 June 2016). Coupled with the fact that few people know what the Queen and the prime ministers says in private weekly audiences (The New York Times 4 June 2012), her earnings are also not subject to public debate in parliament. Thus, it is noted in The Guardian (28 June 2016) that:

Under the Sovereign Grant Act 2011, that percentage is reviewed every five years and can only be changed by the three royal trustees: the prime minister, the chancellor and the Queen’s keeper of the Privy Purse. Any changes are laid before the House of Commons as an “affirmative resolution” without debate.

Although the earnings of the European monarchies appear to come from their states, we argue here that in fact the earnings come from transnational corporations that dispossess, exploit Africans and evade paying taxes to African

governments. In essence, Africans are indirectly paying taxes for the sustenance of European monarchies. In effect, African taxes prop-up European monarchical sovereignty.

New Clothes Do Not Make Us New: Dismissing “Old” Mugabe but Retaining Old Empire

Paradoxically urging Africans to reject “old” Mugabe while keeping old European monarchical institutions and sovereignties, Euro-America is clearly playing games with the ideology of democracy. Demonising Robert Mugabe, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, Jose Eduardo dos Santos and Julius Museveni for allegedly overstaying as African leaders (The Guardian 24 February 2016), Europe ironically maintains unelected monarchies many of whose lineages have sponsored the historical enslavement and colonisation of Africans. Thus, between 1450 and 1700 Queen Elizabeth I of England, Catherine de Medici, Caterina Cornaro of Cyprus, Isable Clara Eugenia of Austria exerted influence on foreign affairs, in trade, in colonisation, in warfare and espionage (Estelle *et al.* 2017; Probasco 2013; Rowse 2003). In this sense, although violence against women and children has often been singularly attributed to patriarchal cultures among colonised peoples (Watson 2009), neocolonial violence is attributable to European Queens who not only destabilised the sovereignty of precolonial African states (McNeil 2007) but also sponsored expeditions to enslave and colonise African women, men and children. The indigenous peoples’ precolonial inherent rights of sovereignty, property rights, rights to govern their own territories, their ownership of culture, economies, governments, laws, lands and other resources within their territories, trade and commerce were trampled upon (McNeil 2007) yet the monarchies that sponsored such heinous crimes are still at the helm of the world.

The British Queen is considered for legal purposes to be the Sovereign Crown and as such immune to prosecution and cannot even be required to give evidence in court (The Guardian 17 May 2007; BBC News 8 November 2002; Independent 3 September 2015). Thus, even as the Euro-American world proclaims the rule of law and the need for accountability of sovereigns, the Queen paradoxically remains above the law and immune to prosecution for life. If the Queen is the law and the law is dispensed in the Queen’s name, this effectively means that the Queen is the rule of law and the rule of law is the Queen (The Guardian 17 May 2007). In fact, the unelected Queen who has been head of Commonwealth since 1952 has recently declared, in 2018, her son Prince Charles, Prince of Wales, to succeed her as head of the Commonwealth – and the 53 Heads of Government in the Commonwealth have sadly accepted such a declaration by the Queen of England (The Guardian 20 April 2018; BBC

News 20 April 2018; Adam 20 April 2018; Reuters 20 April 2018; Independent 20 April 2018; Taylor 2007). While Euro-Americans demonised Mugabe for alleged profligacy, paradoxically, the unelected English Queen and her family have the liberty to spend hundreds of thousands of pounds on most expensive travels around the world (The Guardian 27 June 2017).

Although it may be argued that Europe and America have the capacity to sustain their monarchies financially because they have the financial wherewithal to do so, we argue here that Europe's wealth was and is being built on the backs of enslaved and neocolonised Africans who continue to be dispossessed, robbed and exploited by Euro-American transnational corporations. Between 10 and 28 million Africans were enslaved and sold in America between 1450 and the early 19th century (Smith 5 December 2004), including by churches that owned African slaves (Milwood 2014). Although the British government has paid billions in compensation to slave owners for the loss of their human property (Independent 24 February 2013; The New York Times 27 December 2014; BBC History 17 February 2011; Milwood 2014; Independent 24 February 2013; Spitzer 2002; The Guardian 28 August 2017; Howard-Hassman *et al.* 2013; Falaiye 1999; Olusoga 12 February 2018), Euro-America still refuses to compensate African victims for enslavement and colonisation (Osabu-Kle 2000; BBC News 20 August 1999). They even refuse to restitute land, mineral and other resources which they stole from Africans; Euro-American companies, some of which became rich as a result of the enslavement and colonisation of Africans (Alexander 2005; Tillet 2012), are wrongly addressed as "investors" supposedly worth attracting in Africa. Part of the callousness of the Euro-American enslavement and colonisation of Africans is noted by Milwood (2014:60 - 76) thus:

...Britain was engaged in creating divisions and wars among the Kings and Chiefs and at the same time Britain was busy kidnapping the Kings and Chiefs' people for brutal enslavement in the Caribbean for the economic development of Britain...Britain encouraged divisions, wars and social conflicts between different Kingdoms, Kings and Chiefs...during the time of wars and social conflicts Britain was very busy kidnapping Africans for enslavement and pulverizing all forms of opposition by the Africans or challenges from her European rivals...during the heinous slave trade in African bodies, the magistrate judges and Assembly judges were the planters who were the ministers of religion. They ordered the hanging, whipping, the bashing out of the brains of babies, cutting off the heads of slaves, burying the slaves alive, gibbeting of slaves, cutting slaves slowly until they died, jettisoning of slaves into the sea for insurance claiming, castration of slaves, breeding slaves deliberately for the expansion of the slave populations...sodomized slaves...To have turned Africans into commercial

properties, chattels, cargo, non-human, infidels, primitive, heathenish, pagans, people without a name for themselves, the destruction of African civilization...The indigenous British...enjoy instructing Africans and West Indians to forget the wrongs of the transatlantic chattel slave trade in Africans. What they are actually saying to black people is that you should forget your history. Such a statement is deeply offensive, racist, blatancy and arrogant mentality...

Euro-America paradoxically still enjoys the proceeds of enslaving and colonising Africans even as it denies liability for the crimes of its colonialist fathers and forefathers who passed on the heritages to them. The question here is why descendants of colonialists would accept inheriting the benefits of enslaving and colonising Africans but deny inheriting accountability for the crimes of enslaving and colonising the Africans? It is hypocritical to accept inheritance from foreparents and deny responsibility for the crimes of the same foreparents. In Zimbabwe, descendants of colonialists would ironically, on one hand, deny inheriting responsibility for the colonial crimes of their foreparents while on the other hand they have accepted inheriting the benefits arising from colonising Africans. Similarly, there are arguments to the effect that the direct victims of enslavement are long dead but this is an argument about prescription of crimes which prescription can be rethought in the interest of global justice. Rules of prescription are not cast in concrete. The argument that the direct victims of enslavement are long dead should not necessarily absolve the criminals who in any case would have played roles in the death of the enslaved. The point here is that pleading that the victims are long dead is unacceptable. Otherwise robbers would simply escape liability by pleading that their victims of the violent crime have died. For a criminal to plead that their victims have long died would in fact amount to pleading that the crime has been done very efficiently and so thoroughly that the victims have died. In other words, accepting such a plea would simply motivate criminals to ensure that they kill their victims so that they subsequently plead that the victim has long died.

Furthermore, the African victims of colonialism are still alive and therefore the colonialists and their descendants must restitute, restore and pay reparations to the direct victims of colonisation whose land and other resources were stolen, and who were exploited by colonialists. Robert Mugabe is one of the direct victims of colonialism who should be compensated by the neoimperial system, including the colonialists and their descendants. In fact corporations including Barclays Bank, De Beers mining company and Lonrho (now Lonmin) that enslaved, dispossessed and exploited Africans during the enslavement and colonial eras are not only still in existence but many of them still continue to dispossess and exploit Africans (Mail & Guardia 26 July 2006; Eugene *et al.* 2003;

Okoth 2006; Seaton 2001; Mbele 2 April 2015; Nyamnjoh 2016; Boehmer 1998; Galeano 1997; The Guardian 8 June 2009)

The upshot of the above is that empire is a shapeshifter and trickster that keeps on changing its colours but not its predatory essence. Drawing on old colonial assumptions that indigenous territories and peoples were open, contemporary empire still holds that openness for penetration is what should characterise indigenous people and their nations. Similarly, drawing on old colonial assumptions that indigenous people were not distinct from animals, contemporary empire similarly treats indigenous people as animals that are not worth restitution, restorations and reparations for enslavement and colonial dispossession and robbery. Treating indigenous people as not distinct from animals or beasts was a colonial modality for environmental escapism. Empire sought to escape the moral, ethical and legal constraints to enslaving and colonising Africans – they did so by considering and depicting Africans as not human beings but, rather, as indistinct from animals and beasts. On the other hand, through environmental escapism, colonialists also romanced the natural environment which they depicted as animate and inclusive; colonial environmental escapism offered the colonialists ways in which to disregard the presence of native people who outnumbered the Whites; it allowed the colonialists opportunities to show sympathy and empathy for the natural environment and not for the societies of the colonised native peoples; considering the natural environment as animate allowed the colonialists to ingrain themselves into the environment rather than into native societies, in other words, environmental escapism allowed the colonialists to disregard native societies (Hughes 2010). By emphasising discourses on the so-called return to nature, animism, posthumanism, biocentrism, ecocentrism, earthcentrism, postanthropocentrism, ecocriticism, ecosophy, psychoecology, ecophilosophy and the agency of nature (Hughes 2010; Nhemachena, Kangira & Mlambo 2019; Nhemachena, Kangira & Mlambo 2018), neoempire is effectively revitalising colonial environmental escapism. It will pave way for the recolonisation of Africa, and the Global South more broadly, in this age of the new scramble for Africa marked by ongoing transnational land grabs on the continent (Nhemachena, Warikandwa & Mtapuri 2017).

Ongoing invasions by transnational corporations, Euro-American states and institutions are being naturalised and normalised in two ways: firstly, this is done by claiming that the transnational land grabs are meant to resolve global food insecurity in the context of “climate change”; secondly, they are naturalised and normalised by relating or connecting the transnational neocolonial invasions to natural invasive species. The point here is that to naturalise neo-colonial transnational invasions, they are juxtaposed with natural invasions by nonhumans including different species of animals and microorganisms

(Hoffmann *et al.* 2016). So, there are already transdisciplinary discourses popularising invasion biology that includes human invasions as a component of socio-ecological systems (Wilson *et al.* 2016). There is already a proliferation of Eurocentric scholarly publications on the need to overcome binaries, dichotomies and dualisms between humans and animals/nature – such publications are meant to facilitate environmental escapism. In this respect, we agree with Jenkins (2015) that human beings become chameleons when they want to fit into some territories. Jenkins (2015: 81) contends thus:

When our primary goal in any situation is not about love or empathy, but rather fitting in, we are attempting to seek approval and are not living authentically. Seeking approval is the opposite of accepting ourselves. Most of us are masters at becoming chameleons, assessing and acclimating to any situation in an attempt to fit in. Some people actually pride themselves on being chameleons. But here is the problem with becoming a chameleon – you don't show up authentically by living the truth of who you are and allowing yourself to be truly seen.

In a chameleon world, Africans do not get humanely restitution, restoration and reparations but they get “humanitarian” aid just like masters would feed their dogs and pigs. Paradoxically, in such a chameleon world, there are discourses and practices on restoration of ecologies, restoring nature and degraded environments, restoration of biodiversity, restoration to forests, restoration to soils, restoration of biotic communities, ecological restoration, restoration of indigenous plants, animals and so on (Hobbs *et al.* 1996; Aerts *et al.* 2011; Choi 2007; Heneghan 2018; Atkinson 1988; Dewee *et al.* 2011). Put in other words, while “investors” are noted as using their capital to protect or restore specific landscapes, habitats and species (Dewee *et al.* 2011), ironically, the same transnational “investors” are refusing to restitute, restore and pay reparations to dehumanised African victims of enslavement and colonisation. It is a world of chameleons where empire changes its colours but not its essence – in the contemporary imperial preference of nature to indigenous people, one witnesses logics of Cecil John Rhodes’ remark that he preferred land to “Niggers” (Boehmer 1998; Nhemachena, Kangira & Mlambo 2018).

Explicating ecological restoration, Aradottir *et al.* (2013) note thus:

Rooted in ecological theory, ecological restoration requires an integrated approach of different disciplines including soil science, hydrology and conservation biology, together with the relevant socioeconomic and political frameworks...Restoration of soil quality together with improved nutrient cycling, water retention, pollination services and regulation of soil erosion can benefit traditional agricultural production through improved crop or forage production. It

also enhances the provision of other important ecosystem services including clean water, wildlife habitat, carbon sequestration and recreation.

The emphasis on ecological restoration rather than on restoring stolen land, livestock and minerals to colonised and enslaved indigenous people speaks as much to environmental escapism as to Cecil John Rhodes's preference of land to "Niggers". In necroeconomies and necrocapitalism, indigenous people are still regarded as disposable surplus people to be used as raw materials for transnational corporation value creation (Haskaj 2018). Thus, in a world that purports to care for and restore the African environment, ironically African lives, labour, African human rights, African cultures, human essence, politics, marriages, families, kinship systems, economies and currencies are all being devalued (Godfrey *et al.* 2014; Global Policy Watch 12 February 2016; Gadekar *et al.* 2016; Frieden 2 September 2017; The Washington Post 2 June 1994; Rawlins *et al.* 1993). Africans who used to be so strong that White slave drivers coveted them are now weaklings, sickly, dispossessed, and devalued. In spite of their historical capabilities and fame to productively work, Africans are now depicted in Eurocentric literature as incapable of even farming, mining and smelting ores – occupations that existed in precolonial Africa.

In a world where Eurocentric scholars argue that Africans must not essentialise themselves, their cultures, societies and nations (Mignolo *et al.* 2016; Paradies 2006), it is not surprising that everything African is devalued. From the currencies to the cultures we witness the devaluation of everything African. From the economies to the liberation war heroes, we witness the devaluation of everything African (Kairiza 2009). In this regard, African liberation heroes are demonised in Eurocentric scholarship that paradoxically glorifies Euro-Americans as the economic, political and humanitarian heroes for Africans. From a Eurocentric perspective, White farmers [depicted as agricultural heroes in Africa] are supposed to be compensated for land that was repossessed by the Robert Mugabe government but ironically African liberation heroes are not supposed to be paid gratuities and compensation for the sacrifices of liberating Zimbabwe. In the chameleon world, Euro-American militaries, some of which are heavily politicised and recently increased their budgets by 91 percent (Robinson 2011; Nhemachena *et al.* 2017), are depicted as heroes of so-called antiterrorism campaigns on the African continent yet ironically African armies are often summarily demonised as repressive and abusive on their continent. In essence, African militaries are depicted as terrorists that are terrorising their own African citizens yet, ironically, Euro-American militaries are depicted as fighting terrorism on the African continent. Unwary of the ongoing militarised transnational accumulation/robbery/dispossession, many thinkers may not appreciate the connections or relations between transnational corporations on

the African continent and the Euro-American militarisation of the continent of Africa. Noting that what are described as governance crises, human rights crises, crises of democracy and crises of the rule of law are in fact crises of transnational militarised accumulation, dispossession and exploitation of Africans, we argue that Africa needs to reposition itself to defend African sovereignty and autonomy over resources.

Thus, writing about coloniality, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (n.d:183-190) argues:

This is a situation within which Africans are struggling to create African futures. They are doing so within the context of global coloniality. This means that for the AU to realise its Agenda 2063 it has to struggle ceaselessly against global coloniality. Only after defeating global coloniality can the AU then lead Africans in creating African futures...It is therefore not surprising that one of the long-term consequences of these types of colonial interventions has been to make some Africans to simply capitulate to the idea that what they can only do as part of making history is to adapt to a present and a future made for them by others...the very fact that African leaders could be told to forget about the legacy of colonialism and its present global coloniality speaks volumes about how the powerful continue to try to define for Africans the sources of African problems. The emphasis on investment and security issues speaks to the core interests of the USA.

African leaders who demand restitution and reparations or try to defend African sovereignty and autonomy risk being subjected to assassinations, coups, insurgency, destabilisation and disruptions. With sovereignty currently lodged with transnational institutions, corporations and Euro-American states all of which dictate to African leaders, we argue that African leaders are increasingly becoming ceremonial/titular presidents without executive powers within their jurisdictions. Enticed by phantom aid (Bond 2006; VOA 29 October 2009; Elliot 27 May 2005), phantom democracy, phantom economic growth, phantom freedom, phantom equality, phantom human rights, phantom rule of law, phantom development, phantom modernisation and phantom civilisation, African citizens are being prepared for major postmodern revolutions that will render the continent stateless and utterly open for transnational penetration and dictatorship.

Similarly, inserted with chips [which are deceptively depicted as enabling memory and intelligence], Africans will increasingly be suffused with the mind of the neoimperialists whose databases, cyclopaedias and dictionaries will be uploaded onto African minds via the chips inserted into the brains (Ajemian 2017; Schermer 2009; Mark 2010; Coward 2017; Tana *et al.* 2017). The point here is that there is an emergent networked empire (Passavant *et al.* 2004) via which Africans will increasingly be manipulated through chip-insertions into

brains. Already, via Facebook and Twitter and other media, African citizens are stirred to revolt, protest and rebel against their governments and states – and with dejection, they realise soon after that the freedom they fought for was phantom, inauthentic, surreal, hyperreal, postmodern, post-truth, post-factual and not real. Because African liberation era revolutions and processes of decolonisation and deimperialisation are being encumbered by global coloniality (Ndlovu-Gatsheni n.d.), African states and governments are increasingly becoming entrapped in neoimperial global matrix of power. As part of the tapestry of the neoimperial global matrix of power, technologies are being developed, including by militaries, to destabilise African sovereignty and autonomy, to bypass African states and governments. In this regard, cybereconomies, e-commerce, gig economies, cryptocurrencies and cloud computing (Ortiz 2016; Wong 2010; Hansworth 1995; Pak 2004; Irion 2012; Third World Network 2017) are all set to facilitate the bypassing of African states and governments such that Africa will become stateless and utterly open to transnational dispossession and exploitation.

In spite of the foregoing observations about the global criminocracy, necrocapitalism and necroeconomies, Euro-American transnational corporations that own and control digital networks/technologies will increasingly become more powerful and begin to exercise global sovereignty and dictatorship in the envisaged One World Government. Of course at the head of the transnational corporations and European governments there are already monarchies waiting for the One World Government to crystallise for the global dictatorship to begin in earnest.

Chapter Outlines

In chapter two, Artwell Nhemachena focuses on land repossession and discourses of homosexuality in and on Zimbabwe. He argues that while the recent bouts of Mugabephobia have been fanned on the premise that Robert Gabriel Mugabe has abused human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance; Mugabephobia, just like the homophobia which Mugabe was accused of, is an abuse of the human rights of Robert Gabriel Mugabe and Zimbabwean citizens who voted for him. Arguing that Robert Gabriel Mugabe was in fact fighting for the democratisation of ownership and control of land and other material resources in Zimbabwe, this chapter contends that Mugabe was not necessarily violating democracy but he was extending it to include African ownership and control of their material resources, including land. In this sense, Mugabe should be understood as, in fact, rejecting an attenuated form of Eurocentric democracy that privileged electoral rituals while preventing the materialisation of land ownership and control in Zimbabwe. Thus, what the

Euro-American world calls dictatorship or authoritarianism is in fact an African variant of democracy that challenges Western control over African resources. When Africans and other people in the Global South define, redefine or extend democracy, this becomes so frightening to the Euro-American world that the innovative, transformative and decolonising African leaders and nations are summarily caricatured as undemocratic, as breaching human rights, good governance and the rule of law. While colonialists are fond of describing Africans as traditional and resistant to change, in contemporary Zimbabwe, the world witnessed neocolonialists and neoimperialists resisting change, including the transfer of ownership and control of land and other resources back to Black Zimbabwean original owners.

Ruby Magosvongwe's chapter three is an appreciation of how 'queer' Robert Gabriel Mugabe is on discourses of democracy, rule of law, human rights and land in a former African colony. She argues that the conceptualisations of democracy, rule of law and human rights that have been 'universalised', and whose cultural anchor has not been disclosed, ignore the fundamental African adage of the unequivocal right to be heard. Magosvongwe argues that the Queer Theory as understood in Gaga Feminist literary criticism carries attributes and critical aspects that speak to the 'queer' position that Mugabe metonymically occupies in Zimbabwean politics on land, an aspect that formulates this chapter's major thrust. Robert Mugabe becomes the metonym of the Queer Theory in that he generates intense controversy as he goes 'gaga' on issues to do with sustainable development that cannot be wholly accomplished without the indigenous peoples' repossession of land as a stolen heritage. The chapter further argues that the post-2000 Zimbabwean agrarian reform, effected through land redistribution as an imperative, spells not only sovereignty, but self-expression and self-assertion as a rite of passage into the international family of humankind. Magosvongwe applies the Queer Theory to the marginalised and often silenced indigenous Black African 'minorities', especially their demonised in/access to essential subsistence resources such as land and its subsoil resources, after the year 2000. 'Queer', like 'disability', is exclusionary and diminutive, partly justifying our appropriation of the unorthodox Gaga feminist scream by the often silenced 'lesser human beings' seeking sovereignty, space, legitimacy, as well as right to life choices and self-expression in society.

In chapter four, Tapiwa V. Warikandwa argues that Robert Mugabe and Thomas Sankara were visionaries, charismatic leaders and true revolutionaries. This is why they left an indelible mark on the collective consciousness of the African people and their actions have also had a profound resonance beyond Africa. Both men were ahead of their time. Currently, all the issues at the heart of their struggle are central to national and international debates: the liberation of women, debt, food and resource sovereignty, solidarity between African

states, South-South solidarity, and protection of the environment. The African Union and other continental institutions seeking to build a new development paradigm were designed and implemented by Africans themselves. This was the central axis of Mugabe and Sankara's struggles. Obviously, like any human endeavours, Mugabe and Sankara's were imperfect but they provided Africans with bases to fight for sovereignty and autonomy, including repossession of and control over their resources that were stolen during the colonial era.

Robert Matikiti's chapter five deals with Robert Mugabe's estranged relationship with the Western powers. It evaluates whether or not Mugabe, in his economic and political power struggles with Euro-American domination, had earmarks of an African liberation theologian. Matikiti notes that Mugabe considered his Catholic background as a decisive influence on his life in helping him see the world from the perspective of the dispossessed, impoverished and oppressed Africans. One of Mugabe's legacies was a political life spent on overthrowing Euro-American power structures that debarred Zimbabweans from achieving their full human potential. In this regard, Mugabe averred that violence is an ultimate tool for indigenous people to reclaim ownership of Zimbabwean resources. The burden of African liberation theologians has been to expose Euro-American criminality, political hegemony and direct the attention of the African church to such criminality. Mugabe believed that it was essential to analyse the causes of the glaring plunder, dispossession, social inequalities between the neo-colonial transnational plunderers and the indigenous people, between the majority poor and the minority rich, between the oppressed and the oppressor. He was of the view that neo-colonialism and capitalism never produce justice but only poverty and the attendant criminality of dispossession and theft of resources from indigenous people. Mugabe discerned different dimensions of liberation that espoused nationalistic deliverance of the neo-colonised peoples from degrading servitude; detested inequalities between the minority Whites and majority Blacks and embraced the empowerment of the Black people, indigenisation of natural resources, distribution of land and rejection of western power structures such as the Commonwealth.

Collins Nhengu's chapter six examines Mugabe's defence of the embattled Zimbabwean national identity and sovereignty that were destabilised by resilient Euro-American neo-imperialism. In Mugabe's view, Zimbabwean identity and sovereignty rested on possession of land by the indigenous people, promotion of local languages, culture as it is enforced by the chiefs and dress code normatively perceived to enhance *Unhu/Ubuntu*. However, forces of negation from the Euro-American world undermined Mugabe's efforts to preserve Zimbabwean identity and sovereignty. The Euro-Americans used the decoy of empty-shell human rights to pull down assertions of Zimbabwean national

identity and sovereignty. Mugabe was praised by the Euro-Americans when he initially was quiescent to their interests but they lampooned him when his policies favoured indigenous Zimbabweans. They were averse to the ideas of identity and sovereignty because they entail independence from the Euro-American neo-colonialism. Euro-Americans have always been desirous to yield flag independence, on the continent of Africa, devoid of economic, political and social independence. Mugabe empowered chiefs to be custodians of Zimbabwean culture. He also regarded dress as a reflection of the inner Zimbabwean identity. In this vein Mugabe was particularly engrossed with dress code that reflects Zimbabwean identity but the Euro-American world used the rod of human rights to chastise Mugabe through denying him the lifeline of funding and lines of credit. The real intention of the Euro-Americans was to turn the Zimbabwean people against Mugabe.

In chapter seven, Bowden B. C. Mbanje, Darlington N. Mahuku & Panganai Kahuni note that Eurocentric scholars and analysts criticised Zimbabwe's indigenisation policy as a ZANU PF economic strategy that supposedly focused on nothing else than "primitive accumulation" of local White and foreign "owned" companies and properties. The irony is that these Whites claim to be local even as they are serving neoimperial interests. The trio argue that what is queer is that Whites refused to heed Mugabe's call to share land with indigenous Zimbabweans, yet they claimed to be local and indigenous to Zimbabwe. They argue that being local and indigenous should be evidenced, *inter alia*, by obedience to local and indigenous leaders and authority. To be indigenous and local is to obey local/indigenous rules, norms, ethics, etiquette and laws. The chapter argues that indigeneity is not thrown around like confetti for Whites to cherry-pick in Africa – there is a price to membership of indigenous societies and communities.

Dean Trust Moyo's chapter eight examines Robert Gabriel Mugabe's life history, political career as a revolutionary and political luminary that continues to dominate the political discourses of the second *Chimurenga*. The chapter also explores and exposes Robert Mugabe's 37-year reign focusing on the contributions of his expansive education policies that placed Zimbabwe at 92% literacy rate, the highest on the African continent. The educational system in Zimbabwe which was once regarded as among the best in Africa went into crisis in 2007 partly because of the country's economic meltdown. Moyo argues that the quantitative investments made in education since independence have not optimally benefited the country. He however commends Zimbabwean emigrants who send money back home to alleviate economic crises. Moyo argues that Zimbabweans must be conscious of the investment that the nation has made in them wherever they are. The chapter also discussed Mugabe's

stance on opposition movements and factionalism in general and within ZANU-PF in particular.

In chapter nine, Darlington N. Mahuku, Bowden C. Mbanje & Lameck Gonzo argue that before the unceremonial departure, Robert Mugabe commanded respect and received standing ovations during regional summits and whenever he appeared in public fora. The trio note that Mugabe became a “monster” and “dictator” in the eyes of [dictatorial] Westerners and various others opposed to the Africanising ZANU-PF government. The furore between Britain and Zimbabwe heightened in the 1990s when Britain refused to fulfil its age-old promise to finance the land reclamation and restitution programme. Britain then transformed the bilateral dispute into an international issue. In the circumstances, the ZANU-PF leadership and government reverted to the liberation war rhetoric because Zimbabwe’s problems are still embedded in colonialism and the mischievous machinations of foreign donors and international financial institutions. The chapter argues that Zimbabwe was once again at war with both internal and external enemies who queered the Zimbabwean normalisation of the colonial land anomalies.

Peter Masvotore & Martin Mujinga’s chapter ten focuses on the socio-political and economic climate of Zimbabwe which reached its zenith on the 17th of November 2017 that saw the demise of Robert Mugabe as the longest-serving President of Zimbabwe. Describing the coup that deposed Robert Mugabe, the duo note that the early hours of this day shocked the whole world when the Zimbabwean army turned against the President who was its Commander-in-Chief, forcing him to resign. The coup attracted a number of stakeholders. Of interest to note is that both local and international “civil” society organisations took a decisive role in demanding that Mugabe stepped down. Although some individuals and groups in Zimbabwe persuaded the whole world to believe that the forced resignation of Mugabe was not a coup, one interesting thing that characterised the 17 November 2017 incident was the coming together of the opposition parties, the ruling party- ZANU (PF), the ordinary citizens and the “civil” society organisations, all in agreement with the decision of the army to have Mugabe out of office.

In chapter eleven, Peter Masvotore focuses on a historical analysis of the ways in which [poor] colonially dispossessed African youths were impelled to migrate. It is argued that the dispossession and attendant migration left youths without knowledge of their past, present and future that would have guided them into responsible citizenship in Zimbabwe. The chapter underscores how economic hardships, (neo-)colonial ideologies and sham opportunities map onto adolescent bodies and scuttle their dreams and aspirations. The chapter draws from multidisciplinary sources to articulate how African youths are unfortunately exhorted to be resilient to (neo-)colonial dispossession in

Zimbabwe. In addition the chapter also demonstrates the shortcomings of state policies some of which dehumanise, disempower and exclude African youths. Visited by hardships some of which originate from (neo-)imperialism, African youths are predisposed to violence as an instinct to survival. The chapter concludes by summarising the key lessons that may be learnt from Zimbabwe. These lessons include, among others, the need to redress colonial dispossession of African land. Also included is the need not to simplistically condemn African youths as violent, without factoring in the (neo-)colonially induced excruciating hardships that they face and that predispose them to survivalist violence.

Eve Zvichanzi Nyemba's chapter twelve notes that since Zimbabwe was admitted as a member of the United Nations (UN) on 30 July 1980, shortly after the attainment of independence, Mugabe has been a major spectacle at the multilateral organisation. He quickly, became the darling of the UN due to his tenacious fight against apartheid in the early 1980s right up to 1994 when South Africa attained majority rule. At the behest of Mugabe, Zimbabwe was twice elected to the powerful United Nations Security Council (UNSC), from 1983 to 1984 and from 1991 to 1992. Mugabe was then seen by Euro-America as a liberator, a statesman and an African icon. The decision to adopt the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) earmarked to restore land to Blacks culminated in the deterioration of relations between the West and Mugabe. Mugabe was demonised as a renegade whose wings needed to be clipped. A co-ordinated sanctions regime from the European Union, United States of America (USA) and Australia among others, crippled Zimbabwe's economy and eroded Mugabe's legitimacy. The UN became an arena for Mugabe to present his grievances against the West which imposed what he called 'illegal and filthy sanctions' against Zimbabwe. His calls went unheeded but in 2008, in the aftermath of violent elections, the UNSC attempted to pass a draft resolution to effect sanctions on Zimbabwe. Mugabe saw this attempt as unfair treatment by the UN and decided to turn the UN into a platform to defend the interests of developing nations, particularly, on UN Reform, adoption of a new economic order and sustainable development.

In chapter thirteen, Darlington N. Mahuku, Bowden C. Mbanje & Lameck Gonzo note that the late commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, General Vitalis Zvinavashe blatantly said that the Zimbabwean security sector will only rally behind political leaders who pursue Zimbabwean values, traditions and beliefs for which thousands of lives were lost in pursuit of Zimbabwe's hard won independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interest. Paradoxically the military has recently also 'been caught in the web' of ZANU-PF factional fighting with some in 2014 being noted as supporting the Joice Mujuru faction, in 2017 others were noted as supporting Emmerson Mnangagwa; while some were branded "Generation 40" (G40) supporting

Grace Mugabe. Though Mugabe is blamed by his detractors, who acted against his resolve to redistribute land to Zimbabweans, for allegedly plunging Zimbabwe into economic turmoil, the trio argue that it is the Euro-American sanctions that have brought much suffering to Zimbabweans. They further argue that despite the economic deterioration of the Zimbabwean neo-imperial economy, Mugabe actually remained popular with Africans who cherished pan-Africanism.

Maximillian Julius Chuhila's chapter fourteen argues that African economic thinking and planning, rather than reality, have been at the centre stage of political architects. Governments and their leaders have dictated policy and planning directions from early African independence days. Chuhila observes that soon after independence, much African economic and social planning continued using colonial templates. African governments had options to pursue colonial type planning or to design own models and templates for economic and social planning. Tanzania was one of the countries that tried both approaches, that is, the colonial approach from 1961 – 1967 and the nationalist approach from 1967 – 1980s. These two phases were marked by changes and continuities of colonial approaches. Scholars have divided opinions as to whether the changes engineered by the first President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere were effective or not.

In chapter fifteen, Theobald Frank Theodory & Bashiru Ally Kakurwa argue that transparency and accountability have progressively become common across a range of issues. For the Tanzanian natural resources sector, transparency and accountability became a focal point for action as issues such as anti-corruption, embezzlements of public resources, nepotism and conflict resolution became central. These concepts are critical elements in good natural resource governance; and along with transparency, they are necessary ingredients for resolving curses that come with resource exploitation. Accountability allows government officials to be held responsible for (mis)management of resources that they are entrusted with. Effective systems and controls are vital to ensure accountability. Accountable systems require that government officials and officials of transnational corporations (TNCs) are penalised for misuse and abuse of natural resources. Transparency should be enforced via contracts made between governments and multinational corporations aspiring to “invest” in the extractive industries.

Theobald Frank Theodory's chapter sixteen argues that sustainable natural resource use is key to achieving industrial development in any country. For Theodory, natural resources are of great relevance in industrialisation. Natural resources provide industrial raw materials. Thus, the achievement of targets of national industrialisation policy will be possible only if there is a clear linkage of natural resources and industrial development in Tanzania. The government

should demonstrate positive commitment in reforming “investment policy”, particularly in the mining sector, oil and gas as well as land “investments”. It is necessary to ensure that the available resources in Tanzania benefit the ordinary Tanzanian citizens who Nyerere has always prized.

In chapter seventeen, Tapiwa V. Warikandwa & Artwell Nhemachena observe that contemporary scholarly discourses have reached a crescendo in advancing the view that post-colonial studies have been and are still dominated by a transitology paradigm whose teleological prejudices lead to faulty inquiry into democratisation, transitional justice and decolonisation in Africa. Grounded on a broad investigation of the post-colonial transitional justice in a decolonising and supposedly democratising Africa, and a comprehensive appraisal of the post-colonial transitional justice and anthropology literature, this chapter seeks to reveal the philosophical flaws implicit in arguments of proponents of transitology and to examine the problematic claim(s) that transitional justice is a fundamental instrument for advancing democratic transitions and promoting international human rights law in post-colonial Africa. In principle, this chapter critiques the compatibility of transitology, transitional justice (underlined by “democracy”) and decolonisation. The chapter argues that the notions of transitology and transitional justice advance a secularisation hypothesis which promotes a New World Order agenda underlined by order in chaos.

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Enjoying Queer Sex but Forgetting to Repossess African Land? Between Land and Orifices in Zimbabwe

Artwell Nhemachena

Mugabe's homophobia can also be regarded as a desperate face-saving measure as it buys into the surrounding pool of fundamentalism and intolerance...It is necessary for all democracy minded Africans to understand Mugabe's real intentions because the consequences of not doing so are quite far-reaching. First of all, Mugabe's essentializations bolster a certain strain of African exceptionalism that is at once duly self-marginalizing and self-sabotaging. It also seeks to absolve him from scrutiny and accountability in a context that sorely requires them (Osha 13 October 2015).

Deleuze and Guattari's notions of becoming-animal and becoming-woman emphasise a subjectivity not confined by rigid identity, such as man/woman (Morris 2018: 505).

Presenting the Zimbabwe crisis as simply a leadership crisis revolving around President Mugabe is just too limited...reducing the crisis to a governance crisis. This is a paradigm that is projected by Western nations, civil society organisations, non-governmental organisations as well as the opposition forces in Zimbabwe

(Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006: 7).

Introduction

While the recent bouts of Mugabephobia have been fanned on the premise that Robert Gabriel Mugabe has abused human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance (Steele 23 January 2013; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006), I want to argue that the Mugabephobia, just like the homophobia which Mugabe was accused of, is an abuse of the human rights of Robert Gabriel Mugabe and Zimbabwean citizens who voted for him. Arguing that Robert Gabriel Mugabe was in fact fighting for the democratisation of ownership and control of land and other material resources in Zimbabwe, this chapter contends that Mugabe was not necessarily violating democracy but he was extending it to include African ownership and control of their material resources, including land. In this sense, Mugabe should be understood as, in fact, rejecting an attenuated form of democracy that privileged electoral rituals while preventing the

democratisation of land ownership and control in Zimbabwe. Thus, what the Euro-American world often calls dictatorship or authoritarianism is in fact an African variant of democracy that challenges Western control over African resources. When Africans and other people in the Global South define or redefine or extend democracy, this becomes so frightening to the Euro-American world that the innovative, transformative and decolonising African leaders and nations are summarily caricatured as undemocratic, as breaching human rights, good governance and the rule of law, all in scare quotes.

The million dollar question is whether it is democratic for Euro-America to always define the African world and their spaces and institutions without also according Africans the same opportunity and power to define and redefine the Euro-American world. While the essence of democracy, as conventionally understood, is citizens' participation, it is cause for wonder how Africans participate in democracy discourses, discourses on human rights, good governance and rule of law when the agenda-setting global media is controlled by Euro-Americans. Democracy fails when researches and academics in Africa are funded by the agenda-setting Euro-American corporations and when converted African academics now unfortunately grovel for non-academic consultancy work that does not question ideologies, theories and underlying assumptions of Euro-American interventions in Africa (Nhemachena, Mlambo & Kaundjua 2016). What is worse some academics that I have met, particularly those that fled from crises in Zimbabwe, are now so afraid of what I call the **cudgel of Zimbabwe** that in utter fear of losing their [diasporan] jobs, they exercise self-censorship to the extent that they regard the present criminocratic world (dis)order as something sacred that does not deserve "disruptions" through serious academic interrogation and theorisations from the positions of the dispossessed and exploited. Euro-American sanctions on contemporary Zimbabwe appear to have had serious negative impacts on academic freedom to critically question the theories, ideologies and underlying assumptions of the present world (dis)order. If, as is the case, the United Nations Security Council is dominated by a very few Global Northern states in the world, it also boggles the mind how Africans participate in the agenda setting matters in the world. In so far as animals do not set the agenda in the world, I will argue here that similarly a democracy that disallows Africans from participating in critical agenda setting is in fact a democracy that animalises and degrades the African people – it does not humanise them.

Interfacing current discourses about land restitution and homosexuality in Zimbabwe, I argue that Euro-America is hypocritical in that on the one hand it forces Africans to decriminalise and accept homosexuality while on the other hand it opposes Africans' struggles to repossess their land and other material resources that were stolen during the colonial era. In this respect, the denigratory

assumption [that Euro-America is making] about Africans is that phalluses and orifices matter more than repossessing stolen land and other resources – Euro-America contemptuously assumes that Africans are best at using their phalluses and orifices than at “productively” utilising the land and other resources. In this regard, Africans have been accorded lots of sexual “freedom”/liberalisation than they have been given freedom and liberty to repossess, own and control their land and other material resources. Empire would want Africans to marvel at and be playful with their phalluses and orifices while the colonialists are engaging in more serious businesses of owning, controlling and utilising African land and other resources. Thus, just as early travellers, missionaries and colonialists portrayed Africans as possessing beastly sexual appetites but as lacking ownership of land and other material resources, the Euro-American world continues to foreground sex and sexuality as the supposedly real African issues worth pursuing on a continental grand scale – paradoxically, Africans are dissuaded from repossessing their land, minerals and other material resources that continue to be owned and controlled by Euro-American transnational corporations. Sex and sexuality issues have been broadly infused in various university curricula yet land restitution and repossession issues do not appear, as courses, in much of African university curricula which continue to be heavily influenced by Euro-American funding and attendant agenda-setting.

When Euro-America pre-eminently directs attention to sex and sexuality issues, to phalluses and orifices, the underlying assumption is that land and material resource restitution are not for Africans to learn about or to fight for. The point here is that Africans are told indirectly that they must not worry about repossessing land and other material resources – the presupposition is that all that should matter for Africans is that they possess their phalluses and orifices that need liberalisation. Thus, instead of thinking about repossessing and utilising land and mineral wealth, Africans are advised to be content with utilising phalluses and orifices to mine one another in metaphorical and real senses, including through unnatural orifices - instead of mining the land for mineral wealth (Nhemachena and Warikandwa 2017; Nhemachena, Warikandwa & Amoo 2018). Via postmodernist theories, Africans are informed that binaries do not matter and that the world has overcome binaries including dualisms and dichotomies: in this regard, it is assumed that there are no longer any distinctions between those that spend time sexually mining orifices on one another’s bodies and those that mine the African land for minerals. The world is increasingly being availed with postmodern sex (Nhemachena, Warikandwa & Amoo 2018) which sex is becoming more readily available than land and other material resources on the African continent. In fact as land and other resources are being looted from Africa, the Africans are given more and more postmodern sex to entertain and toy themselves with while the more serious neocolonialists

and neoimperialists focus on land and other material resources. Instead of spending time and energy working to repossess and utilise land and mines, Africans are forced to spend time thinking about and utilising their orifices and phalluses in the metaphorical and real senses of mining one another for pleasure and sexual catharsis. Instead of redistributing land to original Black African owners, transnational corporations and some arms of the United Nations are happier liberalising sex and sexuality supposedly so that Africans can spend time enjoying obligation-free sex and forget about repossessing their land. In this regard, postindependence African universities have ironically witnessed the proliferation of courses and modules on sexuality and sex, masculinity and femininity studies, liberalisation of sex and sexuality, queer sexualities and sex. Africans have spent much time and many years studying and carrying out researches on these issues for their undergraduate, postgraduate degrees and for consultancy work. However, postindependence African universities have not witnessed as much proliferation of curricula on issues of repossessing land and material resources that were stolen during the neocolonial era. In this sense, Foucault's (1976) theses particularly on the repressive hypothesis focus on issues of sexuality and sex wherein Africans are supposed to be liberated or freed to speak and voice their sexual concerns. However, the irony is that Africans are still repressed in so far as voicing out about the necessity of repossession and restitution of their material resources is concerned – in fact the foregrounding of issues of sex and sexuality is intended to foreshadow discourses on land repossession and restitution.

Instead of spending time, and resources thinking through alternative, diverse, multiple or plural ways of fighting for restitution and repossession of land and other material resources, Africans are being engineered to spend much time and resources thinking about supposed multiplicities and diversities of sex and sexualities. Africans are ideologically manipulated to focus on thinking about different or multiple ways of penetrating diverse orifices through a diversity of forms of phalluses. While this is often described as richness in diversity of sexualities or ways of doing sex, the paradox is that such discourses about the richness of diversity of sex and sexualities are happening on a continent where the majority of the citizens are materially impoverished by transnational dispossession, plunder and exploitation. I would want to argue here that discourses in Africa are shaped by transnational corporations which often fund some researches and academies in and on Africa. It is the same corporations that are busy dispossessing, looting and exploiting Africans and their resources. In this sense, I challenge the frontloading of Eurocentric human rights and democracy in contemporary discourses on sex and sexuality in and on Africa. Transnational corporations and some Euro-American states and governments are currently engaged in grabbing African land and leaving African

peasants landless and without compensation (Nhemachena, Warikandwa & Mtapuri 2017), yet the same corporations “generously” and ironically fund projects about sexual diversity, multiplicity and sexual liberation/freedom on the African continent. The question here is, if one is dispossessed and no longer has land, where do they do their liberalised sex and sexuality? If even those that do queer sex need land then why is it that Euro-American discourses presume that all that Africans need is liberalised sex and sexuality without attendant repossession of ownership and control of their land and other material resources?

Right from the enslavement and colonial eras, African men and women were depicted as without sexual moral restraint and hence as wildly sexually free, in animalistic and beastly senses. In this regard, Euro-American depictions of sexual liberalisation are nothing new and they are nothing decolonial because they are rooted in enslavement and colonial era ideologies. In Africa, the origin of sexual restraints is not traced, by Eurocentric scholars, to precolonial African societies but to the supposed contagion effect of the Victorian era that is deemed to have been “civil” enough to enjoin morality and ethics including sexual restraint and repression of sexual appetites. In so far as sexual liberty and absence of restraints were linked to beastliness and animality, I would argue that they are not necessarily civil, humane, ethical, moral, democratic, ruled by law and they do not constitute good governance in their purport particularly in so far as animality and beastliness in the sex and sexuality presuppose the Hobbesian state of nature and absence of governments and order. Because precolonial Africans had their own governments, states, order, structures and hierarchies, I argue here that the postulations of the Hobbesian theory on the state of nature do not capture the reality in precolonial Africa – Africans were not necessarily beastly, queer, monstrous, animalistic and without states and governments, laws, order and structures to regulate sex and sexuality (Nhemachena 2017).

Although Robert Mugabe has been demonised by Euro-America and some “civil” society organisations for describing homosexuals or queers as ‘worse than pigs and dogs’, there is a growing body of scholarship that is postulating relevant theories about becoming animals. There are contemporary Eurocentric postulations about anti-humanism, anti-essentialism, anti-homophobic becomings in which the subject loses stability and identity: the discourses on becoming animal are linked to homosexuality (Bruns 2007; Vilaseca 2013). While the unconscious assigns the animal a particularly important role in dreams and myths, it is noted that becomings -animal are neither dream nor fantasy, nor are they about filiation, classificatory or genealogical trees - they are real, rhizomes and about fascination with multiplicity and deterritorialisation of the self which is thereby thrown into upheaval (Deleuze & Guattari 2004; Tsung-

Huei 2009). Becoming animal is about the existence of zones of indiscernibility or zones of indistinction between human and animal – the distinctions will be overlapping (Gilson 2007). Becomings-animal are well explicated by Deleuze & Guattari (2004: 246 - 277) who note that:

The sorcerer has a relation of alliance with the demon as the power of the anomalous. The old-time theologians drew a clear distinction between two kinds of curses against sexuality. The first concerns sexuality as a process of filiation transmitting the original sin. But the second concerns it as a power of alliance inspiring illicit unions or abominable loves. This differs significantly from the first in that it tends to prevent procreation... There is an entire politics of becomings-animal, as well as a politics of sorcery, which is elaborated in assemblages that are neither those of the family nor of religion nor of the State. Instead, they express minoritarian groups, or groups that are oppressed, prohibited, in revolt, or always on the fringe of recognized institutions, groups all the more secret for being extrinsic, in other words, anomic. If becoming-animal takes the form of a Temptation, and of monsters aroused in the imagination by the demon, it is because it is accompanied, at its origin as in its undertaking, by a rupture with the central institutions that have established themselves or seek to become established.....all becomings are molecular: the animal, flower... one becomes are molecular collectivities, haecceities, not molar subjects, objects, or forms that we know from the outside and recognise from experience, through science, or by habit. If this is true, then we must say the same of things human: there is a becoming-woman, a becoming-child, that do not resemble the woman or the child as clearly distinct molar entities... What we term a molar entity is, for example, the woman as defined by her form, endowed with organs and functions and assigned a subject. Becoming woman is not imitating this entity or even transforming oneself into it. We are not, however, overlooking the importance of imitation, or moments of imitation among certain homosexual males... All we are saying is that these indissociable aspects of becoming-woman must first be understood as a function of something else: not imitating or assuming female form, but emitting particles that enter the relation of movement and rest, or the zone of proximity, of a microfemininity, in other words, that produce in us a molecular woman creating the molecular woman... The girl is certainly not defined by virginity; she is defined by a relation of movement and rest, speed and slowness, by a combination of atoms, an emission of particles: haecceity. She never ceases to roam upon a body without organs. She is an abstract line or line of flight. Thus girls do not belong to an age group, sex, order, or kingdom: they slip everywhere, between orders, acts, ages, sexes; they produce n molecular sexes on the line of flight in relation to the dualism machines they cross right through... The girl is like a block of becoming that remains contemporaneous to each opposable term; man; woman; child; adult.

Becoming indiscernible or indistinct or entering a zone of indiscernibility or indistinction is not something to celebrate as far as Africans are concerned. Firstly, theses on becoming animal and entering zones of indiscernibility or indistinction remind Africans of the enslavement and colonial eras when they were regarded and treated as animals or beast for carrying imperial burdens (Nhemachena 2016; Fanon 1963; Nhemachena, Warikandwa & Amoo 2018). Secondly, the theses on becoming animal buttress the neo-colonial status quo wherein Africans are still regarded as animals and not human enough to own and control their own resources. Animals do not own land, minerals and other material resources – all they enjoy is sex and food. As argued before, neoempire would want Africans to be more preoccupied with sex and sexuality issues and forget about ownership and control of their material resources. Provided with liberalised sex and “humanitarian” food aid, Africans are made to share the same planes with animals: but without ownership and control of land and other material resources on the continent, the humanitarianism is in fact animatism. Animalised Africans would be contented more with the liberalised sex and “humanitarian” food aid than with ownership and control over their resources. Thirdly, theses on becoming animals legitimise the destruction of African sovereignty and autonomy – animals do not necessarily have sovereignty since they can and are assumed to live in Hobbesian states of nature without governments, states, morals, ethics, laws, order, institutional structures and so on (Nhemachena 2017). Fourthly, the theses on becoming animals justify the destruction of African morals, cultures, ethics and laws – animals do not need morals, ethics and laws because theirs is a state of nature. Fifthly, the theses on becoming animals legitimise the destruction of African marriages, families, lineages and filiation because these institutions are premised on morals, ethics, cultures and laws. I argue that the Euro-American support of prostitution, liberalised sexuality, queer sexuality and so on is part and parcel of the becoming animal, entering zones of indiscernibility and indistinctions between humans and animals. In so far as queer sexuality and ultraliberalisation of sexuality occur in zones of indiscernibility or zones of indistinction between animals and humans, I argue that these sexualities are not necessarily in the realm of human rights.

Empire and the Diversity of African Orifices

In a context where colonialists sought to exploit Africans, it is not surprising that they devalued African laws and marriages, African sexuality and African kinship systems that would have made it impossible for them to penetrate African men and women. Devaluation of precolonial African morality, ethics, laws, economies, cultures and spiritualities was meant to open up African

orifices for colonialists and imperialists. In other words, orifices were counted on African bodies; African institutions from marriages, families, laws, religions, economies and politics were deemed to be official in the sense of providing spaces for the colonialists to penetrate, inhabit and colonise. Similarly, African land and landforms were made to suffer orifices particularly in terms of the ways in which Africa has been subjected to mining and neoimperial extraction of resources. What is more, at independence, Africans were given official states that, sounding like empty shells, found themselves unable to repossess material resources and hence unable to deliver services to citizens. Because human rights, democracy, good governance and rule of law discourses appeared before restitution, restoration and reparations by colonialist, they have also assumed hollowness. The issue here is that given this hollowness, democracy, human rights, rule of law and good governance are not hallowed in Africa. A preoccupation with the richness of diverse orifices, which neoempire is always counting, in Africa does not translate to material richness and wealth for Africans. Ever drilling and counting the African orifices, neoempire always reminds Africans not only to see their orifices as richness but to also lie flat, rhizomatic, prostrate and in waiting for neoimperial “fecund” penetration. When African leaders cower, grovel and beg for foreign “investment”, they are in fact pleading for penetration by the so-called “fecund” “investors” who actually come to loot African resources (Nhemachena *et al* 2019; Bond 2006)

Because penetration is not easy in those that are erect and claiming sovereignty and autonomy – they are often ordered to lie flat first and stop worrying about the politico-economic viruses that may infect the diverse African orifices. Often, exploitation is preceded by assurances of [social] protection and promises of aid, much of which is sadly phantom. So, Africans and their leaders are expected to lie flat and wait for the supposedly sweet imperial penetration, and the consequent hard but unfruitful labour that is visited on the prostrate ones. To be erect and to demand sovereignty and autonomy is tantamount to the “abomination” of counting imperial orifices: empire does not allow Africans to count imperial orifices because imperial royal blood has to be kept pure in spite of global hypocritical celebrations of hybridity, diversity, multiplicity, inclusiveness, liberalisation and permissiveness. While it is considered to be abusive for Africans to keep their wives in households, it is ironically deemed appropriate for the Queen to stay in royal palaces that ensure the purity of royal bloodlines. If Queens stay in the open and high density residential areas, the risk is that some sexually animalistic and beastly African may jump onto them and dilute royal bloodlines. It is only African orifices that have to be open, defiled and ever ready for sexual diversity and multiplicity notwithstanding the risks of dilutions of bloodlines and genealogies. In this construction, Africans, it is assumed, do not have to worry about the

implications of openness for their royal purity. It is an abomination for Africans to penetrate neoempire – in fact those that demand sovereignty and autonomy are subjected to sanctions so that they lie quiet, flat and flabby again – they are not supposed to be erect. They can hold elections but no erections are permitted from them. And so the problem with Robert Mugabe is that he erected between the elections. Having been in power for a long time, Robert Mugabe realised that the much celebrated diversity of orifices offers neoempire manifold escape routes after failing to fulfil its promises to Africans – it can enter through one orifice and quietly leave through a different one, and Africa remains all the more hollowed and harrowed but not hallowed.

Seeking to establish a One World Government in the New World Order, global elites are keen to have only one sovereign and thus to destroy all other sovereigns. All indications from scholarship denying sovereignty to African states, summarily demonising African nation states and leadership; overriding African sovereignty at a global level via the setting up of overbearing transnational bodies wherein African states have no or very little say; establishing overriding gig-economies, cyber-economies and cryptocurrencies – all these are indications of a dictatorial and emergent One World Government that is angling to replace African nation states. There are popularisations of flat ontologies, rhizomatic ontologies or onticology (Bryant 2011a; 2011b) in a global context marked by the deconstruction, decentring and effacement of sovereign states in the Global South. In this regard, it is assumed in Eurocentric scholarship that, the penetrated are not supposed to draw distinctions/binaries between the penetrating outsider and the insider, legitimate and illegitimate penetration, pure and impure penetration, safe and unsafe penetration, the penetrating coloniser and the colonised, disposessor and victim, robber and victim, male and female. In a context where there are some scholarly popularisations of absence of distinctions/binaries, Africans are not expected to distinguish themselves as legitimate heirs of their African heritages – in fact African heritages are being declared to be “world heritages” yet the Africans do not even sit on the United Nations Security Council that sets the agenda for the world. In this regard, the term “world” is equivocal in that it assumes inclusivity in an exclusivistic world. Euro-Americans have for instance described their wars as “World” Wars and in all the “world” bodies, it is Euro-Americans that draw the scripts and agendas: this suggests that the term “world” refers to Euro-America and not necessarily to Africa – Africa is deemed to be just an appendage of Euro-America.

In the logics of one who is forced upon by multiple rapists taking turns to penetrate and exploit, Africans are worried about impurity and the defiling nature of the diverse and multiple penetrations (Collins 1984). However, because penetration and the associated carnivals serve to provide for catharsis

(Roseneil 2016; Cresswell 1994), neoempire has encouraged multiple forms of penetration and diversity of sexualities that are hoped to generate cathartic harmony in a world that is replete with transnational dispossession, robbery, theft, plunder, looting and exploitation. The liberalisation of African orifices should therefore be understood and read together with the liberalisation of economies in Africa. The logics are the same – privatisation of sex and sexualities which were previously controlled by African families and communities; devaluation of the African human bodies that are subjected to dehumanising forms of penetration; removal of moral, cultural and ethical inhibitions or conditionalities in the same way economic neoliberalisation removed price controls and other regulations; marketisation of African sexualities in the same way the market has become hallowed in Euro-American neoliberal economic reforms; removal of the rubrics of marriage payments is part of the marketisation and liberalisation of African sexualities. Of course, instead of the parents having to charge marriage payments, it is the “invisible hand of the market” [actually the invisible hand of neoempire controlling the market] that has come to determine the charges for penetration of orifices in Africa.

Just like in other carnivals, the liberalisation does not necessarily help the individual participants but it plays the role of catharsis or safety valve for the entire neoimperial system. Queer and grotesque sexuality, along with the broader liberalisation of African sexualities, serve as control devices in that they allow participants to invert the normal order in the space and time of the performances (Cresswell 1994). Thus, in carnival, normal bodily values are undermined by the celebration of orifices and fat, while normal culture turns the body into a finished product, carnival celebrates the incompleteness by emphasising the openings including the anus, the genitalia and large nostrils; lower regions of the body particularly the buttocks are given priority over the head and the celebration of these in the carnival refer to sex, toil, defaecation rather than reason (Cresswell 1994). Being a time or moment of apparent disorder, deliberate break from normal life and established forms of behaviour, a time of revelry and disrespect, partying, drinking, doing things otherwise frowned upon by the establishments; a time of licensed misrule, suspension of hierarchies, a time of festive misconduct and transgressive inversions (Cresswell 1994; Louati 2016); the carnival is a moment when males can dress and act as women and vice versa (Murray 1998). In this sense, a carnival is a moment of queerness but one that provides cathartic release of pent up emotions in an unjust world replete with dispossession and exploitation. Neoempire needs such carnivals and rituals of queerness so that it can divert attention and have opportunities to renew itself. While neoempire renews itself, the masses of the dispossessed people are forced to rivet their attention on matters of orifices, sex

and sexuality in the carnivals, including around queer sexuality. Neoempire can continue to dispossess them of their land, mineral and other material resources.

It is not only the catharsis of queer sex and sexualities that is needed to produce laughters, smiles and joy in the midst of worldly dispossession and exploitation. The rituals of democratic elections are actually intended to have cathartic effects including laughters, smiles and swearings of obscenities among the dispossessed and exploited. Thus, even as transnational corporations and foreign states and governments dispossess, rob, loot and exploit Africans, the Africans are smiling, laughing, and swearing obscenities at one another over bare electoral rituals. The reason why Euro-America is keen to always monitor and observe African elections, even though Africans do not also monitor and observe Euro-American elections, is that the African elections serve Euro-American criminocratic world (dis)order that is in need of intermittent catharsis. The reason why Euro-America often demonises, assassinates and condemns some African leaders, on the pretext that they are dictatorial, is that such actions provide catharsis for the Euro-American world (dis)order. The African citizens would smile, laugh, and shout obscenities at their own imperially condemned, assassinated and demonised leaders thereby experiencing catharsis and blindness to the fact that it is actually the Euro-American world (dis)order that is oppressive, dispossessive and exploitative. In this sense, it is germane to remember that Euro-America is not necessarily observant of the rule of law, human rights, good governance and democracy (see for instance *The New Yorker* 10 May 2004; Balestrieri 2004; House 2015). Peoples of the world are often imprisoned and men are forced to masturbate in front of female guards, simulate sex on each other, forced to wear women's underwear on their heads and for all these crimes the Euro-American world is not prosecuted at the International Criminal Court (Goldberg 10 March 2006). Thus, the reason why they have put in place discourses of liberalisation, democracy, human rights, rule of law and good governance is to provide for catharsis for their world (dis)order.

Further to the above, the granting of independence to Africans was also meant to simply provide for catharsis because if this was really meant to be independence, then Africans should have been given back their land and other resources (Nhemachena, Warikandwa & Mtapuri 2017; Pheko 6 July 2017). Without restitution of land, independence is merely nominal and not real – the nominal independence is meant to provide catharsis and to act as a ritual of renewal for neoempire which, as is evident in the new 21st century scramble for Africa, is coming back to Africa. If empire really meant to give independence and human rights to Africans, then it should have addressed the deaths, suffering, bloodshed, including murders, genocide, severed head and hands, shattered families and other crimes committed during the enslavement and colonisation of Africans (Jalata 2011). The warfare, trickery, banditry,

kidnappings, burning of villages, raping, torturing, dividing and destroying communities, facilitation of civil wars, destruction of leadership and institutions and cultures during the enslavement and colonial eras have all not been addressed in real and substantive senses (Jalata 2011). In fact the transnational corporations continue to enslave, exploit, dispossess, destabilise and destroy African institutions and peoples (Honest Accounts 2017; Nhemachena & Dhakwa 2017). The transnational corporations are not tried for human rights violations, for violations of democracy, for absence of good governance and absence of the rule of law even when they violate human rights across the entire world. Because some transnational corporations fund researches and public institutions in the world, they also set the agenda for research and teaching in the universities and so the agendas are in the interest of the transnational corporations. Euro-American states that work together with transnational corporations are also not prosecuted for human rights abuses, for absence of rule of law and for lack of good governance (Fabbri *et al.* 2018; Benatar *et al.* 2008; Singh *et al.* 2005). It has to be remembered that international courts, including the International Criminal Court, are ultimately funded from transnational corporations' (African Business 1 October 2011; Kyriakakis 2016; Kaleck *et al.* 2010) exploitations, dispossession and robbery of indigenous peoples across the world. In spite of all these shortcomings, Africans have been encouraged to compete in attracting the transnational corporations that are wrongly described as "investors" when in fact they often come to Africa to dispossess, rob and exploit Africans, as is evident in the ongoing transnational land grabs in Africa (Nhemachena, Warikandwa & Mtapuri 2017). Itching for penetration and having no second thoughts about lying prostrate and flat, some Africans and their leaders have increasingly opened up their countries to exploitation and recolonisation.

Itching for Penetration: Counting on African Orifices

Many explorers, hunters and colonialists that travelled to Africa enjoyed not only penetrating the continent but also penetrating the African people's orifices. In this sense, colonial adventure was about penetration, including of the forbidden orifices, in ways that defied the rules, ethics, morals and laws that existed in precolonial Africa. Colonial penetration was not only about penetrating geographically faraway places but it was also about penetrating morally and culturally far away orifices – in other words, colonial adventure was about penetrating the forbidden orifices in forbidden ways. So it is noted that European hunters and explorers such as Frederick Selous had children by at least three African women including in the then Rhodesia and Botswana. After siring the African women, Selous hypocritically led the British Pioneer Column

which invaded Matabeleland in 1890s. Thus, having married an African woman and having stayed among Africans who mistakenly thought he was a mere hunter and adventurer, Selous showed the other colonialists the road to King Lobengula's palace (Safari Lodges 2006; Mushonga 2013; The Patriot 22 September 2016). Having penetrated not only the orifices of African women but also the orifices of Africa, Selous was awarded, in 1892, the British Founder's Medal of the Royal Geographical Society in recognition of his extensive explorations and surveys (Safari Lodge 2006). Euro-Americans were granted the privilege of exploring Africa as well as African women in a context where Africans did not have the same privilege to explore and penetrate Euro-America and European women (Mushonga 2013; Baxter 2014). Escaping from possible prosecution for homosexuality in Europe, some of the colonialists, missionaries and adventurers were in fact homosexuals like Cecil John Rhodes who also set up secret societies to support their causes in freemasonry homosexuality. Some of these colonial homosexuals were members of the freemasonry that had contributed to the reform of the penal codes of Europe including the abolition of the crime of sodomy in the 1700s (Dynes 2016).

Regarded as natural by some scholars and practitioners; also regarded by others as caused by slimming and thyroid pills (Bindel 14 December 2004; Sheldon *et al.* 2007), homosexuality is argued to be prevalent where there is less desire for children because of pressure on resources (Kuznar *et al.* 2015). Understood to originate from chemical modifications of the hormones and human genome as well as from consuming GMOs which also produce infertility (Balter 8 October 2015; Bawa 2013; Fang *et al.* 2003; The Washington Post 3 May 2018), it is notable that the gene that causes homosexuality has not been identified (Isaacs 2012). Although Robert Mugabe has been castigated as a controversial figure engaging in controversial land redistribution in Zimbabwe, hardly any attention is paid to the fact that the homosexuality that Euro-America promotes in Africa is much more controversial across the continent than is Mugabe. If to be controversial is to be discreditable, then homosexuality is discredited on the African continent because it is more controversial than is Robert Mugabe. Thus, in the same way Euro-America and their "civil" society organisations called on Robert Mugabe to be hacked down, I argue here that similar calls must be made by the same "civil" society organisations and Euro-American states for homosexuality to be chopped down. The point here is about the hypocrisy of Euro-America and its "civil" society organisations that would want to decriminalise controversial homosexuality while on the other hand they want to criminalise and incriminate Robert Mugabe allegedly because he is controversial. If homosexuality is, as is often argued, a human right in spite of it being controversial, Robert Mugabe is also a human being with human rights in spite of him being allegedly controversial.

The fact that Robert Mugabe's aging has been made to appear more controversial than homosexuality is shocking – the threatened impeachment of Robert Mugabe was premised on his old age and thus his alleged incapacity to discharge his duties as President of Zimbabwe but then why this was made more controversial than homosexuality is not easy to understand. Robert Mugabe's argument was that homosexuals do not discharge duties expected by African societies – to produce children for the continuation of society – yet it was only Mugabe that was threatened with impeachment for alleged failure to discharge duties to Zimbabwean society. Apart from this, Euro-America has not only demonised African leaders who criminalise homosexuality but they have also withdrawn aid to African states that criminalise, speak against or condemn the gays and lesbians (Plaut 25 February 2014; The Washington Post 30 October 2014; Seckinelgin 2018; Conistock 2016). Controversial as it is in African societies, homosexuality is considered to be a disease which Africans are not willing to normalise or legalise (The Washington Post 30 October 2014), in spite of the fact that the American Psychiatric Association (APA) has stopped defining homosexuality as a psychiatric illness (Sheldon *et al.* 2007). The problem here is that while homosexuals are not seen by APA as labouring under psychiatric illness, it is now those that do not approve of homosexuality that are portrayed as homophobic and as suffering from intolerant personality disorder (Holland 2004). Thus, the irony is that legislatures of Nigeria, Uganda and Gambia that have recently passed laws increasing penalties for existing offences and added new homosexuality provisions (The Washington Post 30 October 2014), are portrayed as suffering intolerant personality disorders. Holland (2004: 396-397) notes that:

Therefore, so-called homophobia should refer to a mental illness related to the fear of homosexuals or homosexuality. Interestingly, while homosexuals reject being considered mentally ill, they have no problems regarding those who dislike homosexuality as mentally ill...Some mental health professionals have proposed that racism, sexism, and homophobia constitute a form of psychopathology deserving its own category, namely intolerant personality disorder...Homosexuals have become so reckless in labelling others homophobic that the day is not far when someone will be labelled a homophobe for not praising homosexuality...

While Africans are urged, by some scholars, thinkers and “civil” society organisations, to embrace homosexuality and queer sexuality on the pretext that it is Africans' long forgotten tradition, the paradoxical thing is that other African traditions, including the so-called female genital mutilation, circumcision and virginity tests, do not similarly receive Euro-American support. The critical question here is, if homosexuality must be embraced by Africans “because it is

part of their long forgotten tradition”, must Euro-Americans also embrace theft, dispossession, enslavement of Africans, robbery and exploitation of Africans because it is part of their tradition to do so on the continent of Africa? “Civil” society organisations, NGOs and United Nations Organs have embarked on crusades to ban aspects of African traditions yet ironically they would want Africans to “retain” homosexuality on the spurious pretext that it is a long forgotten tradition of Africans. Deemed to be a cultural practice (affecting girls and adult women), female genital mutilation is noted as controversial for having adverse health consequences and to affect more than 200 million women worldwide who have undergone the practice (Andro *et al.* 2016; Gibeau 1998). Considered to be difficult to suppress and to have been subject to colonial attempts to outlaw it (Gibeau 1998), FGM is argued, by women involved, to be important in asserting their cultural rites – they see it as a necessary, obligatory ritual that lies close to cultural and social identity and autonomy (Gibeau 1998; Klein *et al.* 2018). The FGM is culturally deemed to promote chastity, preserve hygiene, enhance sexual pleasure, reduce desire for extra-marital acts, increase marital fidelity, and preserve premarital virginity (Klein *et al.* 2018). In spite of these observations by the women involved, there are concerted Euro-American efforts to eradicate the FGM as a cultural and social practice. While female circumcision [deemed to be female genital mutilation] is being banned as a cultural and social practice, it is being transposed to the Euro-American scientific field where it is called female genital surgery or female genital cosmetic surgery (Saini 2011; Magon *et al.* 2017). This shows that Euro-Americans simply oppose what they do not benefit from and they support anything from which they can benefit. Benefitting from female genital surgery, as they call it, Euro-Americans do not see that they are mutilating African cultures and societies by banning African cultural practices – mutilations happen at different levels such as the biological or physical and the social, cultural, psychological levels. Interfering with indigenous cultures and societies causes mutilations at such cultural and social levels.

Instead of providing African governments and states, like the Zimbabwean one, with funds to redistribute land, Euro-American states and governments are spending hundreds of thousands of United States dollars to promote gay rights globally (The New York Times 20 December 2015). Apart from this, the United Nations – which hasn’t provided funds for redistribution of land to dispossessed Africans – is also spending money making expensive trips to persuade African governments and states to recognise homosexuals or queers (Lusaka Times 16 April 2018; Van Klinken 2013). Married to women but encouraging African youths to accept homosexuality (Mkasi 2016; The Telegraph 28 February 2014), the Euro-Americans that are promoting homosexuality on the African continent have been dismissed by many African societies, states and communities. Seeking

to promote sexual dissidents (Ruvalcaba 2017), including queer ecologies (Ingram 2012; Rodemeyer 2018), some officials including from the United Nations have been described by some African societies as incarnations of AntiChrist and the devil (Van Klinken 2013). In a context where there is xenophobia and Afrophobia in Euro-America and other places (Michael 2015), it is ironic that those that perpetrate xenophobia and Afrophobia are leading the fight against homophobia. Why homosexual and queer identities are given more importance and pre-eminence, in Euro-American discourses, than are African and pan-African identities is cause for wonder. Similarly, in a state, such as America, that claims to champion antihomophobia around the world, it is surprising that African-Americans are subjected to so much state violence and Afrophobia that they have had to demonstrate in the #BlackLivesMatter (Ashebir 2017; Keeanga-Yamahtta 2016). In a world where Eurocentric scholars are urging Africans not only to accept homosexuality but also to refrain from worrying about matters of purity, it is cause for wonder whether homosexuality is not being promoted as a way to offload homosexual, succubus and incubus, spiritual forces onto African people (see Mushishi 2010; Boyd 2013; Aeondo *et al.* 2012; Ndzomo 2013; Nhemachena, Warikandwa & Amoo 2018; Nhemachena 2016; Deleuze & Guattari 2004). The point here is that impurities are associated with possession by evil spirits that also cause people to behave contrary to morality, ethics, unhu/Ubuntu and broader cultural precepts.

In the light of the foregoing, the promotion and celebration of dissident sexuality presuppose possession by evil impure spirits including by wandering spirits [*ngozzi* and *mashavi* – aggrieved and foreign spirits respectively] of the deceased that were not properly buried or that were deviant during their lifetime. Right from the early colonial era, some European traders, hunters, travellers, missionaries and colonialists [some of whom were homosexuals] died in Africa and were not buried according to their customs because they were far away from their homes – in this regard, they are considered to constitute wandering spirits that seek unwary human hosts who when seized become sexual deviants. In addition to these, there are also spirits of some Africans that were not properly buried and that were deviants which seize living human hosts (Nhemachena 2016; Nhemachena 2017; Bullock 1950). As Nhemachena, Kangira & Mlambo (2019) note, Cecil John Rhodes who was a homosexual was buried at the Matopo Hills, in 1902 – the precolonial era shrine for African ancestors. Effectively Cecil John Rhodes sought not only to defile but also to replace African ancestors because he considered the then country of Rhodesia, which he named after himself, to be his private possession. People who are aware of and do not want to be afflicted with the evil dirty spirits perform rituals, of *kurisirira*, to force them to go away and seek different unwary human hosts who are not worried much about impurity; in other words those possessed by evil

spirits do not worry much about becoming impure. Those possessed by evil spirits (*mweya yetsvina*) more readily open their orifices without much worries about risks of impurities whether arising from prostitution, homosexuality, ecosexuality or bestiality. In other words, the unwary humans become victims of *kurasiirira* and those that perform the rituals of *kurasiirira* dissuade the victims from worrying about becoming impure. In fact, they dissuade the victims from seeking and undergoing purification rituals.

In *kurasiirira*, the foreign spirit (*shani*) or *ngozi* (aggrieved spirit) is cast onto a live goat, fowl, pig, sheep, cattle or human being that is then left to wander “freely” in the wilderness, forest or mountain - for life - while carrying the impure spirit (see also Mpeperekwi 26 March 2015; Kwayedza 21 April 2017; Nhemachena 2016). In the light of these observations, this chapter argues that it is important to critically examine the kinds of “freedoms/liberties” that Africans are given by neoempire because some “freedoms” or “liberties” are in fact similar to those of *kurasiirira*. Animals and human beings who are victims of *kurasiirira* are not confined to spaces and places but they are left to wander about, to exercise freedom of movement, freedom of expression and so on but they are not allowed to undergo purification rituals or to become pure and original again. Encouraged by neoempire to forego essences of African identity and purity in favour of impurity/hybridity, Africans are put in the same realm as animals in *kurasiirira* – the foreign spirits and aggrieved spirits stay with human beings that are not worried about impurities. Having become impure and ambiguous or indiscernible or indistinct from animals or beasts, Africans are then given imperial [constitutional] freedoms including freedom of movement to wander about in the same way animals afflicted with foreign spirits and aggrieved spirit wander about freely in the wilderness, forests or mountains. Obviously, with the freedom of movement to wander about, while carrying the impurities, the animals are also free to engage in sexual activities without regard to morals, ethics, culture or inhibitions – after all they are not deemed to be living in a proper society anymore but in a “wilderness” characterised by states of nature, chaos, anarchy, violence, corruption, savagery, absence of laws, ethics and so on. In a similar way, neoimperialists do not consider Africans to have their own societies – to them Africa is a wilderness or a jungle in which Africans were discovered wandering (and full of impurities) “freely” without owning property, without sexual inhibitions; they are supposed to have been discovered without proper marriage institutions, families, religions, without languages of their own, without institutions of education, without governments and states of their own, without laws and economies of their own. In other words, for neoimperialists and colonialists, Africans were supposedly discovered while “wandering” in the wilderness and at the level of animals similar to those in *kurasiirira*. Having supposedly discovered Africans, imperialists then arrogate

purity to themselves and they portray themselves, in spite of the violence of colonial dispossession, robbery, theft, rape, plunder, looting, exploitation and neoimperial *kurasirira*, as serving missions to purify and cleanse Africans.

Even animals have “freedoms of expression” – wild animals bark in the forests: what distinguishes human freedoms and liberties from animal freedoms is the right to recover, own and control one’s land, minerals and other material resources. The point here is that since animals also have freedoms except to own land, minerals and other material property, African scholars should get worried when neoempire foregrounds and emphasises freedoms and liberties that exclude ownership and control of resources – in other words, they foreground and emphasise animal freedoms and liberties with regard to Africans. Human freedoms and liberties necessarily include ownership and control of one’s material resources including land and minerals. It is not the right to work or to “humanitarian” food aid that distinguishes humans from animals because animals also work and they are given food to eat. Freedoms of movement, freedoms of sex and sexuality and so on also pertain to animal freedoms and liberties particularly when they are offered without concomitant regard to rights to own and control and to have restitution of stolen resources. While some scholars present attenuated versions of Ubuntu that emphasise community, collectivity and relations, it is necessary to note here that Ubuntu and Chivanhu also underline restitution, restoration and reparations for crimes or damages perpetrated. It is this aspect of Ubuntu/Chivanhu that would most likely make Eurocentric scholars tremble and quake in their shoes because they would not want to ensure restitution, restoration and reparations to African victims of enslavement and colonisation.

The rights to recover, own and control one’s resources are connected to observations of rubrics of purity and possession of clear identities because if one is not pure and in possession of clear identity even the law may not be able to help in recovering what was stolen. Litigants for restitution, restoration and reparation have to have clear identities before the courts of law. However, Eurocentric scholarship is urging Africans to adopt hybrid identities, impurities, indiscernibilities, indistinctions, ambiguities and unclear affiliations. In fact Africans are urged, in Eurocentric scholarship, to forego their filial identities yet this destroys their genealogies which are important in claims for restitution, restoration and reparations. Once identities are mixed up, become unclear and impure, it becomes difficult for Africans to reclaim stolen resources, including land and minerals. This is why African marriages and families, which would otherwise ensure clear genealogical identities, are under attack in Eurocentric scholarship and discourses – some civil “society” organisations and NGOs attack African marriages and families in the pretext of fighting for human rights, equality and freedom (Nhemachena & Bankie 2017). The fact that restitution,

restoration and reparations for enslavement and colonial crimes would assist the cause of equality among Africans is ignored by the “civil” society organisations and NGOs – in essence, Africans are supposed to have equality in poverty and privation. The neoimperial promotion of prostitution, homosexuality, ecosexuality and various other forms of postmodern sex is, at the core, an attack on African genealogies, heritages, essence, purity and clarity of identity. In other words, there are economic, material and proprietary negative implications of neoimperial attacks on African genealogies, identities, essences, originality, families, marriages and purity.

Africans are being urged, in Eurocentric scholarship and discourses, to forego their African essence and claims about African identities are summarily dismissed as essentialism (Nyamnjoh 2012; Nhemachena, Warikandwa & Amoo 2018). The point here is that distinctions and discernibility are important in litigation processes for restitution, reparations and restoration yet Eurocentric scholarship is postulating theories on indistinctions, indiscernibility, borderlinkages, connections, relations and erosion of distinctions in the world (Deleuze & Guattari 2004; Agamben 2008; Nhemachena 2016). The critical question then is whether, in such a world, Africans are not made to carry the burdens of others in the mistaken belief that distinctions no longer matter? (Nhemachena 2016). In this regard, it is important to note here that since the enslavement and colonial eras, neoempire has been outsourcing its own problems to Africans – Africans have been made to carry the burdens and problems of empire for centuries already and empire would always want the Africans to believe there are carrying their own problems or burdens. Logics of *kurisirira* [outsourcing and sacrifice in this sense] require the trickster neoimperialists to confuse Africans so that they are not able to distinguish between their own burdens and those of the imperialists. Asking questions about whether the contemporary burdens and problems in Africa are purely and essentially African would enable the Africans to sift and sort and offload what is not theirs. However, Eurocentric scholars and thinkers discourage Africans from insisting on and seeking purity and originality – rather, Africans are encouraged to become impure, including by penetrating orifices particularly the impure and nonoriginal ones.

While virginity testings for girls and women is considered to reduce the spread of HIV, preserve societal moral values and while African boys, men, girls and women support it for enhancing self-dignity, purity, respect, marriages (Durajaye 2016; Mhlongo 2009), Euro-America seeks to eradicate this cultural, social and spiritual religious practice. Ironically, while on one hand, encouraging Africans to adopt homosexuality, Eurocentric scholars and thinkers are on the other hand dissuading Africans from maintaining their virginity. While on one hand glorifying homosexuality as a long forgotten African tradition, on the other

hand, the Eurocentric scholars and thinkers demonise the traditional practice of virginity testing as an “unscientific”, “unnecessary” violation of the human rights of girls and women; they argue that the tests are “detrimental” to girls and women’s physical, psychological and social well-being, the tests are condemned as “painful”, “humiliating”, “traumatic”, “disempowering” and “stereotypical” (The Pioneer 21 October 2018; World Health Organisation 2018). Thus, the World Health Organisation (2018: 4-7) argues:

The harmful practice of virginity testing is a social, cultural and political issue, and its elimination will require a comprehensive societal response supported by the public health community and health professionals...The practice of virginity testing has been reported in countries from several regions of the world. It appears to be most established in Asia and the Middle East; countries in northern and southern Africa; and, more recently, among some immigrant groups in Europe and North America...The statement expresses commitment to support efforts to eradicate all forms of virginity testing, thereby upholding the human rights of women and girls across the globe. The statement calls on governments; health professionals and their associations; international, regionals and national health agencies; and communities at large to take the initiative to ban virginity testing and create national guidelines for health professionals, public officials and community members, particularly in countries where virginity testing is widely practised...Virginity testing is a long-standing practice in several regions of the world. Countries where this practice has been documented include Afghanistan, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Malawi, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian territories, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe...It is likely that virginity testing is underreported, particularly in settings where this practice is not seen as desirable.

The problem in Eurocentric scholarship and thinking is that virginity testing is conceived narrowly and in a biological sense. I argue here that virginity can be understood in various senses including the political, social, cultural, epistemological, legal and spiritual senses particularly in relation to those that are inexperienced or neophytes. When Euro-American institutions dictate their human rights, democracy, rule of law, good governance and so on on Africans, the underlying assumption is that Africans are virgins in these areas and therefore they need initiation and testing. African leaders and states that are deemed to be failing the tests are similarly subjected to shame and dishonour, they attract condemnation, banishment, isolation and absence of support from Euro-America (World Health Organisation 2018). Paradoxically, while Africans are not supposed, in Eurocentric senses, to be pure virgins in the biological

senses, they are expected to be pure virgins in the sense of religiously following the edicts of democracy, human rights, rule of law and good governance as pronounced by Euro-America – any diversion or impurity is not tolerated. The electoral observation and monitoring which Euro-America subjects Africans to are in fact processes of monitoring the purity of Euro-American democracy, human rights, rule of law and good governance in Africa. As Robert Mugabe underscores, Euro-American rituals of political virginity testing are not necessarily in the best interest of Africans who need to tailor-make politics to ensure that Africans get restitution, restoration and reparations for enslavement and colonial wrongs. The subjection of Robert Mugabe to shaming, dishonour, isolation, condemnation, sanctions, withdrawal of aid and support all speak to the coercive nature of political virginity testing as Euro-America insists on the purity of Eurocentric democracy, human rights, rule of law and good governance.

While, on one hand, Euro-America advises Africans to religiously and purely follow edicts of Eurocentric democracy, human rights, rule of law and good governance, on the other hand, Africans are ironically deemed to be sexually permissive, to be sexually impure and to penetrate without distinguishing between pure and impure, original and nonoriginal orifices (Stoler 1989; Donovan 2014; Manirak 2006). Thus, Euro-Americans who forced enslaved African women to have sexual intercourse justified their actions by claiming that the African women were licentious, sexually permissive, sexually insatiable – regarding enslaved African women as sexually free, licentious and insatiable was in essence a way of saying African women were animals without restraints and therefore should be sexually available to the enslavers and their proxies. Similarly, contemporary efforts by Euro-America and some “civil” society organisations to eradicate African cultures, morality, ethics and etiquette that force sexual restraints, are in essence meant to create animals out of Africans that lose such restraints in the name of animalistic freedoms and liberty. There is no way people can eradicate cultural practices without at the same time eradicating the cultures within which the practices are embedded. Yet, to have one’s culture eradicated is in essence to become animalised and to enter the realms of beasts or to use Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) phrase, to enter a zone of indiscernibility between humans and animals/beasts. The problem with Euro-American interventions in Africa is that they often use pretexts which do not necessarily stand to close scrutiny. For instance, given the resilient master and servant relationships obtaining at a global level where Africans continue to be dictated to by Euro-America, Euro-America cannot pretend to be against hierarchies in African societies when its own interventions are premised on master and servant relationships at a global level. In this regard, Euro-America has become the mega “husband” of African men and women and so it threatens

to withdraw “aid” when the African “wives” refuse to be dictated to or when they become mean with their orifices. After all both African men and women are deemed by Euro-America to equally have orifices that are penetrated without distinctions or revulsions or questions about originality and purity. Empire survives on carnivals that subvert African conventional Godly order.

One of the biggest problems with Euro-American hypocrisy about equality is that they would want to see African equality before the eyes of neoempire but they do not want Africans to have equality with neoempire. In this regard, discourses of equality are nothing new, they are not even postcolonial or decolonial because even during the colonial era, African men and women were equally dispossessed; African men and women were equally exploited; African men and women were equally animalised or treated like animals; during the enslavement era, African men, women and children were equally exploited and abused. Claiming to be freeing or liberating Africans from their cultures, societies and from their supposedly dictatorial leaders is as old as the enslavement era when slave drivers claimed to be freeing the enslaved from their supposedly dictatorial and backward “tribal” chiefs and kings. In this sense, Africans are, on one hand, supposedly “freed” or “liberated” from their cultures, societies and leaders while, ironically, on the other hand, they are being shackled to neoimperial hierarchies, dictatorships, exploitation and vagaries. The point here is that Euro-American discourses about equality are not meant to free or liberate Africans from neoimperial shackles but they are simply imperial tools with which to demolish African cultures, societies, morals, norms, values, ethics, politics and so on. If anything, Africans are in fact becoming more shackled to neoimperial hegemonies, domination, dictatorship, authoritarianism and hierarchies, criminality and exploitation: the more Africans think they are freeing themselves from their protective nation states and governments, the more they become shackled to the Euro-American world (dis)order which pretends to be supporting freedom and liberation from nation states.

Thus, even as African men, women and children are encouraged to revolt from their local, indigenous, original cultural and social norms that are supposedly oppressive, the same Africans are ironically subjected to global sex trafficking or modern day slavery as is evident even on the internet (Baker 2016). Similarly, instead of having lobola paid for them in African marriage systems, “liberated” African women are typically traded for global commercial sexual purposes in a world with a growing commercial sexual economy where classified adverts on the internet and social media websites are in vogue (Baker 2016). The issue here is that one does not help a colleague or friend by destroying their culture, morals, ethics, social institutions and politics yet this is what Euro-American “civil” society organisations do in the pretext of helping Africans free themselves from such supposedly oppressive cultures and institutions. The logic

would be similar to someone who “helps” another person by destroying their house which they first condemn as confining: after the destruction they then ask the homeless “friend” to rent a room elsewhere. Thus, while Euro-Americans promise to liberate African women from supposed cultural sexual bondage, they are effectively developing their own global transnational sex industries which exploit the Africans who are made to believe that they have been freed or liberated from their “oppressive” cultures, societies and politics. In this regard, Baker (2016) notes that victims of sex trafficking industries in the United States of America come from East Asia, Europe, Mexico and they are kept in United States of America brothels, strip clubs, motels or hotels, truck shops and rest areas. The victims are also found in pornographic films, live webcam shows or in massage parlours.

It is noted that current revenue from sex industry for the U.S.A range between US\$9 billion and US\$ 97billion (Naughton 30 December 2018). Some traders in the sex industry based in U.S.A make US\$10 million a year (The New York Times 9 February 1981). Thus, “freeing” or “liberating” African men, women and children from their supposedly oppressive cultures, societies, morals, ethics and so on is crucial for the growth of the global multibillion dollar prostitution industry. Jeffrey (2009: 1- 79) captures this well when he writes:

The industrialization of prostitution and the sex trade has created a multibillion – global dollar global market, involving millions of women, that makes a substantial contribution to national and global economies...through these practices women’s subordination has been outsourced...The most important is the new economic ideology and practice of these times, neo-liberalism, in which tolerance of ‘sexual freedom’ has been merged with a free market ideology to reconstruct prostitution as legitimate ‘work’ which can form the basis of national and international sex industries – prostitution has been industrialized and globalized in the late 20th and early 21st century...In the mid-1990s extreme hard core pornography became popular amongst young men. This included such practices as ‘spit and gape’, where a man would stretch his partner’s anus as wide as it would go and place a speculum and hose into it in which he would spit or urinate. Anal and double penetration became requirements and what was known in the industry as the ‘airtight trick’, meaning, a penis in every orifice, gang rape, what is called ‘choke- fucking’, and bukkake, in which 50-80 men ejaculate simultaneously onto the naked body of a woman lying on the ground...The significance of US domination of the industry might justify it being seen as a form of American neo-colonialism...The pornography industry is now international in its production and distribution, in the trafficking in women which it facilitates, and in the damaging effects it has on women’s status in non-western cultures in which pornography is a new harmful practice. As the industry expands it seeks both new and cheaper environments in

which to produce the materials and new markets into which to sell it. Elements of the pornography industry choose to make porn movies in countries in which women are vulnerable to severe forms of exploitation and can be paid a pittance.

Used as cannon fodder for transnational or global sex industries, sexually “liberated” or “freed” Africans are exploited in cybersex including via remote control with VR goggles and where one can touch and grope from a distance (Mirror 18 April 2018). Participating anonymously, they use RealDoll equipped both for men and women, Cybogas which are only for females and they also use synthetic dolls which are equipped with genitalia and orifices; they also use dildoes attached to oscillating machines that can be controlled by wireless access or remote control – through virtual sex, there are experiments with different sexuality including homosexuality and fringe behaviours (Kosut 2012).

The upshot of the foregoing is that the decriminalisation of prostitution and homosexuality is meant not necessarily to free or liberate Africans – rather the neoimperial intention is to use Africans as raw materials for the increasingly global sex industry (Mgbako *et al.* 2012). In the same vein, Africans’ insistence on virginity testing will defeat the liberalisation of African sexualities and orifices upon which the global sex industry depends. African insistence on purity, virginity testing, originality, rectitude, morality, ethics and decorum is not good for the global sex industries and so it is not surprising that transnational corporations and foundations fund researches that condemn African virginity testing, African purity, fidelity, felicity, cultures, filiation, genealogies, heterosexuality, African marriages and marriage payments. Even as African men and women are demonstrating in support of purity and virginity testing, Euro-America, including the United Nations is carrying out crusades to ban African quests for purity, virginity and originality. It is noted about South Africans thus:

Hundreds of maidens marched to the office of the Premier in Pietermaritzburg in a bid to challenge the United Nations Human Rights, UN Women and the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) call to end virginity testing. Clad in their traditional outfit, maidens marched...while singing and dancing in support of virginity testing practice. This comes after a joint statement last month called for governments, health professionals and communities to act on eliminating the virginity testing practice (La Gazzeta del Sudafrica 9 November 2018).

In the light of the Global Compact between the United Nations and transnational corporations [which are now influencing policy at the level of the United Nations] (Nhemachena & Warikandwa 2017), the argument here is that the United Nations has been put to the service of transnational corporations that want to profit from African sexuality. The liberalisation of African orifices

and sexuality is a function of transnational corporations and foundations that are helping in building up massive global sex industries which use Africans as sexual raw materials. It is thus not surprising that transnational corporations and some Euro-American foundations sponsor researches that promote sexual liberalisation, prostitution, homosexuality, and condemnation of African cultures, mores and values that would otherwise enjoin sexual restraint contrary to the transnational sexual liberalisation projects. Having been constituted as a continent for colonial adventures, Africans are “supposed” to be penetrated through every orifice – the global sexual liberalisation projects are part of opening up the African orifices for neoimperial sexual adventures. Much as some “civil” society organisations advocate for open society initiatives in Africa, neoempire also advocates for opening up African orifices, whether pure or impure, natural or unnatural.

A few Shona proverbs will help shed light on the issues that are being raised in this chapter. Firstly, the proverb *hapana mbou inokumira mburu isiri yayo* (no cow lows for a calf that is not hers) (Fortune 1975), underscores the fact that those that appear to be helping us may have their own ulterior motives – they will not be lowing for Africans but rather for what they want out of Africans. Secondly, the proverb *zundu kugara mundove hanzi ndava mombenwo* (the caterpillar, by inhabiting in cow dung, thinks that it is also a cow)/ *zizi kurungwa munyu roti ndave bukuwo* (Gwaravanda 2011; Fortune 1975), warn Africans that they must not think they are Europeans/Whites simply because they are staying together with Europeans/Whites. Thirdly, proverbs such as *nzon hairemewi nenyanga dzayo* (an elephant does not feel the weight of its tusks) (Gwaravanda 2011), inform Africans that their states/parents were historically not weighed down by responsibility to their offspring/citizens – it is the neocolonial dispossession and exploitation of Africans that has made it difficult for African parents and states to take care of their children and citizens. Fourthly, proverbs like *gondo kuengerera huona zumbu* (if an eagle circles round and round it has seen a fowl – coop/continued presence is prompted by an ulterior motive) (Fortune 1975), warn Africans that the continued presence of neoimperial forces in Africa is due to ulterior motives – there is continued interest in dispossessing and exploiting Africans. Fifthly, proverbs like *zino irema rinosekerera newarisingadi*, underscore the fact that appearances are deceiving – one may pretend to like someone that they actually hate. Sixthly, proverbs like *mbosva inorondwa hakuna mbosva yakaita bonye* (Fortune 1975), advise Africans that no crime, including enslavement and colonial ones, becomes prescribed simply by the passage of time. Seventhly, proverbs like *dare harizondi munhu rinozonda mbosva* (a court does not hate a person but it hates the crime) (Fortune 1975), advise Africans that it is not out of hatred of the White race that Africans are claiming restitution, restoration and reparations for enslavement and colonial crimes – rather, it is simply because

Africans hate the crimes [and not the perpetrators of the crimes of enslavement and colonisation]. If the perpetrators and their descendants make good the enslavement and colonial crimes, it will become apparent that Africans do not hate the race but they hate crimes committed by some of them. The problem is that Euro-America hides behind the race card each time Africans demand redress to enslavement and colonial crimes yet the issue is not about race but the crimes committed. In the same way that it would be absurd for a criminal to simplistically claim that it is their gender which is at stake when in fact it is their criminality which is of concern, it is also queer for enslavement and colonial criminals to plead that Africans and their states merely hate their race. Race is an identity, it is not a crime and Africans know that very well, the relevant crimes involve enslavement and colonial dispossession, robbery, theft and exploitation. If Africans hated the races and not the crimes, they would not have treated European traders, explorers, travellers, missionaries and so on with hospitality before colonisation. The point here is that there is need to clearly draw distinctions between racial issues and criminal issues – Africans do not need ambiguity, indistinctions or indiscernibility. Ambiguity, indistinction and indiscernibility are more useful to those that seek to hide or conceal their criminality. Eighthly, proverbs like *kurembera kwedamba bakusi kuwa* (Fortune 1975), remind Africans that crises do not necessarily mean demise or death. In this regard, while global media images of crises in Zimbabwe were meant to depict demise, the proverb advises otherwise. Ninthly, proverbs like *chitende chinorema ndicho chine mbodzji* (Fortune 1975), underscore the fact that the most difficult things to do are often the most productive and fruitful – easier things are not necessarily the most fruitful. In this sense, the hardships that Zimbabweans underwent indicate that what they struggled for was the most productive and liberating thing if carried to full term or fruition.

If the repossession of land and other resources was not the most productive and most liberating for Zimbabweans, then it would not have attracted so much resistance from Euro-America. It is obviously easier to just pursue the discourses of sexual and official liberalisation than it is to fight for restitution and restoration of land and other material resources. The really liberating issues are hard to pursue and achieve because they attract opposition from neoempire; however, those things that bring phony liberation attract little or no resistance from neoempire because they do not threaten the core of the neoimperial world (dis)order. As highlighted above, carnivals provide opportunities for periodic rituals of reversals or rebellion. However, while neoempire allows for such reversals and rebellions – which provide it with safety valves for periodic release of pent up emotions – it does not permit its core to be challenged or reversed.

Orifices Do Not Suffice – the Repossession of Land Matters: Robert Mugabe’s Rejection of Queers

Although neoempire readily provides for sexual freedom or liberation of Africans from their cultures and societies, it opposes material or economic independence of Africans who desire restitution from the neoimperial core. So, while the United States of America’s Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) of 2001 professed to be interested in economic recovery (Gono 2008), African scholars have not asked whose economic recovery is the United States of America interested in. Naturally, when Zimbabweans repossessed their land they were interested to recover African ownership and control of the economy. Yet the U.S.A’s ZIDERA was clearly interested in Euro-American recovery of ownership and control of the Zimbabwean economy (Magosvongwe 2019). The problem is that some Africans may have mistaken the phrase “economic recovery” to mean economic recovery by Africans when in fact the U.S.A meant that Euro-Americans needed to recover the ownership and control over the Zimbabwean economy. The recovery, from the U.S.A’s point of view had nothing to do with Africans recovering ownership and control over their economy, including land. In other words, the point here is that because the U.S.A’s ZIDERA did not specify who it wanted to recover the Zimbabwean economy, it was shrouded in equivocation. Similarly, the U.S.A’s ZIDERA was equivocal because it did not specify whose democracy it was supporting in Zimbabwe.

The resistance of neoempire to Africans’ economic or material independence is evident right across the African continent. When Guinea demanded independence from French colonial rule in 1958, France unleashed fury wherein they destroyed schools, nurseries, public administration buildings, cars, books, medicine, research institutes, tractor, animals were killed and food in warehouses was burned or poisoned (Global Research 25 January 2015). In addition, the French forced some African countries to pay a colonial tax to France; through the colonial pact, France is up to now, extracting about US\$500 billion from former French colonies in Africa every year; the African countries are forced to deposit 85% of their foreign reserves into France’s central bank; African leaders who refuse to do so are killed or they become victims of coups but African leaders who obey are supported and rewarded by France (Global Research 25 January 2015). Similarly, since the colonial era in Zimbabwe, colonialists have looted and stolen land, minerals, and livestock from Africans (Cavanagh *et al.* 2016). To justify their looting and theft, colonialists argued that resources including land, minerals and livestock/cattle were not owned by ordinary individuals but they belonged to King Lobengula whom they were robbing and were thus seeking spoils from his kingdom (Cavanagh *et al.* 2016).

In this regard, I argue that colonialists were criminals, and not civilisers. Their robbery and burglary, they described as conquest; their looting and plunder, they described as development, modernisation and progress; their subjection of Africans to the level of animals/beasts, they called humanisation and humanism; their dictatorship, they described as democracy; the victims of their crimes, they simply described as poor, third world, underdeveloped, underprivileged, savages and backward. While they perpetrated crimes of robbery and looting, they misleadingly described themselves as developed, rich, modernised, industrialised, wealthy and first world. Neoimperial equivocations are part and parcel of the creation of ambiguities and the production of confusion that opens up orifices for penetrating Africans. In other words, some open up their orifices due to confusion, indistinctions and absence of clarity

While colonialists like Cecil John Rhodes pretended to be interested in friendship treaties with Africans, they actually wanted to penetrate Africans and then rob them of their land, minerals and livestock. So, Cecil Rhodes later made his interest clear when he quibbled that he ‘preferred land to Niggers’ (Edwards 2016; Brown 2015; Maylam 2002). In much the same way that Frederick Selous pretended to love African women whom he sired, he later made his interest clear when he led the pioneer column to invade and rob the Ndebele King’s palace. While Cecil John Rhodes pretended to be bringing civilisation and progress to Africans, he actually brought his homosexuality to Africans among whom he sought refuge from prosecution for homosexuality back in England (Maylam 2002). Because he was a homosexual himself, Cecil John Rhodes could not have forbidden or criminalised homosexuality in colonial Africa. Similarly, because colonialists including Cecil John Rhodes relied on freemasonry and illuminati that supported homosexuality back in Euro-America (Nhemachena, Warikandwa & Amoo 2018), it is not accurate to argue, as some do, that colonialists criminalised and banned homosexuality in colonial Africa – they were actually in support of homosexuality and thus against the criminalisation of homosexuality even in Europe (Aldrich 2008; Han *et al.* 2018). Thus, Aldrich (2008) notes that:

The imperial vocations of Rhodes, the Lyautey and James Brooke, the Rajah of Sarawak owed much to sexual ambivalence...Their pent-up urges were more likely to be vented overseas than at home...It is the homosexual tourist...more than any other, who has promoted the interplay of sex, travel and subversion...The colonies provided many possibilities of homoeroticism, homosociality and homosexuality...Some European men found sexual partners, whether for casual encounters or longer-term relationships, among fellow Europeans or indigenous men. Others enjoyed the homosexuality of predominantly male expeditions, military barracks, trading posts and missionary stations...The imbalance in the sex

ratio between European men and women, and the limited range of sexual partners in some outposts, encouraged 'situational' homosexuality...For some Europeans abroad...homosexual encounters were...part of the violence perpetrated throughout the colonial world...Colonialism and imperialism, in theory, aimed to set up homosexuality...Relations of power permeated colonial sexual culture. Non-European men were regularly and systematically 'objectified' and 'commodified'...European homosexuals were more interested in their partners' bodies than their minds...some remained blithely unconcerned about the political disenfranchisement, economic exploitation and cultural alienation to which colonialism reduced subject populations.

One thing that is clear from the foregoing is that colonialism and imperialism aimed to set up homosexuality in the colonies some of which, such as Rhodesia, were deemed to be the private property of homosexual colonialists like Cecil John Rhodes. Homosexual criminals fleeing from prosecution in Europe colonised Africa and set up homosexuality. In fact Europe is known to have shipped criminals of all sorts to colonies such as Australia – this is a kind of criminalisation of the continent of Africa by Europe. Europe criminalised the colonies by exporting its criminals to fill up the territories of other people. Because Europe criminalised the continent by filling it with criminals, including homosexuals, it is not accurate to argue, as some do, that European colonialists constructed, set up or enacted criminal laws to ban homosexuality and other crimes in Africa. In fact, I argue here that European colonialists came to Africa precisely to commit crimes including robbery, looting, plunder and exploitation and so they cannot be simplistically considered to have come to set up criminal laws to criminalise *inter alia* homosexuality. Where homosexuality was criminalised, the intention was to defend the European races such as in Nazi Germany (Chedgzoy *et al.* 2002). In Africa, the intention of colonialists was not to defend the African race but to commit genocide and to eliminate the Africans gradually and by drastic means. So, the thesis about the criminalisation of homosexuality among Africans would have been inconsistent with the intention of imperialists to open up Africa/ns for penetration, including by criminals. Because empire intended to eliminate the African race through various forms of genocide, empire promoted and still promotes homosexuality – homosexuality is genocide by other means. It is erroneous European assumptions and postulations about the existence of the Hobbesian state of nature in precolonial Africa which presuppose that precolonial Africans did not have states, politics, government, including criminal laws and courts against homosexuality and other crimes (Nhemachena, Warikandwa & Amoo 2018). While others have argued that it was the Church that condemned homosexuality as immoral in Africa, it is necessary to note the erroneous assumptions

underlying such an argument. It wrongly presupposes that there were no morals in precolonial Africa, it also presupposes that morals come only from the church and not from African religions, cultures and beliefs. It also ignores the fact that colonial churches acted immorally by dispossessing Africans of their land, livestock and minerals particularly as missionaries acted in collusion with other colonialists – some churches are even today built on land from which Africans were forcibly removed and dispossessed. In fact some churches were as complicit in the slave trade as they were in the colonisation of Africans (Nhemachena 2016; Schmidt 1992). Africans had their morals, cultures and ethics and humanism prior to colonisation and prior to the advent of the churches – and these precolonial morals and laws proscribed homosexuality as they also did incest, rape, adultery, murder, theft, prostitution, robbery and bestiality (see Nhemachena, Warikandwa & Amoo 2018).

Because homosexuality is associated with Cecil John Rhodes and his colonisation of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe's revulsion of homosexuality must be understood as in fact revulsion against colonialism and imperialism. His struggles against homosexuality are in fact struggles against neoimperialism and the figure of Cecil John Rhodes whose grave is in Zimbabwe. Because of the association between homosexuality and imperialism, Robert Mugabe should in fact be seen as fighting for the human rights and freedom of Africans who remain entangled and enmeshed in intricate imperial matrices of power, including ideological ones that explain mental colonisation. Rhodes, the homosexual and arch-imperialist did not love African human beings and human rights but he "preferred land to Niggers". Rhodes did not bring his homosexuality to Africa because of the love for African human rights but because of his love for African land, minerals and animals. In fact colonialists across the continent of Africa so much "loved" African animals that they collapsed African human beings into the category of animals and beasts that they marvelled at.

Because colonialists prefer land, animals and minerals to African human beings, they have always either collapsed African human beings to the level of animals or they have elevated animals to the level of African human beings. It is within this context that contemporary discourses on posthumanism, postanthropocentrism, transhumanism, biocentrism, ecocentrism, ecosophy, ecophilosophy, ecopsychology, animism, ecocriticism, ecosexuality, symmetrical anthropology, vitalism and vital materialism, new materialism, new age spirituality and cosmopolitics should be understood. A number of scholars have written about these aspects (see for instance Van der Zaag 2015; Hurley 1995; Boston 1996; Braidotti 2017; Rothenberg 1994; Naess 1989; Le Grange 2015; Grey 1993; Tinnell 2012; Latour 2004; de la Cadena 2010). The point here is that in the same way Cecil John Rhodes stated that he preferred land to

Niggers contemporary discourses about biocentrism, ecocentrism, postanthropocentrism and so on assume that land, animals and other aspects of nature are preferable to human beings. Discourses about postanthropocentrism and posthumanism deconstruct and decentre human beings on the pretext that it is nature that should be centred. Firstly, while other discourses including ecopsychology, psychoecology, ecotherapy, green therapy and reearthing (Boston 1996) seek to recognise interconnections between community, land and people, some of these discourses wrongly collapse African ancestral and Godly sacrality into surreal, non-tangible and cosmic forces. Secondly, while ecosophy or ecophilosophies focus on humanity's fit into nature, relating humans to earth (Rothenberg 1994; Naess 1989; Le Grange 2015), it is necessary to note that when Africans claim restitution, restoration and reparations for their land and other resources, they are not seeking to be related to nature or to be connected to nature but they are interested in owning and controlling their natural resources. Thirdly, while some scholars write about postanthropocentrism – which is argued to evade “anthropocentric parochialism” or “human chauvinism” (Grey 1993), it is important to note that discourses on postanthropocentrism seek to deconstruct autonomy and sovereignty of Africans. In this sense, discourses on postanthropocentrism deconstruct the doctrine of African state sovereignty over natural resources. Thus, along with discourses on posthumanism, transhumanism, eco-humanities, rhizomatic ontologies, ecosophies and postanthropocentrism, postulations on ecocentrism, ecocriticism, biocentrism, ecophilosophy, gaia, geocentrism, earthcentrism and immanence all seek to undo African state sovereignty over natural resources, including land and minerals. They undo African human autonomy and sovereignty by postulating geocentredness, earthcentredness, biocentrism and ecocentrism.

Thus, decentring African human beings, some scholars argue that Ubuntu/Botho and *ukama* signify relatedness to nature or the biophysical world (ecosophy/ecophilosophy) (La Grange 2015). Forgetting that Ubuntu and Chivanhu are essentially about African humanism and not about biocentrism, ecocentrism, ecosophy and so on, such scholars ignore the importance of *unhu* or humanness including morality and ethics and etiquette in Chivanhu and Ubuntu. Confusing Cecil John Rhodes’ “I prefer land to Niggers” for Ubuntu, some scholars have tended to recycle colonial doctrines and misrepresent them as decolonial or postcolonial novelties. In fact Ubuntu/Chivanhu encapsulates the imperative of reparations, restitution and restoration of what was stolen from Africans during the enslavement and colonial eras – this is a key moral, ethical and legal imperative embedded in Ubuntu and Chivanhu. Eurocentric scholars would of course want to ignore these imperatives and rather focus on other aspects of Ubuntu which are less unsettling to neoempire. Similarly, the

Gaia hypothesis presupposes animism, deny creation by God and it puts nature before [African] human beings (Gabrisova 2014) – in essence it shares the assumptions of Darwinism which underwrite colonisation by assuming that African human beings are connected or related to animals. In the light of the foregoing, it is argued by some scholars that feminism is not about humanism but nonhuman life (Zoe) (Braidotti 2017). But, if feminism is not about humanism but about nonhuman life, then it becomes clear that African women are simply being animalised in the same way enslavement and colonial era ideologies were used to depict the African and other colonised women as indistinct from queer beasts/animals. Feminism must help African women free themselves from enslavement and colonial era animalisations.

As evident from the foregoing, the Eurocentric shift from emphasis on human to nonhuman life is nothing new since African human beings were collapsed together with nonhuman animals and beasts during the enslavement and colonial eras. Slave drivers and colonialists were more interested in African natural resources (nature) than in the African human beings so they placed African ecologies at the centre of the imperial matrix in Africa. Africans were subjected to genocide often trapped, and their wells were poisoned as was their food as if to kill animals; Africans' human dignity was trampled upon because empire was more interested in African natural resources than in African human beings. Africans' cultural, social, legal, economic and political institutions were destroyed because empire was more interested in African natural resources than it was in African human beings. In fact Africans were dispossessed, robbed and exploited because empire considered them to be at the same level as animals or beasts that did not have rights to ownership and control of natural resources. The point here is that discourses on biocentrism, ecocentrism, geocentrism, earthcentrism, postanthropocentrism, posthumanism, ecocriticism and so on run the risk of legitimising colonial crimes that are already returning as an accompaniment to the new scramble for Africa. It will increasingly become difficult to defend human rights in postanthropocentric, posthumanistic, biocentric, transhumanistic and ecocentric world *albeit* governed by Euro-American humans. In other words, it is African humans that will increasingly be collapsed together with nonhumans and there will remain Euro-American elite humans to govern the emergent New World (dis)Order. We are currently witnessing a moment in which Africans are not only being dispossessed and robbed of their material resources but they are also dispossessed and robbed of their humanity – they are being animalised.

While some scholars celebrate posthumanism and transhumanism, others critique them. For instance Flores (2018: 381-385) writes:

...the transhumanists hide two subjects: the use of technological implants as a weapon against the citizen and the method they are developing their dangerous project which is suspected to be illicit human experiments in the world. Technological implants like brain nanobots might cause losing mind control and thus, the carriers can be controlled by others and lose their autonomy, they can be spied permanently with the cerebral internet and can lose their privacy, their memory can be deleted and can lose their identity...becoming human slaves at the services of the transnational companies and the economic powers. An objective analysis reveals that transhumanism is only an intellectual swindle that leads to a digital fascism, a society where millionaire elite will govern citizens with technological implants, who will be digital slaves at the service of an oligarchy...The transhumanists state that adding technological implants and inserting DNA in human beings will improve their condition; and would leave biological evolution and would begin an evolution based on technology, the posthuman species would be born...the citizens would be intoxicated with drinks and foods contaminated with brain nanobots or even would be kidnapped to install brain implants in them like the cortical modem or artificial hippocampus without their consent using the hospital surgeries mainly the neurosurgery...

In a world where indigenous people are increasingly demanding their land, neoempire increasingly relies on technology to control and suppress the demands. While some of the technology like social media is often described as enhancing democracy, freedom of information, human rights, transparency, good governance and so on, it is imperative to note that technologies are means of global surveillance by transnational corporations, global elites and secret service. In this regard, dataveillance or the global systematic monitoring of people is emerging (Esposti 2014; Medina 2011). Because empire is not necessarily interested in democracy, freedoms of expression and human rights of Africans but in monitoring people across the whole world, I argue here that its insistence on the freedoms of expression is motivated more by exigencies of global surveillance than by philanthropy or concern for human rights. Having inherited a world that is founded on robbery, theft, plunder, looting, dispossession and exploitation of Africans and other peoples, those that are at the helm of the world have to exercise constant surveillance to monitor and look out for rebellions, revolutions and demands for restitution, restoration and reparations. In order to monitor the dispossessed, robbed and exploited, empire has to encourage “freedoms of expression” so that it captures data about what is happening from across the whole world. The point here is that Africans and other colonised and enslaved peoples do not express themselves so that they are free in the world but they express themselves so that they get captured by empire that capitalises on the data for global surveillance. Put otherwise, African

freedoms of expression enable the capture of Africans by neoimperial technological corporations that use the vocalisations and expressions as raw materials/data for global governance. Africans freely express themselves against their states so that they get captured and enslaved at a global level.

Thus, projects of mind control, including via the insertion of chips into the body, are being developed by the military in the USA and they are used to control one's mood - the microchips are implanted into people's skulls (Collins 27 November 2017). Furthermore, humanity is increasingly being subjected to the editing and deleting of memories: this can also lead to biohacking the human body's most powerful tool – the brain (Martin 11 November 2017). With chips inserted into their bodies, including brains, Africans will possibly have their memories edited and deleted so that they will not remember the enslavement and colonisation – including the exploitation, dispossession, robbery and plunder for which many indigenous people are currently claiming reparations and restitution. Similarly, with chips inserted into their bodies and brains, Africans' moods, memories, and emotions will be manipulated such that revolutions will be easily stirred by neoimperial forces on the African continent – particularly against African leaders that refuse to obey neoimperial orders and edicts. Any African leaders who seek land restitution, restoration and reparations for enslavement and colonial dispossession and exploitation will be the target of revolutions and coups stirred from a distance using mind controlling technologies that are increasingly making up a tapestry around the world.

If “Facebook” and “Twitter” revolutions in North Africa were generated via social media used to stir the tech-savvy youths (Crofford 2015; Schafer 2015; Bonnefoy 2014), scholars and thinkers should anticipate that more revolutions will be experienced with the insertion of chips and nanobots into the human minds and bodies. But just like with the Arab Spring, the revolutions will not necessarily result in the betterment of the lives of Africans (Saikia 20 August 2016; Schafer 2015). With the insertion of chips and other devices, we witness again the empire's fascination with orificing [African] bodies for the sake of controlling them. In this regard, there are already some discourses about the permeability, partibility and dividuality of African bodies and personhood; and on the other hand, the individuality of Western personhood (Geller 2014; Duncan *et al.* 2014; Fowler 2004). These discourses could serve to legitimise the insertion of chips into African bodies, they can legitimise the relational ideologies that serve to deprive Africans of their autonomy, discreteness and sovereignty and forms of structure and order.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that empire has for centuries been fascinated with African orifices – liberalising African sexuality and popularising queer sexuality even as it has evaded restitution, restoration and reparation issues – including land restitution in Africa. Africans are consistently encouraged to practice, liberalise and decriminalise homosexuality in contexts where paradoxically the Africans are denied ownership and control of their land. It has been argued that Africans are consistently encouraged to seize control of their sexuality in a context where they are ironically denied ownership and control of their land. The chapter has argued that empire encourages Africans to practice liberalisation of sexuality particularly queers sex so that they entertain themselves with such sex and forget to reclaim their land. Therefore, the chapter has argued that Robert Mugabe's refusal to legalise homosexuality was in sync with his resistance to colonialism and recolonisation. The chapter raises questions about why Africans are ordered to foreground sex and sexuality issues in a context where they are interested in land restitution and restoration. In wrongly foregrounding sex and sexuality issues, it is forgotten that even queers need land to do their queering.

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The Queer Theory and Depictions of Robert Gabriel Mugabe's Views on the Zimbabwean Land Issue in Some Selected Literary Narratives vis-à-vis the (In)famous 2002 Johannesburg Earth Summit Address

Ruby Magosvongwe

Introduction

In the present chapter we appreciate how 'queer' Robert Gabriel Mugabe is on discourses of democracy, rule of law, human rights and land in a former African colony. Ironically, the conceptualisation of democracy, rule of law and human rights that have been 'universalised', and whose anchoring culture has not been disclosed, ignore the fundamental African adage of the unequivocal right to be heard: The Queer Theory as understood in Gaga Feminist literary criticism carries attributes and critical aspects that speak to the 'queer' position that Mugabe metonymically occupies in Zimbabwean politics on land, an aspect that formulates this chapter's major thrust. Robert Mugabe becomes the metonym of the Queer Theory in that he generates intense controversy as he goes 'gaga' on issues to do with sustainable development that cannot be wholly accomplished without the indigenous peoples' repossession of land as a stolen heritage. The post-2000 Zimbabwean agrarian reform, effected through land redistribution as an imperative, spells not only sovereignty, but self-expression and self-assertion as a rite of passage into the international family of humankind. We apply the Queer Theory to the marginalised and often silenced indigenous black African 'minorities', especially their demonised in/access to essential subsistence resources such as land and its subsoil resources, after the year 2000. 'Queer', like 'disability', is exclusionary and diminutive, partly justifying our appropriation of the unorthodox Gaga feminist scream by the often silenced 'lesser human beings' seeking sovereignty, space, legitimacy, as well as right to life choices and self-expression in society. We use Robert Gabriel Mugabe's 2nd September 2002 Johannesburg Earth Summit Address and other UN addresses where the former President addressed the land issue as a precursor to sustainable development in Zimbabwe, and sections of Ben Freeth's (2011) *Mugabe and the White African* as primary texts for referencing our appreciation of the 'queer fear of failure/betrayal' over the contested land issue in post-2000 Zimbabwe. The pertinent question resonates: How would the Queer Theory

describe Robert Gabriel Mugabe on the Zimbabwean ‘unsettled’ land issue: a Trickster, ambidextrous Daredevil, Villain, Opportunist or Nationalist Patriot?

For want of demonstrating ‘the danger of a single story’ (Adichie 2009) in appreciating the human experiences, queer sexualities included, and the dangers of adopting a monolithic narrative of Robert Gabriel Mugabe the politician, nationalist, social being, and the 37 year president of the Republic of Zimbabwe, variously shaped by and adapting to myriad demands and forces, we open our discussion with some remarks that we made at the 23rd February 2018 launch of Ken Mufuka and Cyril Zenda’s (2018) book on Robert Gabriel Mugabe: *The Life and Times of Robert Mugabe, Dream Betrayed (1980-2017)*.

Story-telling in our communities remains an integral part of human activity for a variety of reasons. The stories about our various leaders remain untold, thereby creating room for conjecture, speculation and loss of their true legacies. For example, how Mugabe and Tekere crossed into Mozambique to join the armed liberation struggle is not yet very broadly written about. The story of the first Black advocate to sit on the bench in the then Southern Rhodesia, and patriot, Herbert Wiltshire Chitepo, also remains locked away in some granary somewhere. The story about Samora Machel’s last fateful flight in that plane remains untold. The story of how Charwe grew up before she became a spirit medium of Nehanda remains untold. As they pass on, including those of their generations, their stories similarly die with them. When shall we be so that we can write about our own founding nationalists who inspired struggles for liberation and empowerment, not only in our country, but among the downtrodden generally? Sometimes when these stories get to be told, it is by people outside Africa. That is why the current project about Robert Gabriel Mugabe, a living icon of liberation, resilience, statesmanship and African triumphalism, is pertinent.

In writing and reading Africa, and Zimbabwe more specifically, schools of thought can never come to a consensus, which is quite admissible to any fair-minded and right-thinking human being. The agendas, aspirations, inspirations, motivations and general life’s outlook cannot be downplayed in the manner that story-bearers eventually give their accounts to their would-be audiences. Why are we using story-bearers, one might ask? Manuel (2009: 126) makes a critical observation:

It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, *their social being that determines their consciousness*. Where the physical environment and poor quality of public services combine to create a sense of abandonment, despair takes root.

Following Manuel's (ibid) analogy, it follows that the story-teller is a product and projection of his environment. In turn, it is the story-bearer who sets the tone, the mood, the atmosphere, and in multiple ways, subtly engineers the ultimate feelings and attitudes that his/her audience adopt and eventually hold on to. To this end, using the information in his environment, the story-bearer makes or breaks his/her audience; inspires or fires-up or alternatively disempowers his/her audience or the converse, depending on what one aspires to achieve. In our indigenous Shona worldview, story-tellers are the ones who die, who get spent out, but the story lives on, to be taken up by the next story-teller: "*Painepo*.... (Once upon a time)...*Ndopakafira Sarungano*... (There ends the story-teller)". The story of Zimbabwe lives on, because Zimbabwe outlives its citizens. Our stories build or destroy Zimbabwe, making our country triumph and live on, or struggle. The tapestry and beauty that Zimbabwe is, therefore becomes the responsibility of the *Sarungano*/story-teller, depending on what they set out to achieve. Impliedly, our writers are not hermits living for themselves on the fringes of society, and writing for writing's sake.

I have used the word tapestry deliberately. Threadbare and singular on their own, the threads that eventually make a quilt are most likely ugly, fragile, flimsy, and easily broken, and are therefore easy to discard. The same principles apply to the story of a country like Zimbabwe. The writers of Zimbabwe's story have taken the life of only one man, Robert Gabriel Mugabe, to be representative of ZANU-PF and post-independence Zimbabwe, its dreams, aspirations, strengths, foibles and character. That is quite intriguing, but also very sad. Ostensibly, it means all the blemishes/achievements are heaped on one man, the odd or queer one. The life and story of a country cannot be conflated and equated with that of a single man or woman, who like every human being, as is the case with Robert Gabriel Mugabe, has their own unique strengths, weaknesses, foibles, inspirations, aspirations and vision, with some Machiavellian in their endeavours.

To demonstrate the invidious place and role that any post-independence African leader occupies, Mugabe included, we cite Lord Macaulay's contested address to the British Parliament on 2nd February 1835:

I have travelled across the length and breadth of Africa and I have not seen one person who is a beggar, who is a thief such wealth I have seen in this country, such high moral values, people of calibre, that I do not think we would ever conquer this country, unless we break the very backbone of this nation, which is her spiritual and cultural heritage and therefore, I propose that we replace her old and ancient education system, her culture, for if the Africans think that all that is foreign and English is good and greater than their own, they will lose their self-

esteem, their native culture and they will become what we want them, a truly dominated nation (Lord Macaulay' 2nd February 1835).

Like Mufuka *et al's* (2018) book *The Life and Times of Robert Mugabe, Dream Betrayed (1980-2017)* dedicated to Heidi Holland and those that have been betrayed by the revolution of land reform, as reported by such writers as Ben Freeth and other white writers, a plethora of questions arise. Introspection demands that the readers interrogate this betrayal. Do those who have been betrayed by the revolution share the same background as Ben Freeth or Heidi Holland? At what point do their lives intersect? Like Shimmer Chinodya's (1989) *Harvest of Thorns*, when do our people start harvesting thorns? When does betrayal for Zimbabweans begin? How has the matter been tackled and with what results? The challenge is for every reader to interrogate the versions that have been propagated about Robert Gabriel Mugabe and Zimbabwe, and indeed add their own version for us to have a more holistic version of Robert Mugabe, the man. Who and what shaped Robert Gabriel Mugabe into the sophisticated/complex figure that he ultimately became? Where were we all, and what did we do as Mugabe mutated into the un/desirable ogre that Mufuka and Zenda confront us with in this book? These are some of the challenges that we must interrogate when writing our own versions of Mugabe and Zimbabwe. A monolithic version risks destroying the real story about Zimbabwe.

We adopt the Queer theory as a basis for political action and intrinsically driven transformation. As already acknowledged above, in the present chapter we appreciate what it is that makes Robert Gabriel Mugabe 'queer' on tackling land and sustainable development on behalf of Zimbabwe's poor majority unflinchingly in one breathe. Mugabe stands up against sanitised and "universalised" discourses of sustainable development, rule of law, democracy and human rights in a former British colony in southern Africa, Zimbabwe. "African land ownership and cultural identities are intertwined. Land is viewed as an essential key to people's sense of belonging and self-knowledge." (Magosvongwe 2014: 1). By extension, talks about human rights and sustainable development for Africans whilst ignoring the issue of land ownership and access, and people's sense of who they really are is not only pretension, hypocrisy and masquerade, but also sanitised lunacy. The contradiction and irony comes in in the sense that what is "universalised" as normalcy is actually lunacy, yet the stigmatised lunacy becomes the underpinning benchmark for rationality and genuine human rights. Just like the feminist cry against genderised oppression, abuse, domination, exclusion and violence, it is very much beyond the scope of anyone arguing from a position of privilege to understand, appreciate and empathise with the victims of perpetually normalised violence and violations. The latter qualifies Mugabe's sentiments and views

about that labyrinthine link between land and sustainable development in Zimbabwe. According to Dinitia Smith (Jan. 17 1998) “queer theory’ is about ethical responsibility. There is an ethical urgency about queer theory that is directed at the damage that [racial, class, ethnic, gender, religious, political and sexual] prohibitions and discriminations do to people.” For us, the link with literary criticism is scrutiny of the ripple effects of prohibitions and discriminations as depicted in selected texts and narratives about land in Zimbabwe.

Queer Theory as a prism helps us re-examine and re-look into conceptualisation of sustainable development and the intrinsic value of land from the position of an oppressed underdog, hence our choice of Robert Gabriel Mugabe’s candid and yet vilified address. Our appropriation of the queer theory emphasises and reinforces the predicament of seeking to establish space and recognition from the position of ‘death’ as a sub-culture against “universalized” and normalised exclusions from mainstream economies, cultures and policies.

Blacks’ right to sustenance and survival “as it functions today is a grave injustice” (Adichie 2014: 21), a subject that Mugabe’s address shocks his audience into confronting and reflecting upon. The queer theorists seek to shock society from positions of complacency and intolerance, in the process defying anxiety, panic and intensifying homophobic attitudes that arise out of rigid definitions relating to issues of gender and sexuality. The latter does not mean that we seek to sanction and legitimise sexual fluidity. We use the same shock principle to criticise rigid attitudes about the Zimbabwean Land Question and its labyrinthine links with Africans’ sustainable development. The approach helps us to interrogate the dissonance between real lived experiences by the African poor majority as espoused by Robert Gabriel Mugabe and the Western-propagated “universalised” principle of sustainable development. Ironically, the universalisms are premised on liberalism thriving on differential human worth whereby other races, beneficiaries of colonial looting and plunder, are regarded as more human than ‘others’ thereby deserving international protection. The latter contrasts sharply with the indigenous Blacks who are perpetually decimated for fighting for similar right to sustenance, survival and sovereignty. Borrowing from the boldness and zest embedded in feminists like the often morally maligned Lady Gaga, contextual interrogation to construct solutions becomes an imperative. For example, why does Mugabe throw all caution to the wind and speak with sternness like one possessed on a subject as controversial as the land imperative for sustainable development in Zimbabwe? “Blunt and hard-charging” (Adichie 2014: 22), like Lady Gaga, Mugabe is canonised a tough-go-getter as a result.

Borrowing the same principle of challenging rigid definitions and “universalised” approaches to sustainable development and traditional modes of knowing that pigeonhole and restrain potential for growth, self-knowing and self-actualisation, the present chapter appropriates similar rationality in its discussion of African sustainable development as espoused by Robert Gabriel Mugabe in his 2002 Johannesburg Earth Summit address. Mugabe appropriates the cultural significance of land and fuses it with the concept of sovereignty/independence, to explain the inextricably intertwined and deeply intense personal issues of land, sustainable development, identity and self-assertion in Zimbabwe.

Denouncing hypocrisy and oppression of the incorrigible ‘I’ in Zizekian parlance, the Queer Theory essentialises, as understood in Gaga Feminist literary criticism, and carries attributes and critical aspects that speak to the ‘queer’ position that Mugabe metonymically occupies in Zimbabwean politics on land and rights to being, an aspect that formulates this chapter’s major thrust. Speaking metaphorically, Robert Mugabe becomes the metonym and epitome of the Queer Theory and African manliness and masculinity. The ‘primitive’ masculinity that Robert Mugabe displays, as will be evidenced by the in/famous 2nd September 2002 Johannesburg Earth Summit Address, challenges the Western lynch mob in its veiled guises as champions of rule of law, democracy and governance, and its capitalist ideology that continue “cannibalising” (Nhemachena, 2018) the unsuspecting African indigenes. In their perceived ‘weakness’, the latter continue fighting to retain sanity and their piece of the earth where Western colonial settler minorities, with the support of the Western multinational companies, continue inching away the remaining pieces of land that the perennially disenfranchised Africans strive to retain unconditionally as their own heritage (Mafongoya *et al.* 2015). Like the Queer Theory and Gaga Feminism in the ears of the ‘civilised’ conservative West, Mugabe generates intense controversy as he goes ‘gaga’ on issues to do with Black Africans’ repossession of land as stolen heritage, muffled self-expression, self-assertion and restrained demonstration of real sovereignty. To a critical mind, Robert Gabriel Mugabe’s unprecedented September 2002 Johannesburg Earth Summit address is metonymic of a rite of passage into the international club of world leaders.

We apply the Queer Theory as an entry point into discourses of sustainable economic and cultural development among the marginalised and often silenced indigenous Black African ‘minorities’, especially against the backdrop of Black Zimbabweans’ demonised land reform and land redistribution programmes that rocked the boat of economic dominance and continued exploitation and manipulation of the marginalised Zimbabwean greater majority, ushering in the current myriad crises in post-2000 Zimbabwe. The latter throws well-meaning

critics back to the fundamentals (Du Bois 1999: 80), aspects that Robert Mugabe addresses in his 2002 Johannesburg Earth Summit address.

The continued exclusion of the indigenous Black majority and rightful owners of the Zimbabwean land from the mainstream economy that is mainly agrarian based, and continual exclusion from essential subsistence resources such as land itself and its subsoil resources, could neither be explained nor retained after the year 2000 (Sadomba 2011). Thus, marking 2000 the watershed in Zimbabwean post-independence experiences, but not without its complications. We argue that 'Queer', like 'disability', is exclusionary, diminutive and out of sync with normalcy and normative conduct as designed and dictated by the larger society. Similarly, Africa's 'little' man's demand for sovereign right to land and independent pursuit of sustainable development strategies on African principles and self-defined terms, cannot be anything else but an aberration. The latter partly justifies our appropriation of the unorthodox queer theory's conceptions of self-assertion, self-preservation, sovereign and independent identities, self-expression, peculiar self-categorising and demand for human space as a sub-culture that the Gaga feminist scream, often judged and ferociously silenced, symbolises and represents.

Proponents of Gaga feminism like Judith Jack Halberstam (2005) claim to argue and agitate for accommodation, acceptance and recognition of those they believe are treated as 'lesser human beings' whom they argue have legitimacy and right to human space in society, like any other human beings. Judith Halberstam's (2005) expose of the queer time and place, though used in appreciation of the often demonised and silenced female masculinity, chimes in well with our exploration of Mugabe's candid, 'unbridled' and unapologetic demand for African land for Africans so that Black Africans cannot remain beggars and puppets to the Westerners on issues to do with their own sustainable development in Africa. Clearly evident in Mugabe's stride is unflinching courage to go against the Western-engineered capitalist globalisation agenda that further alienates the poor Africans from their natural heritage of land and resources.

It is common knowledge that the 1884 Berlin Conference's parcelling of African land and its inhabitants among 'big' European powers concretises European racial superiority, openly disregarding African humanity and sovereignty, and 'decomposing' their territorial boundaries and humanity (Nhemachena, Benyera and Mtapuri 2018: 269), thereby championing the legacy of unjust inequalities, dispossessions and dehumanisation of the African personality. As evidenced by Robert Mugabe's address, the latter aspects must be transcended if Africans are to truly liberate themselves (Armah 2010) and champion their own development, on their own terms and self-sustaining principles. Mugabe's address resurrects African masculinity and personhood, in

itself a defining moment that takes readers and critics back to the championing of the historical Zimbabwean armed liberation struggle and its undergirding values and principles that mobilised the Black majority to fight for their own existence and sustenance.

We use Robert Gabriel Mugabe's 2002 Johannesburg Earth Summit Address and other UN addresses where the former President addressed the land issue in Zimbabwe, and Ben Freeth's (2011) *Mugabe and the White African* as primary texts for our appreciation of the 'queer fear of failure/betrayal over survival' specifically over the land issue in post-2000 Zimbabwe. The pertinent question resonates: How would proponents and advocates of the Queer Theory describe Robert Gabriel Mugabe on the Zimbabwean 'unsettled' Land Question: a Trickster, ambidextrous Daredevil, Villain, Opportunist or Nationalist Patriot? The appreciation of the combative language couching his address provides the primary evidence for our discussion on Mugabe and land in Zimbabwe, which could be extended to Africa and other colonially dispossessed regions. One fact is evident: Robert Mugabe tears to pieces partisan legalism that exists to protect rights of a select few instead of saving the weakest members of society. In his queer isolation, he also demonstrates that spineless humility in the face of adversity further takes away the invaluable characteristic to any individual's freedom/ultimate liberation: "[Being] yourself, [because] if you surrender your personality, you have nothing left to give to the world" (Blyden 1887). Digging from his cultural resources, the African must therefore advance by "methods of his own, to carve out our own way" (Legun 1962: 20).

Cursory Glance at Robert Mugabe's Queer Land Experience in Zimbabwe

The Queer Theory demand that queer sexualities and transgender be appreciated in the context of their backgrounds as generalisations of sexualities tend to mask and marginalise those who are peculiar under the guise of stereotypes and socially carved out performance spaces. Contextualisation in this regard rivets both demand for space and right to being, self-assertion and self-expression, like any other human being. "Stereotypes limit and shape our thinking, especially about Africa" (Adichie 2014: 3). In like manner, to avert dangers of stereotyping, in our analysis we find it prudent to appreciate the background of Robert Gabriel Mugabe before vilifying him about the highly cited 2002 Johannesburg Earth Summit Address, particularly the blunt demand: "let me keep my Zimbabwe". What is the basis of Robert Gabriel Mugabe's outburst? What is it that generated such anger as evidenced by that seemingly unsolicited outburst? Anger has a long history and build up. Once ignored, left

unchecked and stifled, it bursts. Langston Hughes's (1995) poem "Dream deferred" encapsulates the dilemma and ripple effects succinctly using the line "What happens to a dream deferred?"

Race, as a basis for human worth and classification of humanity, especially the right to accessing resources and meeting human needs, remains a grave injustice in former colonies like Zimbabwe. Muzondidya (2009) and Chigara (2012a & b) explore the folly and inconsistencies in relation to selective protection of property rights in the Lancaster House Constitution that remained intact and unscathed for the first ten years into Zimbabwe's independence after a protracted armed liberation struggle. If the major reason why people had to fight, which was primarily to dislodge foreign domination and have access to principle resources under sovereign rule, continues being trivialised, anger and trouble remain inevitable. And postponing resolving the matter intensifies the anger.

Mugabe, an erudite Kutama missionary-educated Roman Catholic and civilised Afro-centric politician belonging to the school of the pioneer African nationalists, was the man at the helm of authority/power in Zimbabwe from attainment of political independence in April 1980 till his ouster on 7th November 2017, totalling almost 38 years (Mufuka and Zenda 2018). Mufuka and Zenda (2018: 18) cite Martin Meredith's conversation with Mugabe about his experiences at Kutama Mission where he grew up, focusing more specifically on White supremacy and Black inferiority in the then colonial Rhodesia, conditions that undoubtedly shaped his attitudes, perceptions of identities, social relationships, and life's outlook:

The white man was infallible. He was ruler to be obeyed....There was no way we could remove the white man. He was power. He had guns. He had subdued everybody through security forces...

There was no place where the physical imposition of white superiority and the forced acceptance of black inferiority was more glaring than at a mission village. *Even the land they tilled was not theirs*, as would have been the case in a village under a chief (Mufuka and Zenda 2018: 18).

The excerpt is self-explanatory concerning who the owners of the land and the economy in colonial Zimbabwe were. With Zimbabwe's economy being largely agrarian-based, it goes without saying who the owners and beneficiaries of the country's wealth were at the time. It is the same deeply entrenched system that was transposed onto post-independence Zimbabwe as enshrined in the Lancaster House Constitution. Retaining the inequalities meant continual marginalisation of the Black majority and continual privileging of the minority White settler clique that had been favoured by the colonial laws (Muzondidya

2009). Mufuka and Zenda (2018: 71-72) highlight the great expectations out of the armed liberation struggle, and rightly so:

While in Mozambique, the liberators had been promised that when liberation came, they would be resettled on newly-conquered land, given lifetime pensions and other lofty featherbeddings...

...many European families were multiple farm owners, 4 000 farmers owned 6 000 farm units in total.

Thus, “[t]he fact that his father left Kutama Mission in search of a liberated life in Bulawayo, was not unusual” (Mufuka and Zenda 2018: 93), because of the “incurable spiritual [and psychological] scars” authored by a system and life history that shows the White man disregarding respect for the “native, no real friendship for him, that he regards him as an inferior being and treats him like a dog” (Mufuka and Zenda 2018: 94). Like Judith Butler’s (2009) feminist notion of ‘gender performativity’ and proscribed/prescribed spaces that the female gender in traditional societies must occupy, the smothering effects on the psyche of the dehumanised Other should not be underestimated, particularly individuation and the attainment of self. We therefore underscore recognition of the net psycho-spiritual scars alluded to earlier. Using Kutama as a microcosm, the fate of the African at the time, even after independence despite the veneer of international diplomacy, remained gruesome. Efforts to amend the notorious exclusionary and apartheid Land Acts met stiff resistance from the White farming community that funded the No Vote for the February 2000 Constitution Referendum that advocated land redistribution (Raftopolous 2009). Arguably evident is that intrinsic redistribution of land would bring closure to a colonial life of robbery, immense exclusions, inequities, inequalities, discrimination and socio-politically-engineered poverty of the greater indigenous majority for which political independence was believed to unlock. With minorities remaining hard-nosed over land continues complicating and disregarding the much needed social cohesion in a democratic society.

To therefore separate Robert Gabriel Mugabe the man, politician and erudite strategist from the environment that shapes him would thus not only be Herculean, but also wishful thinking. It is him who feels the pinch who knows how much it hurts. A prisoner for 11 years for fighting against colonial rule before joining the armed liberation struggle in Mozambique, and rising to chair the revolutionary ZANU PF-led government, ideologically demonstrates that Mugabe has serious reservations with “Eurocentric human rights that have failed to humanise Africans who have remained underdogs in a neo-imperial world which regards Africans as unworthy of humanely restitution, restoration and compensation for (neo)colonial dispossession” (Nhemachena 2018: 78).

Culturally de-centred and maligned by the very forces that shape him, Robert Mugabe's gaga 'scream' at the historical 2002 Johannesburg summit deserves critical attention.

Land in the colonial and post-colonial phases has always been racial and political. In Ben Freeth's (2011) *Robert Mugabe and the White African*, commenting on and protesting against the peasant-led and war veteran-engineered post-2000 land occupations (Sadomba, 2011), and murder of some resisting White farm owners, the White narrator-cum-writer observes:

It was as though the mob wanted to rub out all white farmers. They wanted to erase us as a people and return the land to the way it had been many years before – a place of insecurity and hunger and escaping from invading, looting tribes (Freeth 2011: 47).

The picture painted is reminiscent of Harrison's (2006) Africa sliding back into the 'dark abyss'. Ironically, the 'invaders', depicted in none human terms, are depicted as being responsible for unleashing chaos and violence, deserving punishment and public humiliation. Contrary to Barclay's (2010) decrying racialised land practices in Zimbabwe whereby Whites are land-owners with Blacks as labourers, Saunders in Harrison's *Jambanja* (2006) refers to the land occupations as Black self-inflicted penury. In Ben Freeth's narrator's view, the state under Mugabe is responsible for unleashing the violence, in itself a "bitter betrayal" that "ate away at the farmers and made them, through clenched jaws, feel like leaving Africa to its own awful, self-destructive fate" (Freeth 2011: 48).

Selective and self-serving historicising of land depicts the original beneficiary of colonial looting and apartheid development as the victim, ignoring the intervening efforts and legal instruments aimed at peacefully reversing colonial land injustices (Harrison 2006). In the narrator's pernicious view there is no allusion/reference to the original land injustices against the same 'looting tribes'. In Ben Freeth's autobiographical novel, he depicts the land-occupiers as 'looters', 'invaders', 'groups of looters', 'mobs', and 'gangs moving in greater numbers' (Freeth 2011: 48). "They (Blacks), called it revolution, the Third Chimurenga. It was an excuse to complete unfinished business from the First and Second Chimurengas. The spirits of jealousy and greed were in control" (Freeth 2011: 59). Without admitting to the violence and injustices of colonialism, Freeth depicting White victims at land occupations as martyrs (Freeth 2011: 68) further castigates: "The reason that Africa is hungry is not because of physical factors; there is absolutely no reason why Africa should be hungry. Africa is hungry because of the covenant with death and web of lies in which it has encased itself" (Freeth 2011: 70). Throughout his narrative, like Mufuka and Zenda (2018), Freeth maligns the land moves as a curse on

Zimbabwe. Mufuka and Zenda (2018: 168) ironically castigate Mugabe for Zimbabwe's post-independence socio-economic and political woes: "Mugabe's reign...destroyed all the economic progress that had been bequeathed by the colonial regime", again exhibiting the scourge of psycho-intellectual dehumanisation visited upon the so-called educated elite.

In the indigenous Shona worldview, land is the basis for identities, relationships, spirituality, existence, sustenance and sustainable development (Magosvongwe 2014; Ferris and Moitui, 2011). Ironically, in Mugabe's Zimbabwe then, those holding the keys to land and the economy were minority White settlers pitted against the disenfranchised indigenous Black majority viewed as a stock of labourers (Barclays 2010). Contrary to custom and tradition, the colonial settler dislodged the original owners using muscle of military supremacy (Schreiner 1897; Johnson and Martin 1981; Thomas 1996; Mukonori 2017). Tradition dictates that "a visitor to a strange land must be humble enough not to choose the highest ground in the land to build his home" (Vera 1993: 12). These people disregarded both the people and their customs, plundering and destabilising the African communities in the process. Using Robert Gabriel Mugabe's 2nd September 2002 Johannesburg Earth Summit address as both case study and entry point, the chapter recasts an appreciation of the centrality of land and sustainable development among the marginalised and colonially disenfranchised peoples of Zimbabwe against an exclusionary and obstinate capitalism that criminalises the poor and the oppressed. As already shown in Freeth's narrative, references to some selected White-authored narratives castigating the infamous post-2002 FTLRP and peasant-led land occupations help to demonstrate the imbalances and the unsavoury task confronting Mugabe about land and social injustices in Zimbabwe. With the foregoing backdrop, it is hoped genuine critics may arrive at a balanced appreciation of how and why Mugabe becomes angry, daring, obdurate and queer in the eyes of Western-centred discourses about land in Zimbabwe.

Mugabe's address that we use as a case study, particularly its perceived accompanying vitriol against the Tony Blair-led British Government, has attracted unbridled controversy from the international community. Yet, Mugabe's context continues to be ignored, showing impartiality and a judgemental approach that demonstrates unwillingness to understand, negotiate, embrace and 'rehabilitate'. These are some of the dangers surrounding the depictions of land tensions/conflicts of post-2000 Zimbabwe. Unqualified arguments disregarding the socio-historical and political contexts exacerbate the deepening rifts: "Mugabe's policies had not yielded tangible results for Zimbabweans, the increasing unemployment and migration of industries to neighbouring countries [at the onset of peasant-led land redistribution] being his Achilles heel" (Mufuka and Zenda 2018: 83). Further, the international

sanctions like America's Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Agenda (ZIDERA) imposed against Zimbabwe by George Bush's administration in support of the European Union punitive measures against Mugabe's 'mischief-making' (Raftopolous 2009), testify to the acrimony that the Zimbabwean Land question continues to generate.

Continued debate and contradictory schools of thought that focus on the ripple effects of Zimbabwe's land reform alone, especially corruption, disregarding the larger global factors at play have not helped the situation either. Thus, demanding that serious scholarship adopts holism in appreciating how best sustainable development can be achieved in post-2000 Zimbabwe without heaping all reasons for the different forms of instability on the personality of Mugabe alone. The latter sounds a call to interrogating a sustainable solution to sustainable development in Zimbabwe, taking us back to the basic fundamentals: a fairer system where access to basic subsistence resources such as land is neither premised on race nor class. Every Zimbabwean requires re-education and rewiring over the matter, especially unconditional access to land as a primary subsistence resource (Chigara 2012b). Sustainable development hinged on selective capitalist criteria of the already privileged owners of land doubly privileged with unfair access to basic economic resources can never for an iota be the formula for sustainable development for all in Zimbabwe.

Using the Queer Theory that we will explain later, it is undeniable that the heritage of the White man's burden (Rudyard Kipling 1939) of civilising the colonies is inscribed and evident in the fleecing of the dispossessed indigenous owners of land. The realisation is what partly inspires the eloquent and unflinching champion of people-centred civilisation that Mugabe turns out to become. The intertwined nature of Mugabe's background and the forces that mould him into the eventual 'creature' that he ultimately becomes cannot be blamed on him alone. At the centre of the Zimbabwean 'crises' and incessant controversy is the Land Question with the highly controversial Robert Gabriel Mugabe the statesman essentially a key player and kingpin. The latter school of thought gets closer attention in our analysis of the 2002 Johannesburg Earth Summit Address, but only after identifying a few elements about the queer theory that helps to undergird our appreciation of Robert Mugabe's vilification by cannibals wanting to finish off Zimbabwe, and not empathetic human others.

How 'Queer' is the Queer Theory in Theorising Mugabe and Quest for African Sustainable Development?

Within the context of Zimbabwe's armed liberation struggle, fundamental questions of livelihoods and sustainable development, *a priori* without which we can talk about any other rights. All other rights hinge on survival, sustenance

and equitable access to the key enablers of existence. Conceptualisation of rights should be ethnographic, taking into account the livelihood trajectories and cultures of respective societies and communities. This calls to question the liberal ideological lacuna which insists on what other schools of thought could view as peripheral. We admit from the outset the intrinsic value that our choice of the Queer Theory brings to the study, particularly appreciation of stigma, exclusion, to be maligned, criminalised and eventually marginalised and shut out of mainstream society, taking Robert Mugabe's views about Zimbabwe's Land Question as a case study.

Historical backgrounds and world dynamics that have given rise to the octogenarian screaming to the United Nations general assembly demand critical attention. The scream out of Robert Gabriel Mugabe's queer position is thus the focus. Mugabe's scream debunks the myths about the Marxist political economy. His scream, as will be shown, is a rite of passage, like a baby's scream at birth. He inscribes his presence in world affairs and right to being: *Nenino ndiri mupenyu*/I too am alive! Going outside the logic and idealised notions of normativity, 'queer'/gaga/crazy scream goes against constraints, prohibitions, curtailments to freedom as an ideal, offering a none puritanical mode of thinking about freedoms and alternative way of thinking that is relevant to politics/sustenance and survival. Unreadable to some schools of thought, in like manner when focusing on 'sexual minorities', queerness helps us to tame our erstwhile opponents, compelling one to understand how other people think of Otherness (Halberstam and Russell 2013), especially when reading tropes of Othering as representative of cultural rigidity.

The Queer Theory advocates activism for self-expression, self-assertion, and space for those members of queer sexualities and transgender who feel mainstream society and cultures continuing to judge, exclude, stigmatise, malign and marginalise them. To that end, we argue that Mugabe's address activates new sets of political meanings and references, challenging hegemonic racist performance spaces for the incontrovertible African Other. Just like Brooks aesthetics of opacity in gender and sexuality studies, and locating textual darkness is an interpretive strategy and a mode of reading the world from a particular dark position (Halberstam 2005: 97). Similarly, by theorising the 'queer' in Mugabe's address, readers are encouraged to read the Zimbabwean land experiences within the context of western hegemony and continual dehumanisation of the 'inferior other' from the soft underbelly. The latter forces readers and audiences to think about and bring on board historical contextualisation in textual analysis as traditions of performance and modes of dissent and resistance, including queerness of failure "as the dark landscape of confusion, loneliness, alienation, impossibility, and awkwardness" (Ibid), socially connecting individuation to unbecoming.

Given the context of the armed liberation struggle against the backdrop of the complex intricacies of Western hegemony and smothering/suffocation of the formerly colonised, “[w]e may have to look through and beyond rights talk for an archive that better contains the embodied, affective, and political experience of race, sex, sexuality, and freedom in Southern Africa (Hoad 2007: 89). How can sustainable development be nuanced within the specificities of Zimbabwe’s colonial and anti-colonial struggles? Can historical inequities and variables of race be ignored for genuine sustainable development to be achieved? As long as sustainable development, human rights, rule of law and democracy “take away meaning from the poor, the unemployed, ... the racialised immigrant, the queer” (Halberstam 2005: 107), the monstrosity can never be left unchallenged, pushing discourses of human rights and rule of law to ‘queer directions’ that open new possibilities of seeing and knowing rather than naming them, further challenging and redefining “universalised” notions of gender, equality, human rights, rule of law, democracy and sustainable development. We therefore use the Queer Theory to interrogate, negotiate and explore subterranean historical intersections in an unstable contemporary African terrain given the trauma and baggage of imperialism’s shifting strategies that perpetuate the scramble for Africa using present day globalisation masquerade.

We cannot ignore how the ground can be made even if ‘race performativity’ remains encircled within the same deeply entrenched apartheid colonial economic systems. “It is necessary to also note that genuine democratic transition cannot possibly take place in Africa if democracy is defined in ways that exclude democratisation of ownership and control of material resources by Africans” (Nhemachena 2018: 145). Ironically, under the guise of humanitarian stewardship of “universal” human rights, the champions of democracy in Africa are Euro-American countries whose presence in Africa is driven by their exclusionary ownership and control of Africans’ principal subsistence resources. Few world leaders have challenged this “cannibalisation” (Nhemachena 2018). This continual racial performance space, akin to exclusionary gender performance space that the queer theory critiques, race performance space in Africa/Zimbabwe muffles, smothers and slowly administers death to whole African communities. Without restitution and restoration of ownership and control of principal subsistence and economic resources by the Africans in Africa, talks about democracy, rule of law and sustainable development remain charades for continued Western hegemony in Africa, Zimbabwe more specifically. Hence Mugabe’s ‘gaga scream’ over Africans’ right for land ownership and need for land redistribution in Zimbabwe. From the Queer Theory, we borrow the notion of rigid definitions that have caused anxiety,

panic and homophobic attitudes as individuals, communities and societies are frogmarched into predetermined performance spaces.

Just like the 'enfeebled bodies' (Halberstam 2005: 87) of the queer sexualities restricted by gender performance space, predetermined race performance space evidenced in Mugabe as metonym of the smothered African victim of colonial and postcolonial cannibalisation, continues unabated fostering emotional, intellectual, material, cultural and physical repression, under the different guises of western-driven partisan human rights agendas. "Constant inhibition, restraining normal feelings, keeping back, covering, holding in check atomic forces of the mind and body, is an exhausting process..." (Ibid). The paradox is how to salvage the colonial victims from continual oppression and racial decadence when they are incessantly subjected to decay/decompose as a result of the emasculating and obfuscating tendencies of a so-called 'higher civilisation' masquerading as human rights stewardship. Both intellectual/mental and physical restraint in racially defined performance spaces can never help Africans to achieve sustainable development, bringing to question the dumbfounded baggage of developing on borrowed terms, borrowed language, borrowed philosophies, borrowed technology, borrowed identities and borrowed spaces.

Man's material needs can hardly be extricated from and achieved apart from his intellectual, spiritual and biological needs. Similar to Wells' (cited in Halberstam 2005) exposition of the violent, brutal and barbarous American White male's manliness exuded through lynching Negroes, Mugabe exposes the exclusionary racist practices that continue 'lynching' Africans from exercising full autonomy in spearheading their own development in their divine-given space, and on their own terms. He exposes the anti-African agendas. By inverting terms like rule of law and democracy, Mugabe challenges the fallacy that sustainable development in Zimbabwe and Africa can be achieved on western-designed templates.

Despite the claimed interstice of civilisation, without restitution and restoration of primary resources in their own land, metonymically, Mugabe, exposes the violence and dehumanising nature of racially exclusive templates of rule of law, human rights and sustainable development. As with repression of minorities, weak, and queer sexualities through gender performance spaces, exclusionary racial and racist performance space continues perpetuating savage lynching of the perceived emasculated and effeminate "others", as is reminiscent with American male politicians' paedophile scandals, a type of bullying that Mugabe challenges in view of illegal sanctions imposed against Zimbabwe by the Euro-America club for her post-2000 land redistribution programmes. The cultural construction of sustainable development itself comes under spotlight, demanding redefining its tenets of human rights, rule of law and democracy. Like Wells who is cited to be the Deborah of her race against an American

prized lynch manhood (Halberstam 2005: 64-75), Mugabe takes the unenviable position of defending African right to sovereign development and human rights, like any other race.

More importantly, we conclude this section by borrowing Tompkins' (2012: 226) concluding remarks to her review of Halberstam's *Gaga Feminism: Sex, Gender, and the End of the Normal*, particularly the Gaga manifesto, that is quite persuasive:

In the spirit of queer praxis, Halberstam encourages us by saying, '***In a crisis, do not remain calm, do not look for the nearest exit, do not stick your head in the sand; do agitate***, do make things worse, do run screaming through the street, and do refuse to return to business as usual [...] as means for transformative futures of liberation.

We argue that "[t]he concept of sustainable development is contextualised and redefined by the Zimbabwean president in accordance with his government's ideology on the land question giving the concept a different emphasis" (Chimbarange, Takavarasha and Kombe 2013: 277). In his address Mugabe exposes reasons why such bodies as the UN unwittingly risk exposing how they have long outlived their own usefulness by their failure to question and transform "universalised" notions of rule of law, democracy, human rights and sustainable development that are exclusionary and tailored to cannibalise the smothered and weak Other, using Zimbabwe as a case study. Nevertheless, we hasten to distance our views from the notion that 'we are not going to care about social approval'. Like Gabriel Rotello rightly admits, "It is impossible to advocate a system where everything is okay" (Rotello cited in an interview with Smith D. 2013). We hope to deal with the subject of unjust discrimination on matters of accessing principal resources for survival and sustenance that Mugabe raises in his address. Like sex, we also argue that unlike citizenship that is fluid and subject to change, race is immutable, unchosen and unchangeable, hence the aberrations of exploitation and manipulation that continue to be used in world affairs and development that Mugabe exposes.

The Unabridged 2nd September 2002 Johannesburg Earth Summit Address

"Your Excellencies, we must examine why, 10 years after Rio, the poor remain very much with us, poorer and far more exposed and vulnerable than ever before. Our children suffer from malnutrition, hunger and diseases, compounded now by the deadly HIV/Aids pandemic. No, the World is not like it was at Rio; it is much worse and much more dangerous. Today *Rio* stands out in history as *a milestone betrayed*. The multilateral programme of action we set for

ourselves at Rio has not only been unfulfilled but it has also been ignored, sidelined and *replaced by a half-baked unilateral agenda of globalisation in the service of big corporate interests of the North*. The *focus is profit*, not the poor, the process is globalisation, *not sustainable development*, while the *objective is exploitation*, not liberation.

Comrade President, 10 years, after Rio, the time has come for all of us to state quite categorically that the agenda of sustainable development is not compatible with the current dominant market fundamentalism coming from the proponents of globalisation. *The betrayal of the collective agenda we set at Rio is a compelling manifestation of bad global governance, lack of real political will by the North and a total absence of a just rule of law in international affairs*. The unilateralism of *the unipolar world has reduced the rest of mankind to collective underdogs, chattels of the rich, the wilful few in the North who beat, batter and bully us under the dirty cover of democracy, rule of law and good governance*. Otherwise how would they undermine at global level the same values of good governance and rule of law they arrogantly demand from the South?

Institutionally, we have relied for much too long on structures originally set to recover and rebuild Europe after a devastating war against Nazism. Over the years, these outdated institutions have been unilaterally transformed to dominate the world for the realisation of the strategic national goals of the rich North. That is why, for example, *the International Monetary Fund has never been a fund for poor peasants seeking sustainable development*. Even the United Nations, a body that is supposed to give us equal voices, remains unreformed and undemocratic, largely because of resistance from the powerful and often selfish North.

Comrade President, *it has become starkly clear to us that the failure of sustainable development is a direct and necessary outcome of a neo-liberal model of development propelled by runaway market forces that have been defended in the name of globalisation*. Far from putting people first, *this model rests on entrenching inequities; giving away privatisation of public enterprises and banishing of the State from the public sphere for the benefit of big business*. This has been a vicious, all-out, assault on the poor and their instruments of sustainable development.

In Zimbabwe, we have, with a clear mind and vision, resolved to bring to an end this neo-liberal model. *For us in Zimbabwe, the agenda for sustainable development has to be reasserted, with a vigorous, democratic and progressive interventionist State and public sector capable of playing a full and responsible developmental role*. We are ready to defend the agenda of the poor and we are clear that we can only do that if we do not pander to foreign interests or answer to false imperatives that are not only clearly alien and inimical to the interests of the poor who have given us the mandate to govern them but are also hostile to the agenda for sustainable development. For these reasons, we join our brothers and sisters in the Third World in rejecting completely, manipulative and intimidatory attempts by some countries and regional blocks that are bent on

subordinating our sovereignty to their hegemonic ambitions and imperial interests, falsely presented as matters of rule of law, democracy and good governance. The real objective is interference in our domestic affairs.

The rule of law, democracy and governance are values that we cherish because we fought for them against the very same people who today seek them to preach to us. The sustainable empowerment of the poor cannot take place in circumstances where democratic national sovereignties are assaulted and demonised on a daily basis. The poor should be able to use their sovereignty to fight poverty and preserve their heritage in their corner of the earth without interference. That is why we, in Zimbabwe, understand only too well that sustainable development is not possible without agrarian reforms that acknowledges, in our case, that land comes first before all else, and that all else grows from and off the land. This is the one asset that not only defines the Zimbabwean personality and demarcates sovereignty but also an asset that has a direct bearing on the fortunes of the poor and prospects for their immediate empowerment and sustainable development. Indeed, ours is an agrarian economy, an imperative that renders the issue of access to land paramount. Inequitable access to land is at the heart of poverty, food insecurity and lack of development in Zimbabwe. Consequently, the question of agrarian reforms has, in many developing countries, to be high on the agenda of sustainable development if we are to meet the targets that are before us for adoption at this Summit. In our situation in Zimbabwe, this fundamental question has pitted the black majority who are the right-holders, and, therefore, primary stakeholders, to our land against an obdurate and internationally well-connected racial minority, largely of British descent and brought in and sustained by British colonialism now being supported and manipulated by the (Tony) Blair government.

We have said even as we acquire land, we shall not deprive the white farmers of land completely. Every one of them is entitled to at least one farm, but they would want to continue to have more than one farm. More than one farm indeed. Fifteen, twenty, thirty-five, one person! These are figures I am not just getting out of my mind, they are real figures. So, no farmer is being left without land and there is no one who would want to leave Zimbabwe anyway. So those operations, which are underway of how to airlift those who are threatened in Zimbabwe by the regime of Mugabe, as it is said, are really not called for. We are threatening no one. And therefore, the operations by Mr (Tony) Blair are artificial, completely uncalled for, and an interference in our domestic affairs. But, we say this as Zimbabweans, we have fought for our land, we have fought for our sovereignty, small as we are. We have won our independence and we are prepared to shade our blood for that independence, sustenance, maintenance and protection.

Having said that, we wish no harm to anyone. We are Zimbabweans, we are Africans, we are not English. We are not Europeans. We love Africa, we love Zimbabwe, we love our independence. We are working together in our region to improve the lot of our people. Let no one interfere with our processes. Let no one who is negative want to spoil what we are doing for ourselves in order to unite Africa. We belong to this continent. We do not mind

having and bearing sanctions banning us from Europe. *We are not Europeans. We have not asked for any inch of Europe, any square inch of that territory. So (Tony) Blair, keep your England and let me keep my Zimbabwe. Economically, we are still an occupied country, 22 years after our Independence. Accordingly, my Government has decided to do the only right and just thing by taking back land and giving it to its rightful indigenous, black owners who lost it in circumstances of colonial pillage.*

This process is being done in accordance with the rule of law as enshrined in our national Constitution and laws. *It is in pursuit of true justice as we know and understand it, and so we have no apologies to make to anyone.* Mr Chairman, having said that, may I say we are happy that through SADC, through COMESA and through ECOWAS, we are *doing our best to sustain our environment in every way possible. We keep our forests, we keep our animals, we keep even our reptiles plus insects. We look after our elephants and ivory. We look after our lions as they roar everywhere. They attract those who would want to see them. We sustain our environment. We are committed to that not just now, but in the future because we want a heritage as a legacy. We want that to pass on to future generations.* But we will need support, *we want to be friends and not enemies of other regions. We want to work together* and that is why the theme of this conference is very important to us. Not only has it brought us together, but we hope that at the end of it, it will have cemented our relations, our oneness to work for this globe, which is *ours together.*

Finally Comrade President, Zimbabwe has alongside other Southern African countries, suffered a severe drought, itself a reminder that all is not well on *our Earth.* We continue to import food to sustain all our citizens during this period of drought. I join other Heads of State and Government in our SADC region, in expressing my gratitude and appreciation to those countries and organisations that pledged to assist us. Mr Chairman, as we look at the next decade we must honestly acknowledge those of our actions, which have served mankind and those many others, which have undermined *our collective wellbeing.* Clearly *there has to be a paradigm shift* from the globalised corporate model *to a people-centred paradigm that reaffirms that people must always come first in any process of sustainable development. And let Africans come first in the development of Africa. Not as puppets, not as beggars but as a sovereign people.* I thank you” (Mugabe 2002).

The Critique of ‘Queerness’

For practical intents and purposes, we admit from the outset that Mugabe’s address rides on the crest of ethnographic conceptualisation of identity, belongingness, personhood, humaneness, morality and the right to ‘being’ as understood and envisioned among the indigenous Shona peoples of Zimbabwe. Any other theorisation risks dissonance and misapplication of the lenses that the incumbent uses to his defence. To this end, our argument and appreciation

centres neither on western legalism nor conformity, but focuses on legitimacy of belongingness to Africa and right to enjoying its resources based on Shona ethnography and cultural contexts whereby the African person must be the agent of the change that he desires, and not an 'object' of charity and perpetual philanthropy. And the cultural footing and guiding principles are rooted in the very land, hence the constant references to 'we Zimbabweans'; 'We look after our...'; 'We are Africans' etc. that conjure a Pan-Africanist and African-centred approach to how land and sustainable development must be explored in Africa.

Whilst experiences may not be homogenous, unequal access to resources, power and general pauperisation of the Africans, Mugabe capitalises on feelings of exclusion and the distinctively peculiar dehumanising agendas against Africans in general. 'With this consciousness of the rich complexity of the' [African experiences] (Nembaware 2016: 25), Mugabe grabs the moment to sound his dejection about hypocrisies of the Euro-Western countries. In as much as Donald Trump's mantra is 'America for Americans' and Teresa May's Brexit mantra, Robert Gabriel Mugabe's 'Africa for Africans' and indigenisation of land-ownership that comes much earlier, no matter how liberal, should be viewed in no lesser terms. Modern day discourse on Zimbabwe's post-2000 economic crises, unemployment, socio-political instability, poverty and violence mostly malign and seek to publicly humiliate one figure: Robert Gabriel Mugabe. The 2002 Johannesburg Earth Summit offers a unique window for an alternative narrative that requires some sober attention, squarely taking readers to the real forces behind black penury in Zimbabwe.

Mugabe raises a cocktail of factors surrounding unjust discrimination and criminalisation of land redistribution in favour of a select western racial clique, aspects that directly impinge on sustainable development and problematic human rights conceptualisations in Zimbabwe. Colonial discrimination and apartheid land laws were not a choice for the 'inferiorised' and oppressed African Other, 'small as we are', 'fighting against an obdurate and internationally well-connected racial minority'. Yet, like the antisocial in the queer theory, Mugabe's anticolonialism continuously suffers negativity. The real problem is not Mugabe and his brutal-shattering honesty or what he represents, but the "ennui, [...] indifference, ironic distancing [...] arch dismissal [and] insincerity" (Halberstam 2005: 110) with which leading Euro-American and world leaders deal with approaches to sustainable development and human rights in almost all former colonies, with Robert Mugabe's address as a case study.

Accordingly, proponents of human rights and sustainable development that negate land redistribution, among other principal factors, as the very foundation of sustainable livelihoods, propitiate an unjust cause. Thus Mugabe demands "*a people-centred paradigm that reaffirms that people must always come first in any process of sustainable development. And let Africans come first in the development of Africa. Not as*

puppets, not as beggars but as a sovereign people". The latter conceptualisation of human rights and sustainable development is what activists of human rights must be championing. Given the repressive sanctions that discriminate and criminalise Africans' quest for total liberation, unfettered to colonial baggage of public humiliation, exploitation, manipulation and dehumanisation, Mugabe's gaga scream makes a compelling case for one vilified for trying to reform oppressive conditions and bigotry that were imposed and continue to be waged against the indigenous Africans. Neglecting and ignoring the principal causes of underdevelopment paints a self-contradictory UN Assembly that is complicit in perpetuating poverty among the poor.

One does not fail to see that Mugabe is in some kind of trance. Others claim that it is mere rhetoric, a politician's gimmick to milk sympathy and support from an unsuspecting audience, but we beg to differ. Mugabe speaks as one possessed like the apotheosised Nehanda at the time of her trial before Watermeyer when she says, "My bones shall rise" (Samupindi 1992; Chitando 2015). Our task is to appreciate and examine the metaphorical relationship of Mugabe and the land as rendered in the address. That he speaks selfless in a transcendental manner like Winston Churchill did urging the British never to give up during the First World War is undeniable. He forgets that he is addressing the world powers that politically and economically hold the reigns in both international relations and international trade. He speaks as one resurrected from death to a new sense of being, a new sense of self-awareness: *"Let no one who is negative want to spoil what we are doing for ourselves in order to unite Africa. We belong to this continent... We are not Europeans. We have not asked for any inch of Europe, any square inch of that territory..."*

Body language and language meaning therefore gives thrust to our examination of the queer aspects that he exudes through this exponential address. Mugabe's oration exposes not only the violence, hypocrisy and insensitivity of the North, but also their cannibalistic characteristics as evidenced through their obdurate support for minority settler land holders in Zimbabwe. That by denial of access to land sustainable development, even cultural development, is unachievable is undeniable. The whole indigenous population has been held ransom for more than a century using the violent currency of conquest and western legalism. There could be no better definition and typifying of Violence than is embraced in colonial dispossession of the right stakeholders of their land. An inch is equivalent to a minute 2,5 centimetres, yet unquantifiable in monetary and heritage terms. That is how critical land is in terms of sovereignty and sustainable development in Mugabe's view. Yet, those championing universal human rights and sustainable development continue missing his point.

Perhaps sustainable development would require reconceptualisation as mentioned elsewhere in our discussion. Walls (2007 cited in Chimbarange, Takavarasha and Kombe, 2013: 280) the concept of sustainable development is relative/slippery contrary to that publicised in 1987 by the World Commission on Environment and Economy in the Brundtland Commission report titled “Our Common Future as readers place emphasis on different points of this compound noun deemed to be mediating between environment and the economy. Mugabe contextualises both, bringing up the role of culture and socially unjust historical inequities that are often underplayed. On spurring patriots to defend the only country that is called their own, and indeed their own very existence, Winston Churchill as Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces calls for resilience of the British army during the First World War: “We shall fight on the beaches...We shall not flag or fail, we shall go on to the end. We shall fight in France, we shall fight on the seas and oceans, and we shall fight with growing confidence and strength in the air...”. Chimbarange *et al.* (2013: 280) focus on Mugabe’s ‘scream’ as mere use of political rhetoric called repetition/anaphora. Ours is not a discussion of rhetoric features in Mugabe’s address, but the cry for African sovereignty, unconditional liberation and freedom for Africans on their own cultural terms:

We are Zimbabweans, we are Africans, we are not English. We are not Europeans. We love Africa, we love Zimbabwe, we love our independence. ... We belong to this continent. We do not mind having and bearing sanctions banning us from Europe. We are not Europeans. We have not asked for any inch of Europe, any square inch of that territory. So (Tony) Blair, keep your England and let me keep my Zimbabwe. Economically, we are still an occupied country, 22 years after our Independence.

His address touches on the lacuna that western conception of sustainable development ignores: access to principle primary sustenance resources by the collective indigenous owners shown in the galvanising collective “we”. Mugabe immediately demands a people-centred framework, touching on land as divine heritage that is the game-changer in material and economic terms. Thus, the need for redistribution of land as the principal driver for sustainable development: *Economically, we are still an occupied country, 22 years after our Independence. [...] Land starvation predicates slow death*

which have undermined our collective wellbeing. Clearly there has to be a paradigm shift from the globalised corporate model to a people-centred paradigm that reaffirms that people must always come first in any process of sustainable development. And let Africans come first in the development of Africa. Not as puppets, not as beggars but as a sovereign people.

In “universalised” capitalist discourses of development, “everyone live[s] in a system that equates success with profit and links failure to the inability to accumulate wealth even as profit for some means certain losses for others” (Halberstam 2005: 88), of which Robert Mugabe’s address and refusal to acquiesce becomes antithetical. Refusal to being puppets and beggars as a sovereign people in their own land and demand for recategorisation of factors that spell sustainable development, human rights and specified cultural contexts. Mugabe challenges hegemonic modes of common sense and nonconformity, in itself disidentification from the mainstream logic, for which he is maligned. Mainstream depictions of success are replete with images of individual material wealth, what is viewed as progress, yet negating fundamentals upon which ‘collective wellbeing’ and sustainable development can be achieved. And with a falsified sense of history and achievement, ironically “all losers are the heirs of those who lost before them” (Halberstam 2005: 121). Failure and poverty for the African on African land are predisposed by those wielding power to influence world morality, world trade and world politics, of which Mugabe is an undesired/undesirable ‘Other’.

It is self-defeating to make oneself an appendage to the goodwill of another. Further, as espoused by Blyden cited by Baldwin (1967) in *Nobody Knows my Name*, genuine and sustainable creativity rests in the biological, cultural and religious energy divinely bequeathed to every race. Thus, as Mugabe’s address demonstrates: “Any political and social regime which destroys the self-determination of a people also destroys the creative power of that people” (Baldwin 1961: 38). Mugabe’s law is a social character touching on holistic development of the human being, for a person is social, economic, material, political, cultural and spiritual, all properties ethnographically vested in the culturally and collectively-owned land, hence land redistribution being an unnegotiable imperative as per the Constitution of the people of Zimbabwe:

It is in pursuit of true justice as we know and understand it, and so we have no apologies to make to anyone. ... we are doing our best to sustain our environment in every way possible. We keep our forests, we keep our animals, we keep even our reptiles plus insects. We look after our elephants and ivory. We look after our lions as We sustain our environment. We ... want a heritage as a legacy. We want that to pass on to future generations. ... We want to work together ...our oneness to work for this globe, which is ours together. [...] on our Earth.

Justice outside the African collective ‘we’, ‘our’ rivals the Euro-Western capitalist notions of sustainable development that celebrate cannibalising the effeminate, weak and poor, practices long celebrated through Hegelian and Darwinism philosophies upon which Euro-Western societies are premised. Accessing and controlling land is envisaged to unlock their “creative initiative

in history through [holistic] control of the real means of communal self-definition in time and space” (Mhizha 2008), for Africans ‘live, belong and rightfully own this great corner of the Earth’. ‘*We have not asked for an inch of Europe*’, emphasises ownership, legitimacy and belongingness as mentioned elsewhere. Thus in the unlikely event that Africans would require more land, they would ask for it. Conversely, Mugabe the little man exposes the brutish and roguish character of the bullying North against the diminutive South. The ideological differences are clearly discernible. Unequal economic power is by no means the answer to sustainable development: Mugabe declares: “*even as we acquire land, we shall not deprive the white farmers of land completely. Every one of them is entitled to at least one farm*”.

Further, it smirks of insincerity that the very architects of African underdevelopment come back as champions of rule of law, democracy and human rights. Hence Mugabe’s assertion of ‘*we fought*’. To imagine a sustainable future and sustainable development for Zimbabwe, Mugabe refuses conforming to the Euro-American hypocrisy, exposing the legible traces of the historical causes of apartheid development that continues to be racially based as a result of continual interference from Euro-American powers. The answer to African sustainable development, therefore, must operate from none other than the African centre alone within the Africans’ cultural specificity. It is a question of “strategic efficacy” (Dery 1994: 189).

Conclusion

Snugly fitting in his corner of ‘our Earth’, the little man dramatises the benefits of sovereignty and belongingness, challenging mainstream capitalistic ideology of the North that has erstwhile been thriving on manipulating the weaker Third World using high-sounding materialistic terminologies that have been masking the North’s insincerity. The oppressive rich nations of the North cannot continue on the path of masquerades and pretences. Equally critical is that Mugabe and other little people cannot continue burying their heads in the sand, to their own peril. Hence the command: Blair you keep your England... Let me keep my Zimbabwe’. We conclude our discussion reiterating the dissonance that Robert Gabriel Mugabe’s address unravels concerning Africa’s sustainable development that cannot be achieved using epistemologies, ideologies, legalism and epistemologies of the rich North that is eternally bent on cannibalising the same Africa that they purport to resurrect from the mire of poverty, ironically without taking responsibility for smothering their weakling ‘meal’ in the first place. “They sang of their history, which was the history of our degradation. They recited their triumphs, which was the history of our humiliation” (Legun 1962: 21, citing Blyden).

It therefore comes as no surprise that like the wild Lady Gaga, Robert Gabriel Mugabe's address defies being circumscribed in the race performance space, refusing the legacy of anti-humane legalism, smothering conformity, and spineless humility that cumulatively further alienation from selves and real sustainable development, a legacy that he passionately loathes. The queer thus poses alternative ways of interrogating politics of survival, genuine ethnographic self-actualisation, and meaning in life. Going gaga/crazy on matters of sustenance and survival instead of coalescence, like does Mugabe, is by any logic a fundamental human right, in itself a precursor to taking full responsibility for collective participation in improving every human life. Maligning the weak, excluding them, and publicly humiliating them, exposes from the underbelly the very weaknesses of those bullying others into conformity or lack of it.

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Implementing an Indigenous Approach to Development in Neo-liberalism Teeming Africa: Robert Mugabe as a Contemporary Prototype of Thomas Sankara

Tapiwa V. Warikandwa

“Sankara was not just fighting imperialism for the sake of politics but he wanted the Burkinabe people to develop themselves and their land and rely essentially on themselves instead of the West”

(Kobo 2014).

“Was it not enough punishment and suffering in history that we were uprooted and made helpless slaves not only in new colonial outposts but also domestically ...”

(Reuters 2005 - quoting Robert Mugabe).

“Africa must revert to what it was before the imperialists divided it. These are artificial divisions which we, in our pan-African concept, will seek to remove”

- Robert Mugabe speech in Salisbury, 1962.

“We have fought for our land, we have fought for our sovereignty, small as we are we have won our independence and we are prepared to shed our blood ... So, Blair keep your England, and let me keep my Zimbabwe”

- Robert Mugabe speech at the Earth Summit, South Africa, 2002.

Introduction

The past twenty years have been characterised by a significant increase in relentless efforts aimed at improving the levels of protection of socio-economic rights at the national and international level (Liebenberg 2007). This attention has spanned the spheres of international law, development policy and economics (Andreassen and Marks 2006), and domestic constitutional law. Such efforts cannot be analysed without reference to the sterling anti-imperialist work of two prominent African leaders, Thomas Sankara and Robert Mugabe. Thomas Sankara (Harsch 2013) and Robert Mugabe's ideologies were largely informed by Marxism (Moore-King 2002) and to a certain degree the Chinese Revolution which succeeded in laying the foundations for a transition to

socialism (Martin 1987; Reed 1987). The Chinese revolution, in particular, succeeded after years of war, sacrifice and ideological struggle (Lee 1979). Equally, Robert Mugabe and Thomas Sankara's valiant efforts aimed at emancipating the largely impoverished Africans from the persistent colonial vice-grip, produced positive results until both men were ousted from power in near similar *modus operandi* (Hanlon 2017; Zhangazha 2012; Dembele 2009; Gwaambuka 2016). Thomas Sankara was killed in 1987, the year of the decisive military change to defeat apartheid militarism in Africa. His trusted friend, Blaise Compaore, joined forces with imperialist western French forces to assassinate Thomas Sankara, in a move which could be considered as a great betrayal of Africa's efforts to liberate itself from western imperialism (Baxter 2014). Sankara was shaped by the political, social and ideological struggles in the anti-imperialist world (Murrey & Reza 2016). He helped to assert the claim of African peoples to be a part of those defining the future of humanity. On the other hand, Robert Mugabe was not assassinated but was unceremoniously ousted from his position as President of Zimbabwe through a *coup de tat* orchestrated by his trusted lieutenant, Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa (BBC 2018). Robert Mugabe was ousted from power after waging a valiant war against western resource plunder in Zimbabwe and Africa at large. Robert Mugabe had implemented a successful land repossession programme, which though reviled, had translated to ordinary Zimbabweans being the most assetted Africans on the continent (Masitera 2016; Cliffe *et al.* 2011). Robert Mugabe's ouster from power has been celebrated by the west and non-critical Africans who considered Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa's *coup de tat* as a panacea to a new prosperous dispensation for Zimbabwe (News24 2018). Sadly, as both the West and Africans who celebrated Mugabe's ouster have fast realised, the so-called new dispensation is not one of prosperity but of chronic economic hardships for Zimbabweans (Kuyedzwa 2019; The Economist 2018). Such new dispensation is also riddled with excessive human rights violations characterised by the killing of innocent civilians by a brutal and repressive military, whose actions are largely directed by former Army Commander and current Deputy President of the Republic of Zimbabwe, Constantino Gubeva Dominic Nyikadzino Chiwenga (Burke 2019; Mutsaka 2018).

The assassination of Thomas Sankara and ouster from power of Robert Mugabe remain notable political presences in Burkina Faso and Zimbabwe and the African continent at large. The 15th of October became a day in which tens of thousands of Burkinabes turned into exuberant protests against the regime of President Blaise Compaore', the former army captain who seized power from Thomas Sankara in 1987 and is largely regarded as the chief protagonist behind Sankara's assassination (France24 2014). While the speakers are usually senior opposition figures or former comrades of Sankara, many in the crowd are

young, too young to have had any direct experience of Sankara's revolutionary era. Beyond Burkina Faso's own borders - in other African countries, Europe and the Americas - radical intellectuals and young activists from time to time also gather to discuss Sankara's ideas and the lessons of the revolutionary effort that he led. A similar trend is beginning to emerge with regards to Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, Africa and the rest of the world. Many are beginning to realise that Robert Mugabe was not Zimbabwe's problem but the power thieves (Dambudzo Mnangagwa and Constantino Chiwenga) have been behind Zimbabwe's problems for years on end. More significantly, ideas from the Thomas Sankara and Robert Mugabe eras are often raised as alternative solutions during times of acute crisis. They are proposed not only by those who view themselves as followers of the Sankarist and Mugabeist traditions, but also by liberals, nationalists and others exasperated with the Africa neo-liberal economic order which has seen innocent Africans being driven deeper into chronic poverty largely due to the implementation of the western imperialist ideologies and/or policies.

During the popular protests that rocked Burkina Faso after the December 1998 assassination of independent newspaper editor Norbert Zongo, anger over the prevalent impunity enjoyed by high-level officials for their rights abuses and corrupt dealings elicited calls for a return of the revolutionary courts of the Sankara era (Harsch 1999: 404). After the food price demonstrations that swept Burkina Faso, Senegal and other African countries in early 2008, the Senegal-based rapper Didier Awadi released a hard-hitting song, *Bang Bang/Woye*, and an accompanying series of videos linking hunger to the wide gaps between rich and poor, interspersing his lyrics with quotes from Sankara excoriating the capitalist and imperialist systems. When Burkina Faso erupted after the February 2011 beating to death of a student in Koudougou and anti-government demonstrations roiled the country, popular reggae artist Sams'K Le Jah premiered a new song at a concert suggesting that Compaore' leave the residency - and sang it while wearing a Sankara T-shirt (Harsch 2013). The repeated army mutinies of 2011, with their looting of merchants' shops and residential areas, led several commentators to cite Sankara's adage that "a soldier without political training is just a criminal with power" (Harsch 2013). Similar developments have taken place in Zimbabwe in the post-Mugabe era. Zimbabwean musician Wallace Chirumiko popularly known as "Winky D" premiered a new song titled "*Kudira Jecha*" (translated to "pouring sand" mainly on food. This implies messing up with the livelihood system of the country) which signified how the military junta, Emmerson Mnangagwa and Constantino Chiwenga had ruined Zimbabwe's recovery path through the military coup and the false narrative of a new dispensation that has turned out to be a fallacy.

Why should scholars discuss this lasting legacy left by Sankara and Mugabe? Why do oppositional youths in Burkina Faso and Zimbabwe - and elsewhere in Africa - continue to raise Sankara and Mugabe and their ideas? Undoubtedly, much of the explanation lies in their dissatisfaction with the way things are today: hunger, poverty, widespread abuses and corruption, electoral 'democracies' that bring little real change, elites that incline more towards Western capitals than to their fellow citizens. For some across the region, singing Sankara and Mugabe's praises or wearing a T-shirt with their image can symbolise their alienation and defiance, a political - cultural expression comparable to the ubiquitous portraits of Che Guevara and Bob Marley. In Burkina Faso and Zimbabwe specifically, the message conveyed by brandishing Sankara and Mugabe's name or image is especially pointed. Not only were they home-grown revolutionaries, but persons seen as responsible for their physical (in the case of Sankara) and political (in the case of Mugabe) martyrdom, respectively, have since occupied the presidential palaces of the two countries. What better way to visibly express rejection of the established order can one espouse other than writing about these two revolutionaries.

Thomas Sankara: What Africa Has Missed in a Hopeless Contemporary Era

Thomas Sankara was born in Burkina Faso in 1949, the same year that the Chinese Revolution succeeded in laying the foundations for a transition to socialism (Harsch 2013). This revolution had succeeded after years of war, sacrifice and ideological struggle. The view that the events in Upper Volta on 4 August 1983 marked a 'revolution' still provokes debate in academic and public spheres (Ibid). The Burkinabè Revolution has been perceived as a 'pseudo-revolution' in some circles because it lacked the features of an 'orthodox' revolution which, according to Marx, is produced and conditioned by various stages of class struggles and social transformations with the working class at its centre (Murrey 2018). The Burkinabè Revolution was a military putsch (or coup) led by a group of charismatic Marxist army officers. This military putsch, however, had considerable popular support and came to power under the leadership of Thomas Sankara.

Thomas Sankara sought a national break from Upper Volta's neo-colonial and imperialist domination. In 1983, he stated the aims of the revolution categorically: this would be "a new society free from social injustice and international imperialism's century long domination and exploitation". Yet, securing such a break was a far from simple aim. The combination of popular and grassroots initiatives, with more classic development projects and support

for businesses, expressed a real contradiction. The revolution tried to hold on to a complex (and ultimately deadly) ambiguity.

The singularity of the revolutionary experience of 1983-1987 can only be fully appreciated by keeping in mind the country's social and political conditions at the time. In the colonial era, Upper Volta, "Haute-Volta" as it was named by the French authorities, was regarded as little more than a remote backwater, with few resources deemed worthy of exploitation, except as a labour reserve of young, able-bodied men. As a result, Upper Volta experienced far less investment, infrastructure development, market penetration or class stratification than did many African colonies in the coastal regions. Nor did the different peoples of the colony, or their elites, have much opportunity to develop an "imagined community" (Anderson 1993) beyond their particular ethnic groups, since the colonial state scarcely reached outside a few main towns.

Upper Volta exhibited only limited opposition to colonial rule following the crushing of the last armed resistance to French conquest in 1916. The handful of nationalist or leftist figures who emerged were outmanoeuvred by more conservative forces. When France finally ceded sovereignty in 1960, it handed the reins to a politician, Maurice Yame'ogo, who had actually opposed independence a year earlier. The trade unions and student movements were well organised and militant, however, and led an insurrection against Yame'ogo in January 1966 (Guirma 1991). However, they were too weak to install a more popular government, and instead welcomed the army commander's seizure of power. It was the first of a succession of military takeovers, and trade union agitation played a role in undermining a couple of the subsequent regimes as well.

Since notable independence-era 'national heroes' were scarce, it is likely that the emergence of even a moderately progressive or nationalist leader would have left a prominent mark in the history books. Yet Sankara was anything but moderate. Early on, the young army captain maintained secret contacts with several Marxist-inspired groupings and was especially close to a childhood friend, Soumane Toure', who was the leader of the most militant union federation. Sankara and other leftist officers gradually gained popularity among the military's junior ranks (Andriamirado 1987; Jaffre' 2007).

In late 1981 a fragile military regime seeking to shore up its credibility brought Sankara in as minister of information. That move backfired. Sankara supported the local media in exposing high-level corruption, and when the regime turned more repressive, he resigned and publicly denounced it (using the famous phrase "Woe to those who stifle their people"). Detention and house arrest followed. Yet another coup, this time partly reflecting the growing strength of younger left-leaning officers, brought Sankara back in January 1983

as prime minister. Again he used state office to agitate for change, including by supporting labour mobilisations, denouncing corruption, criticising the conservative sway of traditional chiefs and espousing anti-imperialist foreign policy positions. Alarm bells sounded in Paris, and the conservative senior officers in the regime were encouraged to mount an internal coup in May 1983 to depose and arrest Sankara and his closest colleagues.

That coup did not go as planned. Large demonstrations hit Ouagadougou, involving high school students, youths from the poor neighbourhoods and some trade unionists (Harsch 1999). Protesters cried “Free Sankara!” and chanted slogans against France. Clandestine committees of civilians formed to oppose the coup and anti-government tracts circulated in the barracks. Most seriously, the paratrooper garrison in Po[^] remained under the control of Captain Compaore[’], then a Sankara loyalist. A fragile stalemate set in between the two competing centres of military authority, Ouagadougou and Po[^]. Finally, on 4 August 1983, Compaore[’] led some 250 paratroopers to Ouagadougou to seize major installations, in coordination with Sankara, other military personnel and units of civilian supporters (Harsch 1999). By that evening Sankara was on the air to proclaim the overthrow of the government and the creation of a new National Council of the Revolution (CNR) (Ibid). Some in the media and political detractors saw the uniforms of Sankara and his fellow officers and quickly labelled the takeover a ‘coup’ and the government a ‘military regime’ (Ibid).

Unlike the country’s previous military interventions, however, the 1983 takeover was conducted with the direct collaboration of several leftist civilian groups, whose leaders also filled prominent government posts (Harsch 2013). The CNR and cabinet were hybrid military-civilian formations, although the greatest influence was wielded by Sankara, Compaore[’], Captain Henri Zongo and Commander Jean-Baptiste Lingani, the four ‘historic’ leaders of the August 1983 seizure of power (Ibid).

Whether the experience led by Sankara’s CNR could be characterised as a ‘revolution’ is debatable. By definitions that focus on turnovers in a political system (Tilly 1978; 1995), it was. Yet it clearly did not entail the kind of deep-going economic and social transformations that marked the ‘great revolutions’ of France, Russia or China, or even those that resulted from Africa’s anti-colonial insurrections (Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Mozambique) or the overthrow of the feudal monarchy in Ethiopia. And while Sankara and his colleagues drew on the country’s traditions of popular agitation and often sought to spur popular mobilisation, the latter had serious limits, so that much of the initiative for change came largely from the CNR, thus to some extent resembling a ‘revolution from above’ (Trimberger 1978). Yet whatever label one might apply, it was evident to many contemporary observers that the CNR

brought more political, economic, social and cultural changes in its four short years to the country than had occurred in the previous quarter century.

Thomas Sankara is referred to as “Africa’s Che Guevara”. Like the Argentine revolutionary, Sankara was informed by Marxist struggles, a knowledge of the history of colonialism and imperial domination of the so-called “Third World”, a steadfastness against the powerful status quo as well as military training (Harsch 2013). Both shared a focus on agrarian reform and a commitment to promoting collective well-being through a reformation of the person: Guevara encouraged people to auto-adopt new, more collective characteristics to become “el Hombre Nuevo” (the New Man) (Ibid).

In their 1989 annual report, World Bank analysts commented that since 1984, Burkina Faso’s government had “been taking ... a number of adjustment measures. While it is premature to assess the impact of these programs on economic growth, measures to improve incentives, combined with favourable weather conditions, are beginning to bear fruit” (World Bank 1989: 108).

Thomas Sankara was a revolutionary and he committed himself to revolution (Wilkins 1989). His definition of revolution and fundamental change is alluded to in the epigraph above. Sankara committed the Burkinabè people - as active agents in their awareness of implementing a social, economic and political transformation of both society and themselves as human beings - in a quest for a different kind of world and society (Harsch 1999; Harsch 2013). He wanted the Burkinabè people to commit to ‘nonconformity’ and possess ‘the courage to turn [their] back on the old formulas’ (Ibid). In the drastically short time that Sankara led Burkina Faso (from 1983 to 1987), he demonstrated that it was possible for African countries to run their own affairs with considerable financial success (Ibid).

Visitors to Thomas Sankara’s office did not find the usual symbols of an African president: no overstuffed furniture, expensive rugs or rare paintings. There were, instead, bookcases groaning with new and old volumes and books and papers scattered across the desk - signs of intellectual curiosity and a passion for work (Harsch 2013). Also on the desk was a small bust of the Russian revolutionary Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and on the shelves numerous writings of Lenin, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Sankara was open about his ideological leanings (Ibid).

Through an African feminist political economy perspective, why Thomas Sankara is ‘special’ as an African revolutionary thinker, military personality, advocate for freedoms - particularly women’s freedoms - and as the former leader of an African country, who actually implemented radical policies (although they were short lived) through which he mobilised the working people at large, and women in particular, towards a different vision of the future

(Dembele 2013). As a Pan-Africanist, Thomas Sankara was a radical nationalist who passionately resisted imperialism and colonialism.

Thomas Sankara's political philosophy and its potential for reconstructing statehood in Africa (Dembele 2013). Sankara's political philosophy and leadership challenged patriarchal politics and societies that fail to appreciate and integrate women's contributions to statehood and state-making. Despite post-independence national constitutions, the African Union's gender policy and international conventions (which recognise women's agency, political and civil rights, state decision-making and societal administration) remain male-dominated with patriarchal orientations. Sankara believed in the contribution of ordinary people in state construction. He knew that Burkina Faso's revolution would be incomplete without the participation and emancipation of women.

Three decades after his assassination, Thomas Sankara remains popular among African youth. Youth movements, most often drawing from the sound bites of the ideal of Sankara, have emerged that draw powerfully on Sankara's legacy and political philosophies (Dembele 2013). Among these, *Balai Citoyen* or 'Citizen Broom', a popular and grassroots movement of Burkinabè civil society, stands out as one of the most remarkable (Harsch 2013). The movement was born at a turning point in the country's political life, in a context marked by President Blaise Compaoré's efforts to change the constitution to expand presidential term limits, a change that would allow him to remain longer than intended.

The current international development paradigm is one predicated on notions of country ownership of development - a country's ability to manage its own development policies and strategies, and co-ordinate development stakeholders. The need for country ownership, heretofore ownership, grows out of criticisms over the limited progress gained under structural adjustments, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) proposed country ownership of development as the answer to past and future development quagmires (Smith 2006; Pender 2001). In 2005, the rest of the international community of bilateral and multilateral donors co-signed and further entrenched the principle of ownership as the pinnacle of sovereignty.

At the time that the United States began to normalise its economic, political and cultural relationship with Cuba in 2014, the Institute of the Black World assigned me to visit the refugee camps of the 'last colony' in Africa on a fact finding mission. The "last African colony" is the Western Sahara, which is colonised by the Kingdom of Morocco. The last colony in Africa, as it has come to be known, had a special relationship with the global anti-colonial revolutionary movements of the 1950s and 1960s, including with the 1980s anti-colonial revolution led by Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso.

Thomas Sankara's Ideology

For many outside observers - and citizens of the country itself - it was not easy to pin down the outlook of Sankara's leadership (Harsch 2013). Sankara and his colleagues called theirs a 'democratic and popular revolution'. This led some academic analysts to apply the label 'populist' (Beinen 1985; Martin 1987). They sometimes did so by pairing Sankara with Ghana's Jerry Rawlings, another young officer who in his early years in power did seem to fit the populist characterisation. Some media commentators also tagged Sankara as a follower of Muammar el-Qaddafi. During one visit to Libya, Kaddafi apparently did press Sankara to adopt his "Green Book" approach, but Sankara replied: "We are not exactly political virgins. Your experience interests us, but we want to live our own" (Andriamirado 1987: 58).

Sankara readily identified himself as Marxist, although he took care not to impose that label on the revolutionary process itself. The influence of Marxist ideas is evident throughout his speeches, especially the famous "Political orientation speech" of October 1983, which provided a detailed analysis of class forces and the strategy for allying with some while opposing others (Prairie 2007: 76–109).⁴ In his address to the UN General Assembly he cited the inspiration of the French Revolution, Paris Commune and Russian Revolution (Prairie 2007: 165). For the editors of *Thomas Sankara speaks*, the most extensive collection of his works, this ideological orientation is the defining element of his political legacy: "Sankara stood out among the leaders of struggles for national liberation in Africa in the last half of the twentieth century because he was a communist" (Prairie 2007: 11).

Much has changed since Sankara's death. The Berlin Wall has fallen, the Soviet Union has disappeared and many self-professed communists around the world have either jettisoned their former beliefs or been thrown onto the defensive. In Burkina Faso, those of Sankara's former colleagues who sided with Compaore's coup soon moved rightward; if they still identify with the left at all, they tend to call themselves "social democrats". More tellingly, hardly any of the Sankarist leaders in Burkina Faso today draw attention to their hero's communist beliefs. The largest of the Sankarist groups, the *Union pour la renaissance/Parti sankariste* (UNIR/PS), often speaks in general terms about the need to struggle for democracy and justice and against "exploitation in all its forms" (UNIR/PS 2009, 2012).

Norbert Tiendre'be'ogo, leader of the *Front des forces sociales*, another Sankarist party, has gone so far as to deny that Sankara was ever a Marxist (Sidwaya, 17 October 2007) and has argued that "Sankarism defines itself as a political current born of democratic socialism", with an indigenous and pragmatic character (Sidwaya 9 March 2012).

Other facets of Sankara's ideological outlook have retained somewhat greater favour, both within Burkina Faso and among radical activists elsewhere. His pronouncements against imperialism and in support of liberation movements - from Southern Africa to the Western Sahara, from Central America to New Caledonia - are frequently remembered. So is his staunch stand against Africa's growing foreign debt and his (unsuccessful) call on other African leaders to collectively refuse to pay. Most famously, many recall, Sankara transgressed diplomatic niceties by criticising some of France's foreign policy positions directly to a visiting President Francois Mitterrand, provoking the latter's half-joking rebuke: "This is a somewhat troublesome man, President Sankara" (Sankara and Mitterrand 1986). By earning the enmity of various Western powers and their local allies, Sankara's determination to speak out against imperialist domination simultaneously elicited cheers from many champions of genuine independence for Africa. Sankara's frequent calls for building pan-African unity, not simply at the top, but especially among the continent's peoples, also left a lasting impression. Commented Burundian activist David Gakunzi in his preface to the first French-language collection of Sankara's speeches, 'Profoundly Burkinabe', Sankara was also profoundly pan-Africanist, internationalist and attached to the struggles of the 'Third World' (Gakunzi 1991: 14).

Sankara's strong stance against corruption and high living by government officials reflected another side of his outlook. In such a poor country, frugality and integrity were the new watchwords. Public trials sent scores of dignitaries to jail for corruption or fraud. Sitting government ministers had to drive small and inexpensive Renaults or Peugeots.

Sankara kept his own children in public schools and rebuffed relatives who sought state jobs. Twenty-five years after Sankara's death, Maxime Nikie`ma, a leading figure in the Réseau national de lutte anti-corruption (Ren-lac), the main civil anti-corruption organisation, noted that under the CNR - unlike today - there was a 'strong political will' to combat corruption (Sidwaya 15 October 2012). With corruption, theft and nepotism so prevalent across Africa, Sankara's anti-corruption campaigns and personal example have drawn wide attention. In South Africa, for example, a Black Consciousness-inspired group has drawn explicitly on Sankara's ideas to demand that President Jacob Zuma and other leaders of the ruling African National Congress give up their mansions and live by the same standards as the majority of the people (September National Imbizo 2012).

Pan-Africanist, anti-imperialist, communist, anti-corruption crusader, the labels all appeared to fit Sankara to varying degrees and at various times. Those who cite him today tend to highlight whatever facet seems most appropriate for the occasion.

Thomas Sankara's Nation Building Ideology

Sankara from time to time talked about the need for 'patriotism' to defend, build and modernise his country (Dembele 2013). Yet he generally avoided calls to nationalism in the narrow sense of the term. There was little in the old, 'neo-colonial' state of Upper Volta worth rallying around (Ibid). The revolutionary effort certainly was unfolding within particular borders, but Sankara repeatedly insisted that it also was part of a wider regional, continental and global struggle.

Still, the process of change unleashed under Sankara saw more efforts at nation building than were ever before attempted, or even projected. This was a core element of the revolutionary agenda: trying to forge a semblance of nationhood from among the disparate peoples of the territory once known as Upper Volta, while simultaneously seeking to challenge the narrow parameters of external domination bequeathed by the colonial past (Ibid). As someone grounded in the methods of Marxist analysis, Sankara understood well that the character and possibilities of the revolution were largely determined by existing realities, the "objective conditions" (Harsch 2013). The revolution, Sankara acknowledged, was occurring 'in a backward, agricultural country where the weight of tradition and ideology emanating from a feudal-type social organisation weighs very heavily on the popular masses', and where there was not yet 'an organized working class, conscious of its historic mission' (Prairie 2007: 40). Building socialism, while seen as a desirable future, was clearly not on the immediate agenda. Given Upper Volta's extreme state of underdevelopment, more basic tasks took precedence.

On the first anniversary of the 1983 takeover Sankara's CNR renamed their state 'Burkina Faso', which roughly translates as 'land of the upright people' (Harsch 1999; Harsch 2013; Dembele 2013). By drawing the name from two different indigenous languages (and taking the 'be' suffix in 'Burkinabe' from yet a third), the government affirmed the African identity of the new state it was trying to fashion, a state that sought to draw its legitimacy not from a colonial geographical designation but from the diverse peoples who live in it (Dembele 2013). This effort to tap indigenous culture was consciously pan-territorial. Historically, the Mossi had tended to dominate, given their numbers (about half the population), their geographical concentration (in the centre, around the capital) and the weight of the Mossi kingdom within the colonial state. Sankara's government followed a more inclusive approach (Ibid). The CNR had numerous Mossi in it, but also Bobo, Gourounsi, Peulh and others. Sankara himself was from a marginal and low-status sub-group known as the Silmi-Mossi (of mixed Mossi and Peulh ancestry) (Ibid).

Television news was no longer delivered only in French, but also in Moore' and occasionally other languages. Because very few Burkinabe` had access to

television, radio remained the main means of communication, and it used 11 indigenous languages.

An adult literacy campaign launched in 1986 was conducted in nine. Major rallies and conferences frequently featured dance and musical performances by troupes from different ethnic groups. A declaration of a prize jury at one cultural festival affirmed that while individual works might be in competition, the cultures themselves would not be, since “each culture has its own value ... This festival is an occasion for our different nationalities to discover themselves, to make themselves known, and to mutually enrich themselves, for the birth of a genuinely national culture” (Carrefour africain 29 December 1984).

During the revolutionary era, many citizens acquired a strong sense of pride in their African identity and in the cultural richness of their country. Years after the CNR’s demise, significant sectors of the population, including leading figures who were politically hostile to the Sankara government, seem to readily accept their identification as citizens of Burkina Faso, as *Burkinabe*.

Thomas Sankara’s Government and the Economic and Social Reorientation

In seeking to build a national economy based more on domestic markets and interests, the Sankara government faced a paradoxical situation (Dembele 2013). Since much of the economy was still dominated by subsistence agriculture and there was very little industry of any kind, Burkina Faso was not as deeply enmeshed in external market relations as some of its neighbours, thus posing fewer impediments to major policy reorientations. Yet because the productive forces were so rudimentary, the country had few resources of its own to draw on.

In rather sweeping terms, the government’s five-year plan proclaimed the ultimate goal to be nothing less than an ‘independent, self-sufficient and planned national economy at the service of a democratic and popular society’ (Ministère de la planification 1985, i). The state was to play the central role, since no other force, including the minuscule private sector, could mobilise the capital required for building essential infrastructure and stimulating productive activities. True, the government still drew on foreign aid. Yet while overall aid levels stayed steady in real terms between 1984 and 1987, much of it was tied to specific projects that were already under way. France, the largest donor, halted all general budgetary support after 1983, as did the World Bank after 1984 (Zagré 1994: 164, 176).

New state investments therefore could be financed only by seriously economising on existing operations. Civil service salaries were frozen and government ministers had to give up allowances. Successive budgets spent

much more on health, education and other social programmes and allotted significantly greater investment to infrastructure and productive projects.

Most striking was an overall shift away from the cities and towards the countryside. The government provided poor farmers and livestock herders with more extensive public services, productive inputs, price incentives, marketing assistance, irrigation, environmental protection and other support. In the five-year plan, 71% of investments in the productive sectors were allocated to agriculture, livestock, fisheries, wildlife and forests (Ministère de la planification 1985: 269). Villagers also benefited from greater access to health and education. By January 1986 more than 7460 primary health posts had been established, roughly one for each village (Ibid).

Some 2 million children had been vaccinated against the major childhood diseases, and about 36,000 villagers were taught basic literacy (Novicki 1986; Sidwaya 27 January 1986). These initiatives were part of a broader drive to expand social services. Between 1983 and 1987, public health spending increased by 27% and education expenditures by 42% (Savadogo and Wetta 1992: 60). Important new initiatives were also taken in other areas vital to social welfare, including housing, transport, child assistance, job-creation, water and family planning (Jaffre' 1989: 79-98).

The government welcomed whatever external aid it could get (Ibid). However, Planning Minister Youssouf Oue'draogo insisted that such aid would no longer be the 'determining factor' in the government's priorities. The CNR also explicitly rejected the programmes of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, largely because of their neoliberal policy prescriptions. Reflecting a view of Sankara as a committed opponent of neoliberalism, academics and activists argued at an international symposium in Ouagadougou on the twentieth anniversary of his death that Sankara could be considered a precursor of "altermondialisation", that is, of those who today champion alternatives to capitalist globalisation (Le Pays 15 October 2007; Sidwaya 15 October 2007). Others focused on Sankara's various initiatives to integrate environmental protection into economic development strategies (Sidwaya 16 October 2007), years before the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio popularised such a linkage.

Sankara's "Dare to Invent the Future" Philosophy

In the immediate wake of the coup, there was a frequent reproach levelled against Sankara: that he was a hopeless utopian who failed to heed his country's objective limitations and thereby overreached. Some saw this as a trait typical of charismatic leaders (Skinner 1988). They may be great visionaries, but they often have difficulty grasping the routine, bureaucratic procedures deemed necessary for consolidation. A number of Sankara's own supporters complained that he

tended to announce sweeping initiatives without fully considering how they might be implemented. Sankara's declarations certainly were full of far-reaching goals and grand visions. This was, after all, a revolutionary endeavour, not an attempt at incremental reform. Sankara also expressed great impatience with those who insisted that a poor country - or people who are poor - should not set their sights too high. He was fond of saying:

That which man can imagine, he can achieve' (Sidwaya, 27 August 1986). Or as he told a Swiss journalist: You cannot carry out fundamental change without a certain amount of madness. ... [I]t comes from nonconformity, the courage to turn your back on the old formulas, the courage to invent the future. . . We must dare to invent the future. (Prairie 2007: 232)

Yet Sankara's quest was not utopian. In the four years he was president, he demonstrated repeatedly that initiatives that once were unimaginable could at least be set into motion. He did so by convincing many ordinary people that they had the capacity to act (Harsch 2013).

He had exceptional skills as an orator and was able to reach audiences with colourful and inventive turns of phrase, sharp wit and clear intelligence. His words were reinforced by a personal demeanour that projected sincerity, openness and humility, often conveyed through gestures as simple as riding a bicycle through the streets, playing football in shorts and jersey or mingling with villagers in a relaxed manner.

Sankara also communicated his messages through symbolic, even theatrical measures. To demystify high state functions, central government budgets were formulated in mass public assemblies and executives of state enterprises were subjected to public grillings (Dembele 2013). Civil servants were often required to wear traditionally designed and woven Faso dan Fani outfits instead of Western-style suits, both to boost indigenous culture and create a domestic market for clothes made from local cotton. On International Women's Day men were encouraged to go to market in place of their wives or to plant trees in their honour. Such measures could not always be enforced - and sometimes elicited derision - but many conveyed basic ideas that were long remembered.

Some of the outcomes of popular inspiration could be quite remarkable. In September 1984 the Sankara government announced that it would mount a commando-style campaign to vaccinate most children against the key childhood killers (measles, meningitis and yellow fever) within just two weeks. External donors warned that it could not be done, and urged a more cautious pace. Yet the government persisted, using the state media to publicise the campaign and the CDRs to mobilise local health workers and village activists to carry it out. By the end of the two weeks, some two million children had been vaccinated,

raising the rate of immunisation against the three diseases from just 11-19% of all children to 60-75%. As a result, the usual epidemics of measles and meningitis did not take place the following year, preventing anywhere between 18,000 and 50,000 child deaths (Harrison 1987: 169-170).

As such examples illustrate, Sankara was not only able to convince others to share his dream, but also to realise that their own hard work and commitment could transform the dream into reality. Concluded Boureima Oue'draogo, editor of the Burkinabe` fortnightly *Le Reporter*: 'Sankara certainly was not an angel or saint. He was a man, with his faults and qualities.' If Sankara continues to stir emulation, 'it is above all because he succeeded in getting an entire generation of Africans to dream' (Oue'draogo 2010).

The Dastardly Assassination of Thomas Sankara

Sankara was killed in 1987, the year of the decisive military change to defeat apartheid militarism in Africa (Harsch 2013). In the 37 years while Sankara traversed the earth, he was shaped by the political, social and ideological struggles in the anti-imperialist world (Ibid). Sankara helped to assert the claim of African peoples to be a part of those defining the future of humanity.

The initial accounts of Thomas Sankara's assassination were reported by Sennen Andriamirado in the pages of *Jeune Afrique* as early as November 1987 (Andriamirado 1989). Valère Somé, a close associate and friend of Sankara, would complete these first reports through the publication of his book, *Thomas Sankara, l'Espoir Assassiné* (Somé 1990), soon after. The only survivor of the assassination, Halouna Traoré, has been frequently interviewed; he has always confirmed the same version of the events of that day (Ibid).

A Reflection on the Post-Sankara Era

In late October 2014, protests broke out across Burkina Faso in response to a proposed constitutional amendment to extend presidential term limits (Opalo 2014). Hundreds of thousands of protestors took to the streets, asserting again that "trop, c'est trop!" ("enough is enough") and demanding that Blaise Compaoré step down after 27 years as the country's president. When tear gas, live ammunition and the declaration of martial law failed to suppress the protestors, Blaise announced his resignation. On 30 October 2014, protestors stormed the Parliament building in Ouagadougou (or as it is more commonly referred to, "Ouaga") (Smith 2014).

During the popular uprisings that gathered momentum after 2011 and eventually led to the 2014 overthrow of Blaise Compaoré, the image and name of Thomas Sankara was everywhere (Ibid). The crowds chanted his name,

speech after speech invoked his memory and his face and his slogans were on posters and placards at nearly every rally (Ibid). Although in power just a few short years at a time well before most of the protestors had been born, Sankara - the “Che Guevara of Africa” - nevertheless personified the resistance to Compaoré’s 27 years of semi-authoritarian rule (Ibid).

Robert Mugabe: A Type of Thomas Sankara?

Robert Gabriel Mugabe was born on the 21st of February 1924. A revolutionary and politician, he served as Prime Minister of Zimbabwe from 1980 to 1987 and then as President from 1987 to 2017. He chaired the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) group from 1975 to 1980 and led its successor political party, the ZANU-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), from 1980 to 2017. Ideologically an African nationalist, during the 1970s and 1980s he identified as a Marxist-Leninist, although after the 1990s self-identified only as a socialist. His policies have been described as Mugabeism.

Robert Mugabe was born to an “impoverished” Shona family in Kutama, Southern Rhodesia. Following an education at Kutama College and the University of Fort Hare. He later worked as a school teacher in Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Ghana. Angered that Southern Rhodesia was a colony of the British Empire governed by its White minority, Mugabe, like Sankara, embraced Marxism and joined African nationalist protests calling for an independent black-led state. After making anti-government comments, he was convicted of sedition and imprisoned between 1964 and 1974. On release, he fled to Mozambique, established his leadership of ZANU, and oversaw ZANU’s role in the Rhodesian Bush War, fighting Ian Smith’s predominantly white government. He reluctantly took part in the peace negotiations brokered by the United Kingdom that resulted in the Lancaster House Agreement. The agreement ended the war and resulted in the 1980 general election, at which Mugabe led ZANU-PF to victory. As Prime Minister of the newly renamed Zimbabwe, Mugabe’s administration expanded healthcare and education.

It has been over thirty-seven years since Robert Mugabe took power, before he was ousted from power in November 2017. The Mugabe Revolution was one of the greatest attempts at popular democratic emancipation in post-Independence Africa and is considered a novel experience of broad economic, social, cultural and political transformation. Robert Mugabe employed the concept of indigenous or self-centred development. Indigenous development refers to the process of economic, social, cultural, scientific and political transformation, based on the mobilisation of internal social forces and resources and using the accumulated knowledge and experiences of the people of a country. It also allows citizens to be active agents in the transformation of their

society instead of remaining spectators outside of a political system inspired by foreign models.

Indigenous development aims to mainly rely on its own strength, but it does not necessarily constitute autarky (Dembele 2013). One of the pre-eminent theoreticians of indigenous development, Professor Joseph Ki-Zerbo, states, “If we develop ourselves, it is by drawing from the elements of our own development” (Quoted in Dembele 2013). To put it in another manner, “We do not develop. We develop ourselves.” In fact, the Mugabe Revolution was one of the greatest attempts at popular and democratic emancipation in post-Independence Africa. That is why it is considered a novel experience of deep economic, social, cultural and political transformation as evidenced by mass mobilisations to get people to take responsibility for their own needs, with the construction of infrastructure, (dams, reservoirs, wells, roads and schools) through the use of the principle “relying on one’s own strength.” For Mugabe, true indigenous development was based upon a number of principles, among them:

1. The necessity of relying on one’s own strength;
2. Mass participation in politics with the goal of changing one’s condition in life;
3. The emancipation of women and their inclusion in the processes of development; and
4. The use of the State as an instrument for economic and social transformation.

Interestingly, these above outlined principles as relied upon by Mugabe, formed the foundation of the policies implemented by Sankara and his comrades between 1983 and 1987.

Robert Mugabe’s Educational Policy

Robert Mugabe was deeply committed to the advancement of education and believed it is the foundation for skills development, economic growth and employment creation (Kanyongo 2005). Following the country’s independence, he introduced the Education for All policy, which ushered in a massive expansion in pupil enrolment and the expansion of teacher education facilities through programmes like Morgan Zintec among others. Mugabe’s commitment to education saw a huge increase in adult literacy and improved the quality of educational standards (Chung & Ngara 1985; Gomo 2003; International Labour Review 1995; Ministry of Education, Sport and Culture 2001). The improved access to tertiary education helped create the requisite foundation for research (Nziramasanga 1999). Through the improved research techniques, the tried and

tested wisdom of Mugabe ensured that the country developed a comprehensive agricultural revolution from research into seed varieties, new cropping methods, post harvesting techniques and improved livestock breeds.

Robert Mugabe and Relying on One's Own Strength

For Robert Mugabe, relying on one's own strength meant asking the Zimbabwean people to think about their own development (Agyemang 2013). This approach is consistent with that adopted by Sankara who once pointed out that: "Most important, I think, is to give people confidence in themselves, to understand that ultimately he can sit down and write about his development, he can sit down and write about his happiness, he can say what he wants and, at the same time, understand what price must be paid for this happiness" (Quoted in Dembele 2013) The popular land redistribution programme in Zimbabwe was adopted after a participatory and democratic process including the previously disadvantaged and impoverished Zimbabweans who were landless. This was accompanied by the promulgation of indigenisation laws which were meant to ensure that indigenous Zimbabweans acquire an equity threshold of 51% percent of all mineral resources extracted by foreign "investors" (Warikandwa & Osode 2017). Sadly, all these novel policies have since been done away with by the government led Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa (News24 2017). The financing of the land redistribution programme was 100 percent Zimbabwean.

Mugabe's policies were similar to those adopted by Thomas Sankara when he adopted the first Popular Development Plan (PPD), from October 1984 to December 1985. The PPD was adopted after a participatory and democratic process including the most remote villages. The financing of the plan was 100 percent Burkinabe (Harsch 1999, Harsch 2013; Dembele 2013). It must be noted that from 1985 to 1988, during Sankara's presidency, Burkina Faso did not receive any foreign "aid" from the West, including France, nor the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Dembele 2013). Sankara, like Mugabe, had relied entirely on his own strength and the solidarity of friendly countries sharing the same vision and ideals. Popular mobilisation, mainly through the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDR), and the spirit of relying on one's own forces saw 85 percent of the PPD's objectives realised. In one year, 250 reservoirs were built and 3000 wells drilled (Dembele 2013). This does not even take into account the other achievements in the fields of health, housing, education, and agricultural production.

Robert Mugabe's Resistance to Implement Foreign Models

The concepts of indigenous development and relying on one's own strength were incompatible with accepting foreign funds. Robert Mugabe categorically and definitively rejected all sorts of decrees coming from foreigners (Mushakavanhu 2016). He, like Sankara, denounced "charlatans of all sorts who try to sell development models which have all failed" (Dembele 2013).

Mugabe well understood that of which he spoke. Since independence, African states had experienced a dozen "development models," all of which had come from foreigners and were characterised by dismal failure, with exorbitant costs for the entire continent. In this regard, the 2011 Report by the Economic Commission for Africa states (p. 91) provided that:

The basic design and mode of implementation for all these paradigms came from outside Africa, even if each paradigm had real African disciples. It is difficult to think of other major world regions, where outside influence over the basic strategies of development is so common in recent times.

The failure of these models confirms the old Bambaran proverb which provides that, "Sleeping on another's mat is like sleeping on the ground" (Dembele 2013). This proverb explains a historic truth, a profound truth, a knowledge that a development model imposed from outside can never develop a country, much less a continent (Dembele 2013).

Relying on one's own strength also means accepting to live within one's means and make the best use of available resources. This guarantees dignity and freedom. President Sékou Touré of Guinea had the audacity and temerity to state this in front of General de Gaulle in 1958 in his famous phrase: "We prefer freedom in poverty to slavery in opulence" (Dembele 2013). Robert Mugabe and Thomas Sankara both endorsed the creed of the great Guinean orator and rephrased President Touré's words to a simpler and more straightforward: "Accept living as Africans. That is the only way to live with freedom and dignity" (Dembele 2013) But "to live with freedom and dignity," one must be able to feed themselves and not rely on begging throughout the international community. For a country which cannot feed itself inevitably risks losing its independence and dignity. Sankara famously questioned: "Where is imperialism? Look at your plates when you eat. The imported rice, maize and millet; that is imperialism" (Dembele 2013). To avoid this, Mugabe and Sankara insisted: "Let us try to eat what we control ourselves." It was to achieve this goal that they mobilised the Zimbabwean and Burkinabe farmers to attain food self-sufficiency which in turn strengthened the confidence and dignity of the Zimbabwean and Burkinabe people. In both Zimbabwe and Burkina Faso, this

result was achieved by a massive redistribution of land to rural inhabitants combined with supplying fertilizers and irrigation.

Today, Mugabe and Sankara's ideologies animate African farmers who are struggling to achieve food sovereignty by transforming their local resources and guarding their food from Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) that Western multinationals wish to dump in our African markets (Warikandwa & Nhemachena 2017; Mawere & Nhemachena 2017). But "living free" also involves re-evaluating local resources to meet the needs of the population. In particular, this is why Sankara particularly emphasised the need to transform the cotton produced in Burkina Faso into clothing for the people. The famous "Faso dan Fani", the local garment, was an example of this transformation of the cotton for the domestic market (Dembele 2013). Sankara made an impassioned plea for wearing the "Faso dan Fani" at the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Summit; advocacy which was greeted with applause from African Heads of State (Ibid). Living free also means to avoid the pitfalls and humiliations of the supposed "development aid" which has contributed to the under-development of Africa and its dependency. As Sankara states:

Of course, we encourage everyone to help us eliminate aid. But in general, aid policies leave us disorganised, by undermining our sense of responsibility for our own economic, political and cultural affairs. We have taken the risk of borrowing new ways to realise our own well-being (Quoted by Dembele 2013).

Mugabe's Liberation of Women and Making them Central Actors in Development

Mugabe like Thomas Sankara sought to increase the role of women in parliament and in development (UN Women 2013). Sankara like Mugabe understood that real development would be impossible without the liberation of all oppressed groups, starting with women. In this regard, Sankara once said:

We cannot transform society while maintaining domination and discrimination against women, who comprise more than half our society...Our revolution has worked for three and a half years to progressively eliminate demeaning practices towards women...Also they must be engaged as Burkinabe producers and consumers...Together we must always ensure access of women to work. This emancipatory and liberating work will ensure women's economic independence, a greater social role and a more just and complete knowledge of the world (Quoted by Dembele 2013).

In effect, development, like economic, social, political and cultural processes, cannot become a reality without the total emancipation of women, the end of all forms of discrimination against them and their active participation in the process of transformation. Once again Mugabe and Sankara were ahead of his African peers and even some Western leaders and international institutions. Today, at the United Nations (UN), the most conservative states are loudly celebrated for their “liberation” of women, a liberation which is often more illusory than real. The struggle for the liberation of women has become a common one, with the creation of UN Women, parity laws and other measures aimed at women’s economic, social and political emancipation or empowerment. Once again, history demonstrates the prescience and strategic vision of Mugabe and Sankara, who were far ahead of their time.

Robert Mugabe’s Identification with Popular Mass Aspirations

For Robert Mugabe and indeed Thomas Sankara, being a revolutionary meant giving priority to the basic needs of the urban and rural masses. Robert Mugabe in particular attempted to reach the masses’ level in order to fully understand and marry their cause, which was a source of conflict with the fringes of the urban petty bourgeoisie who would not renounce their “privileges”. In Thomas Sankara’s words, “we do not participate in a revolution to simply replace the old potentates with others. We do not participate in the revolution because of a vindictive motivation.” “Get out of there so I can install myself” (Quoted by Dembele 2013). This kind of movement is alien to the revolutionary ideal of Africans and those who display it demonstrate their flaws as petty bourgeois opportunists and dangerous counter-revolutionaries.

It was in opposition to these urban petty bourgeois that Thomas Sankara, in line with Amilcar Cabral called on intellectuals to “commit suicide” to be reincarnated as “revolutionary workers” in the service of the people. Cabral said:

... the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie must be able to commit suicide as a class to be reincarnated as revolutionary workers identifying completely with the deep aspirations of the people to which they belong (Amilcar 1971: 1).

It is true that Mugabe and Sankara tried to instil a different mentality in the petty intellectual bourgeoisie. Unfortunately, they were not quick to repeat revolutionary slogans and to change their behaviour and lifestyle. In fact, they sought to enlarge the socially transformative movement in African countries. Indeed, Mugabe and Sankara were intellectual “revolutionaries,” once in power, and shunned turning their backs on people in the pursuit of money and privilege. They advanced the struggle for the decolonisation of the mind and the

transformation of economic and social structures inherited from colonialism. Decolonisation is understood in the sense of Fanon, who stated:

Decolonisation, as we know, is a historical process. Decolonisation never takes place unnoticed, for it influences individuals and modifies them fundamentally. It transforms spectators crushed with their inessentiality into privileged actors, with the grandiose glare of history's floodlights upon them. In decolonisation, there is therefore the need of a complete calling into question of the colonial situation (Fanon 1963: 36).

These were the fundamental objectives of Robert Mugabe and Thomas Sankara. Sadly they encountered the forces of inertia, such as the Westernised petty bourgeoisie, which constitutes an obstacle to any political rupture aimed at changing society, and the structures inherited from colonialism. It is this inertial force which explains in part the failure of the leftist parties in Africa, notably in "francophone" countries. It is this obstacle which finally undermined the revolution in Zimbabwe in November 2017 when Robert Mugabe was ousted through a *coup de tat* orchestrated by Emmerson Mnangagwa with the assistance of Constantino Chiwenga. The same obstacle helped to create the 15 October 1987 conditions which led to the assassination of Thomas Sankara.

Robert Mugabe and Thomas Sankara and the State as an Instrument for Economic and Social Transformation

Robert Mugabe and Thomas Sankara were communist and had a great admiration for socialist regimes, including Cuba, which filled him with respect and pride. They recognised that the state was central to successful transformations in their countries. They also knew that a state just emerging from the long and terrible colonial darkness could not rebuild without active and committed leadership. So, for them, the state had to be central in the process of economic, social and cultural transformation. It was under the leadership of the state and its institutions that the masses were mobilised to participate in the land reform and indigenisation programmes in Zimbabwe and the PPD in Burkina Faso, respectively. But, after the ouster of Robert Mugabe from power in November 2017 and the assassination of Thomas Sankara in October 1987, both Zimbabwe and Burkina Faso started begging from the World Bank and the IMF again. The two countries were maligned and stripped of their basic functions for the benefit of foreign capital, with consequences which are now common knowledge. The decline of the two states led to the deterioration of living standards, as is common in other African countries.

The failures of structural adjustment programs (SAP) and the collapse of market fundamentalism requires the re-emergence of the state. It is in this context that African countries are urged to build developmental states in order to become active agents in development, like the Asian “Tigers” or “Dragons” and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa).

Robert Mugabe and Thomas Sankara and Solidarity against the Servitude and Looting Caused by Debt

On the eve of the foundation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, which later became the African Union (AU) in 2001, Kwame Nkrumah, first President of Ghana, visionary leader and figurehead of the Pan-African revolution, said: “Africa must unite or perish!” Indeed, faced with powerful and well organised enemies who wish to continue their domination of Africa in order to plunder its riches, only solidarity and unity can help Africa preserve its independence. Ardent Pan-Africanists and admirers of the great Ghanaian leader, Robert Mugabe and Thomas Sankara endorsed this statement of truth by President Nkrumah. That is why Mugabe, Sankara and Muammar Gaddafi the late Libyan leader often urged African leaders to form a united front to demand the cancellation of illegitimate African debt. In particular, Sankara once said:

Debt in its current form is a cleverly organised re-conquest of Africa that its growth and development conform to standards and levels which are totally foreign. It ensures that each of us becomes a financial slave, meaning a slave for those who had the opportunity, cunning, and deceit to invest their funds in us with the obligation that we repay. The debt can never be repaid since if we refuse to pay it our lenders will not die. Of that we can be certain. Yet if we do pay it is us who will die. Of that we can be equally certain (Quoted in Dembele 2013).

Zimbabwe and Burkina Faso are part of a group of more than thirty African states called “Least Developed Countries” (LDCs). According to United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2010) in the LDCs, 6 out of 10 people live on the equivalent of \$1.25 a day and nearly 9 in 10, 88 percent live on the equivalent of \$2 a day. This means that the two countries need to retain all their resources to put in the service of development. Every penny that comes out of these countries in the form of debt service or the repatriation of profits would be detrimental to the well-being of their people. This is why Mugabe and Sankara were right to say that “if we do pay it we will die.” Always connected to the external debt of the continent, Thomas Sankara was one of the few African leaders, if not the only, to have criticised and rejected

the adjustment policies of the World Bank and IMF, which have increased the debt burden and impoverished African countries. His government refused any form of collaboration with these institutions and rejected their “help”. He developed and implemented his own self-adjustment program, which had been supported by the people who understood the merits of his policies and the sacrifices required of all, both citizens and leaders.

Robert Mugabe and Thomas Sankara and the Struggle for Environmental Protection

Visionaries, Mugabe and Sankara understood before many others, including the so-called developed world, the importance of the environment as an essential fact to the survival of Humanity. Millions of trees were planted in order to stop desertification. Every event, baptism, marriage, was an opportunity to plant trees. This led to a massive mobilisation of people who understood the meaning and scope of such a decision: to build a country with their own hands. This is the key idea behind the vision of Robert Mugabe and Thomas Sankara. They had understood that economic and social costs to their countries might be incurred as a result of environmental degradation. That is why one of the main pillars of their development policies was mobilising people to protect their environment. Mugabe and Sankara understood the link between the mode of capitalist production and consumption to environmental degradation. In particular Sankara once said: “The struggle for the trees and the forest is the anti-imperialist struggle. Imperialism is the arsonist of our forests and our savannahs” (Quoted by Dembele 2013).

The current damage caused by climate change due to greenhouse gas emissions, resulting from capitalist countries production and consumption, have confirmed Mugabe and Sankara’s predictions. However Zimbabwe, Burkina Faso and the rest of Africa, which contribute less to the global degradation by emitting low amounts of greenhouse gases, may yet pay a high price.

Conclusion

It is without doubt that Robert Mugabe and Thomas Sankara were visionaries, charismatic leaders and true revolutionaries. This is why they left an indelible mark on the collective consciousness of the African people and their actions have also had a profound resonance beyond Africa. Both men were ahead of their time. Currently, all the issues at the heart of their struggle are central to national and international debates: the liberation of women, debt, food sovereignty, solidarity between African states, South-South solidarity, and protection of the environment. The African Union and other continental

institutions seeking to build a new development paradigm were designed and implemented by Africans themselves. This was the central axis of Mugabe and Sankara's struggles. Obviously, like any human endeavours, Mugabe and Sankara's were imperfect. It is questionable in many aspects. Nevertheless, what is certain is that it has shown the path to a possible alternative development of Africa, based upon popular mobilisation and self-confidence in the face of imported ideas and models. Undoubtedly, it is a difficult road for Africa, but it is the only way to "live free and dignified".

Mugabe and Sankara embraced the ideas and struggles of their illustrious predecessors, while others are in the process of adopting their ideas and struggles, which are more relevant than ever, since, "you cannot kill ideas." In a speech in memory of Che Guevara, a week before his assassination, Sankara emphasised that one cannot kill ideas. Robert Mugabe and Thomas Sankara are physically gone from Africa's political landscape, but their ideas and example will continue to inspire other Africans to continue the struggle and ideas for which they gave their life. In this sense, Mugabe and Sankara's ideology will continue to be amongst us for generations to come.

Robert Mugabe and Thomas Sankara share similarities. Thomas Sankara was assassinated at the age of 37 in 1987. Years later Mugabe was unceremoniously ousted from power through a *coup de tat* orchestrated by his once trusted lieutenants Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa and Constantino Chiwenga. Their exits from Africa's political landscape setback the African development and decolonisation agenda. In a time when the continent of Africa was and is being dominated by dictatorial and neo-liberal forces, when young people were and are being encouraged to abandon socialism and equality for economic entrepreneurialism and opportunism, Robert Mugabe and Thomas Sankara, rather than joining the ranks of rent-seekers, pursued African liberation through socialist Pan-Africanism.

As alluded to in this chapter, while Compaoré, Mnangagwa and Chiwenga and their military associates (mercenaries?) brought about the immediate physical death of Sankara and the ouster of Robert Mugabe from the political arena respectively, all these misdeeds were done at the behest of many western corporate entities and people who administered or sustained these military processes. The resistance forged by Mugabe and Sankara against western imperialist forces is thus applauded; particularly the progressive forces and those engaged youth of Burkina, who shouted "Sankara lives", while overthrowing the regime of Compaore. Robert Mugabe and Thomas Sankara knew the risks they ran, for they respected and were conscious of the long line of martyrs stretching back to the dawn of African decolonisation: Ben Barka, Mondlane, Moumié, Um Nyobé, Rwagasoré, Lumumba, Olympio and Samora Machel, to

name just a few. Although the list was already long, it continued to grow after the assassination of Sankara: Dulcie September, Chris Hani and others.

After the 15 October 1987 assassination of Thomas Sankara and the 14 November ouster of Robert Mugabe in military coup de tats, the two former presidents remain near-mythical heroes for many young people in Zimbabwe and Burkina Faso and across Africa. They idealised the image of a committed, self-sacrificing freedom fighters, who during their term of office, sought to improve the lives of the impoverished and ordinary people in their countries whilst at the same time projecting the country onto the international arena.

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Robert Mugabe: An African Liberation Theologian?

Robert Matikiti

Introduction

This chapter deals with Robert Mugabe's estranged relationship with the Western powers. It evaluates whether or not Mugabe, in his economic and political power struggles with Euro-American domination, had earmarks of an African liberation theologian. Mugabe considered his Catholic background as a decisive influence on his life in helping him see the world from the perspective of the dispossessed, impoverished and oppressed Africans. In the words of Anderson (2000), Mugabe was one of the few African leaders who combined authentic indigenous ethos and liberation in his thought. One of Mugabe's legacies was a political life spent on overthrowing Euro-American power structures that debarred Zimbabweans from achieving their full human potential. In this regard, Mugabe thought that, in a world characterised by the violence of neocolonial dispossession, robbery and exploitation, violence is an ultimate tool for indigenous people to reclaim ownership of Zimbabwean resources. The burden of African liberation theologians has been to expose Euro-American criminality, political hegemony and direct the attention of the African church to it as a matter of primary concern. Influenced by a Marxist understanding of society and his Catholic background, Mugabe believed that it was essential to analyse the causes of the glaring plunder, dispossession, social inequalities between the neo-colonial transnational plunderers and the indigenous people, between the majority poor and the minority rich, between the oppressed and the oppressor, soon after independence in 1980. He was of the view that neo-colonialism and capitalism never produce justice but only poverty and the attendant criminality of dispossession and theft of resources from indigenous people. Mugabe discerned different dimensions of liberation that espoused nationalistic deliverance of the neo-colonised peoples from degrading servitude; detested inequalities between the minority Whites and majority Blacks and embraced empowerment of the Black people, indigenisation of natural resources, distribution of land and rejection of western power structures such as the Commonwealth. Mugabe's sense of identity was strengthened by the fact that his belief was based on the inclusion of others (inclusivism) as opposed to the exclusivism of westerners. The gist of this

chapter is that Mugabe consciously tried to integrate the impulses of liberation theology in his politics. Part of the appeal of Mugabeism was religious liberation ethos that offered an authoritative cultural, moral and spiritual standpoint which the Euro-Americans could not challenge.

African Liberation Theology and Human Emancipation

There is no idea that has been so compelling to the modern mind than the narrative of human emancipation. Liberation theologians call for a new order committing themselves to the cause of justice demanding that the gospel required that the church side with the poor in their struggle for liberation. Gustavo Gutierrez (Ferm 1988:155), a pioneer of liberation theology in its Latin American form, offers a helpful analysis of liberation theology. He opined that the characteristic feature of liberation theology is not much in its methods in the technical sense, but in its spirituality and struggle for human freedom and justice in the world. Liberation theology sees the world as characterised by conflict more than by compromise, by inequality more than by equality, and by oppression more than by freedom. In the words of Bosch (1991:439), for liberation theologians the “enemy of humanity is not nature (as is the case in technological humanism), but one structure of human power which exploits and destroys the powerless.” According to *The Oxford Companion to Christian Thought* (2000:387), liberation theology is a term that originally applied to a contextual theology originating in Latin America, now used to describe any contextual or political theology which comes from the Third World. Liberation theology has grown into an international and interdenominational movement principally opposed to poverty and neo-colonialism. The term has connotations of salvation, deliverance, rescue and freedom from bondage.

African liberation theologians such as Desmond Tutu of South Africa, John Mbiti of Kenya and Canaan Sodindo Banana of Zimbabwe claim that the Euro-American economic policies have given rise to situations of systemic injustice, oppression and underdevelopment, which are perpetuated in the economic and social divisions that divide the first world from the Third World. These theologians have developed a new vision of the world where the human person supersedes slogans, dogmas and vain ideologies. They are not preoccupied with questions of Christology or classical dogmas of the Christian faith. Their primary interest is in the liberating implications of Jesus’ life. They do not begin with the philosophical question ‘Does God exist? Rather, they ask the question, ‘Whose side is God on?’ The agenda in liberation theology is to change the existing status quo using the power of the affected people to change their own situations and histories. This methodology involves reflection and action. It is a theology of orthopraxis, which is a mutual interplay of theory and practice.

Liberation theology is a political movement largely in catholic theology which interprets the teachings of Jesus in relation to a liberation from unjust, political, or social conditions. The ideas of African liberation theologians were quite familiar to Mugabe given that he appointed one of their own, Canaan Banana, as the first ceremonial President of the Republic of Zimbabwe in 1980. It is evident that Mugabe considered the call by African liberation theologians for a new look at the radical implications of the gospel as justified. In analysing Mugabe's speeches, one immediately notices his profound acquaintance with African liberation theology, which he constantly brings to bear. Mugabe did not settle for an abstract truth, but considered the social consequences as integral part of politics, just as liberation theologians advocated.

During his 37 year reign, Robert Mugabe was an African icon who challenged the might of Euro-American neo-colonialism. He was particularly appealing because he strictly and consistently avoided any attempt at parochial, national and regional introversion, opting for an approach that keeps in full view the entire continent of Africa with all its homogeneity and heterogeneity. Mugabe's concern was Africa rather than the artificial territorial identities that are the result of the partition of Africa at the Berlin Conference of 1884–85. There is no doubt that Mugabe had Africa at heart. For this reason, Mugabe adopted a social justice-oriented form of gospel similar to principles of liberation theology which is popular among the Third World. In hard hitting language at the United Nations Millennium Summit in 2001 Mugabe lambasted the powerful nations of the western world:

We also risk accepting the hypocrisy hidden in the demand for the democratic reform of national governments and institutions in developing countries while doing nothing to reform the undemocratic structures and practices of international bodies such as the Bretton Woods Institutions and indeed the United Nations itself. If the new millennium, like the last, remains an age of hegemonic empires and conquerors doing the same old things in new technological ways; remains the age of the master race; of the master economy and master state, then I am afraid we in the developing countries will have to stand up as a matter of principle and say, "no, not again!" (Mugabe 2001: 28).

In the full glare of the world, Mugabe stood up to the challenges of modern Africa urging a constructive relationship based on mutual respect. As regards the capitalist financial system, Mugabe and the West lived in antithetical worlds. For his Black empowerment drive, Mugabe has been accused of being a total dictator responsible for economic mismanagement, widespread corruption, anti-white racism, human rights abuses and crimes against humanity. The Mugabe is a dictator narrative has been imbedded in the minds of many but it

is not a complete story. Westerners parroted the partisan anti-Mugabe narrative for geopolitical and neo-colonial expedience. Unlike many African leaders Mugabe was not a conformist; he was a revolutionary whose convictions were drawn from his Catholic teachings. Mugabe was a pro-Africa stickler. Even with neo-colonial guns pointing at his head, Mugabe did not capitulate. The Euro-Americans regarded Mugabe's stance as not liberating but dangerous. Both Mugabe and the West had deeply entrenched positions. What the Euro-Americans resented in Mugabe was intellectual prestige of African ideas, the moral and ethical persuasiveness of African social hope. Mugabe was lambasted by the Western powers because his pan Africanist ideas and policies threatened the creeping neo-colonialism that was moving Africa away from the West to one ruled by indigenous Africans. Mugabe was involved in political, economic and social arenas of contestations. Like most African liberation theologians Mugabe was a master of consciousness-raising, the motivation for involvement, the sense of community, the experience of grassroots democracy, the use of direct actions and, finally, political actions against the unjust global system. Throughout his reign Mugabe consistently and gallantly fought for African rights rallying his base of pan Africanism. Western powers saw Mugabe's progressive ideas as a threat to the neo-imperial status quo.

In the pages that follow we shall interrogate Mugabe's solidarity with liberation theologians in relation to the national question, economic bondage, social oppression and cultural perversion to enable us to understand his noticeable cat and mouse game with the West. The chapter's thrust is to address all these aspects in greater detail. This work is a theological necessity as well as a practical one. This chapter consists largely of theological reflections of Mugabe's post-independence era. Before venturing into the solidarity of Mugabe and principles of liberation theology first let us discuss Robert Mugabe a devout-Catholic-narrative.

Robert Mugabe: A Devout Catholic

Mugabe's contestation with the West flow from his religious convictions and without understanding the latter the former can easily be misunderstood. Detaching Mugabe from his Catholic allegiance is a serious form of reductionism and, resultantly, viewing him as a caricature of a skilful leader. Mugabe, the man who ruled Zimbabwe for 37 years, considers the Catholic faith a decisive influence on his life in helping him see the world from the perspective of the poor and oppressed.

Robert Gabriel Mugabe was born on February 21, 1924 at Kutama, a Catholic mission, just a few months after Southern Rhodesia had become a British Crown Colony. Many people in Rhodesia were oppressed by colonial

laws, thus they faced limitations in acquiring education and high profile jobs. The situation which obtained in Southern Rhodesia that time made it very difficult and sometimes near impossible for the generality of people to go beyond grammar school level. Be that as it may, Mugabe was fortunate enough to receive good education. Robert Mugabe's father, Gabriel Matibiri, was a carpenter while his mother Bona taught Christian catechism to the village children. The children were trained in their professions by the Jesuits, the Roman Catholic order which had established the mission. Bona and Gabriel had six children: Miteri (Michael), Raphael, Robert, Dhonandhe (Donald), Sabina, and Bridgette. Mugabe was trained as a teacher in a Roman Catholic mission school.

Mugabe's religious convictions made him to reject the legitimacy of neo-colonialism. He was introduced to nationalist politics while he was a student at the University College of Fort Hare, South Africa, and between 1956 and 1960 he taught in Ghana. Mugabe returned to the then Rhodesia in 1960, and in 1963 he became a founder Secretary of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), a breakaway party from Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). He helped to form ZANU-though in absentia-and decided that this movement was, even unknowingly, God's instrument for the establishment of the Kingdom. Mugabe sought first to seek the political kingdom in the hope that citizens would be politically free to establish the Kingdom. The Catholic faith of Rhodesians was lacking in a theology that could help it understand the events of the times, and respond to them. Rhodesian rule was an obstacle to faith. In 1964 Mugabe was arrested for a "subversive speech" and spent the next 10 years in prison. During that period he acquired law degrees by correspondence courses. While still in prison he was chosen leader of the party in 1974 deposing Ndabaningi Sithole as ZANU's leader. In late 1974 Mugabe was freed. During the war of liberation that pitted Rhodesia's Black majority population against Prime Minister Ian Smith's White-ruled Rhodesian government (1975-79), Mugabe was joint leader, with Joshua Nkomo, of the Patriotic Front (PF) of Zimbabwe. The party's nationalist freedom fighters operated against the Rhodesian government from bases in Zambia, Mozambique Angola and Tanzania. Peace negotiations in Lancaster, London, in 1979 ended the war and led to new British-supervised parliamentary elections in February 1980. Mugabe's party, now using the name ZANU-PF, won a landslide victory over the other black parties, and he became Prime Minister. After independence, his efforts and activities, as well as unflinching principles, made him one the anti-West leaders-to which we shall return.

But, politics aside, it is the role of Christianity in Mugabe's own life which is the subject of this section. Raised by Jesuits, the young Mugabe was instilled with an austere sense of self-discipline from the beginning of his life. Many

biographers of Mugabe agree that when he was 10, his father walked out on the family, and in his absence an Irish Catholic who praised opponents of the British Empire - of which Mugabe was a subject - became a major influence on his life. Robert was a favourite pupil of his headmaster, Father Jerome O’Hea, a Jesuit of Irish origin. Father Jerome O’Hea also preached a philosophy of racial equality as well teaching him about the Irish War of Independence and how revolutionaries had seized their country back from the British. Father O’Hea was Mugabe’s “Spiritual Father” who doted on Mugabe, telling his mother that one day he would be ‘an important somebody’ and a ‘leader’ (Meredith 2002: 28). Bona is said to have believed Father O’Hea had brought that prophecy from God and continued to nurture the young Mugabe according to the catholic. Before he died in 1970, Father O’Hea said his former pupil had ‘an exceptional mind and an exceptional heart’ (Meredith 2002:28).

The Jesuits are known to be strict disciplinarians and under their influence Mugabe developed an intense self-discipline, while also becoming a devout Catholic. Mugabe’s first job was as a teacher at the Driefontein Roman Catholic Mission School near Umvuma (now Mvuma). In February 1961 he married the Ghanaian-born Sally Hayfron in a Roman Catholic ceremony conducted in Salisbury; she had converted to Catholicism to make this possible. His second marriage ceremony to Grace Marufu in August 1996, which took place in Kutama and was orchestrated by the head of the Roman Catholic Church in Zimbabwe, Patrick Chakaipa showed Mugabe’s belief in Catholic sacred sacraments.

What is clear from the above narrative is that Mugabe’s childhood was steeped in piety, revolving round Kutama Catholic mission station. Catholicism did not end in Mugabe’s childhood. Father Mukonori, generally known as the ‘Mugabe priest’, knew Mugabe well during the liberation war which brought an end to White rule, and he has insisted that Mugabe’s Catholic faith, and his habit of saying the rosary, sustained him during the years when he was commanding liberation army:

Robert Mugabe moved in the battlefield with the rosary in his pocket. Robert Mugabe would be saying his rosary sitting in the car, Robert would say his rosary flying on the plane. He flew thousands of miles every year during the war. He was a moving target all the time but he always prayed (The Herald 28 February 2015). Furthermore, remarks made by Mugabe at the Imbisa Plenary Assembly, Harare, 30th July 2001 attested to his Catholic allegiance:

As always it gives me great pleasure personally to be with the church of my father and mother; the church of my whole family, indeed the church that has claimed and I believe, secured my devotional allegiance the larger part of my life.

Of course Chishawasha is the place of my late mother, the place where she grew and developed Christian ways she would later import to all of us her children, and of course to those in her neighbourhood.

Thus, the habits of Catholic piety drummed by both the priest and his mother continued throughout Mugabe's life. According to Father Emmanuel Ribeiro, who was Mugabe's priest during his imprisonment, Mugabe got through the experience of losing his son and hardship in prison "partly through the strength of his spirituality" (Holland 2008:152). In November 2017, as military commanders and opponents' supporters have moved in to bring his illustrious political reign to an end, a Jesuit has been at his side: his lifelong confidante Father Fidelis Mukonori. Notwithstanding that humanity is fallible Mugabe's religious beliefs were his guiding principles. By no means an angel; Robert Gabriel Mugabe was committed to his Catholic faith. Mugabe is a devout Catholic.

Mugabe, Liberation Theologians and Imperialist Interventions

Mugabe and African liberation theologians' interaction with the West was mediated by imperialist interventions. Soon after creating strong industrial economies in the 19th century, the Euro-American countries developed the doctrine of imperialism which prompted them to rob African people of their resources. There was the potential of raw materials and markets that were rudimentary when compared with those of Europe that were more advanced. Industrialisation led to oversupply of goods that outstripped demand in Europe (Mathema 1994:3). A major principle of imperialism was the licence given to these European countries to use force to overthrow the legitimate rulers of Africa to further their imperialist aims and objectives. The lure of wealth was also a huge consideration for the invasion of Africa. The collapse of direct control largely in the 1960s did not however lead to the collapse of imperialist domination. Through the cunning use of economic markets; the mischievous employment of political puppets; investments protection of imperialist corporations; and deception the imperialist powers have maintained domination of the countries of Africa. The fundamental concern of African liberation theology has been liberation. It goes without saying that most African liberation theologians have not felt it necessary to theorise about Christian Theology, because to them religious faith is practical living, expressed most effectively through experience, not through words. They interpreted Scripture in the light of their squalor situation and their situation in the light of Scripture. Africans experience imperialist intervention of neo-colonialism as will be demonstrated below. Analysing his socio-economic context, Mugabe realised that the problem

in Zimbabwe was the capitalist belief system whose default pillar was dependence. Mugabe detested dependence on imperialist nations. The quest for liberation from this dependence – economically – was the thrust of Mugabe's long reign.

Mugabe, African Liberation Theologians and the National Question

Every era and every milieu has its own relation to God, in liberation theology real commitment to and struggle for justice come first. In the long and unremarkable flow of past events we make sense of the present circumstances. For this reason, theology must be done in and through concrete life experiences. Theology in Africa has to be understood as an interpretation of Christ in terms that are relevant and essential to African existence. Africa provides the setting for patterns of which theology in Africa must take account. Theology in this continent must show its Africaness. However, theology in Africa does not overlook present day realities. This emphasis on the “true African” and “African worldview” is succinctly captured by Manas Buthelezi a South African Lutheran theologian: “Theology in Africa must reflect the throbbings of the life situation in which people find themselves” (Torres and Fabella 1978:69). African liberation theology urges theology to be indigenous. Jesse Ndwiga Kanyua Mugambi, a Kenyan Anglican liberation theologian, found no justification for Whites' domination on land while Kenyans remained imperial subjects in their motherland (Mugambi 1994). As in Zimbabwe, to the south, Kenya has a problem with the distribution of land and with many angry people who do not have any. It is a national question in Kenya. Many African countries emerged into independence with dual economies, with wealth (land) abounding in non-Black or non-indigenous communities. Inequitable land distribution oppresses and robs ordinary people. These ideas closely resemble those of Mugabe.

Let us turn to the Zimbabwean situation. The British colonialists set the stage for a serious land crisis in Zimbabwe. Towards the realisation of this, Mugabe, a true African nationalist, saw the land question as an important question in relation to the struggle of the oppressed peoples and broadening of democracy. Thus, when Mugabe came to power, the dominant factor in Zimbabwean situation was the land question. Mugabe's view of the national question was that it had to be examined historically. These historical facts are important to recount for they help us comprehend today's complex national question. Each government anywhere in the world must of necessity defend, support and promote the interests of its citizens. It should be noted that for many African leaders the radicalism of the official rhetoric tended to outstrip the radicalism of official practice. These leaders wanted to show that they were on the side of the masses in order that they stay in power. What is blindingly

evident, though, is that Mugabe was a unique leader; he was a pragmatist and man of action. He translated the rhetoric into action; he turned his tough talking into practical actions to thwart the encroachment of severe neo-colonialism. Mugabe was a special leader who wanted to make life better for Africans, in general, and Zimbabweans, in particular.

The land question became a topical issue in Zimbabwe since colonisation and has dominated post-independence politics because land is a powerful resource for independence. Indeed now as in the past, it remains the root of the political tension within the country and with the former colonial power, Britain. The advent of European colonial settler occupation of Zimbabwe in September 1890 is the genesis of the dispossession of Blacks of their land. Land in Zimbabwe like elsewhere in Africa was stolen through force and colonial legislation. Moyo (2007) states that at independence in 1980, 6000 White farmers retained 39% of land amounting to 15.5 million hectares of prime agro-ecological farmland while 1 million Black households remained confined to 41.4% of the land. The land reform methods which seemed to reward colonialism such as the *Willing Seller Willing Buyer*, dominated the years 1980-1999. Mugabe lamented in one of his speeches at the United Nations Millennium Summit, New York, 8 September, 2001 that it makes absolute nonsense of the history as an African country that most of the arable and ranching land is still in the hands of the colonisers while the majority of the Black peasant communities still live like squatters in their God-given land:

In Zimbabwe, and only because of the colour line arising from British colonialism, 70 percent of the best arable land is owned by less than one percent of the population who happen to be white, while the black majority are congested on barren land. We have sought to redress this inequity through a land reform and resettlement programme that will effect economic and social justice and this in terms of our constitution and law. But what has been the response from former imperialist quarters?

Their response has been staggering beyond description. My country, my Government, my party and my own person has been labelled “land grabbers”, demonised, reviled and threatened with sanctions in the face of accusations of reverse-racism. W. B. Du Bois must be turning in his grave for having thought the problem of the “colour line” would disappear with the 20th century (Mugabe 2001: 26-27).

Mugabe took his war of words to the world’s largest inter-state organisation, the United Nations. His diatribe centred on the disproportionate ownership and control of the land by Whites. Consequently, Mugabe was uncompromisingly nationalistic promising to give land back to Black people. He viewed the land as

the Blacks' birth right. Fortunately, Mugabe did not intend to shut Whites out. His nationalism cannot be defined as "us" against "them" as in the extreme connotation of the term. He regarded Whites as Zimbabweans who must of necessity share the precious natural resource equitably. Mugabe embraced inclusivity rather than exclusivity in his land policy.

Meanwhile, the contentious Lancaster House Constitutional Agreement in 1979 bears testimony to the centrality of the land issue in the country's history. The final agreement did not address the land problem adequately; ZANU PF accepted it on the understanding that the United Kingdom, the USA and other donor nations would pay for land needed for resettlement. Black people languished in congested dry and arid rural areas. The British inserted Section 16 of the Draft Constitution which sought to prohibit the compulsory acquisition of property of any description except under the authority of law which required the acquiring authority to give reasonable notice of its intention to acquire the property in question. The property could only be acquired in the interest of defence, public order, public morality, public health, and town and country planning. In the event of compulsory acquisition, the acquiring authority would be required to pay prompt and adequate compensation. This section 16 would be operational for a period of 10 years from the date of independence. During this period any amendment to the Constitution would be on the basis of a 100% parliamentary vote (i.e. every Member of Parliament supporting any such amendment). The Patriotic Front (PF) objected vehemently to the restrictions imposed on land acquisition. It granted a veto to the minority, contrary to democratic norms and in contradiction to the basic objective of the national liberation struggle itself.

At independence, the Government of Zimbabwe sought to redress the inherited colonial legacy of glaring and skewed racial inequalities in land distribution. Yet, between 1980 and 1990 Government managed to acquire only 3.5 million hectares and resettled 71,000 households (Moyo 2007). The communal areas still remained congested, overstocked and overgrazed. Pressure was mounting on Government to accelerate its land repossession programme. In a bid to accelerate the process of land acquisition and resettlement, Government passed the Land Acquisition Act of 1992, following the introduction in 1990 of Constitutional Amendment 11. These legal instruments had the effect of freeing Government from the willing seller/willing buyer clause. With no financial or material benefits coming to Zimbabwe, the rejection of the 2000 Draft Constitution and the continued legal challenges by the White commercial farmers saw Government embarking on the Fast Track Land Reform Programme. The Programme, which was launched on 15 July 2000, was designed to be undertaken in an accelerated manner and with reliance on domestic resources. The programme was a fundamental departure from

Mugabe's previous philosophy, practices and procedures of acquiring land and resettling people. The fast track was initially targeted at de-congesting communal lands. In the later stages it was extended to incorporate the creation of an indigenous commercial farming sector. The then British Prime Minister from the Labour Party, Mr Tony Blair, reneged on his promise to fund the land reform. With the support of the former US President, George Bush, whom he had support on the war with Iraq, Blair started demonizing Mugabe accusing him of failure to observe the rule of law and human rights.

In his vigorous advocacy for Black empowerment, Mugabe used his best weapon: the oratory gift. In a blistering speech he condemned internationalising of a bilateral squabble between Britain and Zimbabwe:

We are aware that the British Government are working closely with the opposition MDC and other hostile so-called civil groups to trigger urban unrest, in the hope that a ZANU (PF) Government will capitulate or fall in violent circumstances. They have even considered sponsoring hit squads to eliminate some of us. They are working hard to pervert and divide our institutions of governance in the hope of precipitating constitutional crisis. They are working hard to broaden the scope of sanctions against Zimbabwe by trying to enlist the support of the European Union, Nordic countries and the United States of America (Mugabe 2001: 79).

Mugabe resented the West's oppressive arrogance as unethical. As Mugabe viewed the scenario, it was tantamount to pillaging the country's natural resources for the benefit of the West and their kith and kin with no regard for the future of Africans. It should be noted that Mugabe's ruling party adopted the slogan "Land is the economy and the economy is the land" and sought the support of friendly countries:

Our sister countries on the continent have now fully accepted that our struggle for land rights is an integral part of common struggles against imperialism and for full sovereignty of our continent. Presently, there is a new African initiative which is led by Nigeria and supported by South Africa, Kenya, and Jamaica, meant to break the current impasse on the land issue (Mugabe 2001: 42).

Be that as it may, if Mugabe was correct in his assessment, there is little wonder that he was suspicious of any African governments that lessened the urgency of confronting the land question. Throughout the course of Mugabe's battle, the Western world rejected his message of Black empowerment. As Mugabe was getting stronger in the fight against neo-colonialism, the whole world came to know him as a voice of African protest against the land issue and

global financial system. In addressing the national question Mugabe had similarities with African liberation theologians.

The Roots of Dissent: The Economic Bondage of Zimbabwe

Liberationists interpret the teachings of Jesus Christ in relation to liberation from unjust economic conditions. The churches in Africa had to strongly and forcefully address themselves to the burning issue of economic bondage. They refused to be silenced in their prophetic role on behalf of the forgotten of the continent. They became the voice of the voiceless Africans and called for concerted action against the West's exploitation and economic hegemony. Many African liberation theologians decry the international trade designed to make Africa continuously dependent upon the neoimperial world. African economies are geared to be perpetual suppliers of raw materials which are used to produce expensive commodities for African markets. Trade imbalance favours the neoimperial Western world. For African liberation theologians, the first step towards salvation is the transformation of society. The poor must be freed from economic oppression. African theologians view economic dependence as sin. Engelbert Mveng, a Cameroonian Catholic liberation theologian, excoriated and lambasted Westerners for anthropological impoverishment of Africans arguing the poor must be at the focus of theologizing: "How shall we fashion a theology of the Third World without them? What kind of 'Third World theology' would we have if it were a theology they could not recognize?" (Mveng 1983: 218). He accused Westerners of stripping Africans of their personhood and identity. Mveng is not the only African liberation theologian to attack neo-colonialism. Edward Fashole-Luke, a Sierra Leonean Anglican liberation theologian, asserts that "African independent states need theologies of liberation as much as, if not more than, the Blacks in the occupied territories of southern Africa" (Fashole-Luke 1974:359). He strongly urged liberation from economic oppression of African people.

A careful look at Mugabe's reign shows that he took an anti-neo-colonialism stance. In a Foreword to Martin and Johnson's book, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, Robert Mugabe wrote:

Our struggle, which pitted the masses and their vanguard liberation movement on one side against the minority settler bourgeoisie (backed overtly and covertly by western powers, western capital and the apartheid regime of South Africa) on the other, was the ultimate stage in a dialectical process. It represented the final phase in the development of a conflict situation between the colonized and the colonizer, between the land-hungry peasantry and the settler bourgeois land-mongers, between the exploited working class and the capitalist entrepreneurial class (Moore and Phyllis 1981:

v).

Mugabe discovered first-hand soon after independence in 1980 that political independence did not imply economic self-determination. Colonialism still remained intact and the economy still remained in the hands of the transnational corporations (TNCs) and the White bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie. Colonialism had just metamorphosed into neo-colonialism; the economy still remained in the old White and foreign hands. Neo-colonialism was very real and very severe and reliance on the West had never fundamentally changed. The Blacks who fought for their liberation were meant to believe that they had attained what they had been fighting for since the inception of colonialism in 1890. It is clear that Blacks had the political vote and their leaders were now in charge politically. The new Zimbabwe, wielding nation state status, continued to submit to political domination of Britain and other Western states. Mugabe inherited the power to make laws, to engage with other nations and so on, but he did not inherit effective power over economic developments of his own country. It goes without saying that Zimbabwe's independence government was expected to support and promote the global economic system of neo-colonialism, the new face of the dislodged old colonialism. In the colonial period, the Zimbabwean economy had been integrated with the world capitalist economy in a subordinate position. Therefore, the end of the political domination of colonialism did not, and could not, mean the automatic decolonisation of the Zimbabwean economy. The TNCs who accompanied the colonisers as appendages and defenders of the British Empire, particularly the British South Africa Company (BSAC) which at one time actually owned the whole of Zimbabwe as its private property, were still in charge and raring to stay put.

The aim and thrust of the new government of Zimbabwe has been towards the development of an independent and balanced national economy and avoidance of further imperialist economic control and domination. The Zimbabwean capitalist class before 1980 nor since 1980 has been either basically comprador class or a junior partner of the imperialist monopolies. Mugabe was not prepared to welcome such neo-colonialism. From 1980 onwards the big monopoly corporations and international conglomerates of the imperialist world in general and Britain in particular have not been permitted to acquire a major hold inside Zimbabwe. Mugabe refused to be absorbed economically as a neo-colony. This is not to say the Zimbabwean economy is not dependent on imperialism; its development was heavily hampered by imperialism. Zimbabwe is an integral part of the world capitalist economy. There is no doubt that the 'external' restrictions on the Zimbabwean economy and its development are

‘structural’. It produces development in the western world and produces underdevelopment in the Third World.

Mugabe believed that the nature of international economic relations in the capitalist system contradicted Zimbabwe’s vital interests and seriously impeded the development of the independent national economy. For this reason, Mugabe had no faith in western foreign aid as a universal panacea. Western policymakers were apparently tempted by the idea that Africans can be ushered into the 21st century simply by offering them with the same incentives that helped the industrial west to its present wealth and power. Mugabe saw the foreign aid leading to vicious circles of abject poverty.

Mugabe became a thorn in the flesh for the Euro-Americans for proposing and effecting countervailing action against neo-colonialism. He could not allow Zimbabweans to remain loyal servants of overseas employers. Zimbabwe was economically governed by people who had only the most marginal interest in our affairs. They were only interested in looting Zimbabwean resources for their own well-being. That is really the meaning and practice of capitalism. For this reason Mugabe has been a champion for radical restructuring of international economic relations on the basis of equality and justice. He called for a new international economic order in order to overcome economic challenges. To achieve this end, Mugabe utilised the rich natural resources to raise the living standards of the masses.

Social Liberation Using Marxist Ideology

Africa is a continent rich in natural resources, but the majority of the population has been trapped in abject poverty. The problem lies in unjust structures. African liberation theologians were not shy to employ Marxist social analysis arguing that liberation must encompass the social dimension if it is to be meaningful in Africa. African liberation theologians appreciate Marx’s maxim: ‘The philosopher only seeks to understand the world; the revolutionary intends to change it’. Liberation theology seeks to practically promote full and free life. It is the responsibility of Christians to work for the Kingdom. Meanwhile Christians can achieve some good things on earth even though paradise will be realised at the Second Coming. They noted that extreme inequalities do not make for the best society. The good things of life can and should be distributed more fairly.

In his book, *God is not a Christian*, Desmond Tutu the South African Anglican theologian commented:

The voiceless, the weak, the oppressed, the exploited have no one to champion them except the church. We must be patriots who love our countries and our

nations passionately as the prophets of Israel loved their country, their land, and their people. Our love should inspire us to want only the best for our nations, to be involved in true development so that people can enter into the fullness of all that God has intended for them, that they may begin to enjoy life-because Christ said, “I have come that they may have life, and life in its abundance” (John 10:10), in its effervescent abundance (Tutu 2011:61).

Even though Tutu considered himself more anti-capitalist than pro-Marxist he deplored social inequalities in Africa. Canaan Banana, the Zimbabwean Methodist liberation theologian, was more forthright in his acceptance of socialism:

The Church has the opportunity to evolve a theology that encompasses a socialist transformation – instead of being frightened into a state of paralysis at the mention of the word socialism. Indeed, the concept of a classless socialist society is essentially theological: a society where there is neither Gentile nor Jew; neither the rich nor the poor; neither the down-trodden nor the privileged (Banana 1985:17).

Liberationists affirmed human dignity by pushing society forward. They envisioned a new society where members were brothers and sisters. Such a society was free from the greedy, criminality and selfishness of capitalist ideology and its attendant foreign corporates. There is no doubt that the founder of the Christian faith Jesus Christ saw it as a home of the poor and the dispossessed in society and this is the reason why the first Christian believers were simple poor fishermen.

In the case of Mugabe, the connection with liberationists is obvious. Mugabe utilised the language of Marxist African liberationists. Soon after independence in 1980 one of Mugabe’s aims was to establish a socialist egalitarian democratic society guided by Marxist-Leninist principles. Addressing the Heads of Christian Denominations in April 1982 Mugabe spoke like liberation theologians:

Socialism must involve the participation of our whole society, except for those who, because of their individualism as manifested by their bourgeois philosophy and capitalist inclinations, cannot be reconciled to it (Mugabe, Heads of Denominations: ZPS, 375).

Mugabe implored the churches to wake up to the dangers of Western capitalist ideology. This interpretation, which hinges on class analysis, clearly reflects a considerable part of the reality of internal politics and international

relationships of Zimbabwe. Influenced by a Marxist understanding of the society Mugabe avowed that the hierarchical global economic system no longer makes sense to the ones at the bottom of the heap. The system perpetuates abuse and underdevelopment. Mugabe believed that it was essential to analyse the causes of the glaring social and economic inequalities between the majority poor and the minority rich, between the oppressed and the oppressor. In Mugabe's view capitalism never produces justice but only poverty and as far as the "First" and "Third Worlds" are concerned has never solved any of the problems that plague the poor with the regard to health that the basic reasoning is to come to see and realise that the capitalist is evil.

Decolonisation of Culture in Africa

Decolonisation of the African continent without cultural independence is meaningless. Liberation theology arose chiefly as a moral reaction to cultural perversion caused by Western imperialists. Imperialism was partly the result of racist ideas of European cultural supremacy where imperialist like Cecil Rhodes saw colonisation as a vehicle for spreading their culture, Christianity and civilisation. The former President of the Republic of Zimbabwe, Canaan Banana, remarked:

I am sure that Jesus Christ never decreed that the black man should be saved through the medium of white culture. For Christianity to rediscover itself in the revolutionary process in Africa, it would need to abandon the unnecessary baggage that it has gathered through centuries of alliance with Western civilization (Banana 1985:15).

Banana avowed that Jesus Christ never decreed that the Black must be saved through the medium of western culture. Western cultural values are by no means normative. Africans must drink from their own rich cultural wells. African theologians called for the decolonisation of Christianity due to cultural padding that has been added on to the Christian faith.

Mugambi (1997) joins other scholars in African Christian Theology, endeavouring to authentically relate Christianity with the African cultural and religious heritage with appreciation of both the Gospel and the wisdom bequeathed from generation to generation through oral tradition, cherished customs, rituals and symbols. African liberationists call for indigenisation, or more specifically Africanisation. This allows African Christians to reflect Christianity and its truth in their own terms. The integration of African culture into the fabric of Christianity is of paramount significance. If theology in Africa is to be done meaningfully then the African settings must reflect cultural

particularity. Theology should be done in context to ensure that it remains relevant and vital.

There are some resemblances between Mugabe and the essence of African liberation theology with regard to cultural independence. While his parents nurtured him to become a strong Christian, they nurtured him to cherish the African heritage as well. Mugabe opined that:

The time has come for the practice of political and economic dominance of poor nations by the rich to give way to birth of a new inter-dependent world that recognises and respects the diversity and dignity of all cultures and civilisations. In this connection, I am pleased that the United Nations has declared 2001 as the “Year of Dialogue between Civilizations” (Mugabe 2001:28).

Mugabe resonates with African liberation theologians’ positive appraisal of authentic African culture. Mugabe had no kind words for those brainwashed effectively to think that the Westerners’ value systems and categories are of universal validity and, thus, normative. Africans must not play the cultural game according to White man’s rules. Thus, the western cultural elements should give way to elements of African culture. Cultural continuity in Africa is mandatory and a non-negotiable in Africa. Aspects of Westernism have impacted negatively on the development of an authentic African identity.

End of an Era: Mugabe Removed in Coup D’état in Zimbabwe

Mugabe was removed from power through a coup d’état on the 15th of November 2017 because his policies threatened the continuing tentacles of neo-colonialism. In his article *‘John Calvin and Politics: Did Calvinists Approve of the Coup D’état in Zimbabwe?’*, Matikiti (2017:117-118) pointed out that:

The world woke up in the early hours of Wednesday, 15 November 2017, to learn that the long standing Zimbabwean Head of State and Commander in Chief of its Armed Forces, President Robert Mugabe, had been placed under house arrest. The events of that Wednesday also culminated in the arrest of key officials of President Robert Mugabe’s government. This development gave rise to nothing but a coup d’état – removing of government using unconstitutional means.

Many Zimbabweans, who were experiencing hardships largely due to Western sanctions, thought his departure was justified. The coup d’état clarified the urgent need to decide which society Zimbabweans aspired to establish. The fingers on the triggers were different; but the ideological motivation is identical. It is reasonable to say that allowing the coup to go on was a pre-emptive measure

to stop Mugabe nationalism which was challenging imperialist domination of the continent. Economic stagnation, intra-party conflict and a corresponding loss of influence could be the spur to political change. Many Zimbabweans were dragged along without realising the vast conflict of interests underlying the coup d'état. Mugabe has been very bitter about the way he was removed from power. He vowed not to vote for his former party on the eve of the presidential and parliamentary elections on 30 July 2017.

Conclusion

Having been at the helm of Zimbabwe's politics for nearly four decades, Mugabe has been a champion of pan Africanism and a crusader of anti-imperialism and anti-neo-colonialism. He has been praised as a revolutionary hero of the African liberation struggle who helped to free Zimbabwe from British imperialism and White minority rule. The imperialist strategy involves oppressing African countries, maintenance of puppet and surrogate regimes and, finally, the defeat of African nationalism. Mugabe is an African icon whose legacy was African empowerment and this threatened imperialist domination. Imperialism has always sought to frustrate the Zimbabwean national question, economy, culture, society and all imperialistic thinking on the African continent demands the defeat of the national struggle for sovereignty and ownership of resources. African liberation theologians rejected situations of injustice, oppression, and exploitation, which were perpetuated in the economic, cultural and social sectors that divided the rich world from the poor world. Mugabeism resonated with African liberation theologians in its drive towards Black emancipation and empowerment. Mugabe is an African liberation theologian.

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Mugabe, Zimbabwean National Identity and Sovereignty: Interrogating the Euro-American Human Rights Hypocrisy in Africa

Collins Nhengu

Introduction

This chapter examines Mugabe's defence of the embattled Zimbabwean national identity and sovereignty that were destabilised by resilient Euro-American neo-imperialism. In Mugabe's view, Zimbabwean identity and sovereignty rested on possession of land by the indigenous people, promotion of local languages, culture as it is enforced by the chiefs and dress code normatively perceived to enhance *Unhu/Ubuntu*. However, forces of negation from the Euro-American world undermined Mugabe's efforts to fortify Zimbabwean identity and sovereignty. The Euro-Americans used the decoy of empty-shell human rights to pull down assertions of Zimbabwean national identity and sovereignty. Mugabe was praised by the Euro-Americans when he initially was quiescent to their interests but they lampooned him when his policies favoured indigenous Zimbabweans. They were averse to the ideas of identity and sovereignty because they entail independence from the Euro-American neo-colonialism. Euro-Americans have always been desirous to yield flag independence, on the continent of Africa, devoid of economic, political and social independence. According to Muchena (2004), much to the chagrin of Mugabe and many indigenous Zimbabweans, the White descendants of colonialists possessed 85% of arable land in the country. Mugabe saw this as injustice and parcelled land to his indigenous people. To promote the Zimbabwean identity and sovereignty, Mugabe championed the teaching of indigenous languages in the Zimbabwean school curriculum. He despised the erosion of Zimbabwean culture by Euro-American civilisation. In this regard he empowered chiefs to be custodians of Zimbabwean culture. Mugabe regarded dress as a reflection of the inner Zimbabwean identity. In this vein Mugabe was particularly engrossed with dress code that reflects Zimbabwean identity. The Euro-American world used the rod of human rights to chastise Mugabe through denying him the lifeline of funding and lines of credit. As if the Euro-American world is concerned with the welfare of the people of Zimbabwe, they hypocritically lambasted Mugabe for allegedly violating human rights. The real

intention of the Euro-Americans was to turn the Zimbabwean people against Mugabe: Euro-Americans sought to maintain their hegemony over Zimbabwe and the rest of the countries of the Global South. The main thrust of this chapter is to make an exposition of how Mugabe espoused African identity and sovereignty at the expense of being lambasted by the Euro-American agents of neo-colonialism.

Definition of Terms

There are three critical terms that we need to define in this chapter so that we bring clarity to the subject matter namely identity, sovereignty and human rights. Weinreich (1998), defines identity as the totality of one's self construal, in which how one construes one's self in the present expresses the continuity between how one construes oneself as one was in the past and how one construes oneself as one aspires to be in the future. Identity is a multi-splendoured concept. It is who or what somebody or something is in society. The second key term to define is sovereignty. Generally speaking, sovereignty is the full right and power of a governing body over itself, without any interference from outside sources or bodies. In political theory, sovereignty is a substantive term designating supreme authority over some polity. Chasamhuka (2007) adds that sovereignty means independence and non-interference from matters that are essentially in the domestic jurisdiction of another state. The third and last term to define in this section is human rights. The Human Rights Act of the United States of America (1998) defines the term human rights as the basic rights and freedoms that belong to every person in the world from birth until death. Those rights which are inherent to the human being. Reginald (2017) posits that even though the reason to uphold human dignity differs, most of the people in the modern world would agree that humans have equal and inherent dignity. The concept of human rights acknowledges that every single human being is entitled to enjoy his or her human rights without distinction as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Human rights are legally guaranteed by human rights law, protecting individuals and groups against actions which interfere with fundamental freedoms and human dignity. The above three definitions of key terms will enable us to understand Mugabe's entanglement with the Euro-Americans in key areas such as land, culture, education, language and dress.

Mugabe's View of Land as an Anchor of African Identity and Sovereignty

Mugabe was vociferously against the theft of land and disproportionate land distribution that was skewed in favour of the White minority in Zimbabwe. The White minority constituting 5% of the population “owned” and possessed 80% of the land while the remaining 20% of the land belonged to the majority Black Africans. The Whites control the economic, industrial, trade and educational systems. Despite Zimbabwe’s economic policy of indigenisation whereby 51% is reserved for Blacks, the White man is still in charge and the policy is still not operational. Machingura (2012) observed that the average size of farms owned by an individual farmer was between three thousand to five thousand hectares and in extreme cases between fifteen to twenty thousand hectares. It is such unprecedented levels of selfishness that made unrelenting champions like Mugabe to sink their feet deep clamouring for equitable distribution of resources between the Whites and the Blacks. The issue of land in Zimbabwe can be traced to as far back as the advent of robbery, by the Whites, on Zimbabweans in 1890. Mutasa (2015) highlights that the period of formal colonisation in Zimbabwe lasted 90 years, from September 1890 to independence in April 1980, and was marked by European colonial settler occupation of Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia), and the dispossession of millions of Black farmers of their land. What is of great concern is that the land was taken without compensation – it was stolen. When their land was stolen, Blacks were forcibly pushed to the areas which were unproductive, areas where, so to speak, stones grew better than crops.

In as far as Mugabe was concerned, land is an anchor to African identity and sovereignty. As regards the land issue, Mugabe did not mince his words:

We did not send away whites. We took away land in accordance with what the British and ourselves had agreed upon, that commercial land reform programme, land shall be taken from the farmers and be given to the Zimbabweans. So, it was all constitutional (Mugabe News24 09 April 2015).

For Mugabe, we cannot separate the land issue from the African identity. It is the essence of human existence in the African societies. Without land, life becomes meaningless to the indigenous people of Zimbabwe and Africa in general. Mugabe and some other Blacks who have not been hoodwinked by the Euro-American baits support the view that land belongs to the citizens of Zimbabwe citing social justice in view of colonial land dispossessions. In Mugabe’s view land ownership and cultural identities are intertwined. Apart from it being the nexus of existence, land among the indigenous ethnic groupings, is viewed as an essential key to people’s sense of belonging and self-knowledge.

Drawing from African traditional knowledge systems Mugabe illustrated ownership in terms of family ancestral ties and genealogies. When families gather in African traditional societies to honour their ancestors, they pour libations in the ground referring to them as those *varipasi* (those in the ground/soil) (see Nhemachena, Kangira & Mlambo 2019). That on its own speaks volumes to the issue of the possession of land and African identity. It must be noted that an African is connected to the land right from birth because that is where the taproot of identity is. It is traceable to the land as pointed out by Mugabe:

... Nobody had the right to give or take away the land of the people because that meant giving away the ancestors who held the whole nation together (Herald 22 February 2009).

Thus, in Mugabe's view when an African child is born it is those *varipasi* that have necessitated the coming of the member into the family. It is probably from this understanding that the Africans refer to each other as *mwana wevhu* meaning son of the soil as clearly articulated by Mugabe in 2013 at the unveiling the late Vice President Joshua Nkomo's statue:

The man whose statue we are unveiling today has always had the land issue at his heart. He was "Mwana Wevhu", son of the soil. Umdala Wethu's deathbed message remains vivid to me, to this day. He told me to continue the land reform programme and maintain the unity of the people (Chronicle 23 December 2013).

To an African, this speaks of identity which runs through the fabric of the ancestral line. When the umbilical code falls off the baby the African takes it and buries it in the ground to connect the child with those *varipasi*. This is so that even if the child goes away, those *varipasi* would still look after him, or her (see also Nhemachena, Kangira & Mlambo 2019). If the child becomes wayward, those *varipasi* would discipline him or her. They have authority and access to that child. However one thing is certain, that they operate from their base which is the soil or the land where they live. Loss of land through the colonial robbery of the indigenous population then entailed loss of an invaluable resource to life. It entails the cutting of the taproot that perpetuates identity. For Mugabe, access and ownership of land also largely influence perceptions and the way people feel about the acceptance of human worth, over and above the psycho-spiritual, surroundings, the national ethos and political sureties that it embosses.

When Mugabe realised such imbalances in the aspect of land, he sought to redress and address the issue by distributing land to the landless people. He felt

that when the land was stolen from the indigenous Zimbabweans, it was not just soil in its various colours and textures that was confiscated but it was the totality of African identity. It was the dignity, social status and identities that individuals and communities acquire based on their ownership of the land that was stolen. The sense of self-image, and the fact that the one belongs to Zimbabwe, being, self-worth, and self-confidence, including guiding maxims that may predicate or abrogate active participation and benefaction in life. That is what Mugabe sought to correct through the land repossession programme which began in 1980. The programme was also meant to deal with the inequalities in the possession and ownership of land in Zimbabwe. For Mugabe, the emotive nature of the land issue threatened to thwart the 1979 Lancaster House negotiations for Zimbabwe's independence between liberation movements and the White minority Rhodesian regime of Ian Smith. Mugabe only gave a nod to the Lancaster House agreement due to pressure from Frontline States. The derailment was centred on land, owned by the White colonialists, that was to be shared equally with the Black majority in the country after independence.

Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo reiterated on the appropriation of land as a preposture to a concerted peace settlement. This was a reflection of those who had gone into the bush to fight for the liberation of the country that is their guerrilla armies, consisting of the ZANLA and ZIPRA belonging to Mugabe and Nkomo respectively. This also mirrored the expectations that were at the hearts of the rural support populace. They had their expectations so high that after the war, they would have the land redistributed and they would be beneficiaries also. The British government, which was at the negotiating table as the mediators proposed that there should be a constitutional clause White protecting property ownership as an unassailable right to plug a mass egression of White farmers which would lead to the collapse of the economy in the country. This was apotheosised in Section 16 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe in 1980. To clinch a deal with Mugabe and Nkomo for the constitutional adjustment, Lord Carrington, who was the British Foreign Secretary, declared that the British government would assist in land resettlement, providing technical assistance and financial aid. The Secretary-General of the Commonwealth of Nations at that time, Sir Shridath Ramphal, also received assurances from the then American ambassador in London, Kingman Brewster, to the effect that the United States would also contribute capital in order to ensure that land redistribution would be carried out. The United States also promised that they would follow up on the British government and ensure that funds for the redistribution of land were released by Britain. Land was to be purchased on Willing Buyer, Willing Seller basis for the first 10 years, of independence, awaiting policy review and legal amendment.

The Zimbabwean government commenced its land redistribution in the 1980s to address the inequalities that existed between the Blacks and the Whites in land access, ownership and use before independence. A number of amendments were implemented over the years, with correlated adaptations to the law and redistribution targets. The most contemporary enterprise of the fast track land reform programme (FTLRP), commenced in 2001 to accelerate the redistribution of land. The government then commenced the process to ensure that the programme took off. In June 1998, the Zimbabwe government gazetted the policy framework in connection with the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme Phase II (LRRP II), which conceptualised the imperative acquisition over a period of five years of 50,000 square kilometres from the 112,000 square kilometres owned by the Whites who practiced commercial farming, corporations, churches, NGOs as well as multinational companies were also to cede land to the government for resettlement. The 50,000 square kilometres that the government earmarked for distribution meant that every year between 1998 and 2003, the government was going to purchase 10,000 square kilometres for resettlement. The government came up with the idea of organising a referendum that was meant to endorse the new constitution that would give them the authority to compulsorily take the land without compensation. However the new constitution suffered a still birth as it was rejected by the vast majority of the people of Zimbabwe. The government was defeated 45% to 55%.

Following the defeat of the new constitution, the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) propelled several people to undertake a march on White-”owned” farmlands seizing the land and chasing the White farmers off the farmers. This became known as the “Fast-Track Land Reform Program” (FTLRP). The White farmers were forced off the land together with those that were working for them. This was done in a way that was violent because the Whites resisted eviction.

The land imbalance was the bone of contention throughout Mugabe’s reign and land repossession would restore dignity and identity to the Black Zimbabweans. Mugabe like other Pan-Africanists believed that the White colonialists had deprived the Zimbabweans of their history. To many African leaders, Mugabe is seen as a hero of the struggle against European criminality on the continent. The Euro-Americans have robbed the Zimbabwean people of their identity and have made Africans to hate themselves so much that they accepted second class citizen status in their own countries. Mugabe is of the view that when the people of Zimbabwe took up arms to fight the White man, they were not fighting the White people but they were fighting the system that snatched their history in which their identity is imbedded. The fighting was meant to help the people go back to their history and take charge of their future.

Mugabe embarked on the fast track land reform programme also dubbed the third Chimurenga because he was convinced that the history of Zimbabwe is defined by the armed struggle and the land issue. As such if issues such as land are not adequately addressed, the Zimbabwean people are not yet free since land repossession was the major reason of the armed struggle. If that freedom is not realised then people are still suffering from identity crisis and their sovereignty is compromised.

Closely linked to the land is the idea of sovereignty. Mugabe's Speech at the Earth Summit in Johannesburg on 2 September 2002, dubbed "Anti-West anger at summit as Mugabe rounds on Blair", avowed that:

This Hitler has only one objective, justice for his own people, sovereignty for his people, recognition of the independence of his people, and their right to their resources. If that is Hitler, then let me be a Hitler tenfold.

We have fought for our land, we have fought for our sovereignty, small as we are we have won our independence and we are prepared to shed our blood.... So, Blair keep your England, and let me keep my Zimbabwe. I am still the Hitler of the time ten times, that is what we stand for (The Independent 3 September 2002).

Mugabe sarcastically referred to himself as Hitler in reference to the Whites' attitude towards him during the war of liberation. He would rather lose the most coveted associations in the world in order to maintain the sovereignty of the nation of Zimbabwe. Mugabe felt that as long as the people of Zimbabwe had their sovereignty and independence he would rather sacrifice associations with any international leagues like Commonwealth. His belief is that anything that happens in the nation of Zimbabwe should be in favour of the people of Zimbabwe at all costs. Consequently Mugabe asserts that:

If the choice was made for us, one for us to lose our sovereignty and become member of the commonwealth or remain with our sovereignty and lose membership of the commonwealth, then I would say, let the commonwealth go. What is it to us? Our people? Our people are overjoyed, the land is ours. We are now the rulers and owners of Zimbabwe (Speech to ZANU PF Congress 5 December 2003).

Mugabe was the darling of the West before he embarked on the land redistribution programme. But when he started to take possession of land to bequeath to its heirs, he became - in the eyes of Euro-Americans - a dictator, violator of human rights and was deemed a threat to the United States and other Western countries. The United States obtruded restrictions against Zimbabwe in 2000 censuring Mugabe for allegedly violating the rights of the people of

Zimbabwe and “stealing” elections from the opposition parties. They accused him of a violent land-reform program so that he could entrench his political power and reward his cronies. Mugabe is castigated in the West for encouraging Blacks to “invade” White-owned farms, for hounding journalists and judges, and for jailing opposition party leaders. But to some African leaders/people, he is a hero. To them, he is the resistance fighter who ended White hegemony in Zimbabwe in 1980, the statesman who amplified access to education and health care and the revolutionary who is repossessing land stolen from Blacks during the British colonial era. Even though the Western countries and their allies accused him of human rights violations, Mugabe denies all these accusations citing the hypocrisy of the Whites who have hidden agenda in Zimbabwe. He accused them of being greedy people whose appetite for land is never satiated. Mugabe felt that the people of Zimbabwe could not be sacrificed to satisfy the descendants of colonialists. He castigated the Whites who were challenging his land repossession in court. According to Swarns (2002) Mugabe said: “Greedy, greedy, greedy colonials, we can’t satisfy that greed at the expense of the rest of the people, you see.”

The world grew angry and attacked Mugabe and to his utter astonishment he was walloped with a travel ban and financial lifelines were cut. He became furious and accused the Western countries of hypocrisy. This is quite true because when the land was stolen from the Blacks, who were thus pushed to the reserves, the Euro-Americans did not oppose the dispossession of Black people. It became a crime when it was the Whites being moved from the same farms that they took from Mugabe’s people. There was a sudden change of attitude when only thirteen White farmers were killed as the Black people were reclaiming what was theirs. According to Wessels (2015) Mugabe was told to behave. This in a way was racist and hypocritical.

Mugabe’s Perception on Language, Identity, Sovereignty and Human Rights.

Heedfully enmeshed to the land contention is the materiality of language. Local languages were given importance by Mugabe to the extent that everyone who claims to be a Zimbabwean should be able to speak the indigenous languages. It became part of his assignment that before leaving office he should make sure that the Whites were able to speak Shona and Ndebele. If the Whites could not speak the indigenous languages then their claim that they love Zimbabwe was just lip service and hypocritical. Mugabe called to attention the fact that these indigenous languages are crucial as repositories of Zimbabwean classical culture. In this regard, they have to be cherished. Robert Mugabe said:

Before I bow out, I want to make sure that the white people who live here in Zimbabwe prove their love for our country by speaking our language. When I took their millions of acres of farmland and distributed it to our deserving war veterans, the white farmers claimed that Zimbabwe was their home and had nowhere to go. Now the time has come. Every white man must prove that he can speak either Shona or English, otherwise we are going to kick you out (Magunje 2016: 4).

If the Whites claim that they love Zimbabwe, they should whole-heartedly show it by speaking the local languages. Mugabe was of the opinion that there is no genuine love for Zimbabwe if it does not come from the heart as evidenced by speaking indigenous languages. Genuine love for Zimbabwe is displayed by speaking the local languages. Mugabe reiterates that speaking either Shona or Ndebele is a way of understanding the Zimbabwean people, their history and their culture. All these three are embedded in the hearts of the people of Zimbabwe where love is enshrined.

Colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe maintained the nonnative English language as the official language while attenuating the local languages. Mugabe was not against the speaking of other foreign languages but he encourages that while it is noble to speak foreign languages for Zimbabweans, it should not be done at the expense of Shona and Ndebele. Mugabe affirmed that it did not make sense for Zimbabweans to always converse in a foreign language that has nothing to do with Zimbabwe. In a bid to encourage the Whites in Zimbabwe to speak Shona or Ndebele, Mugabe suggested that the Whites were supposed to sit for the General Certificate of Education (GCE) Ordinary Level in Shona and Ndebele. Those who failed the exam would pay \$150 levy until they passed. For Mugabe it was a wonder that the Black people in Zimbabwe speak English while the Whites who were born in Zimbabwe among the Black Zimbabweans did not have any of their children speak either Shona or Ndebele. He had this to say:

Why is it that our children get to speak English, and none of their children do speak a word of our beautiful language of Shona and Ndebele. That is very racist. How can you grow up in a country and fail to speak a leak of the local language (Chronicle 30 October 2017).

For Mugabe, language is not separated from African cultural values. He knew that part of being African is to be able to communicate with other people in their language. It is something that is inculcated in the child from early stages of life. No one lives in isolation but one becomes a person because of other persons. That is the principle of *Ubuntu* which states that you are because we are. Language is very important in establishing this principle. English is a

colonial language that was used to enfeeble the country's languages, and exterminate the Zimbabwean culture. All the way from Algeria to South Africa, foreign languages were employed in the annihilation of native languages. Mugabe bemoaned the disrespect that has been brought about by the corrosion of African languages as people opt for English. Mugabe opined that Zimbabweans swallowed too much colonial venom and must correct it. Mugabe believed that respect is also seen in one's ability to speak the language of the people that one lives with. Thus he says:

If you cannot speak our language when you were born in this country, it is a sign of disrespect. When my daughter went to the private high school in Malaysia, within months, she was fluent in Malay. Here in Zimbabwe, we have been very nice to you and still you do not appreciate our hospitality. Speak some Shona or Ndebele, will you (Chronicle 30 October 2017).

For Mugabe, learning and getting well versed with local languages is not a one way issue. It has to be reciprocated so that all the citizens of Zimbabwe both Black and White know all the languages: it would foster unity among both Blacks and Whites. If not handled properly language can become a source of division among the people. In his view, there is no language that is above the other, no language is superior to the other. Mugabe believed that culture is not divorced from language and so, in order to appreciate our culture, the people in Zimbabwe whether White or Black must learn to speak all languages. The view of Mugabe was that we have to learn to appreciate and respect our own culture. He feels that it is embarrassing that some of the children of Black people go overseas and they speak fluent English to the detriment of their local languages. The embarrassment is even made acute in that they cannot communicate with their elders who cannot speak their adopted language.

While the White community did not directly respond to what Mugabe said in relation to speaking local languages especially Shona and Ndebele, they quietly introduced measures like raising tuition in their racial schools beyond the reach of the Blacks. The moves that they took were meant to maintain their superiority complex and avoid assimilation with the local people. It should be noted that language is a form of identification so if the Whites would speak the Shona or Ndebele language they would be identified with the local people: this they did not want. They wanted to maintain their English identity while avoiding identification with the local people.

What Mugabe saw as hypocrisy was that the Whites wanted to benefit from the resources of the local people, using the local people as cheap labour yet they segregate against their language. It should be noted that language can either unite or divide people. The book of Genesis tells of how people began to speak many

different languages after they attempted to build the Tower of Babel to reach the heavens. Language became a means of dividing people and seeing them abandon their project as they could no longer understand each other. For Mugabe the greatest project was to build a united Zimbabwe, a Zimbabwe that was not divided along “tribal” or linguistic lines. But the Whites felt that they could do it on their own without the Blacks, even in schools. They did not want to recognise the locals as equals with them. Equality is only possible when people speak the same language. At least the Blacks can speak English. The few Whites that can speak Shona are only doing it so that they can be able to control the Blacks who they use for cheap labour. Some churches in Zimbabwe hold two services one for the Whites, usually the morning service, and another one for the Blacks, in the afternoon. Those who cannot speak Shona should, like Mugabe says, make a commitment to speak Shona or Ndebele. The thrust that Mugabe had was that Zimbabweans should not be like the people of the Biblical story who were divided by their different languages. Instead they should learn each other’s languages and work to build the country to greater heights, together. In any case if the Blacks are the only ones speaking English while the Whites do not want to speak Shona, it reflects the White dominance and the subordination of Blacks. This was Mugabe’s wish for unity. However the Euro-American imperialists viewed this as violating human rights: they accused Mugabe of reverse discrimination and reverse racism (Wessels 2015).

Mugabe’s Viewpoint on Culture, Identity, Sovereignty and Human Rights.

Culture is interwoven with identity and sovereignty. Mugabe has always been concerned with the loss of cultural values in the Zimbabwean society. His desire was to see the Africans following the cultural values that were inculcated in them by their forefathers and not follow the Western cultural values, including homosexuality. For Mugabe, if Zimbabwean cultural values are not enforced it will lead to loss of the country’s cultures, including morality, *unhu* and ethics:

If such an attitude persists, Zimbabwe risks suffering what the Nigerian author, Chinua Achebe, calls a crisis in the soul, often exhibited by a tendency to accept everything alien as good and practically everything local or native as inferior (The Chronicle 26 October 2013).

As a result Mugabe roped in traditional leaders to be custodians of the culture of the people. Their role being to enforce these values in the lives of the people especially the young who are often easily swayed by the winds of cultural changes blowing especially from the Western countries. Traditional leaders have

provided “spiritual” and cultural leadership to their respective communities over a multi-generational period. They are the custodians of culture, customs and traditions. Mugabe believed that if culture is not closely followed it can lead to serious problems in the society. It must be noted that traditional leaders are the ones who are in touch with the reality of the cultural realm. They are the mediums who can negotiate with the departed and those *varipasi* to accept or adopt any cultural changes and ameliorations. Thus Mugabe underlined the importance of the chiefs by making sure that they are recognised by the constitution. According to the new constitution adopted in 2013, the responsibilities of the traditional leaders include promoting and upholding the cultural values, traditions and heritage of their communities. As they head their communities, traditional leaders carry out various roles that are connected to culture, customs and traditions. Traditional leaders are expected to ensure that traditional values are observed with respect to burial arrangements, marriage and sacred shrines. Thus, the role of traditional leaders as custodians of the values of society is widely recognised in Zimbabwe.

Mugabe reiterated that globalisation and “Euro-modernisation”, have degraded African cultures and threatened the value of the traditional chiefs. Mugabe whose mission has always been to give land back to the people of Zimbabwe said that the chiefs should jealously guard the land which is the cultural symbol of Zimbabwean identity and sovereignty. In his view, Mugabe saw land as something that is sacred as it embodies the culture of the people. A people without land have no culture hence no identity. Therefore the indigenous Zimbabweans repossessed their land from colonialists and their descendants.

The land is a symbol of our culture and identity in Zimbabwe and traditional leaders are the curators of our land and our culture and they merit the approbation of all Zimbabweans and we salute the Government for ensuring that since independence in 1980, they have always been well catered for. During the colonial era, chiefs were reduced to stooges of the racist Rhodesian government with their dignity and authority whittled down and usurped by white District Administrators (Sunday News 29 October 2017).

As alluded above land is also a cultural aspect and it falls under the jurisdiction of the chiefs. Their relationship with Government is excellent and this bodes well for service delivery in their areas. The government under Mugabe moved in to upgrade the lives of the chiefs by giving them salaries to cushion them as they discharge their duties. In addition to the salaries that chiefs are receiving every month, their headmen are now also getting allowances to enable them to discharge their duties. Mugabe’s government has also availed all-terrain vehicles to chiefs to ensure that they access every corner of their areas

of jurisdiction. While this move has been condemned by opposition parties and the Euro-American colonialists, it is a noble cause that uplifts the lives of those who oversee our culture. It would be a dereliction of duty were government to let chiefs lead a life of penury and destitution when they serve an important national duty.

Mugabe has provoked the Zimbabweans to reorient their minds away from Western influence anchoring their thinking on African values. They should focus their attention on what they are being taught by their traditional elders and stop thinking like Europeans and instead appreciate and be proud of their identity by drinking from the wellspring of the country's rich historical heirloom. Mugabe scoffed at the claims by the Europeans and Americans that he has the same level of thinking like them. He said it was deplorable that in the 1980s the British and the Americans claimed that he thought like them. On the contrary, he said he is African to the bone and his actions portray him as such:

They said publicly in the 1980s that the problem with Mugabe is that he thinks like us (British), goodness me! How can I think like them? I will be a rotten thinker to think like them (Herald 25 October 2013).

Mugabe was infuriated by the fact that the Euro-American imperialists think that their culture is superior to that of the Africans and to make matters worse the sons and daughters of the soil are being swayed to follow the culture and the thinking of the Western countries. In their supposedly superior thinking, the Whites want the Africans to think like them. If they do not think like them, they are addressed as “primitive”, “tribal” and “backwards”. This superiority complex is what caused Mugabe to come out guns blazing against them declaring:

They even do not want to say that they themselves think like Africans, no! They want to say Africans think like them. They think their right is to rob others of their resources and I don't think like them, I am not British, I am not a colonial product because I am a complete Zimbabwean, an African who does not think like the British (Herald 25 October 2013).

Mugabe saw it fit that Africans should have sovereign control over their resources and have the right to shape their own future. On the contrary Euro-Americans are nefariously advancing discourses about what they call shared sovereignty, relationality, shared autonomy, heterarchy, heteronomy, networked and distributed governance (Nhemachena this volume). The people of Zimbabwe should continue fighting to control their God-given resources to stimulate development. For Mugabe, Zimbabweans were supposed to feel a

sense of entitlement when it came to controlling their culture and material resources. In this way they will be elevating their position of identity and reclaiming their sovereignty. If the Euro-Americans continue to control the resources of the Africans, they will have the leeway to manipulate the value systems of the Africans. Mugabe lashed out Euro-American imperialistic Western countries for trying to foist their own culture on Africans. He said Zimbabweans were supposed to use their *sui generis* identity and artistry to muster development:

Let us use Zimbabwean skills, let us be proud to be Zimbabweans, wherever you are, speak as a Zimbabwean and remain true to yourself as an individual as you, you, you, you, who is different from them (former colonisers) (Herald 25 October 2013).

Mugabe was carrying the vision of Black liberation as envisioned by icons who came before him like Marcus Garvey. Marcus Garvey was a Jamaican political leader who advanced a philosophy called Garveyism intending the people of Africa and those of African ancestry in diaspora to redeem the continent of Africa and put an end to Euro-American colonialism (Garvey 1986). In this case therefore Mugabe's desire was that all Africans are made free from Euro-American dominance leading them to become masters of their own destiny defending their birth right and sovereignty. This made him very unpopular with the Whites who saw him as a violator of human rights. They accused him of limiting his subjects to the confines of African culture when the world is moving into the so-called global village of which Euro-Americans are the chiefs and queens and headmen. Mugabe introduced a higher percentage of local content on television channels to enhance cultural activities. He was accused of stifling media exposure among his people. Yet the so called exposure meant watching Western propaganda so that the people would stirred to rise against Mugabe. Mugabe saw this as hypocrisy because Euro-Americans want to promote their culture at the expense of the indigenous culture.

Mugabe was accused of wasting the taxpayer's money when he bought cars for the chiefs. The Euro-Americans did not see the necessity of buying the cars for the chiefs because they do not value anything African. Mugabe on the other hand saw this as a noble cause because chief would need to go round in their spheres of influence dealing with issues that corrupt the social norms and values of the society. Most countries in Africa envy Zimbabweans for being owners of their land and natural resources hence custodians of their identity and sovereignty. Asserting sovereignty helps Africans evade being cannibalised by Euro-Americans that continue to dispossess and exploit Africans in the guise of "investments" (Nhemachena & Kaundjua 2018). Mugabe wanted Zimbabweans

to be independent from Western countries whose selfish ambitions make the people of Zimbabwe drawers of water and hewers of wood. He urges the people to stand on their own:

Act as an individual who has his or her own skills nurtured by circumstances, as a Zimbabwean. All of you as Zimbabweans must have that common identity that makes you believe that you are entitled to the environment around you and its contents, those contents of the environment, the resources, the riches, you have got the sovereign right to control them because of that common identity and sense of belonging and you have got the right to fight for that which is God-given (Herald 25 October 2015).

Mugabe used economic ideologies that were rooted in the lives of the people showing that there is a strong link between culture and development. As long as Africans are side-tracked by cultural syncretism they will never know who they are and will continue to suffer from identity crises. In fact the crises in Zimbabwe were at their core identity crises. Syncretistic tendencies in terms of economic development were borrowing Western economic blue prints. This allowed the Western countries and their allies to interfere within sovereign boundaries of the African states violating their sovereign rights. Mugabe said:

The strong link between culture and development is widely accepted worldwide. For us, Africanness is founded on Unhu/Ubuntu philosophy to which we must commit ourselves and in everything that we do consistently and vigorously championing the liberation of Zimbabwe and managing to win against all odds in the face of forces of imperialism and colonialism (Herald 25 October 2015).

Closely linked to culture is the dress code. The way people dress sends a message to the people about the kind of a person one is. It tells the people around you about the people that raised you and about the kind of people you hang around with. When one dresses, he or she should be sensitive to the parents that brought him or her up and the people connected to the parents. The Africans have evolved over the years out of their heritage into that of Westerners even in their dressing. This according to Mugabe tramples on the values of the Africans. The youths go out of the house dressed half naked and the parents are finding it hard to control them. Wearing clothes that expose the body is considered a sign of immorality. In Zimbabwe it gets so serious that a woman cannot bare her legs. The legs of an African woman are considered sacred and should not just be exposed. If this happens, this is part of what Mugabe calls moral decadency. He bemoaned the problem of moral decadence among the youths who engage in drug abuse and promiscuity walking around

not properly dressed. Drugs and promiscuity are associated with indecent dressing. Mugabe said thus:

We have heard of wild parties that the youths are engaging in, where drugs are peddled and abused. The rate of promiscuity among the youths is also alarming (ZBC news 18 April 2016).

Mugabe empowered chiefs to be custodians of moral values in Zimbabwe. When the chiefs speak they will be echoing the sentiments of the power behind them. The power behind them was Mugabe. One of the chiefs in Mashonaland province lamented the decay of the African values as is displayed by the way some people dress. Chief Musarurwa, blamed the parents who have not disciplined their children by enforcing decent dressing: indecent dressing compromises the ideals of *Ubuntu*. This is something that women cannot stand because they feel that they are being oppressed. Musarurwa had this to say:

Dress code is something that women cannot stand.....a girl leaves her home wearing a 'guvhu out' (crop top) or tops that reveal too much of the cleavages while you as a parent or mother watches (Daily News 6 January 2014).

This kind of dressing is associated with Western culture. Mugabe sees this as accepting Western values at the expense of our own culture and values. However it is such issues that have caused Mugabe to be labelled a dictator because he supposedly speaks against the freedoms of the people. Freedom according to the Euro-Americans is when they have the people accepting Eurocentric ways of life and that means language, dressing, sexuality and culture. They call this "progressiveness" and "respect for human rights". However, Mugabe says it is "hypocrisy".

Conclusion

The chapter has demonstrated that Robert Mugabe was a promoter of African identity and sovereignty despite the attacks from the Western imperialists who demonised him as a violator of human rights in Zimbabwe. Mugabe has stood his ground against the big brother mentality displayed by the hypocritical Euro-American states. He has used the land issues as his trump card to push for the emancipation of the Blacks in Zimbabwe whose identity is buttressed by repossession and retention of their land. When Mugabe was distributing the land to the Blacks, they called him a violator of human rights. But when the Whites took the land from the Blacks they were not regarded as violators of human rights. The chapter looked at language as another important

aspect that has raised controversy in Zimbabwe. Mugabe wanted the Whites to speak Shona to foster unity between the Blacks and Whites. If they refuse then they would rather move out of Zimbabwe. Closely linked to language is culture that the chiefs jealously guarded in order to preserve the *unbu* values of the Zimbabwean society. Thus, land ownership, language and culture are vital pillars for identity and sovereignty in Zimbabwe.

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Indigenisation of Economies in Zimbabwe: Is It Possible with Queered Identities

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Introduction

Many Eurocentric scholars and analysts criticised Zimbabwe's indigenisation policy as a ZANU PF economic strategy that supposedly focused on nothing else than "primitive accumulation" of local White and foreign "owned" companies and properties. The irony is that these Whites claim to be local even as they are serving neoimperial interests. What is queer is that if they refused to heed Mugabe's call to share land with indigenous Zimbabweans, would we say they are local when they refuse to obey local African states? One can be local if one observes the local/indigenous rules of the game. We argue that, in fact, Ubuntu and Chivanhu encapsulate restitution, restoration and reparations for what was stolen during the enslavement and colonial eras. Ubuntu and Chivanhu are not just about community and collectivism as in fact restoration, restitution and reparations are all necessary to restore collectivities and communities disrupted and ravaged by enslavement and colonial crimes. ZANU PF was pursuing Ubuntu and Chivanhu tenets of restitution, restoration and reparations claims – they were not simply pursuing their own economic strategy as a political party. Descendants of colonialists need to take serious note of these tenets of Ubuntu and Chivanhu so that they are able to appraise their own positions as criminals in Africa. Before they can claim any indigeneity, as some of them would want to do, they must pay/comply with restoration, restitution and reparations. There is a cost to claiming indigeneity and belonging and part of the costs is following the tenets of reparations and restitution. In precolonial Africa criminals would be ostracized and their claims of belonging were also revoked. Now Africa has colonialists and descendants of the colonialists who would want to claim indigeneity without first paying/complying with restitution, restoration and reparations – this is queer. This is queer also because if Africans similarly commit crimes in America or Europe, they would not be able to claim belonging or indigeneity to those societies. In order to claim belonging and indigeneity, criminals must first make good their crimes.

Others attacked the policy of indigenisation by claiming that it only enriched ZANU PF cronies and loyalists. We ask, who are Africans anyway? The problem is that current economies and policies in Africa only enrich Whites and other foreigners. It may be better if policies enrich some Africans than for economies to only serve or enrich Whites/ Euro-American foreigners to the detriment of Africans. The issue here would be to weigh the devils and decide on the better one. Much of the critiques of Mugabe's indigenisation policies did not juxtapose or weigh the devils – the critics only targeted ZANU PF without also addressing the worse evils of having Whites owning and controlling African economies.

In some cases; the indigenisation policy was seen as perpetuating ZANU PF's grip on the economy yet, on the other hand, absence of indigenisation policies would perpetuate Euro-American grip on the Zimbabwean economy. It becomes queer when ZANU PF is condemned for having a grip on the economy, yet the same Whites do not see any problem with their own neoimperial grip on the Zimbabwean economy. The question is, if Whites did not see anything wrong with their own grip on the economy then why did they regard ZANU PF control on the economy as bad? Do they imply that they are better and more indigenous than ZANU PF members?

The real reason for coming up with the indigenisation policy was to recover what was stolen by colonialists who were nurtured by a well-established and highly networked Euro-American political and economic system premised on theft, plunder, and exploitation of African resources. Accordingly, when Robert Mugabe questioned what he earnestly considered as unfairness in the ownership and distribution of the country's economic resources, the western world and the White descendants of colonialists queered him as a "despotic" leader. The Eurocentric academics (both White and Black) queered Mugabe's noble indigenisation policy as "abnormal" yet it was quite normal and justifiable. There was no way a well-resourced neo-liberal capitalist world system would have accepted a tiny African country like Zimbabwe to upset the very veins that pumped the economic lifeblood of global capitalism. The success of Zimbabwe's indigenisation programme would have created a domino effect in other African countries where ownership and control of the economies still lie in the hands of a few descendants of White colonialists as well as foreign companies. The reversal of some sections of Zimbabwe's indigenisation policy in late 2017 was an indirect victory for capitalism and colonialism.

Our argument is that, Africa remains enmeshed in a capitalist and colonial web where it wriggles aimlessly with no hope of realising its full potential as an economic giant with abundant natural resources that are supposed to be benefitting indigenous African people. The diatribes against Zimbabwe's indigenisation policy were so many especially from various sections of simplistic and narrow minded academics as well as from some Eurocentric economic

analysts. In this book chapter, we look at the scathing attacks on Zimbabwe's indigenisation programme which in earnest (despite some weaknesses) was aimed at giving indigenous Black Zimbabweans a say in the country's economy. However, this was not to be as Western industries sabotaged the indigenisation policies in Zimbabwe. Worse still, Eurocentric academics and economic analysts (local, regional and international) went in full defence of capitalism and colonialism camouflaged as concerns against ZANU PF and Robert Mugabe's alleged elite capture of the economy. Robert Mugabe was also maliciously accused of baseless racism towards White descendants of colonialists. The irony is that when Africans claim their resources back, they are accused by Westerners of racism yet when Westerners retain resources which they stole from Africans, they are never accused of racism.

As regards elite capture of the economy, the simplistic narrow minded academics and their Eurocentric counterparts conveniently ignored the fact that it was the neocolonialists that had long captured the Zimbabwean economies. Mugabe was only seeking restoration/restitution of what was stolen during the colonial era. In any case, to allege that Mugabe captured the economy does not make sense because naturally it is not a sin for Africans to repossess/capture their resources. Above all, Mugabe was not acting in his personal capacity but was working in an official capacity as a representative of the Zimbabwean people. It was the Zimbabwean people that repossessed their resources/economy and not Mugabe as a singularity. There was everything official in what Mugabe did yet Western driven media and academics imputed personal, malicious and private motives on the part of Mugabe – they conveniently ignored the fact that he was working in official capacity as a representative of the people of Zimbabwe.

Reclaiming Zimbabwe's Resources through an Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Programme

Due to colonialism, the majority of Zimbabwe's rural and urban communities were permanently put in a disadvantaged economic position to the present day. At independence in 1980, the incoming ZANU PF government fell short in addressing the historic social injustices, economic disparities and equality over land (Moyo 1999; 2000; 2009; Moyo and Yeros 2005; 2007) - especially in the rural areas. Scholars such as Mandaza (1986), Ankomah (2013) and many others have asserted that the major impediment that inhibited a complete overhaul of the heavily skewed White-elite and foreign controlled economy at independence was the Lancaster House Agreement. Mandaza (1986:3) notes that the Lancaster House Constitutional Agreement set in motion the "emergent economic, political and social structures" that continued to

characterise the Zimbabwean state even after independence. The economic structure reflected some sort of “arm-twisted” compromise between the ZANU PF leadership and the White descendants of colonialists. These “forced” compromises were made to accommodate White political and economic interests. Thus, the Lancaster House Constitution greatly undermined the liberation promises which the ZANU PF leadership had assured the grassroots during the liberation struggle. Initially, the guerrilla fighters had vowed that they would distribute resources equitably at independence. However, parameters were set right at independence, through constitutional provisions, which greatly inhibited the participation of majority Blacks in the mainstream economy.

Though the Lancaster House Settlement ended White colonial rule in Zimbabwe it still perpetuated “White privilege on the bases of persistent control of the economy by this elite, and through them, transnational capital” (Raftopoulos 1994:1). This means the Constitution managed to entrench White economic hegemony. Thus, Zimbabwe’s post-colonial inheritance included a White controlled economy that proved not only difficult for the new Black government to control, but also to manage (Nyamunda 2013). Consequently, in 1980, Zimbabwe’s independence did not lead to economic empowerment of the majority Blacks. Rather, it was only political change where a Black government took over power, but the economy remained under the control of a White minority (Kondo and Moyo 2012). There was then a need to redress this skewed economic set up that accorded some (descendants of White colonialists), access to resources, while depriving others (the majority Black Zimbabweans), the same privilege. The situation could only be ‘corrected’ through the implementation of an extensive indigenisation and economic empowerment programme (Sibanda 2013; Ankomah 2013; Matsa and Masimbati 2014).

Warikandwa and Osode (2017:3) see Zimbabwe’s indigenisation programme as mainly motivated by the need to correct colonial injustices by improving “the extent of the participation of indigenous Zimbabweans in the country’s economic activities.” The common aim of the indigenisation programme is also seen by Sibanda (2013:1) as a way of increasing the role of the grassroots “in the mainstream economy” as well as “to correct imbalances in resource ownership construed as a major cause of vulnerability and obstacle to economic growth and development.” (Sibanda 2013:1). According to the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act -IEEA [Chapter 1433], “indigenisation” means:

a deliberate involvement of indigenous Zimbabweans in the economic activities of the country, to which hitherto they had no access, so as to ensure the equitable ownership of the nation’s resources.

The aim of Zimbabwe's indigenisation and economic empowerment (IEE) was therefore to help the economically disadvantaged Black masses overcome their isolation and integrate into the mainstream economy in ways that could increase their control and influence over various sources of wealth. This Act, was crafted as a way of empowering the once economically dispossessed grassroots Zimbabweans (Matsa and Masimbati 2014). In justifying the IEEA, Warikandwa and Osode (2017:9) noted that Section 2(1) of Zimbabwe's Indigenisation Act "pursues a distributive justice agenda." They asserted that the aim of the policy was to close "the ever-widening inequalities" by shifting some of Zimbabwe's wealth to Black Zimbabweans. Distributive justice becomes necessary in as much as it accords the once marginalised Black people easy access to land and mineral resources. The role ZANU PF played in pushing for an enactment of the indigenisation policy in 2008 was seen as a considerable feat, especially in terms of its aim to economically empower the once marginalised Black masses (Warikandwa and Osode 2017). In their view, ZANU PF's intention to tackle such an issue was quite plausible as it offered Black Zimbabweans an opportunity to participate in an economy that could distribute equal responsibilities and benefits to all.

For Robert Mugabe, IEE, is not only justified, but is a quest to right an "embittered past". Indigenisation is perceived as "a sovereign right of Zimbabwean people to fully own what is rightfully theirs and God given". It is a "correction of a historical mistake which is long overdue" (Kondo and Moyo 2012: 2319). In this line of thinking, Zimbabwe's indigenisation drive is perceived by Mugabe as a form of restoration/restitution; where, the White descendants of colonialists, and Western corporations which once controlled the economy and owned many assets due to racial prejudice, consolidated through colonial rule; are stripped of those properties as a way of restitution to Blacks who were robbed by the neocolonialists. In its radical economic form; it is premised on putting the last (Blacks) first; and the first (Whites) last, in terms of property ownership. In Mugabe's perception, IEE is an inevitable endeavour to correct the historical injustices of colonialism through radicalised redistributive initiatives. If indigenisation amounts to restitution, restoration and reparations then it cannot be described as racism. If indigenisation is understood as restoration/restitution, there is nothing racist about it. It is essentially about returning of what was stolen back to the owners. If Whites do not see anything racist about claiming compensation for the land that was expropriated from them, then why should they see racism when Zimbabweans repossess their resources?

However, herein lies the problem; in the view of the Eurocentric capitalist world, Robert Mugabe (through his indigenisation policy) dared tread where even angels feared to tread. He committed the worst sin in the Euro-American

eyes, in trying to turn capitalism and colonialism upside down. This was despite the fact that both the UN and African Charter categorically specify that indigenous peoples are entitled to the enjoyment of their God-given resources. The Eurocentric capitalist world refutes such assertions for capitalism and colonialism do not thrive on mob empowerment, they thrive on a few (foreign companies and White descendants of colonialists in Africa) owning the stolen resources/means of production. Below, are the various criticisms levelled against Robert Mugabe when he embarked on a Zimbabwean indigenisation and economic empowerment programme.

Robert Mugabe's Indigenisation Policy and Property Rights

One of the most outstanding and central criticism of IEE lies in the controversial debate on the fate of the property rights of descendants of colonialists. Some scholars have looked at the topic in a very subtle way, by raising issues which have an indirect bearing towards property rights of descendants of colonialists. The other group has openly expressed their views on the need to respect property rights of colonialists. In this discourse, the White descendants of colonialists as well as foreign companies have been perceived by some as “helpful” to Zimbabwe’s economic growth and recovery (Moore 2010; Chitiyo and Kibble 2014). They argued that it is only when the ZANU PF government completely revokes its indigenisation and economic empowerment programme (IEEP) and sincerely honours the property rights of these two groups that the Zimbabwean economy will have a high likelihood of recovering. Such perspectives can be seen in the works of Chitiyo and Kibble (2014:2) where they suggest that Zimbabwe should have second thoughts about its indigenisation legislation if it is to attract foreign “investment” as well as to guarantee the “investors” that “it is a worthwhile business destination and partner in a global economy crowded with competitor nations.” However, as aptly argued by Nhemachena *et al.* (2018) and Warikandwa *et al.* (2017) the assumption that Euro-Americans come to invest is wrong because historically the British South Africa Company, and other colonial companies across Africa, came to dispossess and exploit Africans – they did not come and they do not come to Africa to invest but to dispossess and exploit Africans.

For Magure (2012:72), Zimbabwe’s indigenisation programme ignores the centrality of property rights of descendants of colonialists which are considered by some thinkers as pivotal in terms of luring foreign “investors”. Using documentary evidence, he asserts that if a government fails to respect the property rights this might lead to total collapse of the neocolonial economy. He suggests that the Zimbabwean government was supposed to have shelved the indigenisation programme for some years paving way for the White owned

neocolonial economy to first recover. For Magure (2012), there was need for White businesses and foreign industries to flourish by giving them autonomy in the economic sphere. Thus, supposedly, an indigenisation programme that does not respect property rights of descendants of White colonialists cannot stimulate neocolonial economic growth (Magure 2012). A study carried out by Masunungure and Koga (2012:1) found out that the majority of Zimbabweans; even those who supported ZANU PF, actually preferred “empowerment via jobs rather than business takeovers.” The problem with this argument and findings is that jobs have never been easy for Zimbabweans to find even before the repossession of land. Also as Nhemachena & Dhakwa (2018) observe, jobs are already being taken away by humanoid robots that employers are increasingly preferring. Already scholars are predicting a jobless world in which many humans will constitute a useless class (Harari 2018). So arguments that foreign companies will create jobs for Africans are already archaic and moribund because employers are not so much interested in creating jobs for human beings: they increasingly use industrial robots to do the work that humans used to do.

It is necessary to note that the neocolonialists do not necessarily set up businesses in order to create employment for Africans – they set up businesses in order to exploit Africans and their resources. They set up businesses in order to exploit Africans and their resources for profits which are then repatriated outside Africa. Where Africans get employed, the wages are often pittances, particularly since the introduction of Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAP). There has been growth of precarious workers over time in Africa (Nhemachena, Warikandwa, Mpofu & Chitimira 2019). With or without land restitution/restoration therefore, Africans suffer precarious employment. In fact, retrenchments and massive loss of employment in Zimbabwe started before the repossession of land and the introduction or radicalisation of the indigenisation policies. This is conveniently ignored by those that demonise Mugabe as singularly responsible for the loss of employment in the country.

According to Raftopoulos (2015) the USA Administration has kept on renewing targeted measures against individuals and entities loyal to ZANU PF over its alleged attacks on human rights and property rights (specifically assets belonging to White commercial farmers and business personnel). What is queer as noted by Warikandwa *et al.* (2017) is that transnational corporations that abuse the human rights of Africans were never sanctioned. The IMF and World Bank introduced ESAP which disrupted the rights of Africans to food, housing and so on but these institutions were never sanctioned for it. The USA itself wages wars across the world, often without the sanction of the UN, killing innocent people but it has never been sanctioned for it. Currently transnational corporations are grabbing African land and violating the property rights of

African peasants but they are never sanctioned for it. ZANU PF's supposed 'disrespect' for property rights has been further aggravated by its current indigenisation and economic empowerment programme.

The 'targeted measures' or 'smart sanctions' popularly known as Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) have become part of America's foreign policy towards Zimbabwe. The USA is quite clear over this matter, as it states that, 'smart sanctions' can only be lifted on the ZANU PF government if it "respects human rights" and "honours the property rights" of the White descendants of colonialists (Raftopoulos 2016). As such, pressure has mounted for the ZANU PF government to compromise on economic issues or in some 'extreme' cases, to return White assets (property rights), that is, revert to the economic situation prior to the land restitution programme. Coltart (2008:1) highlights that, "When change comes to Zimbabwe, the nation will have to "rediscover the rule of law" and the "sanctity of persons and property."

Coltart seems to be implying that sanctity means 'sacredness' of White people and the property that they claim to be theirs. Black people and their properties and resources have never been considered as deserving sanctity by Whites. Blacks have been violated and dispossessed of their property since the enslavement and colonial eras. Coltart further asserts that policies such as the IEEA which makes the operations of the private sector very difficult will have to be revoked. However, it has been argued that the private sector is about privation as far as Africans are concerned (Nhemachena, Warikandwa, Mpofu & Chitimira 2019). This is why in South Africa for instance, there are calls for nationalisation rather than privatisation. Why must the private sector be glorified when it is monopolised by descendants of colonialists who are refusing to restitute/restore and compensate Africans for enslavement and colonisation?

For Ernest Mudzengi, President Robert Mugabe and his ZANU PF party need to carry out a thorough review of the IEEA in order to make it a "genuinely empowering law" that also respects property rights of descendants of colonialists, not an 'unpopular' "grabbing and looting legal instrument" (Mudzengi 2015:29). We however, insist that Mugabe introduced indigenisation policies precisely because he respected the property rights of Africans who were dispossessed and exploited during the colonial era.

Moore (2010), in reference to Mbeki's advice to ZANU PF elites in 2001, brings out a clearer argument on property rights. He seems to suggest that there should be an unabated continuity of White criminal and criminocratic control of the Zimbabwean economy if economic growth and development is to be achieved. Quoting President Mbeki (2001) he points out that Zimbabwe's economy had largely remained in White private hands making it a capitalist economy dominated by 'White capital'. As such, these 'White capitalists' were not to have their properties confiscated (as happened during the Fast Track

Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) and now the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (IEE) programme) in order to distribute it to the grassroots. Rather, the White economic hegemony (ownership of properties) was to be preserved to evade economic collapse which would be “disastrous ... on the population as a whole” since “capital in general, including ‘white capital’ in Zimbabwe, is central to economic growth and development” (Moore 2010:757). The problem with Moore’s (2010) argument here is that there is no evidence for the ordinary African that Euro-American economies have grown because of efficiency or high productivity. If Euro-American economies are very productive, then the question is why are Euro-Americans not able to pay reparations, restitution and restoration to African victims of centuries of enslavement and colonisation? Obviously, if Euro-American economies were as well managed, efficient and productive, we would expect Euro-Americans to have long paid reparations and restitution to Africans. Also, if Euro-American economies are really efficient and productive, then why do Euro-American corporations still continue to loot, plunder, rob, steal and exploit Africans and their resources? The point here is that Euro-Americans and descendants of colonialists should stop prescribing measures about African economic growth because history shows that they are not interested in African economic growth but in exploiting Africans and their resources. So, some scholars believe that instead of embarking on indigenisation and economic empowerment programmes, the grassroots can benefit economically by participating in a ‘White’ and ‘foreign’ controlled economy while wholly preserving the property rights of these ‘geese’ that supposedly lay the ‘golden eggs’. Very sadly, the thinking by these scholars is that, the major rudiments of the Zimbabwean economy (White businesses and foreign owned companies) should be kept intact so as to ensure comprehensive economic management and macro-economic solidity.

Although some of the above scholars are cautious in openly calling for the restoration of property rights to foreign companies and the White elites, their arguments remain bold, though camouflaged. What they are definitely suggesting is that rather than coming up with an indigenisation policy, the Zimbabwean government should revoke such policies (Mudzengi 2015; Magure 2012) as well as respect “democratic” principles, which paradoxically do not translate to democratic restoration/restitution of African resources that were stolen during the colonial era (Raftopoulos 2013; Moore 2001; 2003).

The above scholars have continued to project throughout their writings, a disturbing perception that reflects a very gloomy picture of Zimbabwe’s future especially through continued advancement of its indigenisation policy. ZANU PF has been criticised for its ‘populist’ attempts to exclude local White elites (Moore 2010) and international companies (Chitiyo and Kibble 2014) in helping

to boost neocolonial economic growth. There has always been a belief that, a Black government is characterised by “a general breakdown of services” (Mandaza 1986:47), rampant mismanagement and corruption (Bratton and Masunungure 2011), patron-clientelism (Alexander and McGregor 2013), post-colonial accumulation (Moore 2001; 2003; Raftopoulos 1994:10), thus jeopardising development and democratic consolidation (Andreasson 2010:3) while enriching a few politically connected elites (Mawowa 2013; Nyamunda 2016). Supposedly, the solution to these problems lies in respecting foreign owned properties and the preservation of White colonially-acquired assets. In other words, these scholars argue for an ‘indispensable’ role of the White and foreign factor in the African economic sphere. Such thinkers and scholars demonise African liberation heroes yet regard Whites as their indispensable economic, legal and political heroes (Nhemachena this volume). They erroneously assume that this is the ‘best solution’ to avoid an economic crisis (corruption, nepotism, primitive accumulation, mismanagement and so on) under a ZANU PF government. Thus, at times, the discourse becomes so much romanticised to the extent that these critics visualise a situation where the ZANU PF elites should embrace with its ‘out-stretched hands’, foreign companies as well as its White elite ‘saviour’ constituency which supposedly has the ‘magic wand’ to turn around the ‘battered’ Zimbabwean economy which has been in crisis since 2000 supposedly owing to “disastrous land reform programme” (Moore 2010) and currently aggravated by an IEEA which is, supposedly, at best very destructive towards economic growth (Magure 2012; Coltart 2008).

There has been a continuous call among these scholars for ‘democratic’ policies usually premised on a respect for human rights of the descendants of colonialists, especially property rights; that might help entrench safeguards for overall foreign and White control of Zimbabwe’s economic structure. In addition, these scholars seem to support a situation where the post-colonial African state is to prolong foreign and White economic interests, right from the time of majority rule and beyond. The above scholars also seem to dismiss distributive policies such as land reform and IEE as ‘unreasonable’ and ‘intransigent’. But, to dismiss distributive policies such as land reform and IEE as unreasonable and intransigent is to neglect the real reason for the liberation struggle and the injustices created by a skewed colonial economic system. It is also a complete denunciation of the hundreds and thousands of rural and urban people who also want to genuinely benefit from land repossession and IEE by also participating in the mainstream economy.

Accordingly, we argue that; when Black Zimbabweans repossessed resources that had been stolen by colonialists, the Euro-centric academics (White and Black) saw it as a form of “primitive accumulation”. Derogative

labels such as “property grabbers”, “looters”, “corrupt plunderers”, “elite capture”, “primitive accumulation” and so on were given to this new group of economically empowered Black Zimbabweans. While Mugabe and other ZANU PF politicians were queered as “looters” of White and foreign “owned” properties, there was also an intentional whitewashing of the extensive and systemic economic plunder and looting of African resources by the same White descendants of colonialists and foreign companies that now accused Mugabe and his party of ironically, pillaging their God-given natural resources. The narrow focus on Mugabe and his cronies’ supposed looting of resources (under an indigenisation policy), does not measure at all to the excessive plunder of the same resources by the White descendants of colonialists and foreign companies - ever since they set foot in Zimbabwe from the colonial, up to the post-independence period. Below, we look at IEE and racial exclusion.

Robert Mugabe’s Indigenisation Policy and Racial Segregation

The Zimbabwean Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act/Policy (IEEA/P), [Chapter 1433] defines an “indigenous Zimbabwean” as:

“any person who before 18 April 1980 [Zimbabwe’s Independence Day], was disadvantaged by unfair discrimination on the grounds of his or her race, and any descendent of such person, and includes any company, association, syndicate or partnership of which indigenous Zimbabweans form the majority of the members holding the controlling interest.”

Some have criticised the Act or policy of being racist as it excludes White descendants of colonialists from the discourse. The former Minister of Indigenisation, Saviour Kasukuwere, cited in Ankomah (2013:40) asserted that the IEEP had to be viewed in a “historical context” supported by “historical facts”. His argument was that; before 18 April 1980 (Zimbabwe’s independence) the country was known as Rhodesia and it was run for 90 years as a ‘mini-apartheid’ state by minority White Rhodesians who used skin colour as the deciding factor to give advantages and privileges to themselves and their progeny, while denying the same to the majority Black population. For the avoidance of doubt, the term indigenous Zimbabwean, according to Kasukuwere, refers to indigenous Black Zimbabweans. Kasukuwere is not alone in making a clear distinction of whom the ‘indigenous’ word refers to. President Mugabe pointed out that:

The IEEP is a focused response to the previous exclusion of our people [black people] from mainstream economic activity by the settlers. The policy seeks to

broaden the economic base by involving the majority of [Black] Zimbabweans in meaningful and gainful activity, thus giving greater meaning to our independence and self-determination” (Ankomah 2013:41).

Coltart (2016: 678) notes that many ZANU PF politicians (Kasukuwere and President Mugabe included) made it clear that “whites are not viewed as indigenous”. While Coltart laments that Whites are not seen as being indigenous it becomes quite queer if they are to be viewed as so. Indigenous denotes being a native, the original inhabitant of any place. Africans are the autochthonous people of Africa; they have inhabited the continent since time immemorial. Nciizah stresses that the IEEP only targets Blacks while excluding Whites mainly because it was framed as a “direct response to the colonial legacy and its injustices” which were supported by Rhodesia’s racially discriminatory policies (Nciizah 2015:233). Here, we argue that Rhodesia was not merely discriminatory, it was criminal and it criminally robbed and exploited Africans – these are the people that would ironically want to benefit from indigenisation. Because of that, Eurocentric academics see it more as an ‘eye for an eye’ type of justice. However, even the Britons are indigenous to Britain and they do not allow Africans to own land and minerals there. Why must the situation be different in Africa?

According to Matyszak (2011:1) the IEEA is a racist policy which “exclude(s) almost every white person and include(s) every non-white person.” We argue that the same situation obtain in Europe. Africans are not allowed to own and control resources there. Europeans are indigenous to Europe and so they want to own and control Europe’s resources – Africans must do the same with Africa’s resources. Matyszak (2011) further argues that the term “indigenous Zimbabwean” was chosen by the ZANU PF politicians in order “to exploit insidious political and racial considerations” premised on nationalistic racial exclusion since in their view (ZANU PF leadership), they wanted to justify “that whites do not ‘belong naturally’ in Zimbabwe” (Matyszak 2011:3). We also stress that Africans are perceived and treated as not belonging naturally to Europe and America – so Africans can *pari passu* also treat Whites as not belonging naturally to Africa.

According to Matyszak (2011) this supposedly makes the policy discriminatory in terms of one’s skin colour. His argument is that, in legal terms, the IEEA fails to be a national policy as it undermines the rights of other racial groups (White descendants of colonialists) by excluding them from benefitting from indigenisation programmes. What is queer is that Euro-America is also busy denying Africans visas and entry; they are building walls to prevent other races from entering their territories. These are clear forms of exclusion as well. It becomes queerer why authors like Matyszak are not also criticising such open

Euro-American racist policies. It appears his views are very narrow in that he ignores what Europe and America are doing to other races, but attempts to magnify genuine cases of restoration and restitution by soiling them through racist labels.

Matyszak (2011) further argues that the definition of an ‘indigenous Zimbabwean’ is not broad (to include Whites who are also domiciled in Zimbabwe) but, has been narrowed to only mean Black Zimbabweans which in legal terms can be construed as being racially exclusive. Matyszak (2011) only refers to Whites as the ones who are sidelined to claims of genuinely belonging in Zimbabwe or being authentic ‘indigenous Zimbabweans’ and thus exempted from indigenisation and economic empowerment benefits; a claim which Mlambo (2010) refutes as he argues that other non-White groups as well as Africans from other countries who are now Zimbabwean residence (migrants) are also at the receiving end. Muzondidya (2007) notes that the question of ‘indigeneity’ (being Zimbabwean) does not only exclude Whites but it extends to other non-White groups like Coloureds, Indians and migrant Black workers especially from Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique.

Andreasson (2010) argues that indigenisation and economic empowerment in Zimbabwe, is usually seen in Black and White terms. For him, “indigenisation is the turning of indigeneity into actual politics” where ‘nativity’, the politics of belonging or being genuinely African/Zimbabwean is manipulated as a political instrument of “persuasion, mobilisation and justification” (Andreasson 2010:7) in order to ostracise the White community as well as other non-Whites from benefits accruing as a result of a pursuance of transformative and development-oriented policies such as FTLRP and IEEA. This Eurocentric argument is that, indigeneity is ‘apartheid like’ as it excludes others (especially White descendants of colonialists) from the political, economic and social arena. As the argument goes, White descendants of colonialists do not have a claim or entitlement to land and a control over economic activities as indigeneity claims or entitlements give ZANU PF politicians ‘ultimate, judgement’ on “who can claim citizenship and its attendant rights (Andreasson 2010:8). Eurocentric academics therefore perceive the definition of indigeneity, as employed by ZANU PF politicians as exclusionary, ‘racially motivated’ and ‘myopic’. However, we point out that indigeneity does not merely exclude others, in the case of Zimbabwe; it excluded criminal colonialists and their descendants. The critical question here is why indigenisation must include criminals who have stolen resources including land, cows, and minerals from Africans. Who would want to include criminals? Even Euro-American policies exclude [alleged] criminals. They must make good their crimes first in order for them to be considered for inclusion. Those that are excluded are not innocent – they are the criminals. What is more interesting is the reason for their exclusion and not the fact of their exclusion.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015:2) weighs in arguing that, Robert Mugabe managed to portray himself to most Africans “as a victim of neoimperialism and neocolonialism” thus, gaining some sympathies and admirations. We argue that, Mugabe was not speaking of himself as an individual but as a representative of African victims – it is a historical fact that Africans are victims. He asserts that; the ZANU PF leadership has taken advantage of race issues to justify and advance their own interests, usually camouflaged as radical nationalist redistributive policies; focusing on correcting skewed colonial economic wrongs. We further argue that, ZANU PF did not take advantage of race issues, ZANU PF’s reactions were premised not on race issues but on the criminality issues – on the crimes of theft of African resources. The problem is that descendants of colonialists would want to hide behind race and racism each time Africans raise questions about the criminality of colonialism and enslavement (Nhemachena this volume). The objective of ZANU PF was not to address race but to address the criminality of dispossessing and exploiting Africans. As ZANU PF came up with this policy it was acting in a representative capacity of all Black Zimbabweans. In fact claims that ZANU PF was targeting races are a camouflage designed to prevent the repossession of resources by Africans. Claims about human rights abuses, absence of democracy etc. are also camouflages of neoempire that are used to forestall repossession of resources by Africans. The point here is that neoempire has its camouflages which include demonisation of African liberation movements.

Mlambo (2015) adds that, Mugabe’s redistributive policies are not a new thing in Africa. He therefore has a lot of reservations or objections on how these ‘pseudo-nationalisation’ policies are being carried out in Zimbabwe. We queer why he calls them pseudo-nationalist. America also has its nationalist policies, so does Britain but why call African ones pseudo-nationalist? His criticism, which justifies the arguments on the “segregatory” nature of the IEEA as raised by Andreasson (2010) and Matyszak (2013) is what he terms the “violent, authoritarian, and arbitrary implementation style and a particularly virulent type of nativism that defines ‘indigenes’ in a very narrow way, to the exclusion of other groups (in reference to White descendants of colonialists) that have equal claim to Zimbabwe.” (Mlambo 2015:45). A question we ask is on whether America does not implement and pursue its interests violently, with authoritarianism and arbitrariness across the entire world. Why then focus entirely and singularly on demonising Zimbabwe and Mugabe who are not even as rapacious as the American state.

From the above Eurocentric racial diatribes of Zimbabwe’s indigenisation policy, it can be noted that; Robert Mugabe had insisted on an indigenisation policy that was specifically and rightfully intended to only benefit Black Zimbabweans. His argument had been that, no other race in Rhodesia

(Zimbabwe) had been subjected to such high levels of colonial criminality which included racial alienation, robbery, theft, dispossession, political exclusion and economic marginalisation as the indigenous Black Zimbabweans. Neoliberal scholars (both Black and White) as noted above have queered Mugabe's thinking; defining his policy as queer and abnormal since it deprived the White race (specifically the White descendants of colonialists), the same benefits. Thus, Robert Mugabe was labelled a racist because of what Eurocentric academics referred to as his "highly charged racially segregatory" indigenisation policy. What is queer is that when Africans seek to redress colonial crimes of dispossession and exploitation, they are labelled as racist. Whites; and not any other race, Coloured or Indian, received a lot of sympathies from the neo-liberal academic camp especially in relation to the contents of the indigenisation policy. In this regard, White exclusion to resources became an abominable act while previous Black deprivation of the same resources was deemed normal and justified. Below, we analyse IEE vis-à-vis issues of cronyism/corruption.

Robert Mugabe's Indigenisation Policy and Cronyism/Corruption

Eurocentric and some supposedly astute African academics have refuted and critiqued claims by Robert Mugabe's government that the indigenisation programme is inclusive and supportive of broad-based economic empowerment of the majority Black Zimbabweans. These scholars' major argument is that; ZANU PF elites benefitted more from the indigenisation programme than the disadvantaged Black masses. Here, the critical question is whether it is better for minority Whites to benefit more or is it better for indigenous ZANU PF members to benefit more. These are the dimensions that these Eurocentric and supposedly astute African academics need to earnestly compare in this discourse. The opposition Movement for Democratic Change party also "claimed that economic indigenisation [was] a recipe for ZANU-PF elite enrichment, clientelism, cronyism, corruption and political patronage" (Ndakaripa 2015:1). We argue that the absence of indigenisation would have entailed the enrichment of descendants of colonialists; it would imply that these aspects that were applied to ZANU PF would be the prerogative of the White descendants of colonialists.

Nyamunda (2016) remains unconvinced by Robert Mugabe's indigenisation programme as he asserts that it does not serve the needs of the population at large or even those of the Black business community, but is concerned in ZANU PF's 'primitive accumulation' and the perpetuation of its political ambitions. It remains queer on whether the absence of indigenisation would have benefitted the population at large. It is also quite debatable on whether the indigenisation programme could be termed 'primitive accumulation' when in

actual fact; it stood for repossession, restitution and restoration of what was stolen during the colonial era. We question why Nyamunda reduces the work of ZANU PF to mere political ambitions – why does he ignore other dimensions like economic ambitions? Is he assuming that when descendants of colonialists resisted the repossession of land they had no political and economic ambitions of their own? Is it ZANU PF alone that played politics in Zimbabwe? When some academics/scholars sing for their supper and write uncritically in support of neoempire, are they not playing politics as well?

Nyamunda (2016) further argues that indigenisation is a platform to enrich ZANU PF elites without any concern for accountability and the wellbeing of the grassroots. Interestingly, we note that Nyamunda does not produce any evidence to show for this. It seems that he implies that the descendants of colonialists are more accountable and concerned with the wellbeing of the grassroots Africans. A question we raise is on whether he was concerned about the wellbeing of the grassroots in the first instance, or he was singing for his supper by writing in support of neoempire? Ndakaripa (2016) in support of Nyamunda argues that ZANU PF bigwigs, through the indigenisation programme have corruptly enriched themselves while undermining the interests of ordinary Black Zimbabweans. However, Ndakaripa also does not have any convincing evidence to show for this. We question whether corruption did not preexist ZANU PF government; did corruption not even preexist Zimbabwe's independence? Did the colonialists and their descendants not criminally and corruptly dispossess and exploit Africans? Did they not enter into and corrupt African institutions? The problem that needs to be critiqued here is the assumption that corruption started with and resides in ZANU PF. Indeed some scholars who sing for their supper are also corrupt when they write in support of neoempire that is feasting on and cannibalising other Africans.

Totolo (2010) argues that Zimbabwe's indigenisation programme was designed more to benefit the elites than the grassroots, an idea equally shared by Matyszak (2011, 2016) and Bloch (2010). According to Totolo (2010), the indigenisation policy is meaningless and unjustifiable as it only empowers Robert Mugabe and his cronies rather than consolidating the participation of the grassroots in economic development and control over resources. We argue that the global economy also benefits Euro-America and its cronies. Can we therefore say that the global economy is meaningless and unjustifiable because it only benefits a few countries? We wonder what Totolo's point is in criticising indigenisation by using such a very narrow argument.

In Museve's (2013) view, ZANU PF uses indigenisation as an enrichment process while at the same time treating the country's abundant resources as if they belong to the 'revolutionary party' alone. An interesting argument is that even in Euro-America they consider their resources as belonging to them alone

and their sitting governments exercise control over the resources. The same applied to ZANU PF government – as a sitting government it exercised control over the resources within Zimbabwe. For Mabhena and Moyo (2014), IEE is a noble policy but its implementation is suspect as only the politically connected benefit at the expense of the grassroots. Here we argue that even in the global economy, it is only the connected that benefit. Must the global economy be stopped as well because it is benefitting only the connected and networked? If not then, why must indigenisation be stopped on the supposed ground that it benefits only those that are connected? Magure (2012:80) also argues that, “ZANU PF’s militarised patronage system under the guise of indigenisation provides a perfect opportunity to well-connected members of the Zimbabwean ruling party-state complex to become rich overnight.”

Mhlanga (2011) underscores that Zimbabwe’s indigenisation programme should not be about robbing others (White descendants of colonialists and foreign companies) in order to pay the once economically disenfranchised Blacks. Here, our question is that when Africans are colonially robbed and they subsequently claim restitution/restoration/repossession, are they by so claiming, robbing the robbers or they are simply claiming restitution/repossession of what belongs to them? It is also to err to suggest that Blacks were necessarily economically disenfranchised; they were actually robbed and exploited. Mhlanga believes that indigenisation should not be about burning bridges rather, it should focus on rebuilding them. A pertinent argument would be that which bridges to build when Africa is still being looted and plundered? He thus suggests that, experienced businesses (White and foreign owned) can assist upcoming Black businesses while at the same time putting concerted efforts to help boost neocolonial economic growth. We question whether the experience that Mhlanga is giving reference to is not that of Euro-America’s plundering of Africa and the exploitation of Africans? The point that the author is making is quite ambiguous. He says he is opposed to a situation where the ZANU PF government has the temerity to tell others (Whites and foreign companies) to go to hell. Rather, the ZANU PF leadership should concern themselves in creating a win-win situation. We are mystified on whether this assertion is possible especially when they are dealing with colonial and neocolonial criminals.

According to the above Eurocentric and supposedly astute African academics there is a small group of ZANU PF politicians who now have huge stakes in the economy due to the acquisition of some properties, thanks to the manipulation of the indigenisation and economic empowerment policy to their advantage. In other words, ZANU PF politicians and their cronies are accused to have turned into direct beneficiaries of a populist mass-oriented indigenisation policy that they pushed since the beginning of the 21st Century.

They are said to have grown ‘rigid’ and ‘hegemonic’ as they supposedly failed to equitably redistribute the ‘spoils’ of indigenisation to the masses. In fact, these elites have become a direct threat to the very economic strides that they had tried to achieve under the policy. As such, indigenisation has ceased to be part of the struggle to genuinely empower the once economically disadvantaged masses. However, the Eurocentric academics fail to clearly specify how else the grassroots must be genuinely empowered. They don’t proffer any better ways other than to vilify the ZANU PF government on allegations of corruption and nepotism vis-a-vis the indigenisation programme. Thus, indigenisation is reduced to ZANU PF ‘elitist-capitalism’ or ‘elitist-centric’ ‘primitive accumulation’. The other argument is that, the ZANU PF elites have ‘self-empowered’ themselves and profiteered at the expense of the masses; rather than concentrating on deep and broad societal indigenisation and empowerment programmes which the majority economically disenfranchised Blacks had thought the ‘revolutionary’ party would earnestly champion or spearhead. There is now a ‘capitalist’ mentality of “profit over people” where overnight the ZANU PF elites have abandoned the real motives of indigenisation by becoming capitalists themselves.

We argue that the problem with the academics who propound the above arguments is they have a narrow mindset, where their major concern is on shrewdly ignoring the plunder of Zimbabwe’s resources by the White descendants of colonialists and Western corporations. They cleverly amplify African corruption and cronyism while normalising the looting, plunder and exploitation of Africa’s resources by (neo) colonialists. They are impatient to singularly accuse Africans/leaders of corruption. As rightly observed by Nhemachena and Warikandwa (2018) “the question is about the queerness of some supposedly astute African academics who ironically fail to see through the veils of (neo-) imperial ideologies that underlie the resilient (neo-)colonial queering of Africans”.

The discourse on Mugabe’s indigenisation policy witnessed a plethora of Eurocentric and supposedly astute African academics from divergent disciplines (Phimister 2012; Moore 2001; 2003; 2012a; 2012b; 2015; Kriger 2012; Matyszak 2010; 2013; 2016; Raftopoulos 2003; 2013; 2015; Coltart 2008; 2016; Alexander and McGregor 2013; Mlambo 2015; Magure 2012; 2014; Ndakaripa 2015; 2016; Bloch 2011; 2012) each trying to justify an illegality by using either a historical, political, sociological, legal, psychological or economic approach to buttress and consolidate a so -called legitimisation of White (neo)colonialists’ pillaging and looting of African resources. What is queer is that; White primitive accumulation of African resources is justified while what is queerer is that; African reclamation of the same stolen or looted resources through indigenisation policies is condemned as violent or primitive accumulation. Colonialism was never legal.

It illegally disenfranchised the indigenous peoples of Africa from legitimately owning their God-given resources. It was evil, as Africans were dehumanised and brutalised becoming landless and propertyless beings, whose only relevance in terms of existence was that of being chattels of the White man. Thus, it becomes queer when African leaders are accused, by (neo) colonialists, who looted and still want to loot Africa's resources, of looting their own God-given resources.

Robert Mugabe's Indigenisation Policy and the Re-writing of African History

Magure (2012), Phimister (2012), Raftopoulos (2013), Alexander and McGregor (2013) and many others, have argued that through an abuse of patriotic history, Robert Mugabe was able to mobilise the grassroots to gain overwhelming support for his supposedly rabid economic policies. The discourse on patriotic history pits those who support and those who are against such history. It is interesting to note that the Eurocentric academics have been overwhelmingly patriotic to Euro-America. However, there are also those that are patriotic to the Zimbabwean nation state (pan-Africanists) as there are also those [Eurocentric ones] that are patriotic to neoimperialism, to Euro-America – faithfully serving the planetary goals and interests of Euro-America. The question then is which form of patriotism is better. Some are patriotic to Euro-America because they glorify the Whites as economic heroes who, they argue, need not be destabilised/disrupted by African indigenisation policies. Here, there are different forms of heroes and patriotism. Would it then be better to be patriotic to strangers/foreigners that have robbed Africans than it is, to be patriotic to one's own kith and kin?

The strategy that Mugabe is accused to have used was based on racial warfare advanced through massive well calculated political rhetoric of patriotic history. However, a question to be asked is whether it really was racial warfare or it was warfare against those that stole African resources? Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) sees 'patriotic history' in the sense of some crucial roles given to issues of land and race usually defined in terms of loyalty to ZANU PF, while Tendi (2008:325) views it as a "reverse of colonialism" vis-à-vis African sovereignty against White imperialism. Muzondidya (2007:325) calls such a strategy "authoritarian nationalism" which thrives by giving reference to "identity politics". While Muzondidya writes about 'authoritarian nationalism' there is nowhere in his work where he also writes about authoritarian internationalism such as when the United States of America dictates to other states, particularly in the Global South. The issue he raises on 'identity politics' is quite debatable.

One may ask, when a victim of robbery claims back what belongs to him/her, would it be accurate to describe such a victim as playing identity politics.

Eurocentric and supposedly astute African academics, perceive the objective of patriotic history as a strategy used by Mugabe to convince a section of the population (indigenous Zimbabweans) that its interests were best safeguarded through supporting the ZANU PF government against 'recalcitrant' White descendants of colonialists. As a result, Robert Mugabe and his ZANU PF party were seen to have moulded 'national history' (better known as 'patriotic history') to gain a new kind of legitimacy as 'populists' (the voices of the downtrodden), 'nationalists' (fierce fighters against White dominance), 'revolutionaries' (liberators against colonial rule), and 'patrons' ('generous' distributors of resources to the poor).

Eurocentric academics continue to argue that Robert Mugabe through his supposedly queer patriotic history was able to 'manipulate' the grassroots and inspire 'loyalty' among huge segments of Zimbabwe's population. This notion of patriotic history is clearly captured in President Robert Mugabe's 2001 speech where he said:

We seek to complete the realization of the objectives of our just struggle by dismantling everything that attenuates our sovereignty and sovereign right to our heritage and resources, principally land; by empowering our people through greater say and control over our resources, indeed by challenging a political economy which yields a two-race nation, yields a colonial white leisure employer class while the black majority wallows in poverty, serfdom and indigence. We have to be ready; we have to gather courage for the enemy is back on parade, for we either get back into the trenches or we surrender as a slave nation (Mugabe 2001:71).

Mugabe's speech echoes popular frustrations with continued White ownership of the means of production and their dominance over resources. He denounces the White descendants of colonialists' extravagance while the indigenous Blacks wallow in absolute poverty. He uses patriotic history based on racial identity to bind and mobilise the Black masses to rally behind the ZANU PF cause of dismantling the White economic hegemony. The use of the word 'heritage' clearly symbolises a concern for one's birthright which is the whole reason behind Mugabe's later calls for indigenisation and economic empowerment. According to this perception, the real owners of Zimbabwe's resources are the Black majority, who had been sidelined from also enjoying the economic cake by White descendants of colonialists. Thus, as this thinking goes, there is need to rekindle the 'liberation vision' through patriotic history.

Consequently, Eurocentric academics perceived Robert Mugabe and his ZANU PF party as demonstrating some form of "ruthless and discriminatory"

political pragmatism crafted in a very subtle and authoritarian manner, such that the masses were easily cajoled and manipulated to develop negative feelings towards the White descendants of colonialists while exalting extreme nationalistic, racial and ethnic bigotry at the expense of national unity and inclusiveness. Accordingly, this required a process of ‘bombarding’ a section of the populace (the gullible ones usually strong ZANU PF party supporters, lumpen proletariats, vendors, youth, some elites, huge peasant populations and so on) with ‘propagandized’ narratives’ of patriotic history’ (Phimister 2012; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009). This would be achieved by consistently dwelling on the economic privileges which the minority Whites had enjoyed, over the majority Black Zimbabweans.

Raftopoulos (2013:987) asserts that; the use of patriotic history by Robert Mugabe gave bold reference to “ideological legacies of the liberation struggle, the persistent memories of colonial dispossession, and the land reform process.” Here, Raftopoulos, argues that; the ideological legacies of the liberation struggle based on a liberation vision calling for an equitable distribution of resources was propagandised to give weight to racial overtones of exclusivity. Memories of colonial dispossession propagated by Mugabe through his patriotic history are therefore perceived by Raftopoulos as an attempt to magnify the gravity of colonialism and the urgent need to address these racially construed or constructed economic disparities. Of course, we argue that these were not racially construed economic disparities at all but; they were criminally embedded colonial policies of theft and robbery. His argument is that; the major reason for such racial overtures is to create animosity between Black Zimbabweans and White descendants of colonialists as for Mugabe to justify and strengthen his arguments on the indigenisation programme. We argue that frontloaded discourses about race simply became a smokescreen for ensuring the neocolonial status quo.

In all fairness, it was *quite* logical for Mugabe to show ‘concern’ for the poor rural and urban grassroots by introducing indigenisation and economic empowerment programmes. However, Eurocentric academics have accused Robert Mugabe of propagandising history through patriotic history. In fact Eurocentric scholars also propagandise economic history by lying that colonisation was about economic development, civilisation and progress for Africans. The central argument propounded by both White and some supposedly astute Black academics is that, through patriotic history (which is viewed by Eurocentric academics as a distortion of historical facts); Mugabe was able to convince a majority of peasants that the only thing that denied them greater prosperity was the greed of the rapacious property owners (foreign companies and White descendants of colonialists), who were benefitting at the expense of the economically marginalised ‘indigenous’ Zimbabweans.

According to the Eurocentric academics, for this kind of perception to be effective among the Black populace, it had to be buttressed through ‘patriotic history’ (Raftopoulos 2013; Phimister 2012).

Aided by such eloquent rhetoric of indigenising the economy to a 100 percent equity (Nyamunda 2016) in order to economically empower the once disadvantaged grassroots; Mugabe is seen to have managed to ‘win the hearts’ of ‘many’, especially those in rural areas and the poor in urban areas. Therefore, the Eurocentric academics’ perspective is that; the Black masses through heavy dosages of patriotic history, were easily manipulated by Mugabe’s patriotic history to extol feelings over facts. Thus, Mugabe’s “falsified” patriotic history (according to Eurocentric thinking) was not supposed to triumph over Western historical and democratic” truths”. In other words, with all the queerness of such perspectives; Eurocentric academics and some supposedly astute African academics would rather prefer a form of history that whitewashed Zimbabwe’s concerns about the theft and plunder of its resources by the White descendants of colonialists and foreign companies.

In this view point, Robert Mugabe was not supposed to rewrite his own country’s history which intensively captured and described the very reason the liberation struggle was fought - instead, Mugabe and other Africans were supposed to appreciate “revolutionary” history written on their behalf by White descendants of colonialists and the supposedly astute Black academics. It therefore becomes a queer world where revolutionary icons like Robert Mugabe are not supposed to Africanise their country’s history, but should leave the writing of such important history (a history of White disenfranchisement, dispossession, deprivation and extreme subjugation of poor landless and propertyless Africans) to White and Black liberal scholars.

Robert Mugabe’s Indigenisation Policy as Election Bait?

Robert Mugabe’s indigenisation programme has been criticised as a populist strategy to win elections by some supposedly astute African academics. As a result, Nciizah (2015), Nyamunda (2013; 2016) and Magure (2013) have refuted the fact that Robert Mugabe and his ZANU PF party’s indigenisation and economic empowerment initiatives were honestly in pursuance of a “radical anticolonial and anti-imperialist stance” (Gatsheni-Ndlovu 2015) intended to ‘improve’ the living standards of the grassroots as well as create opportunities for economic and personal advancement of the masses.

Accordingly, Nciizah (2015) raises questions regarding the timing of some policies introduced by ZANU PF. She is convinced that the revolutionary party introduces a new policy or gives some impetus to a policy usually when it is heading towards an election. She asserts that the indigenisation and economic

empowerment programme started to gain momentum around 2011 and 2012 mainly in preparation for the 2013 parliamentary and presidential elections. Her conclusion is that; in as much as the indigenisation policy is meant to benefit and empower the grassroots, the motives behind its implementation always remain those of maintaining ZANU PF's political dominance. Thus, in her view, indigenisation is more of a calculated strategy intended to achieve ZANU PF's political and economic goals. Mawowa (2013) also sees the policy as just a political gimmick by ZANU-PF to garner more supporters and placate public opinion towards the party.

Nyamunda (2013:3) claims that the "noise around indigenisation was just meant to win the 2013 elections." His argument being that, prior to the 2013 Zimbabwean elections, ZANU PF's popularity and political hegemony had gone down leading it to come up with "ill-planned politicised and racist redistributive policies" (Nyamunda 2013:1) in order to garner electoral support. In his more current work, Nyamunda (2016) still maintains that the indigenisation and economic empowerment programme is merely a political gimmick only meant to entrench ZANU PF hegemony on Zimbabwe's electoral landscape.

While, Nyamunda (2013, 2016) sounds a bit sceptical on whether the prominence given to IEE during the 2013 elections was effective in luring voters, Magure (2014), Raftopoulos (2013) and Alexander and McGregor (2013) acknowledge that it was so. Magure (2014) describes how IEE was manipulated by ZANU PF in order to win an overwhelming electoral majority in the 2013 elections. He claims that ZANU PF's land, indigenisation and empowerment drive, made a difference in the 2013 elections. He further stresses that in times of impending elections, ZANU PF always creates an uneven playing field which is disadvantageous to opposition political parties. It is alleged that this is usually done through an introduction of populist economic policies (FTLRP and IEEA). In this regard, the indigenisation programme becomes a manipulative tool for entrenching "populist seduction" where the ZANU PF elites deliberately indoctrinate the grassroots on "salvation from economic problems" (Magure 2014:21) through political and economic fantasies based on 'liberating' and empowering policies. We argue that even the global political-economic terrain is uneven. The claimants seem to be mere cry-babies who don't understand the dynamics of politics.

Raftopoulos (2013) argues that the ZANU PF victory in the 2013 elections came as a result of its ability to manipulate the electorate, especially the rural peasants; through deliberate propaganda and historical distortions of the liberation struggle, the brutal memories of colonial dispossession and the economic benefits that the masses were now reaping thanks to ZANU PF's indigenisation and economic empowerment programmes. Alexander and

McGregor (2013) echo the same sentiments by stressing that, during the 2013 elections; Mugabe brought back memories of the liberation struggle and above all, highlighted on his party's achievements on the policies of indigenisation and land repossession. Noteworthy is that, similarly, the Euro-Americans and their Eurocentric Africans also brought back memories of supposed African savagery and barbarism and highlighted their supposed heroism in supposedly bringing development and progress to Africans. Furthermore, Euro-America is increasingly using social media and other pieces of technology to control the minds of Africans who are often surreptitiously stirred against their states and governments – in fact Euro-America is developing chips to insert into the minds of [African] human beings; it has developed technologies to delete and edit some human memories (Nhemachena this volume).

Ndakaripa (2016) points out that ZANU PF came up with the indigenisation policy in 2008 and earnestly started its implementation during the inclusive government era. He weirdly claims that, this was not only to 'bait' the electorate to support Robert Mugabe in the pending 2013 elections, but Mugabe's strategy was also to share the blame with the other two MDC parties if the economy was to collapse due to the implementation of the 'unfavourable' economic policy.

The above views of Eurocentric academics as well as some African academics, omit a very important fact. These scholars do acknowledge that the indigenisation programme helped increase ZANU PF's support during the 2013 elections. However, they 'intentionally' or 'unintentionally' ignore the fact that in most cases, it is the intention of all political parties the world over to come up with people-centred policies in order to gain those people's support when election time comes. It is unclear why, according to the scholars, Mugabe should not have used popular policies – political parties the world over use popular policies also designed to generate support from the grassroots.

Zimbabwe's indigenisation programmes such as those implemented through Community Share Ownership Trusts (CSOTs) have improved the lives of rural communities by way of infrastructural development through the construction of schools, clinics, hospitals, bridges, irrigation schemes, drilling of boreholes and so on (Kurebwa *et al* 2014; Tshuma 2015; Matsa and Masimbati 2014). As such, the IEE, though at times "problematic" in some ways; has also "partially" or "greatly" afforded some people, a better standard of living. As noted above, some scholars tend to have deliberately ignored the 'successes' of the policy by subtly focusing on Robert Mugabe's electoral victory which, however; was as a result of what IEE, despite its various 'imperfections'; had achieved so far. In our view, there was a privileging of specific perspectives over others; since, sincere concerns of ordinary Zimbabweans; to participate meaningfully in the mainstream economy, and to also benefit from their country's abundant resources, are downplayed to mean something else. In this

regard, the benefits accruing to ordinary Zimbabweans because of IEE as noted by Kurebwa *et al.* (2014), Tshuma (2014) and Machinya (2014) seem to carry less weight or are inconsequential when compared to the strategies, used by Robert Mugabe; in winning elections. Consequently, IEE is magnified as an election bait to win votes for Mugabe; and, ignored as a means used by the same Mugabe to ‘improve’ the standard of living of ordinary Zimbabweans.

Robert Mugabe’s Indigenisation Policy and Economic Collapse

The most ‘complicated’ and ‘controversial’ clause of the IEEA was that which called for all foreign companies with a minimum asset-value of at least \$500,000 to give up 51% of their ownership to indigenous Zimbabweans. Thus, an “investor” was basically allowed to hold 49% ownership of a business or company. Among the critics of the indigenisation policy are Erich Bloch, (2011; 2012), Magure (2012; 2014), Alex Magaisa (2015), Shane Makoshori (2017), Raftopoulos (2014) and Matyszak (2016).

The most consistent critic of Zimbabwe’s indigenisation and economic empowerment policy was the late Zimbabwean economist Eric Bloch. He saw in the policy a complete disaster for this Southern African country’s economic growth. Bloch, in several articles, argued that the policy would scare away “investors” [meaning neocolonial plunderers, looters and exploiters; see Bond 2006)], because the “methodology pursued [was] counterproductive and destructive, and [was] the overriding barrier to achieving the declared objectives” of indigenisation and economic empowerment of the grassroots. (Bloch 2011a). In pushing for a 51%-49% ownership, Bloch argued that the ZANU PF leadership failed to grasp a very simple thing. In as much as Robert Mugabe and his ZANU PF party were opposed to elite Whites and foreign companies owning the means of production, the same is also equally true of these two groups as they were also totally against legislation that made them subordinates to Mugabe and his party’s economic dominance. The major grievance of foreign “investors” was that they could not be subordinates in companies or businesses that they formed. The argument was that, the foreign corporations and White descendants of colonialists were the ones who were responsible for the provision of “the bulk, if not all, of the investment capital and when the non-indigenous investors also effect[ed] substantive technology transfer and ready access to their established markets to the Zimbabwean enterprises” (Bloch 2011; n.d.; 2012). This was also aggravated by the fact that the ZANU PF government and even the general populace did not have the necessary resources and capital to undertake such economic endeavours and ventures.

Thus, the IEE was critiqued for directly and indirectly contributing to the already high levels of unemployment in Zimbabwe. The few remaining big companies were said to be constantly retrenching workers citing an unfavourable international economic environment further compounded and aggravated by the IEE's 51% local ownership demands on foreign industries. (Some companies took advantage of the IEEP to reduce their work force and at times they merely did so to increase profits). Accordingly, Bloch (2011; 2012) argued that the IEEA demotivated "investors" from increasing their "investments". He asserted that some Zimbabwean companies had since closed down while others had simply downsized their workforce. However, what is questionable is whether these are genuine Zimbabwean companies or Euro-American companies operating in Zimbabwe. We point out that what makes a company Zimbabwean is its adherence to the ethos and expectations of Zimbabweans. It has to be owned by Zimbabweans.

Bloch (2011) further argues that, even new "investors" had been greatly discouraged from "investing" or starting new business in such an 'unpredictable' economic environment. He was of the view that common sense should dictate to the ZANU PF leadership that no one can ever "invest" in a country where he/she has no entitlement or control over the capital he/she injects in a business enterprise. No "investor" would want a situation where he/she would spend millions if not billions of dollars in terms of technologies and business expertise and acumen only to be deprived of the authority or influence over the operations and profits accruing due to that "investment". We assert that these companies were not simply patriotic. Bloch thus questioned the policy as such:

How can any government of integrity conceivably justify expropriating assets, developed by the investment of billions of dollars, without fair and equitable compensation? How can any government, other than one devoid of good character and probity even contemplate doing so? Admittedly, Zimbabwe's government seeks to justify such action by contending that more than fair compensation has been given by virtue of the existing investors having had recourse to Zimbabwe's mineral wealth (Bloch 2011; n.d.).

The above arguments are equally shared by many scholars. In Magure's view, the uncertain economic environment brought about by the indigenisation policy led to company closures in many cities. He notes that some companies actually closed owing to their negative perceptions of the 'anti-business' contents of the IEEA. He argues that most "investors" are interested in "investing" where they are assured of maximizing profits and where there are also very minimal risks to such "investments". As regards Zimbabwe's IEEA he asserted that under such hostile circumstances, businesses close and it also

“becomes increasingly difficult for Zimbabwe to attract foreign investors capable of injecting fresh capital” (Magure 2012:78). As such, indigenisation was seen to call for unfavourable economic terms which “dissuaded foreign investors, worried by the insecurity of property rights” (Magaisa 2015).

Mounting criticisms of IEE were indicative of Eurocentric academics, commentators and economic analysts’ disillusionment (or biases) about the effectiveness of the policy in boosting Zimbabwe’s economic growth. Since the enactment of the indigenisation policy followed by its implementation, economic challenges increased, many of which could be attributed to either industries relocating to other countries or out rightly closing because of the policy’s restrictiveness in enhancing the profitability of these huge foreign businesses or companies (Coltart 2008; Magure 2012; Bloch 2011; 2012; Magaisa 2015; Ndakaripa 2016).

According to Shame Makoshori (*Financial Gazette*, April 2017), Zimbabwe was losing substantial amounts in potential revenue because of poor “investment” policies and an environment that undermined existing operations. He added that a hostile environment for potential mining “investors” that had been fostered by a punitive tax regime, unfriendly legislation (IEEA) that proscribed foreigners from controlling their “investments” had scared serious “investors” away. As such, the country had lost almost US\$18 billion in potential revenue. In the same vein, Matyszak (2016) another consistent critic of Zimbabwe’s IEE, argued that the indigenisation policy was known through various fora to be an impediment to FDI flows. The country had become an unattractive destination for foreign “investors” because of its negative “investment” climate linked to its indigenisation policy. He argued that Zimbabwe had been ranked at number 155 out of 189 states by the World Bank. This was vis-à-vis the index, on the ease of doing business in a specific country.

Raftopoulos (2014) was of the view that the inherent problems of Zimbabwe’s indigenisation programme lay in its ambiguities and its propensity to scare away “investors”. He quoted the former Australian Ambassador to Zimbabwe, Mathew Neuhaus; for having said, “investing in Zimbabwe remains akin to swimming in the Zambezi between crocodiles and hippos” (Raftopoulos 2014:97). This literally meant that Zimbabwe was not a friendly “investor” destination owing of course; to policies such as the IEEA and political interference. According to these Eurocentric academics, “investing” in Zimbabwe, became a big gamble one would have to take at his own peril. According to this logic, the economic environment was ‘contaminated’ by ‘rapacious’ individuals (ZANU PF politicians denoting the crocodiles and hippos) who could confiscate anything the “investor” injected in a business venture owing to the ‘warped’ indigenisation legislation. Raftopoulos saw the policy as ambiguous as it “lacked some clarity”. A similar view on the ambiguity

of the policy is raised by Magaisa (2015), Ndakaripa (2016), Matyszak (2016) and Shame Makoshori (2017). In these scholars' view, there are quite a lot of inconsistencies as regards the framing of the Act. This has led to some conflicting pronouncements on the policy made by many senior government officials (Magaisa 2015; Ndakaripa 2016; Matyszak 2016). In Matyszak's (2016:2) view, "the source of the "lack of clarity" arises from the disjunctures between the Act as it is, the Act as various government officials think it ought to be and the implementation of the law, or its conceptualisation, in practice." Below we highlight some of these inconsistencies and ambiguities found within the Indigenisation Ministry, Ministry of Finance and the executive office.

While Bloch (2011; 2012), Matyszak (2016), Ndakaripa (2016), Magaisa (2015) and many others criticise the 51% shareholding by indirectly equating it to a 'nationalization' of non-indigenous companies, Canaan Dube (2013) refutes such an assertion arguing that Section 6 of Chapter 14:33 of the IEEA (on the 51-49 % equity) is solely meant to create a mutually beneficial partnership between the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) and the non-indigenous companies. His argument, also shared by President Mugabe is that, the non-indigenous "investor" injects capital and equipment to do business in Zimbabwe and the GoZ which owns the natural resources meets the "investor" halfway by offering its resources as part of the bargain to acquire the 51% of the company. Thus, Dube believed that it was a win-win situation for both.

We argue that the neo-liberal (Eurocentric) perspective sees the ownership of mines, industries and other resources by Black Zimbabweans (as well as other Africans on the continent) as something queer or abnormal which needs an immediate reversal or overhaul of resource ownership in favour of White descendants of colonialists and foreign companies. When Robert Mugabe and his government came up with the 51% local, and 49% foreign ownership of resources; the neo-liberal response was to queer him as an abnormal leader. In other words, while Mugabe questioned why foreigners should have the lion share of benefits accruing from the exploitation of local resources, the Western countries queered Mugabe as a very abnormal leader who deserved economic sanctions and a closure of foreign companies in his country.

Conclusion

The reality being propounded by Eurocentric academics is quite queer. It is queer in that, in some of their works for example Raftopoulos (1994); Phimister (2012); Moore (2001; 2003; 2010); they are quite conversant on the historical imbalances and even the continuity and perpetuation of White economic hegemony years after independence. What then becomes queer is that they tend to give more focus on democratic issues and property rights while ignoring

issues to do with restitution, restoration and compensation for the (neo-)colonial plunder of African resources. A question that we quickly ask is whether an economy skewed in favour of minority White descendants of colonialists can be sustainable in a sea of Black poverty and grievances. Is it not also justifiable that some kind of restitution, restoration and compensation of Africans due to years of (neo) colonial plunder also takes place. Indigenous African people also need to benefit from their God-given resources. Eurocentric academics deliberately leave out these important facts in order to justify, and at times magnify, specific issues as regards property rights. However, in most cases, these Eurocentric writings camouflage and hamper genuine discussions on economic, political and social issues that affect independent African countries today; emanating from the colonial dispossession of property.

We argue that, rather than coming up with solutions to genuinely address the political, historical and socio-economic factors which might have triggered the radical drive for indigenisation in Zimbabwe, the Eurocentric and supposedly astute African academics were quick to argue that these actions were illegal, unjust, a violation of property rights, primitive accumulation gone wrong and so on; without of course, analysing the real conditions that might have influenced the ZANU PF politicians to execute such a 'popular' or 'unpopular' feat. The Eurocentric academics tend to ignore the fact that; reality can best be explained by first looking back at what was there (historical evidence that leads to the plunder and looting of Black people's resources by the White descendants of colonialists) before what is now called reality (the few White descendants of colonialists now owning the looted and plundered Black people's resources as if those resources had always been theirs). We need to first explain the reality of historical events before we can accept the current reality as the correct reality. In other words, reality should never be understood as it is, without tracing past events to see if what is being referred to as real had always been the reality it is now said to be.

A people who lack knowledge of their past are like a tree without roots. Reality comes from the truth that was there in the beginning. From this reality, the Black people become the real owners of Africa's abundant resources and not multinational corporations and White descendants of colonialists that now lay claim to these resources through the manipulation of reality. So, when Robert Mugabe called for patriotic history, he was not hallucinating or being queer. He was actually driven by a genuine desire to bring out the reality which Western and supposedly astute African academics are heavily paid to whitewash, ignore and erase in favour of White economic dominance on the African continent.

We also argue that; if it was undemocratic and unjustifiable for leaders like Robert Mugabe to call for a fairer or equitable distribution of Zimbabwe's

natural resources through the indigenisation and economic empowerment programme, it should similarly be undemocratic and unjustifiable to allow a few descendants of White colonialists and foreign companies to plunder the country's resources at will, without any meaningful benefits to the indigenous people. It is queer for the Westerners and the descendants of White colonialists to talk of economic rights, yet perceive it as queer or abnormal when Mugabe claimed the same rights for his people.

Finally, the whole discourse on Zimbabwe's indigenisation programme as propounded by Eurocentric and some African academics has tended to concentrate more on property rights through an indirect defence and prolongation of the unjustified colonial economic gains achieved through the exclusion of most Blacks in the mainstream economy. The major focus has been on a primitive accumulation gone wrong and not how the beneficiaries of the IEE are now participating in the mainstream economy. These scholars implicitly and explicitly defend White property rights and other economic advantages. Thus, ever since 2000 when 'primitive accumulation' (Moore 2001; 2003) through an 'Africanization' or 'indigenization' (Mlambo 2015) programme took place in Zimbabwe; there was a barrage of criticisms levelled against Mugabe by these Eurocentric academics.

Notwithstanding these diatribes on indigenisation and economic empowerment; there has not been a viable approach from these academics, on how best to deal with issues related to previous colonial economic imbalances that might have triggered racial bigotry, culminating in forceful land evictions and calls for an Africanisation of the economy. The above scholars' narratives seem to perpetuate an entrenchment of the White descendants of colonialists' economic status quo. The work lacks thorough academic engagement on how best to address the underlying African grievances concerning neo-colonial criminality, including economic inequalities caused by past colonial injustices. They downplay the need for a situation where indigenous Zimbabweans are compensated for the plunder of their resources by (neo) colonialists. As Nhemachena (2018:3) rightly argues; "hardly any scholarly attention has been paid to the fact that the deconstruction and decentring of Africa is inconsistent with the African liberation objective of Africanisation." Instead, the works/writings indirectly pressure the former Mugabe government to compromise more on economic issues.

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Sharpening the Minds of Opponents in Opposition Movements? Mugabe's Education Policies in Zimbabwe

Dean Trust Moyo

Introduction

This chapter examines Robert Gabriel Mugabe's 37-year reign in Zimbabwe with special focus on his education policies and stance on opposition movements. Prior to independence in 1980; colonial Zimbabwe had a dual system of education deeply-rooted in the then preeminent socio-political philosophy of racism and racial discrimination (Nziramanga 1999). While the curriculum for Whites empowered learners for economic, political and technological dominance and leadership, the curriculum for Blacks was deliberately designed to produce workers to promote cheap labour (Mapako 2013). This chapter argues that although the attainment of political independence in 1980 ushered in a new socio-political order built on a non-racial society, the government of Robert Mugabe had many challenges ahead: economic meltdown as a result of neo-liberal economic reforms foisted on Zimbabwe by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in the early 1990s, Euro-American sponsored opposition political movements and Euro-American sponsored human rights organisations. In fact, some of Mugabe's critics in the opposition movements and human rights organisations are previous beneficiaries of his education policies. Mugabe also faced pressure from brain drain as a result of the continued drain of national resources and exploitation of Africans. The process of exploitation of Africans started in the late 1800 when Zimbabweans were dispossessed of their resources and exploited through cheap labour and *chibharo* (forced labour without any form of payment) (Van Onselen 1980). In addition, Mugabe faced pressure from his own political party, the Zimbabwe African National People's Union- Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) due to factionalism and membership expulsions emanating from succession politics (Mare 2015) which ultimately resulted in Mugabe himself being ousted in November 2017 under operation code named "Restore Legacy".

Zimbabwe, a former British colony is a land-locked country located in the Southern region of the African continent. The country shares borders with Mozambique to the East, Botswana to the West and Zambia to the North and

South Africa to the south. After Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965 to the first half of 1979, Zimbabwe was known as Rhodesia. However, under the Federation, which was an amalgamation of modern Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe that existed between 1953 and 1963, modern Zimbabwe was known as Southern Rhodesia (Shizha and Kariwo 2011). In the last half of 1979, Ian Smith, hoping to shorten the lengthy war that drained much resource, tried to mix his government with Black faces, notably with that of Bishop Muzorewa; under the Internal Settlement deal between Ian Smith and Bishop Abel Muzorewa; the country was named Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in the last half of 1979. This kind of arrangement between Abel Muzorewa and Ian Smith is an example of what contemporary Eurocentric scholars are calling shared sovereignty or distributed governance wherein Africans do not have full sovereignty over their territories or nation states (see Nhemachena this volume). However, Mugabe and Nkomo did not recognise the arrangement; they remained in exile and continued with the war. Consequently, Zimbabwe attained political independence on 18 April 1980 after a protracted war waged by two main political parties namely: Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) led by Robert Gabriel Mugabe and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (PF-ZAPU) led by the late Joshua Mqabuko Nkomo.

Colonial education in Zimbabwe was a creation and product of a foreign dominant culture of the British middle-class education system. According to Shizha and Kariwo (2011) the Rhodesian government used a two-tier racially structured education system that protected the interests of the White ruling class, perpetuated and reinforced the subjectivity and subjugation of the Black people. For many years the colonial government paid special attention to the education of the Whites; it was free and compulsory while education for Africans survived on grants and aid allocated to Missionaries (Kanyongo 2005; Shizha and Kariwo 2011). Nherera (2000) asserts that when the demand for education among the indigenous Black people increased, the colonial government would step in to control and ensure missionaries did not "overeducate" them. Nyagura (1989) in Mapako and Mareva (2013) laments that while education for Whites was free, education for the Africans was largely for cheap labour, exploitation and servitude. Mapako and Mareva (2013) observed that colonial education in Zimbabwe was largely a colonial project; hence, opportunities for indigenous people were extremely limited and restricted as they were considered only suitable for manual work and repetitive labour tasks. It was under these circumstances that Mugabe was born and bred. This chapter explores Mugabe's 37-year reign, discusses his educational policies in redressing the gross colonial inequalities and imbalances and the effects thereof. The chapter also discusses Mugabe's stance on opposition movements and factionalism within ZANU-PF. The chapter suggests methods of handling

opposition movements constructed on modern theories of leadership. The chapter collected data from archives, newspapers and published reports.

Who is Robert Gabriel Mugabe?

Robert Gabriel Mugabe, a former revolutionary and political luminary that continues to dominate the political discourses of the second *Chimurenga* (war of liberation) in Zimbabwe was born on February 21, 1924 in Kutama village in the then British colony of Southern Rhodesia. He is a teacher by profession, a holder of seven academic university degrees, taught in several local mission schools from 1951-1955. Abroad, he taught at Chalimbana in Zambia, 1955-1958 and thereafter he taught at Takoradi, Ghana, 1958-1960 from where he met his first wife Sally Hayfron. Mugabe tied a knot with Sally Hayfron, a Ghanaian woman in April 1961. The couple was blessed with a son who died at the age of three years from cerebral malaria. Sally died of a kidney failure in 1992 and Mugabe married Grace Marufu in August 1996.

Mugabe's political career dates back to the 1950s when he taught in Ghana where he saw Ghana's independence with great admiration. Upon his return to the then Rhodesia, full of zeal and determination to bring about political change, Mugabe joined the National Democratic Party (NDP) as the party's publicity secretary. In 1961, he left NDP and joined Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) led by the late Joshua Nkomo. Again, Mugabe did not stay long, upon the split of ZAPU in 1963, Mugabe and other ZAPU executive members regrouped and formed ZANU in August 1963, the late Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole was elected president of the party, and Mugabe the secretary general (Mare 2015).

In 1964, after his subversive speech, Mugabe was arrested and jailed for ten years (Simmons 2017). ZANU leaders disappointed with Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole's willingness to compromise with Smith necessitated the appointment of Mugabe to the position of party president while in prison in 1974. After his release from prison in 1975, Mugabe went to Zambia and took over the leadership of the party while Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole formed ZANU Mwenje later known as ZANU-Ndonga (Chan 2003). In the same year (1975) Herbert Chitepo, a predominant figure in ZANU was assassinated. Mugabe and his allies were arrested by Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia in connection with the death of Chitepo, to be released after a month. Upon his release, Mugabe had to find a new base from which he could direct the struggle; he therefore escaped into Mozambique, amassing troops of Rhodesian African-trainees with whom he launched a protracted war of independence against the Smith regime.

Mugabe returned to the then Rhodesia in 1979 and upon winning the 1980 general elections, he became the first Prime Minister of the newly independent

country re-named Zimbabwe on April 18, 1980. In 1987, upon the signing of the Unity Accord between ZANU and PF-ZAPU, Mugabe became the President of the Republic; an all-powerful position that gave him authority to dissolve parliament, institute martial law and run for as many terms as desired (Simmons 2017). In principle, this gave Mugabe chances of becoming a president for life especially with the guaranteed support from his party members. Indeed he held this position till November 21, 2017 when he was sacked by his own party ZANU-PF as he faced the ignominy of impeachment.

Different commentators have different ways of describing Mugabe's leadership: Hill (2003) asserts that in the first decade of independence, Mugabe was not only popular at home, but in Africa and beyond. Hill further says "in those days thousands would throng ZANU-PF meetings, just to catch a glimpse of the hero" (2003:8). On the other hand Sachikonye (2011) posits that Mugabe is a rare African leader who stood against the powerful countries of the West reminding them of their imperial machinations. Dell (2007), cited in Gwisai (2011) describes Mugabe as a brilliant tactician who thrived on his ability to abruptly change the rules of the game, radicalises the political dynamics and force everyone to react to his agenda. For Chinua Achebe cited in Ghosh (2014), these are the characteristics of the neo-imperialist system that keep on changing, particularly seeking to "re-create" the past. Barely hours to the presidential elections, Mnangagwa the incumbent and ZANU-PF's presidential candidate for the July 30, 2018 described Mugabe as a *de facto* opposition party leader. This came as a response to Mugabe's vow to vote for the opposition, Nelson Chamisa in particular.

This chapter argues that although Mugabe ruled Zimbabwe for thirty-seven years with such high praises in the first two decades, opposition to his rule began to grow starting from opposition political movements as economic meltdown took toll and pressure mounted from his own political party ZANU-PF as factionalism and membership expulsion engineered by the succession politics increased each day. Although succession politics is used to explain the deposition of Mugabe, it is important to note that this explanation is not satisfactory because in other places or realms where leaders have overstayed, we do not see similar succession politics. In the United Nations Security Council for example, the United States of America continues to reign for almost a century but there haven't been any similar succession politics; in the unipolar world, the USA also rules but we haven't seen any succession politics there; in the 53 member Commonwealth, the English Queen has been head since 1952 up to 2018 but there haven't been any succession politics (Nhemachena this volume). Ministers and other top ZANU-PF and MDC top officials held several secret meetings with United States of America Ambassador in Harare and the object was to topple Mugabe (Wiki Leaks, 2014; Nhemachena, Warikandwa &

Mpofu 2018). Wiki leaks further confirmed that Dell's mission from 2004-2007 was regime change in Zimbabwe.

The Education System in Zimbabwe

The education system in Zimbabwe consists of three levels: Primary, Secondary and Tertiary (Tichagwa 2012). Primary level is a seven-year process; it runs from Grade 1 through Grade 7 (Kanyongo 2005). Prior to Grade 1, children enrol in the Early Childhood Education (ECE). At the end of Grade 7, students write standardised public examinations and the results are used to enrol at the secondary level. Secondary education is divided into two, Ordinary level (O-Level) that starts in Form 1 and students write standardised public examinations at the end of four years which covers a wide curriculum. In order to proceed to the last part of the secondary education (Advanced-level), students must pass a minimum of five subjects. A-Level is a two-year course based on O-level performance. At A-level, students major in a minimum of three subjects (Kanyongo 2005). Those with good passes at A-level proceed to tertiary level. Tertiary education in Zimbabwe covers universities, technical colleges, polytechnical colleges, teachers' training colleges and other vocational training.

The education system in Zimbabwe is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education for primary and secondary education and the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education, Science and Technology Development for higher education. Both are regulated by the Cabinet of Zimbabwe. It has been indicated above that formal education in colonial Zimbabwe was based on racial discrimination, education for Blacks was only necessary in as far as it enabled them to better serve the interests of the White man (Auret 1990). To demonstrate the magnitude of deprivation, Auret (1990:18) observed that of the 133,951 Blacks who started primary education in 1970, only 78,000 completed primary school in 1976, of the 78,000, only 14,000 found places in secondary schools to continue their education". Auret further argued that the major reason for these figures is lack of educational facilities. The need to redress these and other imbalances in the education system formed the basis for the post-independence education policies. Indeed the populace had high expectations, rightly so, "the newly elected government heeded to the call for the provision of education to all those who required it regardless of race, creed, sex or religion" (Mabika and Bukaliya 2011:3). Therefore, at independence in 1980, in a bid to redress the past inequalities and imbalances to increase participation of the indigenous people at all levels of education, the government of Robert Mugabe made an array of legislative changes in line with the party's 1980 Election Manifesto on education: Key for this chapter are:

- Education: A basic human right
- Education for All (EFA)
- Free, compulsory primary education

Education: A Basic Human Right for Every Zimbabwean Citizen

What are human rights? Article 2 of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights enshrines the principle of "non-discrimination on the ground of race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social, origin for the better of the status". Against this background, the newly elected Government of Mugabe declared education a basic human right in Zimbabwe. By this declaration, the government legally guaranteed accessibility of education to all citizens. In the same vein the government equally committed itself to protect, respect and fulfil the right to education for every citizen. The declaration also marked the end of the dual colonial education system. Under the new system, education was no longer a privilege of the Whites or of the rich few, but a right for all. From the government's point of view, every child had an opportunity to attend school. Over and above this, the Mugabe administration adopted Education for All (EFA) policy.

Education for All

Education for All (EFA) is deeply rooted in the philosophy of Universal Education (UE) propounded by John Amos Comenius (1592-1670), a celebrated 17th century Moravian Brethren Bishop, philosopher, educationist and a great writer. About three hundred years after Comenius, Skinner (1904-1990) argued that the ultimate aim of education is that of transforming society. Against this background, the adoption of EFA in new independent Zimbabwe was the realisation by government that education is an investment in human capital that sustains and accelerates the rate of economic growth and socio-economic development (Shizha and Kariwo 2011). Bo Dahlin (2009) posits that education is the engine of development without which human beings may not make meaningful contributions to the society of which they are a part. Therefore, EFA means that Zimbabweans from all walks of life had equal access to education according to their needs and potentials. Unpacking the EFA philosophy, Siyakwazi and Siyakwazi (1999: 7) argued:

Nobody has the right to deny students access to great reservoirs of human knowledge. Nobody has the right to encourage or coerce students into becoming anything less than they might become-nobody knows, least of all the students

themselves what they might become. In short nobody has the right to shut intellectual doors even those whom God has denied intelligence.

Based on the philosophy of EFA, one of Zimbabwe's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) was to achieve universal education by 2015. However, the goal was not achieved as of 2015 due to economic meltdown and high costs associated with education. Currently, Zimbabwe is working towards the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) of providing universal and free education to all students by 2030.

EFA entails a commitment by Government to provide basic education to all its citizens. The new Government of Robert Mugabe believed that education was necessary in shaping the socio-cultural identity and in changing the country's underdevelopment. Over and above the adoption of the EFA policy, the government introduced free and compulsory primary education. This came as a great relief to the majority of parents who could not afford school fees. Further, to ensure accessibility of educational facilities, the government adopted the policy of five kilometres radius for primary schools and eleven kilometres for secondary schools. Under this policy primary school going pupils would walk a maximum of five kilometres and eleven to and from school respectively.

Free, Compulsory Primary Education

Free compulsory primary education policy coupled with reduced distances resulted in an education "explosion" (Auret 1990:17). The 'explosion' extended to non-formal education, all adults who had not received education prior to independence now had the chance to make up for the lost time. Auret (1990) further argued that free compulsory primary education came as a compensatory "payback" particularly for women who had been side-lined for a long time by the White government and those who had been denied access to education. The nation witnessed unprecedented increases in enrolments in all sectors of education; pre-school, primary, secondary, tertiary and adult education.

At pre-school level, Zimbabwe witnessed the mushrooming of play groups, crèches or play centres in rural, mine and farming communities (Chiparange 2016). Initially these centres were meant to provide custodial services for the young children (baby-sit) while their mothers engaged in profitable activities for survival or community development (Makuvaza and Gatsi 2014). To increase equity and accessibility, the Zimbabwe government integrated ECD into formal primary school education system (Education Act, 1996; Nziramasanga 1999; Samkange and Samkange 2013). Primary schools were therefore instructed to establish two ECD classes (ECD-A and ECD-B) (Secretary's Circular 4: 2004) in Samkange and Samkange (2013).

The immediate results of education policy changes were unprecedented increase in enrolments. Kanyongo, (2005:69) observed the following:

Primary schools increased from 2401 in 1979 to 4504 in 1989 which is an 87.6 % increment, equally, enrolment moved from 819 586 to 2 274 178 which is 177.5% increase. The number of secondary schools increased from 177 in 1979 to 1502 in 1989, a change of 748.6% and enrolment increased from 66 215 in 1979 to 695 882 in 1989 which is a 950.9%.

So great was the demand for education and the increase in enrolments gave rise to the need for more classrooms. This was managed by introducing double shifts per day (hot-seating). In order to construct adequate classrooms the government introduced “self-help” approach in communal areas whereby parents provided locally available materials such as bricks, sand and expertise and the Government would provide; cement, roofing material, doors and window frames (Auret 1990:9). Countrywide, there were flourishing study groups, night schools and the new phenomenon called private colleges came into being as many wanted to make up for lost time (Auret 1990:30).

To cope with the immediate shortage of teachers, the government recruited expatriate teachers from countries such as Ireland, Germany, Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom (Auret 1990). Locally, the demand for teachers saw the rapidly increasing numbers of untrained teachers and the introduction of the Zimbabwe Integrated National Teacher Education (ZINTEC). This was an “on the job or teach while you learn” programme where only two terms of the four-year course were spent in the college and the remainder in teaching (Kanyongo 2005). Nhundu (1992) observed that the intake in teachers’ colleges moved from 3 082 in 1979 to 7 231 in 1982 and the University of Zimbabwe increased its intake from 1 873 in 1979 to 3 091 in 1982 and intake in Technical Colleges increased from 3 469 to 6 962 between 1980 and 1982. In turn, the number of Technical Colleges, Teachers’ Training Colleges increased so were universities. Chivore (2006) explored the University of Zimbabwe’s intake in five years and the following figure shows the results:

Figure 1. Demand for first year student registration at the UZ, 1990-1994.

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	Total
No. of students qualified	4 350	5 093	5 555	5 221	5 681	25 900
No. of students registered	1 937	2 135	1 689	1 773	1 873	9 403
No. of students rejected	2 413	2 960	3 866	3 448	3 810	16 497

Source: UZ statistical report, 2004 cited in Chivore (2006:235).

The figure 1 above shows that places mismatched supply, from 1990-1994, a total of 25 900 students who qualified to enter the University of Zimbabwe, only 9 403 (36.3%) secured a place to pursue their undergraduate studies. Over a period of four years 16 497 students qualified to enrol at the University of Zimbabwe but could not obtain places to pursue their dreams (Garwe 2013:7). The number excludes those who qualified, but did not apply. To mitigate this new demand, the government of Mugabe informed by the William Commission of Inquiry into Higher Education of 1989, embarked on a massive construction of institutions of higher education to ease the pressure on UZ, the only university in the land then. However, the William Commission registered this critical point: “our main concern is that expansion should not be at the expense of quality and that programmes which we suggest should be of high standard” (William’s Commission 1989:29).

Due to the demand for tertiary education, the Government established more universities: National University of Science and Technology (NUST), Bindura University of Science Education (BUSE), Zimbabwe Open University (ZOU), Midlands State University (MSU), Chinhoyi University of Technology (CUT), Great Zimbabwe University (GZU), Lupane State University (LSU), and Harare Institute of Technology (HIT) and Gwanda State University. Churches also joined in, the United Methodist Church took the lead by establishing Africa University (AU), the Seventh Day Adventist putting up Solusi University (SU), Catholic University in Zimbabwe (CUZ), Reformed Church University (RCU), Southern Africa Methodist University and Zimbabwe Ezekiel Guti University (ZEGU). Recently we have Manicaland University of Science and Technology, Marondera University of Science and Technology and an independent Women’s University in Africa (WUA).

To ensure quality, curriculum for primary and secondary education is centrally designed by the Curriculum Development Unit (CDU) in the Ministry of Education. At tertiary level, taking heed of the William’s Commission of 1989

that “expansion should not be at the expense of quality and that programmes which we suggest should be of high standard”, (William’s Commission 1989:29), the government established Zimbabwe Council for Higher Education (ZIMCHE) which has the overall mandate to ensure quality in higher and tertiary education. However, different institutions do have internal quality control measures.

Impact of Mugabe’s Education Policies in Zimbabwe

The Government of Mugabe is highly commendable for expansive education policies and investments in the education sector that frog-jumped Zimbabwe to 92% literate rate, the highest on the African continent. Altbach (1992) argues that the democratisation of access of higher education is fundamental for rapid social transformation and national economy. Shizha and Kariwo (2011) reiterate that higher education increases employment prospects, incomes and ability to invest and save money for both public and private benefits of a country. While Zimbabwe cherishes and celebrates the massive educational expansion brought about by the Mugabe government in a bid to redress the colonial educational imbalances, the immediate result was the massification of higher and tertiary education. Scott (1995) defines massification as a rapid increase on student enrolment. Against the background of the colonial education system, the liberalisation of education was essential for Zimbabweans, however, the resultant massification has the following effects on higher and tertiary education:

Staff-Student Ratio

The increase in student enrolment requires an increase in academic teaching staff to maintain the quality of teaching and learning if the face-to-face mode of education is used (Mohamedbhai 2008:4). Increased enrolment means increased teaching load, the staff hardly have any time to devote to research, hence the temptation of repeating if not recycling the same old ideas. Most institutions of higher education use research output as an important criterion for promotion, because of their limited research, many staff, overburdened with teaching, have fewer chances of being promoted, thus affecting their morale, in turn this has a bearing on lesson delivery and quality of the end product.

Teaching and Learning

According to Altbach (2005) one of the greatest teaching challenges that hugely contribute to poor quality is that many new institutions of higher education rely on part-time teachers who have little commitment to the institutions and some with scant qualifications. Mohamedbhai (2008) quality

teaching and learning requires not only adequate human resource but also sufficient and functional physical facilities and equipment which include: sufficient lecture rooms and theatres to accommodate the huge numbers of students. This is a huge challenge in most institutions of higher education in Zimbabwe as some hire classrooms from some local high schools which are rarely cleaned and some abandoned mines being turned into university campuses: Midlands State University, Great Zimbabwe University and Gwanda State University use Shabani Mine, Mashava Mine and Epoch Mine respectively.

Large groups hamper consultation between students and staff, hence, tutorials sessions in small groups have been abandoned because of the large cohorts of students, the benefit of close interaction with the lecturer thus being lost (Mohamedbhai 2008) yet tutorials are particularly important for first year students who are ill-prepared for university education. Mohamedbhai further argued:

Practical and site visits, prescribed in the curriculum, are often either reduced or not undertaken, many of the laboratories are not functional because of breakdown of the equipment as a result of poor maintenance, and lack of supplies. Where laboratory practical are held, these often take the form of demonstrations to a large group of students, the latter being mere onlookers with no opportunity to handle instruments nor to be directly involved in the experiments (2008: 35).

Library

According to Mohamedbhai (2008) a library is an important resource for university students and staff in teaching and learning. Yet, in almost all the institutions, the available library facilities have not kept pace with increasing enrolment because of lack of funds. Because of shortage of funds, the escalating costs of books on the international market, most university libraries have been unable to replenish their stock with additional holdings; this says it all about the quality of the end product.

Information and Communication Technologies (ICT)

ICT has become a global engine for acquiring and disseminating knowledge and as such plays an indispensable role in teaching and learning in higher education, in addition to its importance in a myriad of other academic and administrative activities. The development and availability of ICT in most institutions of higher learning remains a huge challenge; the same is true of internet accessibility.

Student Assessment

Mohamedbhai (2008) argue that massification poses serious problems for student assessment and the conduct of examinations. Due to large number of students, the nature of examination questions has also changed, most lecturers preferring structured and multiple choice questions which are easier to mark. Garwe (2013) posits that such examinations test knowledge acquisition rather than knowledge application. One major challenge associated with student assessment is examination security with large cohorts of students and that one invigilator for a large number of students increases the chances of cheating by the students. Mohamedbhai (2008) maintains that large numbers of students put pressure on lecturers to mark large amounts of scripts in a limited time also increases the risk of human error.

Infrastructure Development and Student Residence

According to Obanya (2004), massification has compounded the problem of funding in higher education. Due to shortage of funds; the physical infrastructures at almost all the institutions have not increased proportionately with the increased enrolment (Mohamedbhai 2008). As a result, university students are renting inhabitable places without electricity: this means a student is unable to study during the night. Some stay in far places which inhibits them from utilising the library during the night. With a small proportion of students now living on campus, universities are becoming less of an academic community than they were in the 1960s and the 1970s (Mohamedbhai 2008). Mohamedbhai further argued that this limits academic interaction and exchanges of ideas. Insufficient physical facilities, compounded by lack of maintenance, have resulted in the majority of universities experiencing a degradation of their physical infrastructure as a result of massification.

Employment Prospects

This remains one of the greatest challenges; institutions of higher education continue churning out graduates every year without industries to absorb them. Shizha and Kariwo (2011) lament that Zimbabwe has become a human resources training ground for other countries, hence, the quantitative gains in education since independence have not been used optimally to the benefit of the country. One may argue that due to high education quality, most Zimbabweans are employed in international institutions operating in Africa and beyond. These emigrants send money back home in the much needed foreign currency to alleviate the economic challenges of the nation. Therefore Zimbabweans do not have to be employed in Zimbabwe in order to contribute to the economic growth of the country, but they have to be conscious of the investment that the nation has made in them wherever they are. Our problem

is that facilities in Zimbabwe have not been tailor-made to promote home-investments by Zimbabweans in the diaspora. The Zimbabwe indigenisation policies and processes which are regulated by Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (IEEA) have benefited a few elites (Warikandwa and Osode 2017). Magure (2012) lamented that the indigenisation programme promised much to the anxious and highly expectant majority, but delivered very little.

Mugabe's Leadership in Face of Opposition Political Movements

After winning the 1980 elections, Mugabe was pre-occupied with the establishment of one-party-state (Chigora, Guzura and Mutumburanzou 2010). The only strongest opposition was PF-ZAPU; therefore Mugabe perceived PF-ZAPU as the only obstacle to his dream of one-party-state (Mandaza and Sachikonye 1991) in Chigora, Guzura and Mutumburanzou (2010). Against the backdrop of Mugabe's emphasis on the need for uniting the country and his declaration of national reconciliation at independence that he wanted to unite the nation not merely establish one-party-state. Just as much as the United States of America, Britain and other members of the United Nations Security Council force other nations to unite and to be subservient to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and its dictates, individual African nations also need unity, Zimbabwe also needed unity as a nation. Against this background, it can be argued that Mugabe wanted to unite the nation in the same way Euro-America seeks unity, including the One World Government that they envisage and would want to rule (see Nhemachena this volume).

At independence in 1980, Joshua Nkomo joined the coalition government and he was offered the presidency which he rejected opting for the vital Home Affairs Ministry. His rejection of the presidency gave an opportunity for Canaan Banana to grab the chance. Under the peace accord, war veterans were confined in camps during the run-up to the elections, while awaiting the integration into the Zimbabwe National Army, some of Nkomo's men went back into the bush to fight on (Auret 1992). Joshua Nkomo, as Minister of Home Affairs, was responsible for the police, whose job was to hunt down the deserters who were labelled dissidents (Hill 2003:75). As the dissident activities continued in Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands Province, in February 1981, Nkomo was demoted to Minister without portfolio. When secret arms caches were discovered in Matabeleland, the stronghold of Joshua Nkomo, worse in farms belonging to PF-ZAPU, although, Nkomo denied any knowledge of it, Mugabe reacted by dismissing Nkomo from government and dispatched his new crackdown force into Matabeleland; the Fifth Brigade. The Fifth Brigade was a military wing of the ZANU party trained and equipped by North Korean military advisers to Zimbabwe specially to deal with internal dissidents.

(Randolph 1985: 50 cited in Auret 1992:153). Mugabe declared a state of emergence that allowed him to detain people indiscriminately; consequently, Joshua Nkomo's Commanders Dumiso Dabengwa and Lookout Masuku were arrested. Masuku died in prison and reports of the beatings, torture and killing were unbelievable. Addressing his party supporters, Mugabe first chanted the party slogan: *Pamberi ne ZANU!* (Forward with ZANU). He went further and said: *Pamberi ne one-party-state* (Forward with one-party-state). He then started his speech by saying: "the dissident party and its dissident father both taste not only rejection, but utter destruction as well" (Gukurahundi massacres YouTube-online).

Following the reign of terror in Matabeleland, in 1987, Joshua Nkomo having been beaten into submission merged his party PF-ZAPU with ZANU into ZANU-PF under the Unity Accord. Hill (2003:9) argued that after the signing of the Unity Accord on December 22, 1987 "Zimbabwe became a de facto one-party-state". Moyo (1992) asserts that for Mugabe, the merging of ZANU and PF-ZAPU into ZANU-PF ended a complicated exercise of removing PF-ZAPU as an obstacle to his one-party-state dream. The position of the prime minister was abolished and Mugabe assumed the position of president, an all-powerful position that gave Mugabe the authority to dissolve parliament, institute martial law and run for as many times as he desired, but had no economic powers: economic power still resided with the Euro-American corporations that still owned and controlled Zimbabwean resources. According to Simmons (2017) this new arrangement gave Mugabe the opportunity of becoming president for life, propped by his ruling party. Joshua Nkomo became the Vice President. To deal with the White opposition, Mugabe made constitutional amendment number six (No.6) that abolished the twenty (20) reserved seats for Whites allocated to party loyalists and a few deemed sympathetic to the ruling party. After the signing of the Unity Accord and the removal of the cabinet seats, there remained no credible opposition political party to challenge the ZANU-PF's dominance. However, one may argue that ZANU-PF never dominated in post-independence Zimbabwe because it did not have control over the economy. From a Marxist point of view; it is those that control the economy who have power over the superstructure including politics, law, and education and so on.

Faced with the possibility of a one-party-state, Edgar Tekere was expelled from ZANU-PF in 1988 saved the situation by forming Zimbabwe Unit Movement (ZUM) in 1989 and challenged Mugabe in the 1990 presidential elections and broke the myth of ZANU-PF party's invincibility and won 20% of the presidential votes (Wafawarova 2018). Thus Tekere made a huge contribution at the critical hour in the political development of Zimbabwe when the nation faced real possibility of a one-party-state (Makumbe 1995 cited in

Chigora, Guzura and Matumburanzou 2010). Afterwards, ZUM strangely disintegrated. However, one may argue that what Zimbabweans needed more than opposition politics was economic development including unyoking from the neo-imperial ownership and control of the economy or from economic enslavement by Euro-American transnational corporations.

After ZUM, Zimbabwe, witnessed the creation of several political parties: Zimbabwe Unit of Democrats (ZUD) led by Margret Dongo another member expelled from ZANU-PF. However, ZUD party suffered factionalism as Margret Dongo and Makamure split. Kempton Makamure formed Transparency Front (TF). With the view to unseat or neutralize ZANU-PF, Muzorewa's attempt to bring all opposition parties under one umbrella: United Parties (UP) failed before take-off. During the same period, Zimbabwe was undergoing economic difficulties: economic policies shifted from scientific socialism to capitalism, the government of Robert Mugabe was undergoing economic meltdown as a result of neo-liberal economic reforms foisted on Zimbabwe by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Poverty and inequality persisted, poor salaries and unattractive working conditions as well as political instability pushed professionals to flee the country. For the workers that remained, nationwide strikes became more frequent than breakfast with the year 1997 recording the highest number of strikes since independence.

In order to quench internal struggles spearheaded by the then war veteran leader, the late Chenjerai Hunzvi who pushed for the compensation of the war veterans, Mugabe offered the war veterans fifty thousand dollars gratuities each, money that did not appear on the budget (Hill 2003). The move was met with huge criticisms, but this is not something new because even the USA, Britain and France are paying their war veterans as well as their unelected monarchies (Nhemachena this volume). If the USA, Britain and America do not have money on their budgets they simply grab African resources and their transnational corporations evade paying taxes to African governments. Because of neoimperial resource plunder, theft, robbery and looting on the African continent, some African governments and states lack the means to compensate their liberation war veterans. So, the unfortunate thing was that Zimbabwe did not have the economic means, Upon payment of the fifty thousand gratuities, the Zimbabwean dollar crashed, the zenith of it being the "Black Friday" (Friday November 14, 1997) the Zimbabwean dollar crashed by more than 70% of its value, International Financial Institutions raised a red flag against Zimbabwe. The sad thing is that the same international corporations and institutions are responsible for the neoimperial plunder, looting and theft of resources on the continent of Africa.

On the other hand Morgan Tsvangirai, a former mine worker, a man who had spent most of his life underground with Bindura Nickel Mine and was appointed Secretary General of Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) in 1988, saw the launch of the nationwide strikes (mass stay aways) signalling discontent with government's payouts to war veterans. Tsvangirai utilised the opportunity to form a political party; the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999 to confront the ZANU-PF Government (Hill 2003). One may argue that Africans need to confront the neo-imperial system rather than confronting one another in a context where all Africans are being dispossessed and exploited by transnational corporations, institutions and foreign states. Zimbabweans need to express their discontent against the neo-imperialists that have continued to own and control the economy in the country. The challenge is that Zimbabweans continued to blindly support neo-imperialism and to fight one another, which is a continuation of the divide and rule tactics deployed during the colonial era. Because the MDC was an outgrowth of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions; its core components included workers, students, middle-class intellectuals, civil rights activists and White corporate capital. The MDC embraced members from Matabeleland, but did not find roots among the rural people.

It is argued that the MDC's first victory over ZANU-PF was in February 2000 referendum in which the "No" vote triumphed over the "Yes" vote. For the first time since independence, ZANU-PF experienced defeat. This chapter argues that there was no need for Africans to oppose each other: Zimbabweans should rather work for the economic emancipation from neoimperialism. However, fearing that the up-coming elections would be a repeat of the referendum or losing power to the newly formed opposition MDC, Mugabe embarked on violent elections (Chigora, Guzura and Mutumburanzou 2010). A "war of self-determination" broke out. In the same way neo-imperialists were determined to erase Mugabe from the political map of the nation, Mugabe was equally determined to erase the MDC from the political map of the nation especially in rural constituencies. As the "battle" continued, elections scheduled for March 2000 were postponed to June to give ample time for ZANU-PF to strategise. In rural areas Non-Governmental Organisations were directed that they could only distribute food aid in the presence of ZANU-PF leaders. Although food aid is supposedly intended to save lives among acutely food insecure populations (Barrett 2006), it is also used for neoimperial humanitarian and political grandstanding on a global scale. The politicisation of food aid is a common political campaign tool used even by the Euro-Americans securing global political capital in former colonies. According to Chigora *et-al.* (2010:7) ZANU-PF also used food aid as a campaign tool.

As preparations for the elections proceeded, the late Border Gezi, the then bearded governor of Mashonaland East, declared his province a “one-party zone”, warning that no MDC election material would be allowed in the region (Hill 2003:109). Hill further argued that the Daily Newspaper was banned in the province, if found in any shop, it would be confiscated and be burnt (2003:109). A few weeks before the presidential elections, the chiefs of staff: the then Commander of Zimbabwe Defence Forces, the late General Vitalis Zvinavashe, Police Commissioner Augustine Chihuri, Zimbabwe Prison Services Major-General Zimondi (retired) and the then Army Commander Chiwenga (now Vice President) and Zimbabwe’s Air Force Air Marshal Perrence Shiri (now Minister of Agriculture) appeared on the national television stating that they would neither cooperate, salute a presidential candidate whose liberation war credentials were questionable nor would they at any moment salute a president without liberation war credentials (Makumbe 2003). The paradox was; on one hand, the imposition of the sanctions by Euro-America meant that Zimbabweans would vote ZANU-PF at their own risk; on the other hand, the appearance of the service chiefs posed a threat to the part of Zimbabwean populace who would have wanted to vote for the MDC. The general populace was caught in between, however, in face of such threats; a ZANU-PF victory was assured. According to Makumbe (2003), service chiefs’ unwillingness to work with and to salute a president who has no liberation history negated the freedoms of the electorate. However, one may argue that elections are necessarily secondary, owning and possessing resources, like Zimbabweans did, is the primary thing. Elections have been conducted several times in African countries in general and Zimbabwe in particular, but the situation of the electorate continues to deteriorate. The fact that elections have been held across Africa and leaders have been changed but without any improvements in the lives of the generality of the electorate shows that the hope of Africans should not lie with Eurocentric electoral democracy but with the repossession of stolen African resources. It has been argued that Zimbabweans do not eat elections; hence ZANU-PF remained focused on the land, which was one of the major driving factors of the liberation struggle.

Mugabe put in place several legislative Acts: Public Order and Security Act (POSA), Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and Broadcasting Services Act among others which were meant to protect the state and government. He also enacted the Land Acquisition Act to enable Zimbabweans to repossess their land and other resources that were stolen during the colonial era. While POSA gave the police sweeping powers to prevent any gatherings or demonstrations; AIPPA was introduced to regulate the work of foreign and local (Taundi 2010:5). Taundi further argued that with the closing of “independent” media outlets and the intimidation of journalists,

the opposition movements lost valuable space to communicate their policies. To deal with the urban population from where most MDC's votes came, Mugabe embarked on Operation Murambatsvina (operation restore order) in May 2005. Urban shelters and informal businesses in sprawling high density suburbs were destroyed and millions of people were left homeless. The majority of the victims went back to their rural homes thereby boosting the rural support base for the ruling party ZANU-PF.

After bloodshed and loss of lives Mugabe and Tsvangirai came to a mutual agreement of power sharing under the Government of National Unity (GNU). At the end of 2010, hardly two years from its inception, the GNU was facing terminal challenges, Mugabe unilaterally appointed or re-appointed provincial governors, ambassadors and senior judges and refused to appoint Tsvangirai's designated deputy minister of agriculture, Roy Bennet, arguing that he was an unrepentant former Rhodesian (Gwisai 2011:2). Gwisai further reveals that Tsvangirai declared that he would not recognise Mugabe's appointments including that of the Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono and the Attorney General Johannes Tomana. From the look of things, Mugabe's actions implied that he did not like to share power with an opposition political party or that the opposition political movements did not matter and would not make difference. Tsvangirai responded by boycotting cabinet meetings in protest, but for Mugabe it was of no significance and indeed nothing changed. One may be persuaded to ask whether opposition political parties are important in a context where Africans should fight more of economic struggles than political struggles. It may be argued that Africans need to fight the neo-imperial system rather than fight one another. Indeed, Zimbabweans need to collectively express their discontent against the neo-imperial systems that continues to own and control the economy in the country. The challenge is that Zimbabweans continue to blindly support neo-imperialism and to fight one another much as divide and rule tactics worked in the interest of colonialists. It is time to engage more in economic struggles, for resource ownership and control, than in mere political struggles.

Factionalism and Mugabe's Leadership

Mare (2015) defines factionalism as a group of people forming a cohesive, usually a contentious, minority within a larger group or a splitting of political parties. Factionalism has been very dominant in Zimbabwean political parties. Makumbe (2011) concluded that the Zimbabwean political parties whatever their histories are synonymous with factionalism. Masipula Sithole cited in Musekiwa (2017) once commented that if you take two Zimbabweans to the moon, overnight and you visit them the next morning they would have formed three political parties. This is so because politics has been much more

foregrounded than economic issues. The foregrounding of politics is part of the ideology of neo-imperialism. MDC was formed in 1999 by disparate groups with different interests, but it was not long, MDC was wrecked by factionalism. In 2005 it was split into MDC-Tsvangirai (MDC-T) and MDC-Sibanda (MDC-S) which later became MDC-Mutambara (MDC-M), MDC-Ncube (MDC-N) and now MDC-T led by Thokozani Khupe while MDC-Alliance is under the leadership of Nelson Chamisa. It further split into Elton Mangoma, Tendai Biti, and Job Sikhala-MDC-99. Over and above all these, during the 2013 elections, MDC-Tsvangirai had about twenty-five candidates contesting as independent candidates disgruntled by the way the party's primary elections were conducted (Moyo 2013). In Zimbabwe MDC has recorded the highest number of splits since its formation in 1999. However, it is outside the scope of this chapter to deal extensively with factionalism within MDC. It suffices to focus on those issues that are relevant to our purpose.

Factionalism within ZANU-PF

It is important to note from the onset that the formation of ZANU in 1963 was as a split from ZAPU based on ethnic-Shona and Ndebele cleavages. However, ZANU and ZAPU re-united in December 1987 after a civil war, the opposition PF-ZAPU under Joshua Nkomo was absorbed through the Unity Accord into ZANU-PF. According to Makumbe (2011 cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2014) what was not being said in the 1963 PF-ZAPU split was to do with ethnic groups between the Shona and the Ndebele. Ethnicity was a colonial invention for divide and rule. Hobsbawm (1992) defines ethnicity as where nationalism thirsts for identification with a particular "tribal" grouping. At the 1963 PF-ZAPU split, the authentic subject was to do with the primal rights to rule over Zimbabwe at the end of the colonial rule. Makumbe (2011) asserts that Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole miscalculated by leading the split because he did not belong to those who claimed primal ethnic rights to inherit Zimbabwe from White colonisers, it was inevitable that he would be disposed, hence the final control of the split by Mugabe. ZANU later split as Ndabaningi formed ZANU-Mwenje later known as ZANU-Ndonga with the minority Ndaue people.

It has been already indicated above that in 1989 Edgar Tekere, second to Mugabe was expelled from ZANU-PF and he formed Zimbabwe Unit Movement (ZUM), challenged Mugabe in the 1990 presidential elections and won 20% of the votes. Afterwards, ZUM strangely disintegrated and Margret Dongo another expelled ZANU-PF member founded Zimbabwe Unity of Democrats (ZUD), Jonathan Moyo contested as an independent in the 2005 elections. Simba Makoni a former ZANU-PF Minister of Finance formed Mavambo, Sekhusile, Dawn (MSD) in 2008. Mugabe's strategy of sacking

faction aspirants at the early stages worked for him to avoid a party split as he would expel aspirants before they lead a greater group. In November 2008, a group of former ZAPU members came out and re-established ZAPU under the leadership of Dumiso Dabengwa. This was a major blow for Mugabe as the majority of ZAPU's old guards were still in ZANU-PF (Mare 2014:56). To quench factional appetite and to avoid a major split from ZANU-PF, Mugabe gave PF-ZAPU old guards good leadership posts; the appointment of Mphoko as the Vice President. The major question is why the Mugabe strategy of sacking faction aspirants failed in the Joyce Mujuru and Mnangagwa factions?

The twenty-first century factionalism in ZANU-PF has been engineered by the succession politics. Mlambo (2014) asserts that ZANU-PF has two main factions led by Mujuru, former Vice President and Mnangagwa, defence Minister. Mare (2015) maintains that there were about five factions: Mujuru, Mnangagwa, youth faction commonly known as Generation 40 (G40), the Military and the Mugabe faction. While the Mujuru and Mnangagwa factions fought to secure positions of leadership in the event that Mugabe retires or dies, the youth faction influenced by Jonathan Moyo, Kasukuwere and a former Politburo member Zhuwawo aimed at replacing the old politicians in the political system. This is the group that triggered the coming of the former first lady Grace Mugabe into active politics (Chikwanha 2012). Chikwanha further notes that the military faction was led by Defence Commander General Constantino Dominic Guvheya Chiwenga who harboured presidential ambitions.

Mugabe dismissed Joyce Mujuru and all her strong allies: Dydmus Mutasa and Rugare Gumbo on allegations of corruption, assassination attempts and for fanning factionalism. Further, Mugabe suspended party members implicated or named in the faction that issued a vote of no confidence in his leadership (Mare 2014:56). Mare further argued that Mugabe employed dictatorial styles to forestall any opposing interests. It is argued that Mugabe used his military arm as the commander in chief of the Zimbabwe Defence forces to entrench his rule. One may argue that Mugabe foregrounded national interest rather than his personal ones. It would be paradoxical to assume that Euro-America is charitable and has the interests of Africans at heart, while, on the other hand, assuming that African leaders are utterly selfish and without the interest of their own people at heart.

Since independence, Mugabe preached unity. However, in this particular instance, suspensions and dismissals of ambitious factional elements did not bring in a permanent solution to control factionalism and prevent a party split as the core cause of factionalism was not resolved namely the "succession" power struggle. Mlambo (2015) argued that factionalism in the ZANU-PF party was not about individuals, but was centred on Mugabe's succession power

struggles. Sachikonye (2011) asserts that the factions within ZANU-PF, between Joyce Mujuru and Mnangagwa, were struggles for “succeeding” Mugabe. What is not easy to understand here is why the members of ZANU PF would so much struggle to succeed Mugabe yet some of them did not struggle as much to succeed White farmers and transnational corporations that have run the Zimbabwean economies for centuries. The question is why is it that Africans struggle for political succession only and never for economic succession? Might it be the case that those that own and control the economy sponsor the political struggles so that they can have their favourite politicians leading the country? So, was the struggle one simply to enable political succession or was it meant to prevent economic succession or the repossession of the economic realm by Black Zimbabweans?

Critique

Mugabe’s teacher, Father O’Hea (1970) cited in Hill (2003; 48) describes Mugabe as an exceptional man with an exceptional heart; he did not take part in any sport or school plays he enjoyed his own company. Mugabe always works to safeguard his own power, barely two years after the implementation of the policy of national reconciliation; Zimbabwe was divided on “tribal” lines. “Tribes” was a colonial creation for purposes of divide and rule. Therefore when the Fifth Brigade descended into Matabeleland in full force, it was like facing a foreign nation, not fellow citizens. Hence, thousands mostly civilians lost their lives. Upon the signing of the Unity Accord, Mugabe, through parliament, abolished the position of prime minister and he himself assumed the position of president, only to revive it under the Government of National Unity when Tsvangirai became the prime minister of the Republic. GNU was more of a repeat of the Unity Accord of 1987. However, unlike PF-ZAPU that was swallowed by ZANU into ZANU-PF, the MDC survived, but greatly suffered factionalism. Consequently, in the history of political parties in Zimbabwe MDC has the highest number of splits.

While the Government of Mugabe is highly commended for the huge investments in education that frog-jumped Zimbabwe to 92% literacy rate, the highest in Africa, however, the ever-increasing demand in education outstripped the Government’s capacity to provide adequate resources. As the government failed to deliver the basic educational materials standards were compromised. Many schools faced deterioration in all its forms: infrastructure, quality of education as qualified teachers shun poorly equipped schools, particularly those in the rural areas, resulting in differential standards. In addition, the deterioration was due to poor salaries, poor working conditions, poor accommodation, and lack of respect, political harassment/victimisation and

overworking; big class sizes. Today, the common cry is that more and more school leavers join the job market each year without any industries to absorb them; hence, both parents and children no longer see any tangible gains of education. It is also observed that despite the huge investments in education, Zimbabwe as a nation has not yet enjoyed the benefits of its investment; the best qualified Zimbabweans find employment elsewhere. It can be argued that Euro-Americans and Chinese are everywhere in the world and they even rob, steal and exploit other people and their resources across the world. Europeans colonised Africa because they went all over and were not confined to Europe and America, therefore, Zimbabweans do not have to be confined to Zimbabwe. One may also argue that education is not necessarily and solely for purposes of employment, but for creating industries, autonomy and sovereignty. Therefore, job market is not the best place for school leavers because these are owned and controlled by Euro-America. Since colonisation, these transnational corporations were known for dispossessing and exploiting Africans. They must reclaim and utilise their resources to create employment. Without strong industries to create jobs and add value to raw materials, Zimbabwe risks remaining jobless and poor.

Factionalism is a result of power struggles; it played and continues to play a critical role in the Zimbabwean politics from the days of nationalism to the post-independence period. This chapter argues that the 21st century factionalism within ZANU-PF is centred on the succession politics. To safeguard his position, Mugabe used authoritarian styles to quench diverting interests and to humble all those with factional appetite. Factionalism divides and weakens societies and organisations; however, it creates internal power sharing. Factionalism improves interparty dialogue and debate between leaders and followers; it gives rebels space (Mare 2015). The formation of factions and breakaway groups is a result of power struggles and undemocratic tendencies. However, factionalism is a common phenomenon in any human life and organisations.

Recommendations

It has been established that factionalism has negative effects and therefore should not be tolerated. The fundamental question for this chapter is: how to manage factionalism without splitting the party/organisation? The chapter recommends servant leadership propounded by Robert Greenleaf (1970). Greenleaf highlights the following key leadership qualities:

- Leadership should be bestowed on a person who is by nature a servant.
- Servant leaders serve a purpose, focus on the needs of the followers and

help them grow and become more knowledgeable, more autonomous and more like servants themselves.

- Greatness in leadership is not achieved by reducing men to one's service, but by giving one's selfless service to them.
- The desire to serve reduces every leader, every Chief Executive whether elected or appointed neither to be bosses nor masters, but humble servants.

Further, Greenleaf (1977) argued that the best test for servant leadership is to establish whether those served grow as persons, do they, while being served, become healthier, more resourced, wiser, freer, autonomous and more likely themselves to become servants? This chapter argues that leadership is necessary for motivating, managing and maintaining team momentum for organizational effectiveness. However, this chapter argues that leadership should create space for followers to grow, to exercise their gifts and to realise their full potentials (Northouse 2004:182). The writer is of the opinion that political parties or organisations should employ servant leadership theory to best build teams and manage factions and break individual groupings. It promotes continuous communication, increase transparency help leaders realise that they are servants. While Greenleaf (1977) was writing during the colonial era, it is important to note that colonialists were not servant leaders, even neo-colonialists and neoimperialists –including NGOs, civil society organisations – are not servant leaders but they serve their own interests, often promoting neoimperial interests in the guise of humanitarianism. Servant leadership is an ideal and an ideology that is yet to be fulfilled anywhere in the world.

Conclusion

This chapter examined Robert Gabriel Mugabe's life history, political career as a revolutionary and political luminary that continues to dominate the political discourses of the second *Chimurenga*. The chapter also explored and exposed Robert Mugabe's 37-year reign focusing on the contributions of his expansive education policies that placed Zimbabwe at 92% literate rate, the highest on the African continent. The educational system in Zimbabwe which was once regarded as among the best in Africa went into crisis in 2007 partly because of the country's economic meltdown and the ever-increasing demand in education outstripped the Government's capacity to provide resources. The quantitative investments made in education since independence have not optimally benefited the country hence, Zimbabwe continues to be a human resources training ground for other countries. It is however, commendable that Zimbabwean emigrants send money back home to alleviate the economic crises. Zimbabweans must be conscious of the investment that the nation has made in

them wherever they are. The chapter also discussed Mugabe's stance on opposition movements and factionalism in general and within ZANU-PF in particular. The chapter suggested servant leadership as the best in handling factionalism and opposition movements because this leadership type creates space for followers not only to grow, but to share their views and to exercise their gifts and to realise their full potentials.

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Robert Gabriel Mugabe, the Zimbabwe Liberation Struggle and the Resilience of Colonialism in Africa

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The looting machine has been modernized. Where once treaties signed at gunpoint dispossessed Africa's inhabitants of their land, gold, and diamonds, today phalanxes of lawyers representing oil and mineral revenues in the hundreds of billions of dollars impose miserly terms on African governments and employ tax dodges to bleed profit from destitute nations. In the place of old Empires are hidden networks of multinationals, middlemen and African potentates... belong instead to the transnational elites that have flourished in the era of globalization.

(Burgis 2015:8).

Introduction

Robert Mugabe until his unceremonious and untimely departure from power had commanded respect and has received standing ovations during regional summits and whenever he appeared in public fora. Mugabe became a “monster” and “dictator” in the eyes of [dictatorial] Westerners and various others opposed to the Africanising ZANU-PF government. Westerners who are themselves international dictators, dictating to African states at an international level, would ironically want to accuse African leaders of dictatorship. The furore between Britain and Zimbabwe heightened when Britain refused to fulfil its age-old promise to finance the land reclamation and restitution programme in the late 1990s. This marked the heightening of conflict between Zimbabwe and Britain culminating in the internationalising of a bilateral issue. The ZANU-PF leadership and government reverted to the liberation war rhetoric because Zimbabwe's problems are embedded in resilient colonialism and the mischievous machinations of foreign donors, states and international financial institutions. Zimbabwe was once again at war with both internal and external enemies who queered the normalisation of the post-colonial land anomalies.

As will be noted in the foregoing the West has continued to wage neo-colonial economic wars on Africa by looting, stealing and plundering African resources and this enraged some African leaders like Mugabe. In this chapter we interrogate why the ZANU-PF government all of a sudden, in 2000, began to

use continuous ‘liberation rhetoric’ that clearly envisaged a sense of belonging: ‘true sons of the soil, us versus them, revolutionaries versus puppets,’ the either you are with us or against George Bush jnr., language (Mahuku 2017: 171). Why was the Zimbabwean government now evoking the liberation war narratives? We also propose to explore how Mugabe’s person, his actions and his vision impacted on Zimbabweans and those in Africa south of the Sahara including the Southern African Development Community.

It must be pointed out from the beginning that there are two main schools of thought that try to explain why Africa is in a state of economic and political morass. These are the externalists and internalists. Internalist scholars argue that economic and political problems in Africa are a result of incompetent, dictatorial African leaders who vandalise the countries that they repossessed at independence. It is in this context that Meredith (2002; 2003; 2007), Raftopoulos and Phimster (2004), Moore (2001; 2005; 2006) and Compagnon (2010), among other scholars, allege that Robert Mugabe “mismanaged” the “jewel of Africa,” that was the bread basket of Southern Africa. Internalist scholars submit that while it is beyond dispute that “Western colonialism and imperialism did not leave Africa in good shape, Africa’s condition has been made immeasurably worse by internal factors: misguided leadership, collapsing economies and infrastructure, corruption, capital flight, political authoritarianism and dictatorship that have turned them into ‘fascist states’ and flagrant violators of human rights. Arguably, to connote that African leaders mismanaged their country’s economies is synonymous with putting the cart before the horse because Euro-Americans have got to first of all pay/comply with restitution, restoration and reparations to Africans before they can accuse Africans of running down economies. In fact the economies that African leaders inherited at independence are not African economies – rather, they are Euro-American economies located in Africa. African leaders like Mugabe repossessed resources in countries that colonialists had ravaged. President Mugabe sought to correct the colonial wrongs. The problem with Eurocentric scholars is that they would want to reduce African Presidents to their managers and chief executives. Nhemachena and Bankie (2017: 13) are correct when they argue that:

The fundamentalism of empire lies... in its fundamentals of the liberal free market that is sadly not equipped to restitute those that suffered brutalities and expropriations of colonisation and enslavement.

In July 2000, former Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, at an Organisation of African Unity Summit, without mincing words told African leaders that they were responsible for Africa’s malaise. He retorted that “instead of being exploited for the benefit of the people, Africa’s mineral

resources have been so mismanaged and plundered that they are now the source of our misery,”(Ayittey 2006:5). The question that arises is whether Annan was being sincere in his analysis or he was Empire’s mouth piece? President Robert Mugabe doubted whether the UN General Secretary was his own man. He saw him as a bona-fide disciple of the United States and British interests. Annan had constantly questioned Mugabe’s statesmanship with regard to his treatment of the Movement for Democratic Change party and the land reclamation and restitution exercise. What Annan failed to realise is that Britain was refusing to honour its obligation to restore, restitute and compensate Africans for enslavement and colonial exploitation and dispossession. Mugabe was very correct that Annan was a disciple of neoempire because the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is in fact an extension of the U.S.A. It is a fact that the United Nations during Kofi Annan’s time, signed the Global Compact with transnational corporations (TNCs): thus the UN is serving the interests of global capital. Kofi Annan could therefore not have blamed global capital or the neo-imperialists states like the U.S.A and Britain. African leaders who are cited as examples of bad administrators of their countries are Idi Amin, Mobuto Sese Seko, Sani Abacha, Paul Biya and Robert Mugabe among other leaders. These leaders have been castigated as vampire ruling elites, and are architects of what Ayittey (2006:459) regard as “Black imperialism.” This is the subjugation and exploitation of Africa by the zombified African ruling political and economic elites.

The problem with Ayittey’s argument is that he gave a blind eye to the fact that firstly, Zombified African leaders like the late Mobuto Sese Seko, Sani Abacha, Paul Biya and others ‘shipped’ their proceeds to Euro-America. Arguably, this is because leaders that exploit and subjugate their own kith and kin bank their loot in Euro-America and are therefore acting on behalf of the global neo-imperial matrix of power. Africa’s mineral sector is still dominated, owned and controlled by transnational corporations. Although Eurocentric scholars are fond of alleging that African leaders are power hungry, African states and governments actually have very little power and control over their political and economic realms that are subject to transnational corporations, foreign institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund and foreign states that dictate to the African leaders. The TNCs even evade paying taxes to African governments. Internalist scholars also lambast African leaders and intellectuals who support them, (African presidents), of not being sincere in their defence of African leaders who they accuse of being predatory on their countries’ national coffers. These African leaders have therefore been alleged to be in overdrive castigating empire and its allies for being responsible for Africa’s misery. Commenting on the Zimbabwean problems, Archbishop Desmond Tutu said:

Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe seems to have gone bonkers in a big way. It is very dangerous when you subvert the rule of law in your own country, when you don't even respect the judgement of your own judges...then you are on a slippery slope of perdition. It is a sad thing that happened to Robert Mugabe, (Ayittey 2006:18).

What Archbishop Desmond Tutu failed to acknowledge is that neo-empire has not restored Zimbabwe's stolen resources. Because of neo-empire's failure to pay reparations to Zimbabweans, Robert Mugabe must not be blamed for repossessing what was stolen by the colonialists and promoting indigenisation programmes and beneficiation of Zimbabweans' mineral resources.

Externalists on the other hand argue that, the West is responsible for all the problems that Africa is experiencing. Externalist scholars like Ali Mazrui (1986), Mahmood Mamdani (2008), Sam Moyo and Yeros (2005; 2007), Warikandwa, Nhemachena and Mtapuri (2017), among others contend that slavery, colonialism and neo-colonialism are responsible for everything that is haunting the African continent today. This is in agreement with Tom Burgis's submission quoted above. Mazrui (1986:199, 210) argued that the political decadence being experienced in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, mismanagement of funds and the selective application of the law all have their roots in Western colonialism and neo-colonialism. Nhemachena (2018) also weighs in positing that the colonialists cannibalised and savaged Africa and now Africa can only be salvaged by bricoleurs, or bricolage, that is the rebuilding of Africa from the ruins of what was ravaged and ransacked during the colonial era.

Ayittey (2006:459) observed that events in Africa usually attract world attention. Paradoxically, this was the case with Zimbabwe when it was characterised by the West as a rogue state. Zimbabwe's crime was its demand of restitution of the Zimbabwean land to its rightful owners. Some local, regional and international media outlets negatively portrayed these land developments. Since the arrival of the British South Africa Company in the land between the Zambezi and the Limpopo, everything has always been wrong in Zimbabwe. Giving a blind eye to the devastating effects of colonialism and neo-colonialism, Raftopoulos and Phimster (2004), contend that the period of the late 1990s ushered in a decisive new phase in Zimbabwe's political economy. They allege that it was a period that set out the contours of the crisis that was to be experienced in Zimbabwe from 2000 to 2013. As will be noted in the chapter, the problem with Raftopoulos and Phimister, Compagnon, Meredith and other likeminded scholars, is that they ignore that the political and economic situation in Zimbabwe has always been tainted and wrong since the beginning of the colonial era. Things did not go wrong with the coming of Mugabe to power, the crisis started well before Mugabe came into power. Apparently the

contradictions caused by the neo-colonial economy in Zimbabwe became intractable, something that we refer to as ‘contradictions within contradictions of the neo-colonial economy within Zimbabwe.’ Colonialism disrupted and destroyed Zimbabwe’s traditional and political economy. The colonial government that came into being was a vampire state that thrived on excessive looting and exploitation of African resources. The looting still continues with transnational corporations currently still dispossessing Africans of their land (Warikandwa *et al.* 2017). Ian Smith had maintained that there would be no majority rule in his life-time because he wanted to maintain a political, social and economic status quo that favoured his kith and kin. After having successfully fought against the exploitative and evil colonial system, former President Robert Gabriel Mugabe continued fighting against the injustices of (neo-) colonialism and became a victim of empire and its mischievous political and economic cohorts. However, Mugabe has remained the proverbial ‘political cat that every political dog admires. We argue that though Mugabe has wittingly or unwittingly made political and economic decisions that did not go down well with those who regard him as a dictator and racist he will still be celebrated in history for his fight against neo-colonial exploitation, theft and plunder of African resources.

Having valiantly fought the liberation war, Mugabe could not have been expected to tolerate the neoimperially inspired castration, often addressed as regime change, which is ongoing in contemporary Africa and Zimbabwe. It is in this light that queer neoliberal theorists, politicians, international financial institutions and neoliberal aligned and funded organisations have launched relentless attacks on Mugabe and Zimbabwe. They queered him as a mentally deranged racist dictator. Martin Meredith submits that “Mugabe was a monster who destroyed the promise and hope of his people” (Mufuka & Zenda 2018:132). Like their Eurocentric counterparts Mufuka and Zenda erroneously posited that between 1980 and 2000, Mugabe transmogrified into a Dracula, a monster (Ibid: 133).

Dr Simbi Mubako observed that “the West demonised the country and portrayed Mugabe as a leader who had developed the horns of a demon and a tail. He is called a tyrant, a thief and a corrupt monster, with all the epithets that the West heaps upon “third world” leaders (Rob Gowland 2002:5). It would have been political naivety for Mugabe not to fight back. Mugabe responded by lambasting Britain, the United States of America and members of the European Union for trying to be the neo-colonial policemen and guardians of Zimbabweans. Mugabe shrewdly observed that the queer Westerners were violating the Zimbabwean political and economic space; the neo-imperialist and neo-colonialist Draculas bent on exploiting Zimbabweans and plundering Zimbabwean mineral resources. This, thus explains why the West led by Britain

and the USA were against the Zimbabwean land redistribution programme that they feared would have a domino effect in southern Africa. The problem with Mugabe and his ZANU-PF government in the eyes of empire and its looting machine was that they were now redressing the colonial and neo-colonial injustices. In a jingle that was used to psyche Zimbabweans to “finish the unfinished business,” the narrator’s voice audibly quipped “In the beginning was the land. The people were on the land. The people owned the land. As it was in the beginning, so shall it always be. Welcome to Zimbabwe. We are down to earth” (Chitando 2005:224).

Lord Soames observed that “of all politicians he had to deal with, Mugabe was the most difficult...he wore his pride up his sleeve, and as such was temperamental and unpredictable” Mufuka & Zenda (2018: 138). This is the Mugabe who Ambassador Agrippah Mutambara wrote, “was our mentor, political strategist and orator par excellence. His speeches and every interview shaped the direction of our political consciousness and became the resource pool of our political thinking. We saw the ugliness of capitalist exploitation through his eyes. We began to perceive things through his mind. The Mugabe that refused to be treated as a second class citizen, that showed courage in the face of adversities” (Mutambara 2014:85-86). This was Mugabe the unwavering pan-Africanist who was applauded when he told Tony Blair to keep his England and not meddle with issues in Zimbabwe. The bone of contention is that the West believes that African countries must be governed along certain Western lines and African leaders who try to resist this are therefore enemies of neoempire and its allies. The farm invasions resulted in Mugabe being queered and Zimbabwe being branded a pariah state and an outpost of tyranny. It is therefore logical to make a brief academic detour and give a brief description of the genesis of the Zimbabwean problem.

Robert Mugabe, the Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes, Land Reclamation and Restitution

Land was violently seized by the British South Africa Company from its Zimbabwean owners in 1890. Though both the Ndebele and the Shona had tried to resist this they were defeated in the 1896-97 war. After having realised that the ‘mineral eldorado’ that they had hoped for would not be profitable compared to those in Johannesburg the BSA Company advised the settlers to concentrate on agriculture, (Leber 2001: 1). Land expropriations were further cemented by the colonial legislations especially the 1930 Land Apportionment Act, the 1950 Land Husbandry Act and the 1969 Land Tenure Act that entrenched the separation of land between Whites and Blacks. Rhodesia became the equivalent of apartheid yet land problems in areas designated for Blacks

begun to be felt because of the growing Black population and land degradation. The land hunger by Blacks was not given the much needed attention at 1979 Lancaster House Conference hence it was a grievance that was carried into the postindependence Zimbabwe.

Many scholars consider that cordial relations between Zimbabwe and Britain and its allies begun faltering in the late 1990s. Zimbabwe by then had experienced the disastrous effects of the Washington pioneered queer economic “stabilising” programmes. These programmes had decimated the lives of the majority of the Zimbabwean people, the workers who had been retrenched and members of their extended families who inhabited the rural areas. Stephen Chan (2003: 96-97) posits that by adopting economic “stabilising” programmes by the IMF and World Bank, Mugabe mortgaged Zimbabwe to international financial institutions. Addressing a forum of industrialists, Mugabe averred his commitment to structural adjustment as he had been ‘liberated’ from being a Marxist disciple. He said:

[This] Forum was like a boxing ring. We used to say: these people, what do they think they are? They think government must do things for them. Who are they? Malcontents, exploiters, never satisfied-every dirt word you can think of. This is the first time I have come to this conference liberated, perhaps because of the measures that we have put in place that have brought about the liberation of the economy. I would like to believe that liberation also meant the unleashing of what were fettered energies that have cleared the air. Now we can relate to one another in a clear manner (Chan 2003:96-97).

What Chan did not realise is that Mugabe had refused to adopt ESAP but was pressured by Bernard Chidzero, Tichaendepi Masaya and others who had been bribed by the IMF and World Bank, (See Andreasson:2010). The IMF programmes were thus instituted with its legendary ills of currency devaluation, reduction in government expenditure through ‘reforms’ that resulted in unemployment, poverty and later on inflation. According to Jenkins and Knight (2002:4), there occurred a rapid junction of interests between the ‘Rhodies’ and the emerging African economic and political ruling elites who had an insatiable desire to accumulate wealth for themselves, thus the economic and political elites became reluctant to adopt reformist policies that they had promised the majority of the Zimbabweans who had supported them during the Second Chimurenga war. Mugabe’s finance minister, Bernard Chidzero, was later to see himself in an untenable position that John S. Saul and Richard Saunders (2005:964) regarded, “a catch-22, caught between the politically unpopular demands of the IFIs and the dynamics of society which cannot easily be controlled.” Linda Freeman submits that the neo-liberal macroeconomic

policies by international financial institutions were responsible for laying the foundation of the crisis that is still haunting Zimbabwe (2014:349). Ayittey (2006) succinctly summed this up when he submitted that “Western aid was mainly about buying loyalty, not alleviating poverty...serve the interests of the donors first and the needs of the recipients second.” The truth is that the needs of the recipients were not addressed thus problems experienced were caused and entrenched by empire. Paradoxically, the aid that Zimbabwe got is phantom aid that never reached the targeted recipients and was in fact looted by NGOs top personnel in cahoots with some politicians.

Having not been insulated against the devastating effects of the economic structural adjustment programmes, the war veterans who participated in the second Chimurenga, now under the leadership of their association leader Chenjerai Hunzvi, demanded to be compensated for having fought for the independence of the country. The Harare government was thus subjected to donor and “investor” verbal bombardment to disclose where they were going to get the money to give to the war veterans. Because the so called donors and “investors” had refused to pay compensation for their colonial ills and enslavement, Mugabe asked Treasury to disburse the money that was needed and so begun the massive fall of the Zimbabwean dollar. The situation was further compounded by Zimbabwe’s intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo in what Paul Moorcraft (2012:128) referred to as ‘Africa’s First World War’ that had a Western hand. He observed that “the war was a financial disaster for the Zimbabwean treasury. Martin Rupiya was later on to retort “On the balance, the country appears to have made an enormous sacrifice for its involvement in the war, which has left it scarred, impoverished and politically divided, (Ibid: 139). The paradox here is that while Eurocentric scholars blamed the government for spending taxpayers’ money on the DRC war, the same Eurocentric scholars urged the government to find money with which to compensate White farmers who were evicted from repossessed farms. Similarly, it must be pointed out that wars that involve powerful Western states like U.S.A and Britain are never financial disasters because they continue to suck Africans of their resources and vitality. As the new millennium approached, the continuing economic meltdown culminated in the growth of opposition in “civil” society and the eventual formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) political party.

In the late 1990s there were sporadic land repossession incidents by some rural populace like Chief Svosve and his people who were of the view that the government was taking long to respond to their demands for land. They were treated as squatters. Sam Moyo (2001:24) notes that these “community land occupations,” could not be stopped because as had earlier been observed by Palmer (1990: 181) the masses had realised that “the British were determined to

perpetuate the spirit of Lancaster House.” The Zimbabwean government and the masses were indirectly being told to wait. Mugabe was further enraged by the British government now under Tony Blair who was not willing to finance the land resettlement programme as had been promised under the Margaret Thatcher government. The situation was further worsened by Clare Short who wrote a letter to the then Minister of Agriculture Kumbirai Kangai, informing him that: *“I do not accept that Britain has a special responsibility to meet the costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe. We are a new government... without links to former colonial interests. My own origins are Irish, and as you know, we were colonized not colonizers,”* (Ankomah 2013: 52). This was the letter that put Mugabe into a fit of rage; he came to the painful realisation that Britain and America were fake. They had promised to bank-roll the land redistribution and were now trying to be smart by refusing to honour their promises. Attention was shifted to supporting leaders like Nelson Mandela of South Africa showing that in the international system there are no permanent friends but interests.

The crime that Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo had committed was that of religiously adhering to the 1979 Lancaster constitutional dictates. They had allowed the “willing seller-willing buyer principle,” that had failed to deliver any meaningful progress with regard to land restitution. The major grievance for mobilisation for the waging of the second Chimurenga was the issue of land. This was clearly captured by the ZANU chairperson Herbert Chitepo (1970:10-15), in his paper “The Passing of the Tribal Man: A Rhodesia Review.” He argued, “I could go into the whole theories of discrimination in legislation, in residency, in economic opportunities, in education...but I will restrict myself to the question of land... To us the essence of exploitation, the essence of white domination is domination over land. That is the real issue.” By not supporting land reclamation and restitution, donor countries and international financial institutions indirectly waylaid the Zimbabwean government not to prioritise land restitution.

Britain, America and the White commercial farmers in Zimbabwe were responsible for the violence that took place in Zimbabwe. When Mugabe agreed to community land occupations, the Third Chimurenga began and it was spear-headed by the people supported by the war veterans and later on the government. Mlambo noted that the land reclamation and restitution that begun in 2000 marked a crucial phase in consolidating “Zimbabwe’s political independence by capturing land, the basis of the country’s economy, and, therefore, giving the country its economic independence. This was well captured in the ZANU-PF government slogan, “the land is the economy; the economy the land,” (2005:1). Britain, America, and the international White community cried foul and fell upon each other condemning what they termed barbaric acts by a “mentally deranged leader,” who they alleged had outlived his usefulness.

Mugabe and all those who were supporting the fast track land reclamations and restitution were regarded as not civil. Mugabe and his government were zombified, termed uncivil and racist. Their problem was trying to redress the colonial injustices. However supporters of the land reclamation and restitution exercise lionised Mugabe for asserting and defending African independence, and the restoration of land to its people. David Anderson (2013) correctly pointed out that Mugabe sought to correct the misdemeanours of history, “there are good reasons for African bitterness over land. Whites in colonial Rhodesia simply took the land they wanted by conquest. They paid no compensation to the Africans they dispossessed...Zimbabweans have won quiet admiration of many other Africans for refusing to be pushed around by their former colonial master,” (Mlambo 2005:2). As already noted, land that had belonged to Zimbabweans had been stolen by a rogue imperialist, Cecil John Rhodes, for the United Kingdom between 1890 and 1915 and later handed over to White settlers (Mufuka and Zenda 2018:84).

It is therefore not surprising that Mugabe and Zimbabweans who have endured the devastating effects of sanctions are victims of empire in empire’s endeavour to queer a rightful redress of past wrongs. Mugabe thus resolved to resist empire and therefore “projected himself as the candid sentinel-in-chief against Western domination and exploitation of Zimbabwe and Africa,” (Mashingaidze 2011: 261). Paradoxically, Mugabe has never been mentally deranged and knew that he had been duped by the British and the White commercial community in Zimbabwe who were not willing to support land restitution. This explains why he radically retorted that “we are not an extension of Britain, I will never stand for it, dead or alive, even my ghost will not stand for it.”(Moorcraft 2012:21). It is therefore not surprising that Mugabe still enjoys “much kudos” for his tirade against British and American hypocrisy with regard to the land issue and attempts at regime change” (Ibid).

Mugabe realised that he had to adopt the liberation struggle rhetoric to fight against empire. He was under a ferocious political attack from empire and her cohorts. Empire was supporting the Movement for Democratic Change to stampede ZANU-PF out of power. The political situation was further compounded by pictures that were publicised showing White farmers giving checks to Morgan Tsvangirai. Things were falling apart in Zimbabwe. Mugabe shrewdly situated his defence in the anti-colonial discourse. It became a well-executed strategic response to empire’s onslaught on his rule. Jonathan Moyo (Mugabe’s spin doctor) astutely popularised the idea that Zimbabwe was fighting a third war of liberation against neo-colonialists and neo-imperialists as this was a decisive phase of Zimbabwe’s history. He knew that empire would never repent just as empire’s kith and kin had averred that “Rhodesia will never die.” Mugabe thus lambasted empire:

Today, Britain, America, New Zealand and Australia, what colour are they? White. They are the ones leading in the fight against Zimbabwe, the fight of resisting the completion of the independence process that began in 1980. We are not made as a government in Washington. Let Mr Bush know that. We are made as the government by our people here. Let foolish Blair also know that (Scarnecchia 2006:234).

Zimbabwe was thus engaged in a war against a hypocritical empire and its allies in Zimbabwe, the MDC and donor funded NGOs. Zimbabweans had to jealously guard their sovereignty, thus Zimbabwe adopted a form of political identity that was a fusion of Zimbabweanness and ZANU-PF elite and party rank-and-file interests. The Third Chimurenga was a means to an end that was cemented by President Robert Mugabe when he said:

The country is our country and this land is our land... They think that because they are white they have a divine right to our resources. Not here. The white man is not indigenous to Africa. Africa is for Africans. Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans. (Britz & Tshuma 2011:237-58).

Chitando (2005: 224) President Mugabe in his address at the International Conference Centre in January 2002 (Day of National Prayer) told the audience that it was God's plan for Black Zimbabweans repossess their land. Land restitution was thus God's plan to ensure Black dignity. Chitando (Ibid:236) submits that land reclamation and restitution were "a culmination of his (Mugabe) covenant with the landless and the poor." Mugabe was fighting for Zimbabwe's salvation hence when he attended Thabo Mbeki's inauguration in 2004 he was well received by the South African general populace and other African leaders. Harry Mashabela exclaimed, "Mugabe is speaking for black people world-wide." In a Helen Suzman Newsletter he wrote "the applause and standing ovations (are) a tacit expression of the courageous stand Mugabe has taken in trying to resolve the critical land problems facing his country," (Alden and Anseuw 2006: 3). Mashabela hit the nail on the head, South Africans were aware that George W. Bush in support of Tony Blair had been asked by the United States Congress to sign the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) into law. ZIDERA does not permit any director, or any chief executive officer (CEO) of a US supported institution to assist in the giving of a loan, extension or credit to Zimbabwe. Since then Zimbabwe has been on the receiving end as neoempire sought to punish Mugabe who regarded himself as an indispensable factor in the Zimbabwean political matrix and as he fought on, Zimbabwe's economy continued on a downward trend. The refusal by international financial institutions to give Zimbabwe any loans showed that

the IMF and World Bank support the queer interests of neo-imperialist powers. What is bewildering is that empire intervenes in the internal affairs of independent states, such intervention is illegal, bullish and exploitative and explains why international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and foreign funded non-governmental organisations (NGOs) advance the interests of neoempire. Below we trace how neoempire conscripted NGOs in its service to weaken Mugabe's political standing.

INGOs and NGOs – In the Service of Empire

In Zimbabwe the Mugabe led government complained time and again that the foreign funded NGOs were meddling in Zimbabwe's political affairs supporting the MDC. President Robert Mugabe threatened that some of these NGOs would not be permitted to continue operating in Zimbabwe if they did not repent. An analysis of the work of NGOs depict that many of these foreign funded NGOs are not to be trusted. In fact some of the NGOs operating in Africa are owned and run by politicians, including members of the British House of Lords, in Euro-America (see Nhemachena & Bankie 2017). James Petras (1999) noted that NGOs are 'compradors' or agents of empire. The 'comprador' theory, a strand of Marxist thinking, shows the 'evil' nature of imperialism and neo-colonialism. The crux of the matter is that, the comprador bourgeoisie (middle-class/elites) in the 'developing countries' survives on Western bourgeoisie benevolence, who give them resources as long as they are in the service of empire. In other words, the 'comprador' is more of a 'middle-man' or 'representative' of the core, serving the interests of the inhuman Western capitalist system "against the interests of the indigenous classes" (Hearn 2007:1098).

The above view is supported by Fanon (1990:123), who criticises the local/national middle class which he accuses of assuming the role of a 'manager' for the capitalist system. This means, they are happy with the intermediary role than being revolutionary. As mere managers, this middle-class or 'comprador' group has no control or ownership of the means of production or the political apparatus. All it does is to maintain the status quo. The NGOs were thus against Zimbabwe's land reclamation and restitution and so all they did was to make a lot of noise, not in support of the repossession of land but in highlighting only the negative sides of repossessing the land (See Nhemachena & Bankie 2017). The needs of recipient countries came second to empire's interests. The Human Rights Watch, Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), the National Constitutional Assembly and others were thus on the forefront saying the economic and political crisis was a result of bad governance by the ZANU-PF government. The CFU deliberately derailed and slowed the

land redistribution process. Palmer (1990) noted that the CFU argued that rapid land redistribution would undermine White confidence and threaten export earnings and employment. The union therefore worked for the maintenance of the status quo. They thus downplayed the disastrous activities of neoempire in Zimbabwe's domestic affairs. Englund (2006:196) was correct in his assessment that "civil" society organisations work for the promotion of interests of donor countries than the concerns of recipients. In Zimbabwe they therefore chose to dwell on purported human rights violations by the Mugabe government instead of focusing on the rights of indigenous Zimbabweans who wanted to repossess their land.

Petras (1999) developed the most sustained critique of Southern NGOs as agents of Western governments. His argument was that those who lead NGOs are a new propertied class that is not productive (that does not own the means of production) but maintains a high status in society through imperial funding. The NGO leaders are therefore seen as "a kind of 'neo-comprador' group that exist and functions to serve the interests of the neoimperial funders. This means as a non-productive group, NGOs survive through donor funding in order to maintain a high status in society. In this regard, the NGO compradors' major preoccupation becomes that of sourcing for funds from northern countries (and INGOs) under the pretext of assisting poor communities. This is 'false generosity' as most of the money is diverted to personal use. In this regard, the poor local communities become mere 'pawns' in the fund sourcing hierarchy. Petras (1999:434) alleges that, "at best after the deals have been cooked by the Director and the overseas funders, the NGO staff will call a meeting of 'grassroots activists' of the poor to approve the project." As such, the local communities become 'objects' rather than 'subjects' of the development process. Interestingly no foreign funded NGOs in Zimbabwe asked for funds to assist the land reclamation and restitution exercise. What they were good at was simply demonizing government efforts to repossess land.

Petras (1999) goes on to criticise international financial institutions (IFIs) and Multilateral Corporations (MNC) for bribing local elites or 'compradors' as to 'pillage' African economies. This view is supported by Perkins (2005) in his book *"Confessions of an Economic Hitman"* where he comprehensively outlines, how the elites in most 'third world' countries are manipulated by IFIs to adopt policies that further the interests of neoempire. As already noted, this was the case with Dr Bernard Chidzero, Kumbirai Kangai and Tichaendepi Masaya in Zimbabwe who hoodwinked Zimbabwe into adopting the economic structural adjustment programmes in 1990.

Petras (1999) argues that after such unethical practices, NGOs are used to play a complementary role through pacifying any disgruntlement that might come from the grassroots due to the 'savaging' of the economy. This view is

also supported by Bienefeld (1994), who argues that, northern countries use NGO assistance to sway attention of the poor masses (in ‘developing countries’) from the actual forces that caused the social and economic misery which they are experiencing. The above view on structural adjustment resonates with Mitlin *et al’s* (2007) perspective that, after the failure of structural adjustment, NGOs were needed to help deal with the limits of this neo-liberal policy (which had created massive unemployment and poverty as noted in the sections above) that was now leading to violent and unprecedented protests in various adjusting countries. Tandon (1996) gives a similar standpoint, arguing that the proliferation of NGOs was to divert the attention of Africans from the root causes of poverty, as well as to promote northern values and beliefs. In the views of the above scholars, NGOs are used by their northern funders to disconnect local people from a liberating consciousness. This was the case in Zimbabwe especially when one considers the human resource pool of the Movement for Democratic Change. Terms like ‘empowerment’, ‘people centred participation’ and so on, are used in order to camouflage the imperialist image. This means the term ‘development’ is used to “hide, obscure, undercut and displace more anti-systemic notions such as ‘transformation’ and ‘revolution’” (Helliker 2006:100). Wright, to quote him in full, is in support of the above writers as he similarly submits that:

There are two main roles that NGOs play. First, they act as a softener for the damage caused by the West’s structural adjustment policies in the developing world, thus lessening resistance to those policies; and second, they diffuse the grassroots political resistance to neo-liberalism (Wright 2012:129).

The logic of Wright’s assertion runs roughly as follows: The service provision role that most NGOs have occupied in the past three decades is a mere ‘smokescreen’ used to shield the effects of neo-liberal policies of SAPs, thus mollifying public enragement. In such a situation, the impoverished masses instead of challenging the neo-liberal system tend to put the blame on their governments as what happened in Zimbabwe in the late 1990s. The IMF and the World Bank refused to give Zimbabwe money to stop the economic decline. The international financial institutions were thus in cahoots with neoempire to foment unrest in Zimbabwe in the process increasing the number of supporters of the MDC party as had happened with Fredrick Chiluba’s Movement for Multi-party Democracy in Zambia. Such circumstances prompted scholars like Manji and O’Coill to argue that, the role of NGOs and INGOs “represents a continuity of the work of their precursors, the missionaries and voluntary organisations that co-operated in Europe’s colonisation and control of Africa” (Manji and O’Coill’ 2002: 568). INGOs and NGOs and empire are thus partners

in crime. Boron (2005:80) correctly noted that an analysis of the work of NGOs and INGOs shows that they intentionally further the interests of neoempire. “It is a well calculated move to weaken the state while simultaneously increasing the ability of (neo) imperialism and foreign companies and nations to control not only the economic life but also the political life of the countries of the periphery. Leaders of “third world” countries are therefore reduced to unenviable positions of “mastering misery” that is dispensed to them as foreign direct “investment”: this is the African problematique.

In a way, this means NGOs and INGOs were strategically placed to support neoempire in its neo-colonial looting and plunder of African resources through the neo-liberal policies they foisted on Zimbabwe. However, this does not mean some NGOs are not aware of such a set-up, taking note of Wright’s (2012) argument that the United States National Endowment for Democracy, a brainchild of Ronald Regan and others, is funded by the US Congress and has been at the forefront in advancing U.S.A interests in Central America. He concludes by saying “NGOs are less the Trojan horses of imperialism, and more the outright policy instruments of the West” (Wright 2012:126). The neo-liberal “New Policy Agenda” of the 1990s (Edward and Hulme 1998; Hearn 1998; Wright 2012) gave renewed prominence to NGOs in poverty alleviation, social welfare, development and civil society advocacy. Arguably, this has simply been a farce. As noted by Boron (2005:80) the word reform was used to refer to a situation that was far from being a reformation exercise, adopted policies actually worsened the plight of the people whose lives were supposed to be improved.

Petras (1999), Shivji (2007), Mitlin *et al* (2007), Wright (2012) and Manji and O’Coill (2002:568) have argued that NGOs have actually ‘undermined the struggle of African people to emancipate themselves from economic, social and political oppression’. It is therefore evident from the foregoing, that development projects become some kind of ‘opium’ that makes the masses docile and uncritical of the ‘flawed and corrupt’ capitalist system. Thus, humanitarian aid serves to ensure that Africans forget that their land and other resources were stolen by the same people that are now pretending to offer them aid. In other words, NGO development interventions turn out to be a pragmatic strategy to soften the poor masses in ‘developing countries’ from rising against the international capitalist/colonial system. To add on, NGO development interventions silence opposing ‘third world’ voices and dissent that challenges the theft of wealth and power by some northern countries. This is why Mugabe was against his people’s dependence on donor false generosity and thus advocated for indigenisation and empowerment of Zimbabweans through land reclamation and restitution. This therefore justified using the liberation war rhetoric so that Zimbabweans would grasp the kind of war they were fighting.

To be fed with genetically modified food coming through “humanitarian” aid is to be made vulnerable to hormonal changes that also cause homosexual tendencies (Mawere & Nhemachena 2017). In fact, some of the food that is donated in “humanitarian” aid is actually food that is meant for animals in the countries of export, where it comes from (Nhemachena 2017).

Petras (1999) further perceives the proliferation of NGOs in ‘developing countries’ as having given birth to a new breed of a petit bourgeois class which is different from the old middle class of businessmen. This new group (NGOs) as highlighted elsewhere in this section, does not produce anything but is quite cunning in that it exaggerates, foments and perpetuate crisis so that it remains in business and continues to obtain donor funds. President Mugabe at one point referred to this as the “Madhuku syndrome”. Lovemore Madhuku was the leader of National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) who did exactly what Petras is submitting. Mercer (1999) concurs and observes that some NGOs are a new form of accumulation, where the educated elites in the face of diminishing state resources have found some salvation in the NGO sector. In other words, without property or a fixed position in the state apparatus, local NGOs depend heavily on external funding agencies to reproduce themselves. According to Petras (1999:430) this is done by “mainly trading in domestic poverty for individual perks.” Making money has thus, become a lucrative venture within the NGO sector (Mercer 1999; Petras 1999; Platteau and Gaspart 2003).

In Zimbabwe, some NGOs still fuel an endless crisis; in order to benefit from the ‘lucrative’ donor funded business (Mahoso 2012; 2014). The same concerns are echoed by Platteau and Gaspart (2003) who point out that the creation of an NGO has become one of the best means of procuring funds from the international community. Leaked confidential US Embassy cables made available by Wikileaks revealed that USAID poured millions of dollars into various NGOs in Zimbabwe (*The Sunday Mail* 23 August 2015). The European Union is yet to come to terms on how the more than 2 billion US dollars it channelled towards NGOs in Zimbabwe was used.

Greed has become a norm in some quarters of the NGO sector. It is our contention, however, that some NGO personnel due to greed have undermined rural development initiatives and have abused donor funds. An example is that of Caritas Zimbabwe. We give this example as a matter of academic criticism rather than to point fingers. Serious financial malpractices were committed by Caritas Zimbabwe’s national director, national programmes coordinator and the finance and administration officer. The NGO was prejudiced of more than half a million dollars by the three officers, through sharing funds from donors/funding partners as “salary advances” and later on fraudulently writing the amounts off (Gagare 2014). However, more could be happening, but as Helliker (2006) has noted, many NGOs are very secretive. NGOs in Zimbabwe

are very reserved with regard to releasing information pertaining to their policies and practices (Helliker 2006:11).

From the above works, the true mission of NGOs can be divided into four categories:

- Facilitating neoliberal and neocolonial projects and ideologies on behalf of imperial and corporate interests;
- Taking indigenous people's movements away from their objectives and paths of development and onto those paths already mapped by the World Bank, IMF, and other global donors;
- Providing Northern governments with cheap raw data and intelligence for the control of the economies in the periphery;
- Making (neo) imperialism appear to be sensitive and humane, by dwelling on the rights discourse.

We now focus on why it was prudent for Robert Gabriel Mugabe to use liberation war rhetoric to justify and make other pan-Africanists leaders and masses resonate with his war against empire. It is apparent that NGOs and INGOs are imperialistic and are agents of regime change. They are in the service of imperialism and are parts of the looting machine that is facilitating the underdevelopment of Africa.

It is a fact that the plunder of southern Africa was already underway by the time Zimbabwe was colonised. In the 19th century missionaries, miners and merchants were already in Africa trading in slaves, gold, diamonds in exchange for clothing and other cheap goods that they gave African chiefs and kings. Burgis (2015:6-7) submits that:

Some think that Africa is a great drain of philanthropy, a continent that guzzles aid to no avail and contributes little to the global economy in return. But this is not. In 2010 fuel and mineral exports from Africa were worth US\$333 billion, more than seven times the value of aid that went in the opposite direction. Natural resources flow to a global market in which traders based in London, New York and Hong Kong set prices. If South Africa exports less gold, Nigeria less oil or Congo less copper, the prices go up for everyone. What is happening in Africa is systematic looting.

It is plausible to point out that Mugabe realised the importance of using the liberation rhetoric to fight against empire. Empire has been vandalising and looting resources that Mugabe wanted to harness for the benefit of his compatriots. Burgis (Burgis 2015:233) observed that empire had set up a machine to extract resources and when they left such work became a prerogative

of multinational companies and corporations. Zimbabwe has a variety of mineral resources like nickel, gold, diamonds, platinum and others. This explains why Mugabe, while addressing the United Nations General Assembly, said “Our small and peaceful country is threatened daily by covetous and bigoted big powers whose hunger for domination and control of other nations and their resources knows no bounds.” Imperialism and neo-imperialism negate the historical process of the periphery by violently usurping the freedom of development and nationalistic productive forces (Cabral 1966:9) Using liberation war rhetoric was some kind of going back to basics to touch the hearts and minds of the ordinary masses and the veterans of the Second Chimurenga.

As pointed above the crux of the matter is that the ideological armoury of waging the Chimurenga was used as the “soul of the Zimbabwean revolution” to win the hearts and minds of the people in the fight against Empire. The politicisation of the masses and war veterans became a necessity because the use and indoctrination of political ideologies were the soul that enabled the success of the armed struggle (Mutambara 2014:80-81). Rhetoric of the liberation struggle was going back to basics, to the roots, showing how imperialism and colonialism had been transplanted against the wishes of the gallant warriors of the 1896-97 Ndebele and Shona uprising to fight against colonialism. Patriotic history therefore became very important to reignite the importance of resisting neo-imperialist domination at a time when the country had already gained political independence. Patriotic history shaped and sedimented political consciousness on the evils of empire that was trying to thwart closure to the Zimbabwean land problem. By embarking on the much denounced land reclamation, Zimbabweans under the leadership of Robert Mugabe showed empire that it wanted to determine its own destiny as an inalienable right to their God and ancestor given land. Meredith (2007: 22), submits that even at Lancaster Mugabe had retorted:

We are irrevocably committed to the position that the Zimbabwean people, by whose blood and sacrifice colonialism was exorcised from the land, must themselves be the perpetual guarantors of sovereignty in the face of all challenges, domestic and foreign. Liberation and the process leading thereto must be irrevocable and irreversible.

The war veterans and the party youths and chiefs became the revolutionary vanguards to resist the capitalist/colonial structure of empire implanted in the national territory and safeguarded by neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism via multilateral corporations and international financial institutions. The situation had been further compounded by the MDC, a neoliberal political party and donor funded project that had approached empire to impose sanctions on the

Mugabe government for undertaking land reclamations and restitution. These stooges of empire (the MDC) masquerading as opposition political parties are too politically blind to realise that the neo-imperialist and neo-colonialist vehicle to dominate the periphery is violence instituted via illegal sanctions.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have argued that Mugabe will still go down in history as a nationalist and pan-Africanist who stood up to empire to see to it that land in Zimbabwe is given back to its original owners, Black Zimbabweans. It was indeed prudent and pragmatic to use liberation war rhetoric because even now Zimbabwe is at war with empire that is spirited to let Zimbabwe adhere to its dictates so that Euro-America continues to loot and plunder its resources. Non-governmental organisations and international non-governmental organisations are also in the service of empire to entrench subservience on the people of Africa. What Zimbabweans will do with their land and minerals whether they remortgage them to empire will be up to them but Mugabe played his part and ran a good race, which is why Africa still salutes him.

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Elephants in the Same Room: Interfacing Robert Mugabe and “Civil” Society Organisations in Zimbabwe

Peter Masvotore & Martin Mujinga

Introduction

The socio-political and economic climate of Zimbabwe reached its zenith on the 17th of November 2017 that saw the demise of Robert Mugabe as the first and longest-serving president of Zimbabwe. The early hours of this day shocked the whole world when the Zimbabwean army turned against the president who was its Commander-in-Chief, forcing him to resign. The coup attracted a number of stakeholders. Of interest to note is that both local and international “civil” society organisations took a decisive role in demanding Mugabe to step down. Although some individuals and groups in Zimbabwe persuaded the whole world to believe that the forced resignation of Mugabe was not a coup, one interesting thing that characterised the 17 November 2017 incident was the coming together of the opposition parties, the ruling party- ZANU (PF), the ordinary citizens and the “civil” society organisations, all in agreement with the decision of the army to have Mugabe out of office.

According to Magaisa (2018) the coming together of opposing stakeholders towards a common cause is called ‘elite convergence’. Although the ‘coup’ involved the ordinary citizens, Magaisa’s article in the *Newsday* sheds more light to his argument. He argues that:

...the notion of elite convergence is used to describe a process by which groups of elites from different sectors come together in pursuit of a common purpose despite their differences and this elitist process tends to exclude the ordinary people. These elites exist in various sectors, they include the political, economic, military, “civil” society elites and they also come from the religious and traditional sectors. Politically, elites exist on either side of the political aisle: the ruling party and the opposition. The power of elites could be political, economic, military or social (Magaisa 2018).

The 17th of November 2017 incident raised a number of questions which shape the scope of this chapter. Some of the questions that beg for answers; include- ‘why were the “civil” society organisations interested in the downfall of

Mugabe? The interests of the “civil” society are expressed in their request to the military to ensure restoration of the Constitutional order and an inclusive process to resolve Zimbabwe’s political and socio-economic problems (Machaira 2017). The question as to why the “civil” society organisations called for an inclusive process is suggestive of their queer interest in Zimbabwean politics. Other questions to be addressed in this chapter are why did the “civil” society organisations, if “civil” at all, not also call for the demise of the neo-colonial order which is exclusive, exploitative and has been on the African continent longer than Robert Mugabe? If, as is the case, colonialists and their descendants perpetrated crimes including robbery, theft, dispossession and exploitation on Africans, why must Africans include the criminals that have not yet paid/complied with restitution, restoration and reparations? Why must Africans foreground inclusivity and not reparations, restitution and restoration? If the criminals are included in the light of the discourses on inclusivism, will they not continue to rob, steal, dispossess and exploit their victims from within?

The chapter also argues that Zimbabwe’s political and economic problems emanated not from Mugabe but from the neo-colonial processes including transnational plunder of African resources and the exploitation of Africans for meagre wages (Warikandwa, Nhemachena and Mtapuri 2017:2). This chapter traces the changing role of “civil” society organisations during and in the aftermath of the Mugabe era.

What Is Civil Society

According to McGrew “civil” society organisations are those agencies, institutions, movements, cultural forces and social relationships that are both privately and voluntarily organised which are not directly controlled by the [African] states (1998:69). In other words, “civil” society refers to the sphere of private power and private organisations whereas the state is the realm of public power and public organisations. The words private power and private organisations that McGrew uses are misleading given that some of the “civil” society organisations are sponsored by western government including by some members of the British House of Lords and some by Western intelligence agents that come to Africa in the guise of humanitarianism (Nhemachena and Bankie 2017; Amutabi 2013).

Although Nhemachena and Bankie argue that the definition of the term “civil” society is controversial, Alexander (2001:193) argues that “civil” society is a sphere or subsystem of society that is logically and to various degrees, empirically separated from the spheres of political, economic and religious life. Kaldnor (2007:154) adds that “civil” society is the process through which

individuals negotiate, argue, struggle against, or agree with each other and with the centres of political and economic authority.

From the definitions provided above, one notes that, “civil” society is a broad concept, encompassing all the organisations and associations that exist outside of the [African] state including political parties (Håakstad 2016:156). “Civil” society also includes the array of organisations that political scientists describe as ‘interest groups’ (Nhemachena and Bankie 2017). In addition, they include labour unions, professional associations (such as those of doctors and lawyers), chambers of commerce and ethnic associations (Zhou 2014:42).

“Civil” society also includes other associations that are established for purposes other than promoting precise social or political agendas, such as religious organisations, student groups, cultural organisations (choral societies), sports clubs, and informal community groups (Salbzei 2016; Zhou 2014). According to Masunungure (2014), “civil” society and NGOs are two sides of the same coin. This chapter will borrow the idea of Masunungure (2014) and the two words will be used interchangeably. NGOs shape policy by wielding pressure on governments and by providing technical expertise to policy makers.

The idea of “civil” society has attracted a lot of scholarship both locally and internationally (Moyo 1993; Beasley-Murray 1999; Masunungure 2014; Zhou 2014; Sabzehei 2016, Warikandwa *et al* 2017). These scholars generally agree that “civil” societies are common in the “third world” countries and most of them are from the western world (Sabzehei 2016). Warikandwa *et al* (2017: 7) associate international “civil” society with transnational corporations whose agenda is to coerce and pacify Africans so that they will plunder African resources in the name of climate change and global food shortages. One of the reasons for the proliferation of international “civil” society organisations in Africa is the assertion by the west that African states have progressively lost credibility from the donors and international financial institutions. As such, “civil” society organisations become the favoured child of official development agencies, hailed as the new panacea to cure the ills that have befallen the development process (Fisher 1997:442). Håakstad (2001: 156) adds that- what explains the proliferation of NGO in the 1990s is their alleged ability to be more efficient than the Africans and their states.

In Zimbabwe, “civil” society organisations had conflicts with President Mugabe as he accused them of regime change agenda. Mugabe denounced the activities of the “civil” society organisations labelling them as uninvited, unelected, sell-outs, selfish, ignorant and serving foreign interests (Daily News 2016). The upshot of the foregoing is the question why “civil” society organisations do not focus on civilising Euro-America that continues to plunder, rob, loot, dispossess and exploit Africans? (Nhemachena *et al.* 2017). Amutabi stresses that:

NGOs in Africa do not really want to eradicate poverty and institutionalise democracy in Africa, but intended to keep Africans poor and needy in order to justify their own existence. In fact, they have never been anticipating to achieve these goals but have always worked towards maintaining the status quo and benefiting a rich, often foreign, elite instead of helping local people (2013:34)

This confrontation between Mugabe and some “civil” society organisations can be understood in terms of the analogy of the elephants in the same room. On one hand, “civil” society organisations exist as important actors in policy, dialogue, delivery of social services and also taking the role of the watchdog demanding effective accountability and transparency from the government (Sabzehei 2016; Beasley-Murray 1999:75). On the other hand, Mugabe feels that they are Western agents of regime change and therefore their tentacles should be cut short (Moyo 1993:4).

In view of the above facts, Masunungure (2014) stresses that “civil” society organisations have been regarded by some western scholars as an important instrument for promoting democracy, development and human rights. Their role being to fill in the spaces in a “healthy” democracy and not to substitute for government in jurisdictions of African states. The argument to be explored is whether it is democratic for organisations from other jurisdictions to meddle in the affairs of other African states? If the answer is yes, then does Euro-America want Africans to also interfere in the Euro-American politics and economies? An analysis of these justifies Moyo’s argument that most “civil” society organisations are neo-colonial machinations that are set to replace the African states (1993:4). Although it is very democratic for Africans to own and control their resources, some western “civil” society organisations feel that Africans are not civilised to that level, which is a serious misconception and encumbrance to African renaissance. Some of the “civil” society organisations in Zimbabwe only support a Western form of democracy that is not inclined to African ownership and control of resources. This is one of the issues at the centre of Mugabe’s intention of ousting international non-governmental organisations.

Mugabe questioned the neutrality of some “civil” society organisations in Zimbabwe. His fears were rightly expressed by Moyo (1993:4) who states that, most of the mushrooming NGOs and voluntary associations are in fact a danger to the prospects of a viable society which enshrines democracy and human rights because they have shown a tendency towards a type of particularism, fundamentalism and ethno-nationalism based on intolerance of the African state and African cultures. From these discussions, it becomes evident that the contestations between Mugabe and the “civil” society organisations was rooted

in NGOs' allegiance to Western agendas and their regime change agendas in Africa (Warikandwa *et al* 2017).

“Civil” Society Organisations and the State in Zimbabwe

The brand of “civil” society that is presently being created in developing countries such as Zimbabwe is marked by their associations with village communities, privileged clubs in urban areas, political parties, burial societies, trade unions, industrial confederations, commercial organisations, student groups and fundamentalist religious sects, all of which do not push an interest in affairs beyond their own immediate concerns (Moyo 1993:5). These associations typically equate their aims with those of the African public domain and thus seek to control the African state for their own selfish purposes. Moyo (1993:5) stresses that, in so far as it is a political concept, “civil” society should be regarded as an individual’s social space which shrinks or expands depending on the nature of state-society relationship (see Singh 2012). In most cases, these associations are the mirror images of the state which they seek to confront (Moyo 1993:6). Such social groups do not belong to genuine “civil” society in the sense of a political community with the ability to accommodate various social interests in a pluralist framework.

In order to understand the concepts of “civil” society and state, one has to follow Charles Taylor’s (1990) argument. However, we note that what is clear from this statement is that African states are not considered by Eurocentric scholars on “civil” society to be civil, but brutish. Such kinds of definitions of “civil” society that exclude African states serve to legitimise Western interventionisms, they serve to legitimise the targeting of African leaders at the International Criminal Court and they serve to legitimise Euro-American deconstruction of African autonomy and nation state sovereignty. Taylor raised three critical points:

First “civil” society is a minimal sense in which there are free associations which can be empirically shown to be free from the control of the state. Second it is a stronger sense in which “civil” society exists only where the political community as a whole is able to organize itself and co-ordinate its activities without the control of the state, third it is a strongest sense in which “civil” society exists only when the political community is composed of an ensemble of free associations which have the political and organizational capacity not only to co-ordinate their own activities but also to significantly determine or inflect the sequence and development of state policy (1990:98).

From these possible scenarios cited above and considering their implications for democratic governance one can conclude that “civil” society organisations in Zimbabwe have a challenge in future because currently they are struggling to define themselves within the confines of the minimalist sense of the concept meaning to say it is still to establish free associations which are not under the auspices of state power (Taylor 1990:99). But the problem here is about who says African state power is unfree and uncivil – if Mugabe and his state could repossess and redistribute land to Black Zimbabweans why should that not be considered to constitute civility? The relationship of Mugabe and the “civil” society organisations in Zimbabwe can be discussed in view of the events that led to the establishment of Western “civil” society organisations in Zimbabwe.

“Civil” Society in the Pre-independent Zimbabwe

The pre- independence Zimbabwe witnessed the British colonial policies from 1890 and the period of the Rhodesian Front government led by Ian Smith after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence that aimed at criminalising politics in the Black community (Moyo 1993:7). It became difficult for the Blacks to organise and coordinate their affairs publicly. All political activities by Blacks were to be done behind closed doors and under life threatening conditions. This entails that without political activity the prospects of “civil” society organisations were weakened. Therefore the action by the British and Rhodesians to monopolise politics resulted in underdeveloped “civil” society organisations among the Blacks in Zimbabwe (Beach 1985; Todd 1987). According to Moyo (1993:7), “during the colonial period, social movements such as trade unions, student groups, community organisations and political parties in the Black communities were trampled upon in an attempt to relegate them to permanent political irrelevance”.

When one analyses these episodes it shows that the colonial authorities discouraged the development and growth of “civil” society in Zimbabwe by side-lining Blacks from mainstream politics. For Ranger (1985:6) the colonialists confined Blacks to the sphere of “tribal” existence where they would, as ‘natives’, define themselves in terms of “ethnic” as opposed to national identities. The essence of the colonial belief that the native was better governed as a “tribal” entity dominated much of the government thinking during the Unilateral Declaration of Independence and the colonial period which therefore undermined the development of “civil” society organisations in Zimbabwe (Moyo 1993:7).

“Civil” Society in Post-independent Zimbabwe

With the advent of Zimbabwean Independence in 1980 the country expected changes in attitudes towards political and civic organisations (Moyo 2018:8). The ruling party Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) ZANU (PF) claimed that it was the only legitimate representative of the people (Håakstad 2001:156). Under the guise of this claim the party under the leadership of Mugabe declared itself to be the umbrella organisation of all social movements and went about destroying “civil” society associations in the name of the revolution (Moyo 1993:8). ZANU (PF) challenged all “legitimate” organisations like UNICEF to join the ruling party as a sign to prove their revolutionary and patriotic solidarity and commitment (Moyo 1993). It is however logical to justify Mugabe’s stance given that UNICEF is not an elected body, it operates from the West, is controlled by the West and serves the Western interests. Although it is an arm of the United Nations, however the United Nations Security Council is itself not elected and it is dominated by the Euro-American states.

In 1981, the ZANU (PF) government declared it a year of the consolidation of the people’s power (Moyo 1993:8) meaning the need to establish a one-party state. This is seen in Mugabe’s address on the New Year’s Eve when he called upon Zimbabweans to embrace the spirit of national unity and reconciliation. During his address Mugabe made reference to ‘a single loyalty’ which indirectly meant loyalty to the ruling party ZANU (PF) (Håakstad2001:156). According to Moyo (1993:9), Mugabe’s plea was for a legislated one-party state because in his words, ‘we [Zimbabweans] are one state with one society and one nation that is the political concept we cherish’. By implication all “civil” society groups that tried to refuse to go along with ZANU (PF)’s tactic of elimination by substitution under the disguise of ‘one state, one society, one nation, one leader’, were branded as sell-outs bent on working for ‘the enemy’ as the ruling party publicly touted its commitment to a legislated one-party state, especially between 1980 and 1990 (Moyo 1993:9). We argue that the latent function of Western demands for multipartyism was to induce, in Africans, the fear of unity among themselves. The fear of one party state effectively translated into fear of unity among Africans. The irony is that while Euro-America cherishes unity at the United Nations level that it controls, it dissuades Africans from building and having unity among themselves and within their states.

Mugabe’s idea of one central power came at the same time when America was advocating for a New World Order, with an emergent One World Government, in reference to the Cold War. Rivage and Rivage (1995) argue that in 1991, President George W. Bush stated that, “what is at stake is more than one small country, it is a big idea, a new world order where diverse nations are

drawn together in common cause to achieve universal aspirations of mankind, peace and security, such is the world worthy our struggle". According to Rivage and Rivage, "the beginning of the new world order began at the end of the Cold War when the era of superpowers ended, leaving a world with only one economic and military superpower –the United States of America (1995). It can be justified that, Mugabe's negative stance on "civil" society organisations as merely neoimperial was influenced by this American ideology. The point here is that while Euro-America dissuaded Africans from accepting Mugabe's idea of a one party state, Euro-America has and is ironically busy building a New World Order with a One World Government headed by Euro-America.

It is however interesting to note that Zimbabwe became liberated politically in only one part of the state which is the government bureaucracy and political leadership that became Black, ZANU (PF) in 1980. The "civil" society groups, like trade unions and student movements, that operated underground during the days of colonial government with the belief of gaining legitimacy after independence were left bleeding by the ruling party's tactics, and some organisations ceased to exist because they failed to find any political space for independent policy action arising from self-management and self-organisation without state protection.

The only organisations that survived were White dominated groups such as the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI), the Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC), the Commercial Farmers' Union (CFU) and Employers Confederation of Zimbabwe (EMCOZ) (Moyo 1993). If organisations like the CFU, the CZI, the ZNCC and EMCOZ were Black-dominated from the onset, Zimbabwe would have established effective "civil" society organisations. But these White-dominated organisations, with the possible exception of the CFU, preferred doing business with the ZANU (PF) government behind closed doors, claiming that they are apolitical organisations and that it is better to co-operate with the government in private than to challenge it in public. The overall impression is that since 1980 politics in Zimbabwe has become the preserve of Blacks while commerce and industry have remained areas of White domination (Moyo 1993). It is important to note however that Zimbabwean politics were also controlled by Euro-America right from the moment the country got independence. Black politicians appeared to be in controlled when in fact they were not so.

Mugabe's ruling party had failed whether by design or by default to realise that the goal of the colonisers was to limit and ultimately eliminating the participation of the Black majority from politics thereby destroying the "civil" society organisations (Moyo 1993:10). Moyo (1993: 10) notes that: 'during the colonial period the public institutions were not made to be accountable to the general public. There was absence of due process of law; instead the law was

against the Black majority'. The public order could not be maintained because colonial institutions lost their legitimacy and threw the state into a crisis.

The colonial institutions and rules of conduct continued to exist way after independence and this has cast a shadow of doubt over the true meaning of independence. As a result problems of legitimacy and credibility of the political system continue to surface. This then shut the doors for "civil" society organisations to grow in Zimbabwe, even after independence. The government continued to pose challenges to civic movements through the introduction of laws such as the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) both enacted by Parliament in 2002 with the majority of parliamentarians being ZANU (PF). All these pieces of legislation were a continuation of reprisal laws from colonial era. It is imperative to note here that the U.S.A passed similar pieces of legislation soon after the September 11 2001 terrorist attack (see Nhemachena this volume). Despite the determination of the people, the civic movement remains under the eagle's eye (Moyo 1993:10).

The trajectory for "civil" society organisations over the last several decades in Zimbabwe has been a painful one. The political landscape saw repression and violence against "civil" society organisations in the country and the turn of events for the worst happened in 2000. The upsurge followed the emergence of the opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), from the trade union. After the General Election of 2000, ZANU (PF) had slight majority in parliament while MDC got the majority of votes from the urban areas thereby posing threat to ZANU PF (Håakstad 2001:157). Since the MDC evolved from the trade union led by the late Morgan Tsvangirai, Håakstad (2001:157) presents an unhealthy situation whereby the regime change was clearly pronounced by some NGOs. A case in point was the withdrawal by the Norwegian government from supporting the ZANU (PF) government while choosing to support the MDC. The Norwegian government removed from their budget the government to government economic help to Zimbabwe. It however maintained the economic aid which was directed through NGOs. This was meant to support MDC activities (Håakstad 2001:157). Although Zhou (2014:43) feels that the "civil" society has a role to play to promote "good governance" by limiting and controlling the power of the state, Mugabe's negative attitude towards the "civil" society organisations is justified given that those that advocate for regime change are mostly from the West (see also Warikandwa *et al* 2017). Kode and Mawarire (2017) state that, at a ZANU (PF) party conference in Victoria Falls in 2002, Mugabe announced to the delegates that 'those who try to cause disunity among our people must watch out because death will befall them...' It cannot be overemphasised that the beginning of the twenty first century in Zimbabwe was characterised by violence against members of the political

opposition party and “civil” society organisations, perpetrated by the police, intelligence units, ZANU-(PF) members and youth militia.

The eruption of state-sponsored violence gave birth to other formal “civil” society groups that were courageous to face the onslaught and fought tooth and nail. Zhou claims that the reason for the emergence of these “civil” society organisations was to fulfil their mandate to protect citizens against possible state predator behaviour as well as monitoring public performance, human rights abuse and curb corruption by ZANU (PF) (2014:43). However, Hancock (1994) does not agree with the notion of “civil” society as protectors of citizenry, but together with transnational corporations they are also centres of corruption in Africa with some plundering African resources and exploiting Africans, others going as far as bribing African leaders to cause animosity between the government and the citizens (1994:7). In any case, why must civil society organisations focus on controlling the power of African states and not focus on controlling the power of rapacious neoimperial states in Europe and America which dispossess, exploit and ravage Africans? Africans are brutalised more by neoimperial power than they are by their own states, which are in any case often dictated to by Euro-America.

From 2003 organisations such as, Zimbabwe Human Rights, NGO Forum, a Coalition of Human rights organisations, were created in response to the violence and torture meted out to citizens (Moyo 1993). Kode and Mawarire (2017) further state that:

Violence climaxed in March 2007 when a prayer meeting in the Harare, called for by the Save Zimbabwe Campaign (a coalition of church and “civil” society organisations) was violently repressed, under the pretext that the meeting was organised to evade a ban on political gatherings. One activist was killed and several others were injured when police fired live ammunition at attendees.

A similar scenario was witnessed on the 1st of August 2018 after the harmonised elections on July 30 where some people were also killed by soldiers during a demonstration by the public who were demanding the release of Presidential results. Police have brutally repressed protests, beating and arbitrarily detaining protesters on frivolous charges, following them up with various forms of judicial harassment (Kode and Mawarire 2017). The disappearance of an activist Itai Dzamara, during the Mugabe regime, was a result of efforts to silence activists. Many activists fled the country to avoid reprisals and formed “civil” society organisations abroad, to push for political reforms in Zimbabwe. While the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African Union (AU) and individual African countries failed to publicly criticise the Zimbabwean government for atrocities and violence

committed against its people, the Human Rights and NGOs in Zimbabwe which comprised of the Amnesty International (Zimbabwe), Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe, Justice for Children Trust, Legal Resources Foundation, Media Institute of Southern Africa, Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe and Research and Advocacy Unit condemned the actions as regrettable and unacceptable (Pindula 2018). The new President Emmerson Mnangagwa also took the human rights abuse to be a political gimmick of the main opposition party MDC Alliance and set a Commission of Inquiry, with controversial characters like Lovemore Madhuku who was both a lawyer against MDC Alliance and a Presidential Candidate.

In the events leading to the coup of the 17th November 2017, the state continued to attack “civil” society organisations. On the other hand, the “civil” society organisations were arrogant towards Mugabe and his government calling for regime change. Zimbabwe’s Platform for Concerned Citizens, a “civil” society group, called for a far-reaching national dialogue involving all political parties to help plot a new course for the country after the resignation of Mugabe (Pindula 2018). The question that one asks is, are “civil” society organisations civil in nature or they are evil, propelling the Euro-American regime change agenda in Africa. Why do the “civil” society organisations fight for regime change in Africa instead of fighting to decolonise the broader and more enduring neoimperial order from the Euro-American centre which is the ultimate source of African troubles and travails since the enslavement and colonial eras?

As economic circumstances remained terrible, more brave activists have taken to the streets in protest including the Tajamuka/Sesijikile group, #This Flag led by pastor Evan Mawarire, National Vendors Union of Zimbabwe led by Stendrick Zvorwadza among others. Police have brutally repressed any protest, beating and arbitrarily detaining protesters on frivolous charges, following them up with various forms of judicial harassment. A case in point is Mawarire who was charged with treason in May 2016 (New Zimbabwe 2018) but after his acquittal, he contested as an independent councillor. Mawarire gathered all independent politicians and called their civic/ political party People’s Own Voice (Clark 2018). Although Mawarire was a victim of Mugabe’s brutality, his involvement in politics is a clear indication that “civil” society organisations are not as “civil” as they should be - some are after regime change. Journalists also faced an equally challenging environment including physical attacks from the state and ZANU-(PF) actors’ (Kode and Mawarire 2017). Political leaders have not been shy to threaten activists who they accuse of having a regime-change agenda.

“Civil” or Evil Society?

Having looked at the “civil” society organisations and the state in Zimbabwe, the question that remains contested is whether these organisations are “civil” or rather evil in the eyes of Mugabe and the generality of Zimbabweans. Different schools of thought emerge around the idea of viewing the organisations as evil instead of “civil”. In order to do justice to the question one has to go back to the definition of terms and the historical trends that were followed in Zimbabwe with regards to the “civil” or evil society. For these organisations to qualify to be “civil” they should emerge from the local community without having strings attached to any foreign influences or sponsorship (Gumbo 2002).

An analysis of the “civil” or evil societies in Zimbabwe shows that there is a continuous engagement of some “civil” society groups with the opposition party especially the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) under the leadership of the late Morgan Tsvangirai. MDC became the strongest rival of ZANU (PF) which then raised questions, by leaders of the ruling party, of neutrality and legitimacy of “civil” society organisations. This also led to “civil” society groups to be labelled evil and anti-government by the ZANU (PF) government (Kode and Mawarire 2017).

It is also important to note that there is lack of ideological discipline in the “civil” society groups at the moment. They are dominated by foreign funders. Funding comes from various donors mainly from the Global North. Many of the organisations that are pouring in money to Zimbabwe have motives behind their supposed generosity. Most of these funders have openly stated that they can only fund certain programmes forcing “civil” society groups to alter their programmes to accommodate the needs and demands of the funders: they have forced some organisations to turn against their governments (Gumbo 2002).

Although some “civil” society organisations demonised Mugabe for allegedly running down the neo-colonial economy, it is necessary to note that the colonial economy has never been good for Africans – it was excellent for colonialists but not for Africans who were dispossessed and exploited by the colonialists (Nhemachena *et al.* 2017). Mugabe sought to make the economy good for Africans who have suffered odds since the colonial era. The neo-colonialists resisted the transformations that Mugabe wanted and then they conveniently blamed Mugabe for the consequences of their resistance to the Africanisation of the economy. There were many other players in the downturn of the economy; it was not only Mugabe who was playing the ball. In fact, the “civil” society organisations resisted Zimbabwean-defined democracy which included ownership and control of resources by Africans (Nhemachena *et al.* 2017). The organisations only promote a Western version of democracy and

they do not recognise the democracy that inheres in Africans owning and controlling their own resources.

The Future of “Civil” Society Organisations: Conclusion

During the stand-off between the Zimbabwean military and President Mugabe, which led to his historic resignation, there was reason for hope. The military allowed mass protests calling for Mugabe’s resignation, inspiring optimism for the future. A few months earlier, such demonstrations would have been violently repressed. Also, the army insisted on respecting constitutional provisions relating to the removal and appointment of the President.

On the contrary, since President Mnangagwa took over from Mugabe leading up to the harmonised elections of 30 July 2018 and after the elections, the president has focused on strengthening the role of the military in power structures, appointing the junta into the party and senior roles in government. He has done little so far to open up spaces for the participation of “civil” society organisations. There is concern around whether “civil” society organisations are going to participate freely in electoral processes before, during and after the polls and whether military decisions dictate the politics.

As a way-forward Zimbabwean “civil” society organisations must now reinvent themselves to reclaim and maintain spaces that these opportunities present to enable them to address challenges in a post-Mugabe Zimbabwe. Much work remains to be done in aligning laws to the new Constitution, electoral reforms are still incomplete and the ability of the state to allow for an environment that will enable free and fair elections has to be demanded.

This is only possible through creating the synergies between the formal “civil” society groups working on governance, democracy, human rights, social and economic development, gender and women’s rights, and the social movements and individual activists who have shown their power in mobilising citizens. Self-funding instead of foreign or donor funding is the only way to avoid becoming evil: foreign funded “civil” society organisations are evil societies tasked with regime change agendas in Africa. But to self-sponsor, the civil society organisations need to support land repossession, restitution and reparations for enslavement and colonisation of Africans. They can then use the resources to fund themselves. African civil society organisations cannot fund themselves precisely because African resources are owned and controlled by Euro-Americans.

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Youths without Pasts, Presents and Futures: African Youths and the Resilient (Neo) Colonial Dispossession

Peter Masvotore

Introduction

The chapter is a historical analysis of the ways in which [poor] colonially dispossessed African youths were coerced to migrate. It is argued that the dispossession and attendant migration left youths without knowledge of their past, present and future that would have guided them into responsible citizenship in Zimbabwe. In this regard, I argue that African youths are also being ideologically migrated and displaced from their indigenous cultures, morals, ethics, patriotism, essences and identities to Euro-American cultures and hybrid identities marked by crises. In other words, the youths are persuaded by Eurocentric scholars and thinkers to become animals, to become indistinct/indiscernible from animals – they are encouraged by Eurocentric scholars and thinkers to become homosexuals, ecosexuals and queers (Nhemachena this volume). The chapter underscores how economic hardships, (neo-)colonial ideologies and sham opportunities map onto adolescent bodies and scuttle their dreams and aspirations. The chapter draws from multidisciplinary sources to articulate how African youths are unfortunately exhorted to be resilient to (neo-) colonial dispossession in Zimbabwe. In addition the chapter also demonstrates the shortcomings of state policies some of which dehumanise, disempower and exclude African youths. Visited by hardships some of which originate from (neo-)imperialism, African youths are predisposed to violence as an instinct to survival. The chapter concludes by summarising the key lessons that may be learnt from Zimbabwe. These lessons include among others the need to redress colonial dispossession of African land. Also included is the need not to simplistically condemn African youths as violent, without factoring in the (neo-)colonially induced excruciating hardships that they face and that predispose them to survivalist violence.

Although the term youth is defined to mean people between the ages of fifteen and thirty-five years as enshrined in the constitution of Zimbabwe (Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.20) Act 2013:20; see also African Youth Charter 2006:11), in this chapter the term is not only limited to age but also embraces a lived experience regardless of age boundary. Additionally it also

refers to generational categories that are part of the struggle for influence and authority within every society (Ukeje and Iwilade 2012:340; see also Utas and Vigh 2006:11).

Historical Background and Overview

A historical and Biblical analysis shows that land occupies a central and critical position in the history of humanity in general and Zimbabweans in particular. From a Biblical point of view in the time of the Israelites land was and still is a source of life, sustenance, hope, freedom and redemption. This is also a true reflection of the African youths, Zimbabweans in particular who consider land as a source of livelihood. Historical narratives demonstrates that Zimbabwe has been negatively viewed internationally because of the land repossession.

For African youths, life is centred on their land which is inherited from their ancestors. Furthermore land for them facilitates some form of dignity, integrity and source of prosperity. Consequently, to be dispossessed of land is to be stripped of selfhood and livelihood. As a matter of fact land is a crucial resource that provides meaning, sustenance, means for poverty eradication and a source of investment and wealthy accumulation that is transferable from generation to generation among Zimbabweans. The spiritual realm of Africans particularly Zimbabweans cannot be divorced from their land (Bourdillon 1976). Further to this, it is a religious space where the deceased and the living connect hence the saying *mwanawerhu* (son of the soil) (see Nhemachena, Kangira & Mlambo 2019).

Besides land as a source of livelihood, it is also a fact as testified by Kanyenze *et al.* (2011: 275) and Masunungure (2017) that in Zimbabwe the formal sector employment reduced by half, from a peak of 1.4 million in 1998 to an estimated 700,000 in 2007. Thus, the observation stated above is in line with ideas posed by Nhemachena (2017:1) who argues that, “Africa has already suffered not only enslavement and colonial dispossession but also recent harsh (neo) liberal reforms imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Furthermore, owners of industries across the world are adopting industrial robots that also dispossess youth of formal employment. Nhemachena (2017:1) adds that, the employment of industrial robots will result in massive loss of employment in the industrial employment sectors. As such debates are underway regarding this phenomenon of humanoid robots taking over jobs from human beings. Indeed the Post and Telecommunications industry in Zimbabwe was left with no option but to retrench workers because of the introduction of technological gadgets such as cell phones and other ICTs.

Kanyenze *et al* (2011) indicate that the percentage of the people employed in the formal sector ‘declined from 14 per cent in 1980 to around 6 per cent by

2007'. However it should be acknowledged at this point that statistics on employment are debatable. According to UNOCHA (2008), only 480,000 people were formally employed in 2008, down from 3.6 million in 2003. There are indications that unemployment in the formal sector was as high as 94 per cent (Sitima and Hlatywayo 2013: 786; Masunungure 2017). In the light of the fact that [Africans] youths were colonially dispossessed of their land yet there is an increasingly bleak future in the employment sectors where industrial robots are taking over the jobs from human beings, it is imperative to examine the positions of African youths with regards to temporal questions.

The Dispossession of Youths and Migration from Zimbabwe

This chapter looks at factors leading to migration of youths from two angles. It is the view of Ukeje and Iwelade (2012:340) that 'the peculiar African context of social deprivation within which many young people grow up makes the youth experience there particularly problematic'. In the context of Zimbabwe, the circumstances that continuously push young people towards the margins of society and not the centre have to be interrogated. (Ukeje and Iwelade 2012:341; Amin 2001). According to the World Bank (2000) and Fukuyama (2004) Zimbabwe's marginal place in the international system and its "government deficits obligations" that are outstanding continue to alienate youths. In contrast to the above, Goody (2006) is opposed to the so-called 'international systems' or what he calls the 'Eurocentric diffusionism', which is an ideology that always places Europe in the centre and sees only phenomena that spread outward from Europe. The point here is that theorisations about diffusionism from Europe hide the Euro-American imperial realities of enslavement and colonial dispossession and exploitation of Africans. Those that dispossessed and exploited Africans cannot logically and legitimately claim that Africans have benefitted from diffusion from Euro-America. In view of the above, Euro-American systems cannot be morally and ethically justified as the 'ideal': they should not shift unrectified colonial faults to African governments which are in fact struggling to repossess what was stolen during the colonial eras. In other words even though African states are partly to blame through their policies to alienate youths from the centre, international Euro-American systems are largely responsible because they push African youths to the periphery of economic development. The young people feel increasingly unable to ensure that promises of the new economy are made good. (Ukeje and Iwelade 2012:342). All these and other issues are explored in this chapter.

Colonialism as a key factor in youth dispossession and migration is evident in land theft where Africans were forced off their fertile land and driven to infertile areas called reserves in Zimbabwe. According to Chemwaita and Moyo

(2014:43) ‘reserves were areas that were earmarked for Africans to occupy: they were not suitable for human habitation’. Because of this process of land dispossession the Ndebele were forced to occupy the Gwayi and Shangani reserves while in Mashonaland many reserves were created for Africans. It should be noted that the conditions in the reserves were extremely harsh, the soils were infertile and unproductive. These areas were disease-infected, received low rainfall and they were tsetse infested. Ranger (1967) observes that Africans nicknamed these areas ‘cemeteries or graveyards’ because many people and their livestock died as a result of diseases and famine.

Dispossession, during the colonial era, was followed up with forced labour which deprived African youths of opportunities to develop self-sufficiently. The colonial settlers demanded cheap labour on the colonial farms and mines. The target group for forced labour were youths who were deemed to be energetic enough to work in the farms and mines. Chemwaita and Moyo (2014:43) confirm that ‘the district administrator forcibly rounded men to work on the farms and mines; they were not well paid and were beaten up at work places’. All this was in violation of human rights. In this regard, the colonialists never had respect for African marriages and families that were disregarded during the colonial forced labour regimes which separated husbands and wives. Similarly, contemporary developments of humanoid sex robots disregard African families by encouraging youths to marry humanoid robots instead of marrying human beings. In fact, African youths are dissuaded by Euro-American NGOs and “civil” society organisations from paying marriage payments for human wives on the premise that marriage payments are oppressive and patriarchal. Yet the African youths are then encouraged to use the resources/money they would have used for marriage payments to instead buy humanoid sex robots (Nhemachena, Warikandwa & Amoo 2018). Also depriving African youths of future social and biological continuity, Euro-Americans are encouraging the African youths to become homosexuals and ecosexuals (Nhemachena this volume). This is depicted as exercise of freedom and human rights but it amounts to freedom and human rights to destroy human social institutions – in essence freedom to become animals (see Nhemachena this volume). Given these regressions, the future of African youths is sadly more in the animal realm than in the human realm. It is more in the realm of the dead than it is in the realm of the living.

As if that was not enough, White colonial settlers killed African cattle which were alleged to be affected by rinderpest: they did not consult the Africans before killing the cattle (Chemwaita and Moyo 2014). This can be interpreted as a deliberate move by White colonial settlers to eradicate African herds because cattle were important to African societies particularly the youths. Furthermore both Shona and Ndebele regard cattle as a status symbol of wealth and could be

used to pay lobola (bride wealth). Additionally taxation was introduced in different forms and it became a heavy burden for the Africans.

Neocolonialism thrives on dispossessing youths of their God given natural resources in the form of land and minerals such as gold and diamonds. Further to this, colonialism also displaced Africans through cultural domination. Ngugi waThiongo (1993:32) underscores that, 'while there is need for cultures to interact and borrow from each other, this has to be on the basis of equality and mutual respect'. Adding to the above Makombe (2014:90) affirms that 'centeredness is the basis of all knowledge and human development. A person must know where they stand in order to know in what direction they must proceed'. Therefore Africans ought to be psychologically located in Africa and not measure themselves against western standards. In this regard, Euro-American technologies to manipulate [African] human memories by deleting and editing the memories constitute serious threats to the personal integrity of Africans. The insertion of nanobots and chips into human brains/minds, so as to manipulate them, means that neoempire will be able to delete and edit human memories - in essence depriving the human beings of their personal integrity, privacy and senses of direction or orientation in life (Nhemachena this volume). Thus, it is particularly African youths that are targeted with the technologies. Praised as tech-savvy and cyborgs, the youths are made to think that they are using the technology when in fact they are being manipulated using the pieces of technology (Nhemachena this volume).

Apart from inserting chips in the bodies/brains of humans and the manipulating the youths' minds via technology, other scholars like Makombe (2014:90) notes that western values have been embraced as the ideal at the expense of the local content. Additionally western/colonial education has destroyed African knowledge systems by celebrating western heroes. The legendary White explorers and imperialists like Cecil John Rhodes who are said to have discovered Africa, that was assumed to be a dark and chaotic continent, are venerated while African heroes like Chaminuka, Mbuya Nehanda, Mugabe and many others are denigrated. In this sense, while African scholars are fighting against the colonisation of their mind (Ngugi waThiongo 1993), Euro-America is busy developing and inserting chips in order to deepen the colonisation of African minds and bodies (Nhemachena this volume).

Neo/colonial schools impart knowledge that looks down upon Africa and is thoroughly irrelevant to the African context. History indicates that missionaries also facilitated the process of dispossession and forced labour of poor African people. What is more fascinating is that Nhemachena (2016:2) reminds us that "much as colonial officials who presided over the colonial holocaust were proclaimed humanitarian and saints by Popes, empire and capitalism still retain the privilege to perpetrate planetary ultra-objective,

systemic violence without being accountable for it”. In other words those that are considered the custodians of modern democracy and the rule of law are the very White people who formed minority apartheid governments that denied Africans, youths in particular, the right to vote and chart their own destiny. The western epistemologies are questionable in Africa because the same were used to support the plundering of resources from Africa, through colonialism.

The assumed superiority of Eurocentric education systems is unfounded. Scholarship opportunities are dangled before African youths to lure them into Eurocentric education systems that train them to “excel in irrelevance” (Nyamnjoh 2012). This is worsened by the allure of scholarship opportunities that entice thousands of Zimbabweans to traverse outside its borders for academic “development”. Pursuant to the above, in 2013 the former United States President Barak Obama announced the Washington Fellowship for Young African Leaders, a new programme that was going to give thousands of promising young Africans opportunities to go to the United States of America and “develop” their skills at US Universities (Mawere and Van Stam 2016:48). The risk is that some university campuses are infiltrated by secret intelligence agents that recruit and use foreign students to destabilise their own governments back in their home countries (Warikandwa, Nhemachena & Mpofu 2017). The actual quantum of Africa’s brain drain, particularly in Zimbabwe, is difficult to fathom because there is no registration system that captures this kind of data. Moreover some young people who leave Zimbabwe do so illegally so that their records are never captured.

Eurocentric education serves to divide Africans because those who acquire it become zombified and alienated from their people (Makombe 2014:91). This is the reason why Mugabe insisted that no lessons about tolerance can be learnt from invading imperialists who demonise African people for resisting dispossession and forced labour. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013:331) even though there is continuous resistance of the forms of domination, Africans have not yet succeeded in destroying the global technologies of colonialism that continue to prevent the possibilities of African agency. As such he opted for a decolonisation and de-imperialisation of international order in the 21st century Africa in order to divorce the continent from the north.

Further to the forms of dispossession in Africa, Nhemachena (2017) notes that impending humanoid robots have already started to take jobs away from human beings leaving them without human security and with depleted human development opportunities. In this case Africa, has already suffered not only enslavement and colonial dispossession as mentioned above but also they experienced harsh (neo-) liberal reforms, hence Africa cannot afford to relax in the context of threats of massive loss of employment following invasions by humanoid robots in the industrial employment sectors.

Besides colonialism there is also perpetual government failure in Zimbabwe in terms of policies that continue to create a society in perpetual crisis and it is worse for marginalised social categories like children, women and youth. Policies passed through legislation during and after colonialism also facilitated the loss of youths' African identity, culture and possessions. This left some youths without past and present - even their future is compromised.

Colonial legislation that was oppressive served the interests of the minority White settlers. It served to oppress and dehumanise Africans. Chemwaita and Moyo (2014:950) noted that colonisation followed some patterns that destroyed African independence through crafted pieces of legislation that were passed to justify the expropriation of African resources. Today the government is trying to address the colonial imbalances in land ownership. From land repossession to indigenisation laws and policies, there is evidence that the government of Zimbabwe is trying hard to redress the colonial criminality that resulted in dispossession and exploitation of Africans.

Although Blacks have made advances in the control of mines, land and manufacturing sectors of the economy, the youths are still marginalised. They are not found at the centre of the economy instead they are at the periphery of economic development in Zimbabwe and in Africa as a whole. Those in control of these economic sectors are the transnational corporations and some Black political elites rather than youths (Nhemachena 2016).

There was the introduction of Zimbabwe's Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1990 under the pretext of bringing about a modernised, competitive and export led industrialisation. However, the programme undermined the relative stability of Zimbabwe's economy. Panganayi (2014:184) describes IMF-led ESAP as a 'policy that involved among other things trade, currency de-regulation, devaluation of Zimbabwean dollar, lifting up of price controls, chopping of social spending and removing of consumer subsidies'. This liberalisation had a negative impact on Zimbabwean companies such as Triangle, Hippo Valley, Mkwasine, David Whitehead and others that retrenched thousands of workers (Panganayi 2014:185).

Multitudes of young people were affected by ESAP directly and indirectly. Zimbabwe plunged into an accelerated spiral of economic and social decline and this led youths to be deprived of means of survival and some were forced to migrate into neighbouring countries and overseas in search of employment. Even those in rural areas were not spared, instead the plight of the rural population worsened with ESAP. Muzondidya (2010) noted that as the agro-industrialisation sectors were de-industrialised, rural poverty increased as a result of ESAP's adverse effects on the agricultural output of the poor rural folks who could not survive above the poverty datum line.

Furthermore the introduction of policies, including about Project Sunrise (*Zuva rabuda*, *Ilanga seliphumile*) and others negatively influenced Zimbabweans, most of who are young people, in terms of economic empowerment. This project was meant to protect Zimbabweans against chaos of financial or banking sectors and cash riots in the streets. Additionally it was also designed to alter and ameliorate people's socio-economic challenges (Gono 2009). It was initiated to increase liquidity by introducing bearer cheques.

However, *Zuva Rabuda* project negatively impacted Zimbabweans because even though the project was meant to protect people from financial chaos, the introduction of bearer cheques resulted in hyperinflation. This resulted in the rapid loss of value of the Zimbabwean currency and led to dollarisation of economic transactions (Raftopoulos and Mlambo 2009: 222). This policy dehumanised young people.

Another policy code named 'Operation Murambatsvina' (restore legacy) was launched in June 2005 to ensure that sanity returned to urban areas and business centres on the country. Also all unauthorised vending sites and buildings were razed to the ground. In consequence some people were affected by this operation and relocated to rural areas while others were left homeless. For this reason it is argued that this operation disempowered many people either through loss of accommodation, livelihood or both (UN Report 2005). Those affected were mostly youths who had started vending activities in cities and towns.

The impact of Operation Murambatsvina included among others the destruction of the AIDS centre in Hatcliffe that helped over 600 people (Maposa *et al.* 2010: 197). For most Zimbabweans, the HIV/AIDS repercussions of the forced removals were a setback as some of them were relocated to places where they could not access their medication (Anti-Retroviral Therapy). Further to this the situation was worsened by the fact that in the rural areas, the health services were under-resourced and the centres understaffed. Moyo (2000) viewed the clean-up as a response to the reassertion of state authority and reigning in of radical elements within the ZANU PF party, the regulation of the economy and crackdown on corruption and the restoration of functioning services to cities. On the contrary Maposa *et al* (2010:197) says, the Operation Murambatsvina can be viewed from a political angle where the MDC party thought the operation was designed to destroy the party's urban base. The conclusion was that by relocating people to rural areas they will be under the sway of ruling party aligned Chiefs.

In addition to the above policies, an operation code-named 'Chikorokoza chapera' was unleashed in November 2006 where homes of thousands of informal miners were destroyed. The government accused the informal miners of fuelling inflation by selling gold on the black market (Report on the

Presidential Land Review Committee 2008). After the displacement of these young informal miners, the government took over in places such as Chiadzwa where it is now in the public domain that 15 billion United States dollars went missing and never contributed to the national fiscus (Herald 28 April 2016; Newsday 16 March 2016; Daily News 1 January 2018). It can be deduced from these policies that they were crafted with a hidden agenda even though they may appear to be serving the people they never benefitted the majority of the people except the few political heavy weights who were riding on the masses of people while hiding on certain crafted policies to continue to disenfranchise Zimbabwean youths.

African Youths and Violence

Many people in Zimbabwe, youths included, were displaced and uprooted from their original and traditional places as a result of the colonisers' mischief making. Be that as it may, the contemporary societies in Africa, Zimbabwe in particular, are coming to terms to reconsider the youth question and ways in which it feeds into land ownership issues (Ukeje and Iwide 2012:339). In as much as youth engagement is having considerable impact for good or for bad among communities, the focus should not merely be on how society shapes youths and experiences of youths but the understandings of the dynamics of these social changes in Africa must also be integrated. The ways in which young people in Zimbabwe are excluded and suffer unemployment and landlessness need to be seriously considered.

The implication of social marginalisation of youths is discerned in violent conduct, this fuels generational tensions that often end in further youth exclusion, thus creating a vicious cycle of exclusion and resistance (Ukeje and Iwilade 2012:341). Nhemachena (2016:1) and Ndlovu Gatsheni (2013) add that focus on violence should not only be limited to perpetrators as has been the custom, rather there is need to trace the violence to coloniality, that includes ways in which the empire has continued to poke into Africa decades after the end of formal colonialism. Therefore it is vital to look at the structural conditions that shape youths' experiences and provide disincentives for violence. In other words, before labelling youths as hooligan demonstrators, as happened in the just ended harmonised elections of 2018, it is necessary to critically consider the local and global circumstances surrounding youths' violent behaviour.

Conclusion

There are key lessons that can be learnt from this chapter. In Africa, and Zimbabwe in particular, young people migrate to other countries in search of job opportunities. They are often enthused by inaccurate information and unfounded high expectations. Everyday, thousands of young people either willingly or unwillingly join the ranks of illegal migrants. A parallel industry of illicit travel agents, job brokers and middlemen has evolved to “assist” these migrants, many of whom are also victims of human trafficking (International Organization for Migration 1997). For this reason young women and girls who are impoverished and uneducated and who may be members of indigenous, ethnic minority, rural or refugee groups are most vulnerable to this form of exploitation (James and Atler 2003). In order to avoid dispossession and youths’ migration with its attendant risks and disadvantages, governments need to create viable employment alternatives for young people in their home countries. At a more fundamental level, action must be taken to address root causes such as dispossession, exploitation, poverty and contribute to narrowing the inequalities between rich and poor nations (International Organization for Migration 1997). Efforts are also required to ensure that young people are provided with sufficient education, training and skill development to gain the knowledge and confidence they need to become successful participants in their national labour markets.

Since land occupies the central and crucial position in the history of Africans, there is need to redress colonial dispossession of African land in order to create opportunities for young people to have a source of life, sustenance, hope, freedom, redemption and take pride in their land as a source of their livelihood inherited from one generation to another generation. As a matter of fact, acquiring land for Africans is a form of dignity, integrity and source of prosperity. As such, to be dispossessed of this jewel resource is to be stripped off their selfhood.

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Advancing African Interests and Survival? Robert Mugabe's Messianic Role at the United Nations

Eve Zvichanzi Nyemba

Introduction

Since Zimbabwe was admitted as a member of the United Nations (UN) on 30 July 1980, shortly after the attainment of independence, Mugabe has been a major spectacle at the multilateral organisation. He quickly became the darling of the UN due to his tenacious fight against apartheid in the early 1980s right up to 1994 when South Africa attained majority rule. At the behest of Mugabe, Zimbabwe was twice elected to the powerful United Nations Security Council (UNSC) from 1983 to 1984 and from 1991 to 1992. Mugabe was then seen by Euro-America as a liberator, a statesman and an African icon. The decision to adopt the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) earmarked to restore land to Blacks, who had been robbed of their land during the colonial period, culminated in the deterioration of relations between the West and Mugabe. Mugabe was demonised as a renegade whose wings needed to be clipped. A co-ordinated sanctions regime from the European Union, United States of America (USA) and Australia among others, crippled Zimbabwe's economy and eroded Mugabe's legitimacy. The UN became an arena for Mugabe to present his grievances against the West which imposed what he called 'illegal and filthy sanctions' against Zimbabwe. His calls went unheeded but in 2008, in the aftermath of violent elections, the UNSC failed to pass a draft resolution to effect sanctions on Zimbabwe. Mugabe saw this attempt as unfair treatment by the UN and decided to turn the UN into a platform to defend the interests of developing nations, particularly, on UN Reform, adoption of a new economic order and sustainable development. This chapter seeks to examine what motivated Mugabe to use the UN to fight his battles. It seeks to determine the implications of his messianic attempts to champion African interests on global governance.

Robert Gabriel Mugabe was a political icon at the United Nations whose personality, career and life attracted passionate haters and admirers alike. His ascension to power was as equally dramatic as his sudden and graceless exit. Thirty-seven years of rule saw him wear many hats as freedom fighter, liberator, nationalist, academic, politician, Pan-Africanist and global icon for restitution,

redistribution, indigenisation and restoration. His admirers saw in Mugabe, a champion of developing countries' interests. He was the de facto spokesperson of Africa at the UN. He was the voice of the voiceless. A defender of the rights of downtrodden Africans by the 'neo-colonial West'. His haters however, saw him as a "corrupt despot" who clung on to "power" using Machiavellian strategies to outwit his opponents and maintain his hegemony. Mugabe was perceived as a man who had single-handedly ruined the supposedly once prosperous bread basket of Africa and plunged it into crippling economic malaise and international isolation.

There is debate on whether Zimbabwe was really a breadbasket of Africa or Southern Africa? Wandile Sihlobo, an agronomist argues that there is limited evidence to suggest that Zimbabwe was a dominant country in Africa's food production (Sihlobo 2017). "Zimbabwe's production of key staple foods like wheat and maize never surpassed a 10% share on the continent over the last 55 years" (Ibid). Sihlobo (2017) argues that Zimbabwe had a volatile wheat and maize production such that it cannot be considered as having been once the breadbasket of Africa. In the period 1960 – 1980, Zimbabwe then Southern Rhodesia, was a net exporter of maize, contributing at least 6% of Africa's maize production and outpacing consumption by an average of 400, 000 tonnes a year (Sihlobo 2017). During Mugabe's first two decades in power, from 1980 – 2000, Zimbabwe's maize production, dwindled. Following the implementation of the FTLRP production fell to an average of 2% share to Africa's maize yield from 2001 to 2016 (Ibid). The country's consumption exceeded production by 550, 000 tonnes per year, turning it into a net importer of maize (Sihlobo 2017). The statistics above suggest that Zimbabwe was self-sufficient during the colonial period and the first two decades of Mugabe's rule. Although Zimbabwe had a strong and impressive agricultural sector on the continent of Africa before the FTLRP, findings suggest that it was never the breadbasket of Southern Africa.

During my own interviews, one respondent argued that Zimbabwe's food production declined in the 1990s, way before the implementation of FTLRP. He attributed the decline to the large scale commercial farmers who turned to cash crop production like Tobacco and horticulture (fruit, vegetables and flowers) for export. Hence, Zimbabwe was not the bread basket of Southern Africa. The failure to solve the succession crisis between the two main factions [Generation 40 (G40) and Lacoste respectively] in Mugabe's ruling Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) in November 2017, led to his purge by the army in an operation code named, Operation Restore Legacy (ORL). Pindula (2018) posits that ORL was a military assisted transition to the resignation of Mugabe and the subsequent succession by Emmerson Mnangagwa. The military claimed that the operation's aim was to restore discipline in the rank and file of ZANU PF and stop the purging of people with

a liberation war background from the party (Ibid). This was in the aftermath of the dismissal of Emmerson Mnangagwa from the presidium where he was serving as the Vice President of Zimbabwe. Although the military denies that ORL was not a coup, scholars like Mandaza and Reeler (2018:4) contend that, 'whilst it seems strangely unpopular to call the internal political re-structuring of ZANU-PF a coup, it is obvious to all that this is what has taken place'.

This chapter seeks to analyse the underlying factors facilitating Mugabe's use of the UN as a stage for political, economic, legal and moral combat with the West. It seeks to examine the efficacy of Mugabe's megaphone diplomacy at the UN as a strategy for advancing African interests. It will assess the implications of Mugabe's 'queer' defence of domestic policies of restitution, restoration and compensation at the UN in the wake of Zimbabwe's debilitating economic and succession crisis. Mugabe did what no other African leader dared to do. He provided a remedy for past injustices that the Blacks suffered due to the colonial theft of land in Zimbabwe. If as Cowen (1997:168) attests to, 'the US government has already paid compensation to descendants of the Japanese-Americans imprisoned in internment camps during the Second World War and in New Zealand, the Crown has begun to settle land and resource claims that have been filed by Maori', why were Mugabe's claims anomalous? The main research questions this study seeks to address are: was Mugabe's defence of African interests motivated by Pan Africanism or by desperation to survive a hostile western avalanche against his regime? Was Mugabe motivated by the mendacity and dishonesty of the Tony Blair government that repudiated Britain's colonial responsibility for land redistribution in Zimbabwe? In Clare Short's letter to the then Zimbabwean Minister of Agriculture and Land, Kumbirai Kangai, she indicated that the British Labour government would not honour the Conservative government's commitment to provide compensation for Zimbabwe's land redistribution programme (Blessing-Miles 2010: 87). Short said:

I should make it clear that we do not accept that Britain has a special responsibility to meet the costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe. We are a new government from diverse backgrounds without links to former colonial interests. My own origins are Irish, and as you know, we were colonised, not colonisers.

She further elaborated that:

I am told Britain provided a package of assistance for resettlement in the period immediately following independence. This was, I gather, carefully planned and implemented, and met most of its targets. Again, I am told there were discussions

in 1989 and 1996 to explore the possibility of further assistance. However, that is all in the past.

Claire Short's letter demonstrated that the avenue for assistance on Zimbabwe's land restitution policy had been closed. This culminated in the FTLRP in 2000 leading to the souring of relations between Britain and its Western allies, particularly, the US, EU and Australia. The Mugabe regime was labelled as a 'pariah' (Youde 2013). It was named an 'outpost of tyranny' alongside Cuba, Burma, Belarus, Iran and North Korea by the former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (Independent 2005). Was this demonisation of Mugabe by the West justified? Were Mugabe's speeches at the UN mere rhetoric?

The research for this chapter employed a case study design. A purposive sampling frame guided the study. The qualitative methodological framework was adopted. Primary and secondary sources were used to collect data. Documentary search was useful in analysing and interpreting Mugabe's foreign policy pronouncements, speeches at the UN and various texts on Zimbabwe's multilateral relations. In-depth interviews with key informants were conducted with diplomats, academics, civil servants and politicians. Data were analysed through discourse, thematic and content analysis. Ethical considerations of informed consent, confidentiality and participants' right to withdraw were taken into account.

Who is Mugabe?

Mugabe was born on 21 February 1924 in Kutama, Zvimba in Southern Rhodesia (now known as Zimbabwe). He acquired his Marxist and Pan-Africanist thought at the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute at Winneba between 1958 and 1960 (Norman 2018). Mugabe underwent further Marxist – Leninist ideological training during his years in exile (Moore 2001). He joined the National Democratic Party under Joshua Nkomo as publicity secretary in 1960 (Holland 2007). The Zimbabwe African People's Union was formed in 1961 to replace NDP which had been banned. ZAPU was banned in 1962 leading to the birth of rival nationalist Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in 1963 (Holland 2007). Mugabe became a member of ZANU PF but he was detained and released in 1974 (Bio Newsletter 2018). The revolutionary leader gained control of ZANU PF in 1977 and became part of the delegation that negotiated the Lancaster House Constitution (Holland 2007). The main purpose of the Lancaster House Conference conducted from 10 September to 15 December 1979, was to discuss and reach agreement on the terms of an Independence Constitution and the supervision of elections to enable Southern

Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) to proceed to legal independence. The conference was chaired by Lord Carrington and the delegates participating in the settlement included John Nkomo, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Ian Douglas Smith and Robert Mugabe. Land reform according to Moyo (2014) officially began in 1979 with the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement which attempted to ‘equitably distribute land between the historically disenfranchised Blacks and the minority-Whites who had ruled Southern Rhodesia from 1890 to 1979’.

Mugabe became the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe in 1980 when the country gained independence from British colonial rule. Mugabe consolidated his power when he became the first executive President “with the powers and office of the Prime Minister subsumed into that of the Presidency, the post previously being titular” (Miller 2012:2). The post of Prime Minister had been a purely formal title without any real authority.

Mugabeism

Mugabeism is a difficult concept to discuss since it has many interpretations depending on what one wants to depict about the character, personality and political life of Robert Mugabe. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni in Moyo (2017:10) “Mugabeism is a summation of a constellation of political controversies, political behaviour, political ideas, utterances, rhetoric and actions that have crystallised around Mugabe’s political life”. Moyo (2017) describes the political controversies, behaviour and actions that constitute Mugabeism.

Mugabeism”...stands for all that destroyed the “jewel of Africa” ...systemic corruption, vote-rigging, human rights abuses, rampant nepotism, looting of state resources by those in power — in short, a heartless dictatorship that has reduced 90% of Zimbabweans to unemployment and abject poverty (Mbanga in Moyo 2018:10).

Zimbabwe after independence was considered as the ‘jewel of Africa’ because of the impressive policies of reconciliation, education and poverty reduction, all attributed to the new ‘egalitarian’ Mugabe regime in the early 1980s. Mugabe’s restitution policies like the FTLRP and the Indigenisation Economic Empowerment Act (IEEA) which stipulated that Blacks were to own 51% shares of all companies operating in Zimbabwe led to a slump in Zimbabwe’s economy. Is the West justified in criticising Mugabe for his supposed excesses when they also violate human rights? For instance, human rights abuses are also perpetrated by the Western countries. The USA is notorious for police brutality towards Afro-Americans which has led to the

formation of civil rights groups, the #BlackLivesMatter group (Siscoe 2016). The USA has placed sanctions on Zimbabwe in the form of Zimbabwe Democracy Economic Recovery Act which forbids American officials at the IMF and World Bank to vote in favour of the granting of lines of credit to Zimbabwe. The sanctions have affected not only the government of Zimbabwe but the ordinary man on Zimbabwe's streets. The Bretton Wood institutions, the IMF and WB have been criticised for plunging African economies into economic downturns through their Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) which further impoverished African countries. This argument is crystallised by Bond (2006), 'Africa is poor, ultimately, because its economy and society have been ravaged by international capital as well as by local elites who are often propped up by foreign powers'.

Others are more explicit in their analysis of Mugabeism. Moyo (2018:11) stresses that "Mugabeism is an autocratic way of leadership whereby everything is centred around an absolute ruler". However, in a world where African leaders are dictated to by Euro-America, it is inaccurate to say that African leaders are absolute rulers – in fact the absolute rulers in Africa are the Euro-Americans. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015:1139) denotes that "a neoliberal-inspired perspective sees Mugabeism as a form of racial chauvinism and authoritarianism marked by antipathy towards norms of liberal governance and disdain for human rights and democracy". Despite the negative connotation that the Mugabeism attracts, Chengu (2014) states that "Mugabeism is an ideology that appreciates that the only way to allow Africa to surpass its former glory, is to undergo the three stages of any true African revolution: political, agrarian and economic".

Chengu (2014) has a positive description of Mugabeism. He argues that Zimbabwe under the tutelage of Robert Mugabe managed to achieve land democratisation and economic indigenisation which have not been achieved by most African countries (Ibid). Most African countries have achieved political but not economic independence. "Colonialism was an economic system designed to systematically exploit indigenous Africans for the betterment of Europeans" (Chengu 2018:1) who perpetrated theft of land, livestock and other means of production. Mugabeism is "a contested phenomenon...of a Pan-African redemptive ideology opposed to all forms of imperialism and colonialism and dedicated to a radical redistributive project predicated on redress of colonial injustices" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2017:5). It is important to note that Mugabe is not the first or only one to claim restitution or restoration. The struggles for restitution are much wider than Mugabe. The World Conference on Racism is a series of conferences organised by UNESCO which have been conducted to promote the struggle against racism. Four conferences have been conducted to date, beginning in 1978, then 1983, 2001, and 2009 (United Nations website). At the conference in 2001, African countries and African

American NGOs wanted reparations and an apology for slavery. They also wanted slavery to be considered as a crime against humanity, African countries have been clamouring for fairness and justice at the International Criminal Court. According to Pheko (2015: 1), 'Former US President George W. Bush and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair destroyed entire countries in their military adventurism. Yet they are free men enjoying their retirement without any fear of international justice'. There has been an outcry by African states on why African leaders have been indicted for human rights violations, war crimes and crimes against humanity, yet Western leaders are free and immune from prosecution for the same. Former President of Ivory Coast Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Taylor have been indicted by the ICC. The United States is on record for claiming that the USA will place sanctions on the ICC if it tries to put US officials under trial.

The question that arises then is: why conflate the demands for restitution or reparations with Mugabe only, when other nations and groups have been advocating for the same compensation? Is it not just a way of caricaturing him? After all, the FTLRP which Mugabe embarked on distributed land to 413 000 Black households (Chengu 2018). Previously 42% of the land in Zimbabwe was owned by 4 000 White farmers (Chengu 2018). Mugabe stated that the 'return' of the land to its 'rightful' owners marked the completion of the decolonisation process' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2017). Mugabe tried to achieve economic revolution through the Indigenisation Economic Empowerment Act which provided for 51% share ownership of companies to Black Zimbabweans. This policy was so unpopular with the Eurocentric institutions, individuals and organisations that opposed Black economic empowerment and indigenisation resulting in capital flight, lack of foreign direct "investment" (FDI) and a worsening neo-colonial economic outlook.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2017) notes that Mugabe's character is complex because his ideology is rooted in Marxism, Stalinism, Maoism, Nkrumahism, Nyerereism, Garveyism, Negritude, Pan-Africanism, African neo-traditionalism and Nativism. These characterisations depict Mugabe's many-sided personalities. He is a radical Marxist who fought the war of liberation against White settlers using Marxism in the forms of Leninism and Maoism. He was inspired by the African founding fathers of the Organisation of African Unity, Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere. Mugabe most of all, is Pan-Africanist at heart, inspired by the likes of Marvin Garvey. Mugabe is indeed a complex character. It makes it difficult to make sense of Mugabe (Norman 2008). Mugabeism is indeed diverse. It has championed the issues of liberation and oppression; peace and war; reconciliation and retribution; empowerment and dispossession; victimhood and heroism; social justice and injustice (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2017:5) domestically and internationally. Mugabe's charisma, personal

appeal and eloquence has been used to deliver memorable addresses at the UN General Assembly. Mugabeism according to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015), is characterised by impunity and the failure to account for the;

traumatic and violent moments ranging from the Gukurahundi atrocities of the 1980s, suppression riots in 1998, Operation Murambatsvina of 2005, and the post-29 March election-related violence code-named Operation Mavhotera Papi (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015:5).

The Impunity that Ndlovu-Gatsheni alludes to is problematic. Those who killed Saddam Hussein on vexatious allegations that he possessed weapons of mass destruction have not faced the same vitriol as Mugabe. Is this monstrosity part of Mugabeism or are Saddam's killers Mugabes also? The French, Germans and other Europeans have not been punished for enslaving and colonising Africans – are they Mugabeists too? If impunity applies to a wider range of states, institutions and people, then why conflate it with Mugabe alone?

Rational Actor Model of Decision Making

In light of the above characterisation of Mugabe, the Rational Actor Model (RAM) of Decision Making is best suited to analyse if his decisions were rational or not? Mintz and DeRouen (2010:3) posit that Foreign Policy Decision Making (FPDM) “refers to the choices individuals, groups and coalitions make that affect a nation's actions on the international stage”. Goldstein and Pevehouse (2010:105) postulate that FPDM “as a steering process in which adjustments are made as per the feedback from the outside world”. This chapter will analyse the decisions that Mugabe made when he had cordial relations with the West and particularly when that affected Zimbabwe's foreign relations. Decisions are carried out by actions taken to change the world, and then information from the world is mentioned to evaluate the effects of these actions. According to Raman (n.d.) decision-making in Foreign Policy involves the analysis and assessment of past and current data, in the light of our past experience and that of others, who had dealt with similar situations, in order to identify the need and available options for action in the future and the likely implications of each of those options for the protection and promotion of our national interests. Decision making involves action or inaction. Most foreign policy decisions are made in a constricted environment where they are competing issues vying for the leader's attention. It is imperative to understand the constrictions Mugabe faced in making his foreign policy decisions to determine if they were in the national interest.

Allison Graham developed three different models of foreign policy decision making. These are The Rational Actor Model (RAM), Organisational Process Model (OPM) and Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM). This study will focus on the RAM since Mugabe was the chief maker and articulator of Zimbabwe's foreign policy. The RAM of decision making is the process to choose the right options to achieve national goals by analysing all possible alternatives and their consequences (Stein 2008).

The Rational Actor Model, like a chess board game as it always aims to acquire the optimum benefit with minimum cost (Shodhganga 2018). Under the Rational Actor Model, the state is the only player, hence there is hardly any room for the non-state actors or interest groups (Ibid). The leader is not bound to go along with advice or input of information. The Decision maker under the RAM enjoys full freedom to go with his own cognitive interpretations ensuring maximum benefit for the nation (Shodhganga 2018). The decision of the leader is considered supreme and absolute (Shodhganga 2018). There is no place for emotions, beliefs, cultural traditions and self-assumptions in the decision making process. This model ignores the importance of the individuals involved in decision making as individuals are grown-up, with their own beliefs, values, emotions, perceptions, ideologies and host of other traits which might affect their decisions (Raymond *et al.* 2008). For instance, Mugabe's ideological schooling and his deep belief in Pan-Africanism affected his domestic and foreign policy.

The application of the RAM to African foreign policies is not without its questions. For instance, do Africans and their states enjoy freedom in a world dominated by Euro-America and the UNSC that exclude Africans and their states from permanent membership? The answer is obvious. Mugabe spent his greater time at the UNGA plenary sessions advocating for equitable representation and distribution of power at the UN.

Membership to the United Nations

Patel (2006:176), notes that Mugabe was the chief maker and articulator of Zimbabwe's foreign policy because of his academic and liberation war credentials as the leader of the nationalist party ZANU PF. After attaining independence, Zimbabwe successfully applied for admittance to the United Nations. United Nations Security Council Resolution 477 was adopted unanimously on 30 July 1980, paving the way for the country's membership to the world body by a United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/S-11/1 on 25 August 1980 (United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library, 2018). Zimbabwe was officially admitted to the UN as the 153rd member of the global

institution. In Mugabe's first address as the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, he outlined the guiding principles of Zimbabwe's foreign policy as;

national sovereignty and equality among nations, attainment of a socialist and egalitarian democratic society, right of all peoples to self-determination and independence, non-racialism at home and abroad, positive nonalignment and peaceful co-existence among nations (Patel 1985: 229–230).

The Underlying Factors Motivating Mugabe's UN Strategy

Policy of Reconciliation

Mugabe soon became a passionate proponent of the foreign policy principles highlighted above. In 1984 he enunciated the national policy of reconciliation which Zimbabwe had begun implementing by adopting a Government of National Unity (GNU). He reiterated this policy adoption in his address to the UNGA in 1984. Mugabe adhered to the principle of non-racialism at home and abroad by declaring that “past differences had to be forgotten and past crimes forgiven” if Zimbabwe was to experience economic development (UNGA Official Records, 1984: 327). Mugabe was indeed living up to the expectations of the UN. His non-racial policy was in line with articles 1 and 55 of the UN Charter which provide for the observance of fundamental human rights and non-discrimination on the grounds of race, sex, language or religion (Charter of the United Nations).

Promotion of Self-determination and Independence

a. Anti-Apartheid Policy

At the international level, Mugabe began to champion African interests on the policy of non-racialism by advocating for the eradication of apartheid in South Africa (SA) at the UNGA. Mugabe was critical of the SA government which had subjected another African country, Namibia under colonial rule. In his 1984 speech at the UNGA, he referred to SA, as “a racist regime” (UNGA Official Records 1984:329). Mugabe called the SA government “an apartheid regime (UNGA Official Records 1986:6)”. Mugabe's vitriol was directed at the SA regime though he did not hesitate to subtly indicate that the apartheid government was being propped up by the western states. Mugabe referred to them as “respectable Members of the UN” (Ibid). Indeed, in the 1980s, Mugabe was a darling of the West, hence he trod with caution and his rhetoric was friendly but hinted that he did not support their policy towards the apartheid regime in SA. He was directly opposed to the USA's constructive engagement policy towards SA. Mugabe disagreed vehemently with SA's destabilisation

policy against members of the Frontline states of which Zimbabwe was a member. He did not hesitate to register his displeasure at UNGA meetings in the 1980s accusing the “Pretoria apartheid regime’s... use of banditry and mercenary elements” against sovereign states (UNGA Official Records 1986: 7).

Mugabe brought his battle against apartheid to the international stage and kept it there until South Africa gained majority rule in 1994. Zimbabwe’s foreign policy has therefore, always been a highly visible and active one since independence right up to 2017 when Mugabe, the once iconic figure, ungraciously exited his oval office and left the global stage to less willing contenders to take up the struggle. Mugabe has continually called for the self-determination of the Western Sahara peoples.

We call on the Security Council to demonstrate its authority by ensuring the holding, without much further delay, of the independence referendum in Western Sahara (UNGA Official Records 2017: 15).

Policies of Restitution, Restoration and Compensation

A Redistributive Land Policy?

Mugabe was always a defender of African interests since independence. He was a passionate advocate for majority rule in SA, the independence of Namibia and Lesotho. His discontentment was always directed at White domination. During colonialism, his battle was directed towards the White settler regime. After 1980, his onslaught was against the Whites who were perpetuating apartheid policies in South Africa. Zimbabwe’s disputed Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) revealed who Mugabe really was to the international community. Not that anything much had changed about him. His harsh rhetoric simply shifted its direction to the White man he had purported he was earlier on reconciling with. Britain’s refusal to honour its responsibility to compensate Black farmers for their land which the Whites had forcibly dispossessed them of, resulted in Mugabe’s implementation of the FTLRP without compensation to redress colonial imbalances. Scholars like Patel (2006:178), argue that “the fast-track land reform programme since 2000... resulted in a historically and morally necessary massive redistribution of income, wealth and ownership to the majority population”.

Pursuing Developing Country Interests

Mugabe was more than just an eloquent enigma at the UN. Since the independence of Zimbabwe right up to the end of his presidential tenure, Mugabe was always at the forefront of advocating for the end of cold war

hostilities between the Soviet Union and the USA (UNGA Official Records 1988:15). He called for a “nuclear free world”, eradication of bloc politics (referring to the use of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact by the USA and USSR respectively as rival military institutions during the cold war) and the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait (UNGA Official Records 1990:4). He championed the call for resolution of the Middle East Crisis, particularly the granting of self-determination to the people of Palestine. Mugabe is on record for supporting the Palestinian bid to become a member of the UN (UNGA Official Records 1993:1). In 1997, in his speech at the 52nd Session of the UNGA, he noted with concern, “the steady fall of... Official Development Assistance (ODA) from 0.34 per cent in 1992 to 0.25 per cent in 1996”. Consequently, Mugabe championed the call for the increased provision of official development assistance and foreign direct “investment” to African countries (UNGA Official Records 1997:3).

- **Sovereignty**

Whilst Mugabe’s tone during his first two decades as the Prime Minister (1980-1987) and President of Zimbabwe (1980 – 1999), was mild and cautionary from 2000 onwards, it was out-rightly critical of Western governments. Mugabe’s speech at the UNGA in 2003 was castigatory towards the USA and Britain. He stated referring to the second Gulf War of 2003 code named Operation Iraqi Freedom that;

Some powerful Western nations, led by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Britain, went into a war of unclear objectives in the face of clear opposition from the rest of the world, and, as we now know, with clear opposition from their own people as well. It was and remains an unjust, illegitimate war — unjust to the extent that it was founded and prosecuted on false words; illegitimate to the extent that it was not sanctioned by the United Nations and has transformed itself into an effective occupation of a sovereign people (UNGA Official Records 2003:1).

He was, in the above statement, making reference to the USA’s 2003 unilateral pre-emptive military action in Iraq. The USA was supported by the ‘coalition of the willing’, a group of 30 states including the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan and the Czech Republic (Schifferes 2003). According to Nyemba and Mhandara (2013) the US – led Coalition of the Willing invaded Iraq on the premise of the alleged production and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), harbouring of terrorists and democracy promotion. The Iraqi war was perceived as an unjust war because, no WMD were found in Iraq neither was Saddam Hussein harbouring terrorists (Ibid). The Iraqi war was

condemned because it was started on false intent, the USA did not have the right authority to invade Iraq under resolution 1441 as they claimed and disproportionate force was used against Iraq (Nyemba and Mhandara 2013).

- **Regime Change in Libya**

In 2012, in his speech at the UNGA, Mugabe condemned the abuse of Resolution 1973 authorising the implementation of the no fly zone over Libya (UNGA Official Records 2012:4). He noted with disapproval the loss of civilian lives and the targeted killings of the Colonel Al-Qadhafi and some of his family members. Mugabe denigrated the NATO member states for seeking regime change and ignoring the African Union's call for dialogue between the revolutionaries and the Libyan government of Colonel Al-Qadhafi.

- **Threat of Extinction Towards North Korea**

Whilst other nations and leaders watched in dismay as Donald Trump, the USA President threatened North Korea with extinction, it was Mugabe once again, who managed to stand up to him (Zulu 2018:1). He protested;

Are we experiencing the return of a Goliath in our midst that threatens the extinction of all countries? May I say to the United States President, Mr. Trump, that he please blow his trumpet in a musical way towards the values of unity, peace, cooperation, togetherness and dialogue, for which we have always stood and that are enshrined in our very sacred document, the Charter of the United Nations (UNGA Official Records 2017:15).

- **Democratisation of Multilateral Institutions**

- a. **Democratisation of the UN**

Almost his entire speech to the UNGA in 1993 called for UN Reform with particular emphasis on the restructuring of the UNSC to cater for equitable geographic representation, growth in membership to the UN and its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security (UNGA Official Records 1993). It seemed that his addresses to the UN were now preoccupied with the call for UNSC reform. In 1997, in his address to the UNGA, he posed the question that, "Are we meant to conclude that democracy and good governance at the international level should only be at the pleasure and behest of the mighty and powerful?" (UNGA Official Records 1997). In 2015, Mugabe called on all friends of Africa to support "Africa's common position on UNSC reform contained in the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration" (UNGA Official Records 2015:15). He underscored the need for, "inclusivity and transparency in selecting our Organization's Secretary-General by ensuring that the General Assembly plays a more significant role in that process" (Ibid).

- **Greater Representation in International Financial Institutions (IFIs)**

Mugabe criticised UN subsidiary bodies, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) for “succumbing to the whims and caprices of the major powers (UNGA Official Records 2003:2). He lambasted the Bretton Woods institutions for denying African countries, particularly Zimbabwe, development aid. He defended Zimbabwe’s military assistance in the DRC as a response to a “distress call by a neighbour (Ibid). He reiterated the need for reforming the structure of the IFIs so that developing countries would have representation. Mugabe argued that the Bretton Wood Institutions were designed to undermine the development of African countries. These programmes increase poverty, created capital flight, caused conflicts and increased human suffering. However, the same austerity measures have been applied on European countries during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) like Greece and Spain leading to demonstrations against job losses, price hikes and rises in taxes.

Defence of African Interests or Survival?

- **Survival Interests**

Key informant interviews conducted depicted mixed participant views on whether Mugabe was defending African interests at the UN or his rhetoric was driven by regime survival. Some respondents were of the view that Mugabe was defending his own interests at the global institution. They argued that Mugabe was a rational actor and his moves were calculating at the world stage. They noted that his interests of regime longevity and power converged with his populist aims to sway audiences with his eloquent speeches at the UN. One respondent stated that Mugabe toed the ideological line to consolidate his status as an African statesman who can articulate African interests to protect his image and perpetuate his survival. Mugabe was pragmatic, fitting his rhetoric with what people wanted to hear. In the 1980s and 1990s anti-colonial, anti-apartheid and non-alignment rhetoric was attractive and that is what Mugabe centred on during his tenure at the UNSC and membership in the UNGA. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, birth of majority rule in South Africa and independence of Namibia and Lesotho, the revolutionary message lost currency but Mugabe was quite versatile. He was quick to adapt from his focus on political to economic independence.

One participant contended that Mugabe was angry with the sanctions that had been placed on Zimbabwe by the EU and the USA. The sanctions were crippling Zimbabwe’s economy and therefore Mugabe’s speeches at the UN were meant to attract sympathisers who could stand with him against the Western ploy to effect regime change in Zimbabwe. The question of survival

was at the heart of Mugabe's foreign policy since he wanted to encourage a different perception of the West. Most Rational Actors were prepared to give Mugabe rhetorical support only since there was no immediate benefit that would accrue to them by supporting a 'pariah' state. Most African states were worried that they would get the same sanctions that Zimbabwe was under if they supported him in his verbal wars with the West. One can therefore, argue that Mugabe was fighting against international authoritarianism and other African countries were afraid of the same repercussions that Zimbabwe had suffered under an authoritarian international order.

A participant noted that, Namibia under Sam Nujoma provided rhetorical support only to Mugabe but on the ground they sought their own interests. South Africa (SA) was hesitant to support Zimbabwe at the UN. Mbeki employed his quiet diplomacy in the aftermath of the 2008 electoral contestation between the major contesting political parties (ZANU PF, MDC – T and MDC – M). This resulted in the signing of the Global Political Agreement between the parties and the formation of a GNU which was in place from 2009 to 2013.

A key informant affirmed that Mugabe was not advancing African interests at the UN. He posited that Mugabe was cunning just like any other politician. The respondent depicted Mugabe as a shrewd Machiavelli who wanted to portray himself as a defender of African sovereignty by challenging the world's bullies. Perhaps that is why he paid a heavy price for going against the tide and challenging western hegemony at the UN. The respondent noted that every politician has a model he seeks to follow, maintain and expand. Mugabe's aim was to maintain his stranglehold on power. He used populist speeches at the UN to enthuse the masses for his benefit. The respondent opined that what motivated Mugabe was not Pan-Africanism but he was driven by obsession for power. Mugabe lived and breathed power. He was drunk with power. This conception of Mugabe raises this question: Which politician in Africa or Europe or Asia is not interested in power? In any case, do African leaders have power in a world, and a continent, that is dictated to by Euro-America? Is it not the case that it is Euro-America that has power in and over Africa and that African leaders are merely figureheads or ceremonial? If African leaders are mere figureheads and ceremonial then what power would they want to keep or to be obsessed with? Did independence give African leaders power or was it not the case that power remained at the neoimperial level?

A respondent asserted that Mugabe's political model portrayed neopatrimonialism. Mugabe used state resources for patronage. Mugabe had amassed wealth in the 1980s and therefore his goal was not to acquire more wealth but to hold on to power no matter the cost to serve his selfish egoistical power drives. The respondent avowed that Mugabe never loved Africa because he brought "shame" to the continent. One can therefore ask: Is it shameful to

repossess one's resources or to fight for restitution or reparations. The respondent further noted that Mugabe was greedy and selfish. He knew he could hold on to power and therefore, thrived on political brinkmanship at the expense of the nation.

- **Pan African Interests**

Some key informants stated that Mugabe was a true Pan-Africanist. They maintained that he was defending African interests at the UN, it being a body that is basically governed by the powerful. According to one respondent, Mugabe was not concerned with benefits associated with the powerful. The aspect of survival was not of fundamental importance because he did not get his legitimacy from the United Nations but the people of Zimbabwe who voted for him. Mugabe was trying to defend African interests in earnest. The respondent noted that it was important to underscore that whilst Mugabe was Pan-Africanist at the international stage and was seen as a hero, domestically he was “undemocratic”. His policies of survival were more apparent at the home front where his autocratic rule bordered around human rights abuses, electoral fraud and violence. Another respondent claimed that everything that Mugabe did was Pan-African. For instance, his statement that Africa was for Africans and Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans was a reflection that he was concerned with the interests of not only Zimbabwe but Africa as a whole. His main interest was transforming the UN into a democratic entity that represented the interests of Africans and developing countries and not just the interests of the West. His speeches at the UN were an attempt to appeal to the Africans to stand against Western supremacy at the UN.

Mugabe belongs to a certain generation of people that were non – conformist at the UN. To understand Mugabe, one has to understand his friends at the UN, the likes of Cuban Fidel Castro, Venezuelan Hugo Chavez, Colonel Muammar Gadhafi and other likeminded radical African and non – African leaders. These leaders spoke truth to power! They spoke the truth about the nature of international relations. One thing that was common among these leaders was that they were revolutionaries who had fought against western criminality and domination in their countries, some through liberation struggles. They seemed to read from the same script. Their speeches at the UN were legendary. They, like Mugabe, brought their political battles with the US at the UNGA. Fidel Castro is known for giving the “longest timed speech at the UN General Assembly which lasted 4 hours and 29 minutes on the 26th of September, 1960”. (Zulu 2018:1). In his speech;

...he described his 1959 Cuban revolution... as having ended...his Latin American country's status as a colony of the United States and condemned

Washington for promoting anarchy in his country, in the mistaken belief that it had the right to promote and encourage subversion in... his country. ... Castro called then U.S President John F Kennedy 'an illiterate and ignorant millionaire' (Zulu 2018:1).

Hugo Chavez was well known for his hostile anti- West addresses at the UNGA. According to Zulu (2018:1), Chavez's speech at the 2006 UNGA described former U.S. President George. W. Bush as "the devil". Chavez said; 'Yesterday the devil came here. Right here. Right here. And it smells of sulphur still today, this table that I am standing in front of.'

Colonel Muammar Gadhafi is known for tearing a copy of UN Charter claiming that he did not recognise the document (Zulu 2018). These revolutionaries, it seemed, were waging a battle with the West in one way or the other. Their conduct at the UN was simply, a continuation of their struggle against the West, but this time at the international stage. Although, their states were perceived as rogue states and international pariahs, they were unflinchingly daring in speaking the uncomfortable truth to power.

Was Demonisation of Mugabe Justified?

Some of the participants were of the opinion that Mugabe's demonisation by the West was justified. One respondent reiterated that they were flagrant human rights abuses, lack of rule of law, endemic corruption and apparent misrule in Zimbabwe that warranted demonisation. Mugabe was violating the very principles that are enshrined in the UN, particularly in Article 1 and 56 of the Charter of the UN and therefore he became synonymous with violation of fundamental rights, hence his condemnation. One respondent stressed that Mugabe brought demonisation upon himself. He brought crippling sanctions upon himself and his regime, and sacrificed the nation on the altar of political brinkmanship. The debilitating economic malady that ensued after crippling sanctions were implemented, culminated in untold humanitarian suffering. Any moral leader would have resigned based on his unpopularity but Mugabe decided to consolidate his grip on power at whatever cost.

Mugabe's policies were centred on a madness which turned even his staunchest supporters into avid opponents. His involvement of the army in civilian affairs to hold on to power, destructive policies such as the involvement in the expensive DRC war, the payment of unbudgeted costly war veterans gratuities, introduction of the bond notes, failure to solve the succession crisis, the use of his wife to settle political scores and eventually possibly succeed him among others, not only made him unpopular but they were his nemesis. However, one can note that Euro-America has not been succeeded in global

governance/dominance. It has been dominant for centuries and it has not yet chosen a successor. The European queens and kings have not been succeeded and they are not elected – why then was the succession of Mugabe an issue?

During Operation Restore Legacy, the army, masses, ruling and opposition parties, Blacks and Whites, all found a common cause in removing Mugabe. The masses told SADC and AU to stay out of their affairs because they had failed to resolve the Zimbabwean crises. Even South Africa was reduced to sending a face-saving fact finding mission to understand if Mugabe was not under siege. Apart from that, most countries, South Africa included, buried their heads in the sand and waited for whatever fate would befall Mugabe. The UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres was happy that the conflict in Zimbabwe had not degenerated into open and violent conflict. He was not as much seized with the question of the legality of the removal of Mugabe from office against UN principles of unconstitutional removal of heads of states but was more concerned about stability. Watching him on BBC one could conclude that he may have shared in the hope of the West that someone or some process had at long last been found to remove Mugabe – the symbol of anti-West rhetoric. The ‘Messiah’ or rather ‘saviour’ of African and developing country interests at the UN had been crucified and no one seemed to care. It seemed the world had been fatigued with his brinkmanship and could hardly wait for him to exit the stage.

Some respondents argued that Mugabe’s demonisation by the West was unjustified. One respondent noted that the West, particularly, the British were more concerned about protecting the interests of their nationals (living in Zimbabwe who had been affected by the FTLRP) rather than the majority of Zimbabweans. The sanctions imposed by the EU, USA and other Western states though targeting a brutal regime, culminated in a worsening economic outlook which further slumped the ordinary Zimbabwean into abject poverty. Another respondent noted that the demonisation of Mugabe was unjustified because it was selective. They were more brutal regimes than Mugabe’s Zimbabwe. For instance, USA allies in the Middle East, like Saudi Arabia and Bahrain never got as much attention as Zimbabwe, yet they were perpetrating worse human rights atrocities. The West was not principled. Mugabe could justifiably criticise them at the UN because of their double standards. Their hands were not clean either!

One key informant was of the opinion that even though Mugabe had his own faults, the practice of diplomacy should have been respected at the UN. Mugabe, being an elderly statesman, should have been treated with respect. The respondent applauded South Africa’s Mbeki for his quiet diplomacy towards Zimbabwe during his term of office. The respondent stated that Mbeki had treated Mugabe with honour by dealing with Mugabe’s errors privately, away

from the glare of the public. The west should have done the same. Maybe the Zimbabwean political and economic crisis would have been minimised. It is important to note that Mbeki's quiet diplomacy during Mugabe's final years did not manage to avert the volatile ZANU PF succession crisis. If anything, his advice fell on deaf ears as defiant Mugabe refused to relinquish power or name his successor.

The Efficacy of Mugabe's Megaphone Diplomacy at the UN

Some respondents were of the view that nothing much was achieved through Mugabe's bold rhetoric at the UN. Some respondents argued that Mugabe used the UN as an accessory for entertainment. *"He was just entertaining delegates. That's all"*, remarked one of the respondents. Another respondent attested to the fact that although there are no immediate results that can be seen of Mugabe's advocacy efforts at the UN, every policy that exists in the world today started as an idea before it was implemented. The respondent was of the opinion that someday Mugabe's propositions might be considered at the UN.

Meanwhile, Mugabe's successor has not wasted time in implementing a policy of re – engagement and returning to the "family" of nations. Whist vestiges of Mugabe's thoughts and attitudes may be observed here and there in selected pockets such as the war veterans' associations, Zimbabwe's Mnangagwa is decidedly not seeking an activist foreign policy. The era of a hard line foreign policy stance is over. Mnangagwa is seeking to consolidate whatever gains from the policies of restitution for economic benefit in the community of nations. The major question is: will he succeed? Already criticism is mounting that he has not been able to generate the political hype around him that Mugabe used to generate at the UN. It seems that barely a year after Mugabe has left office he is already being missed.

Is there any leader who is willing to step into the shoes of Mugabe in Africa? Mugabe himself answered that question before his unceremonious departure. He said, 'Africa is now led by new leaders who are no longer members of the founding fathers of the Organisation of African Unity. It is now led by cowards only, without direction ... It cannot only be Mr. Mugabe who comes out calling for UN reforms (Zulu 2018:1). Zulu (2018:1) has described other African leaders as "spineless". He reiterated that, 'the rest of our African leaders are puppets of the West and feel that demanding for their space threatens their relations with the superpowers'. It therefore, remains to be seen if another Mugabe will emerge or not? Already, South Africans and Namibians are also demanding restitution of their land and other resources that were looted during colonialism and apartheid.

Assessing whether Mugabe was advancing African interests or not is no easy task. It's difficult to separate the two, his Pan-Africanism and the desperation to survive. Other African leaders were prepared to abandon Pan-Africanism soon after independence to toe the line with the west. The policy of reconciliation that Mugabe pursued after independence, brought hope to the west. The British tried to bring Mugabe into their circles by granting him an honorary Knight Grand Cross in the Order of the Bath by Queen Elizabeth II in 1994. The knighthood was revoked in 2008 as a sign of the British revulsions about Mugabe's "poor human rights" record. The fallout with the west was inevitable after the implementation of Mugabe's "restitution" policies. Some claim that these policies benefit a select few Black bourgeoisies at the expense of the ordinary masses. Mugabe's international wars were unpopular at home because of the backlash from the west. In fact, the masses were not concerned about Mugabe's wars with the west at the UN, they wanted bread and butter issues addressed through economic empowerment. By providing them with ownership of land and minerals, Robert Mugabe had provided Zimbabweans with bread and butter issues – all that Zimbabweans needed to do was to work productively on the land and in the mines and industries. It would have been unfair for Zimbabweans to expect Mugabe to put on an overall and work for them on all the pieces of land and in all the industries and mines. Mugabe gave Zimbabweans opportunities to own and use their resources.

Conclusion

Mugabe made all the right noises at the UN. He became a model, for other African states, of assertiveness. He would not let historical questions of imbalances and inequality in the international system go undiscussed and unaddressed. His assertiveness transformed him into an international icon but more importantly, it highlighted a David and Goliath situation as a moral question between neo-colonial giants and a post-colonial state, between superpowers and a small state in Southern Africa. Like all activist states, Mugabe and his state paid dearly for refusing to toe the line. Mugabe represents a question to the international system. What happens to those that decide to be non-conformist and begin to question the very layout of international power structure? Who defines rogue states and is there room for expression of discomfort with those that feel disadvantaged by the current international order? If not dialogue and speeches at the UN what else do they have to resort to for redress?

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Robert Mugabe, the Military ‘Uncaged’ and the November 2017 “Coup-not-Coup”

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Introduction

The late commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, General Vitalis Zvinavashe blatantly said that the Zimbabwean security sector will only rally behind political leaders who “pursue Zimbabwean values, traditions and beliefs for which thousands of lives were lost in pursuit of Zimbabwe’s hard won independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interest” (Rupiya 2011: 9). Paradoxically the military has also ‘been caught in the web’ of ZANU-PF factional fighting with some in 2014 being noted as supporting the Joice Mujuru faction, in 2017 others were noted as supporting Emmerson Mnangagwa; while still others were branded “Generation 40” (G40) supporting Grace Mugabe. Luckham (1994:16) has observed that at times governments which become unpopular ‘with their own people or empire’ suffer a backlash when they are forcefully removed from power by uniformed men who intervene supposedly to alleviate the suffering of the ordinary masses whose livelihoods would have been reduced to destitution. Though Mugabe is blamed by his detractors, who were against his resolve to redistribute land to Zimbabweans, for allegedly plunging Zimbabwe into economic turmoil, it is the Euro-American sanctions that have brought much suffering to Zimbabweans. It is a fact that despite the economic deterioration of the Zimbabwean neo-imperial economy, Mugabe actually remained popular with Africans who cherished pan-Africanism. Geddes (2010: 1-3) contends that very few scholars have grappled with trying to explain how at some point the military intervenes in politics, coup a government and at times do not.

It must be pointed out from the outset that the world that we are living in is militarised. This is not a surprise because Euro-America has stationed its military forces in many parts of the world including Africa. Paradoxically Eurocentric scholars try to evade the truth that the American armed forces have played a greater part in the militarisation of the world order. Fayemi (1998:82) contends that in a militarised state, the armed forces have a greater say in the decision making processes as well as an increased use of force to ‘reign in

perceived malcontents' or those they do not agree with. Militarism becomes an outgrowth of a process whereby the public sphere is militarised and the militaristic option becomes an attractive option to solve internal contradictions 'as well as global contradictions.' (Fayemi 1998: 85). Arguably periods of 'intense crisis,' be it political or economic, have a considerable impact on the behaviour of the military in potentially two diametrically opposed ways; that is the military can notoriously defend the ruling government and hegemonic Euro-American interests or rebel against it. We propose to answer why the military in Zimbabwe decided to dethrone Robert Gabriel Mugabe, the then President of Zimbabwe and commander-in-chief in November 2017. Linda Freeman (2005:1) characterised Zimbabwe as a country that has become a site for intellectual as well as political and material contestation. Mugabe's forced resignation attracted a lot of attention not only in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region but internationally. It is in this light that we also lay an academic foundation for further discussion on whether his removal from office was a coup or not. We argue that the military have shown that they are a force that cannot be discounted and therefore not mere political pawns that can be used for political expedience by politicians. Just as the militarisation of politics was a signpost of White minority rule (Campbel 2003: 264); the military in Zimbabwe has arguably not been insulated from participating in politics - a development that came into existence during the liberation struggle. We commence by answering why the Zimbabwean military have always been involved in Zimbabwean politics.

Below we describe the relationship between the Zimbabwean civilian government and the military leadership in Zimbabwe before the military intervention in 2017. This is very essential in that it provides the much needed background information that will assist in analysing whether civil-military relations in Zimbabwe have followed a 'certain developmental progression' that explains why the military was loyal to the ZANU-PF party and government. Thomas Bruneau and Floorina Cristia Mateu (2013: 2-3) opine that 'elite'-civil-military relations are the 'linchpin' of political life in all nation-states that maintain military organisations. It is in this context that soldiers occupy a very subtle position in society in that by joining the military of their respective countries they voluntarily 'give away' certain civil rights and become defenders of the nation-state's interests and its people.

Mugabe rose to power in the 1970s because of the support given to him by the ZANLA military many of whom now occupy very senior positions in the ZNA. Why then did the same military elites who stood with him from the liberation struggle through all the 2008 crises decide to go against their commander-in-chief. Military ethics entail that the soldiers' rank and file and those above them are mandated to accept orders from their superiors

unconditionally. This explains why the Zimbabwean military occupies a very important position in the Zimbabwe political matrix, crucial actors in Zimbabwe's development since the inception of independence in 1980. Since the inception of Zimbabwe's independence (until outright disregard of Mugabe's succession views) Mugabe had managed to keep the military loyal to him. It is alleged that the civilian government has politicised the security-sector institutions while at the same time acting against the aspirations of the people (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006:51).

The Zimbabwe Defence Forces and Politicians

Martin Rupiya, Robert Paxton, David Zoumenon, (David Ikome 2007) among other scholars concur that military involvement in national politics is not accidental. Military intervention in politics is not new. How can this phenomenon be explained? Military interventions in politics are a result of what we refer to as the 'political push and pull factors' albeit the symbiotic elite relations that they have enjoyed. Rupiya (2011:10) observed that the;

Sub-Saharan African region provides an interesting laboratory for civil-military relations innovations informed by its colonial inheritance, which significantly includes the fact that the characteristic role of the armed forces was...supporting the status quo.

It must be pointed from the beginning that the Zimbabwean military elites occupy a very important position in Zimbabwe. It is beyond dispute that the Zimbabwean political space is militarised and the military are politicised. The ZDF is alleged to be playing an increasing role in the political decision-making process in support of the ZANU-PF led government and party especially from 2000 to date. The ZDF is therefore viewed as the 'life-blood' of the ZANU-PF party and government. This has become very noticeable through utterances that are made by the Zimbabwean military elites. Musavengana (2011: 37) observed that the Zimbabwean military are still operating just like what the ZANLA cadres used to do during the liberation struggle. He goes on to note that the military 'still subscribe' to the pan-Africanist and nationalist views advanced by Robert Mugabe and ZANU in the late 1970s. Though Mugabe had always maintained that politics lead the gun, this was not to be the case especially when Mugabe was seen dithering on choosing a 'rightful' successor to the country's highest political office. It is a fact that Mugabe had to rely on the military's support especially during crucial elections as was the case in 2002, 2008 and 2013. Meredith quoted Mugabe in 1976 as having remarked that:

Our votes must go together with our guns. After all, any vote we shall have shall have been the product of the gun. The gun which produces the vote should remain its guarantor. The people's votes and the people's guns are always inseparable twins (2003: 253).

Makumbe (2003: 19) after the crucial 2002 presidential election contest between Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai, observed that "The guerrillas have still not taken off their uniforms; they have not yet laid down their guns." This may be because southern Africa tends to differ with other regions in Africa South of the Sahara. Melber (2002:4-5) observed that the ruling civilian elites in southern Africa employ selective narratives and memories relating to liberation wars, 'construct and invent' a new set of traditions to establish an exclusive post-colonial legitimacy under one particular agency of forces. This therefore solidifies the role that was played by former guerrilla fighters who are still serving in the military. The politicians thus continuously remind them of the horrors of the war that they fought against racist Ian Smith's regime. What is puzzling is that while Melber criticises African leaders for such selective memories he fails to acknowledge that facts are like a double edged sword. What he blames African leaders of doing is the very same thing that is happening in Euro-America. It cannot be denied that the Euro-Americans also employ selective narratives and memories relating to colonisation and the dispossession and exploitation of Africans. The Euro-Americans also continuously remind Africans of Western economic and political heroism (Nhemachena this volume). As economic heroes they saw Zimbabwe's future as bleak, doom and gloom because Robert Mugabe had evicted White farmers.

These narratives remind the military elites, those in the military rank and file, the war veterans and the general populace to remain resolute in defending Zimbabwe's hard won independence and ZANU-PF's continual hold of political office. The Zimbabwean military thus has the right to intervene in politics especially when they realise that Zimbabwe's independence is about to be mortgaged to our erstwhile exploiters and colonisers. Notably Zimbabwe's economy was put under siege by Euro-America that made sure that the political and economic situation deteriorated to alarming proportions. It was thus not surprising that the late Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa alarmed by what was happening lamented that Zimbabwe was a "sinking titanic." It was a declining economy besieged by hyperinflation with negative downstream social and political effects on susceptible groups and civilians at large. This is evident in the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) governor's lamentation that the Zimbabwean economy had become a casino economy (Gono 2008). Arguably, this was not necessarily because of Mugabe but because of Euro-American machinations including sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe. The Euro-Americans

had created despondency, among some Zimbabweans, to cause political mayhem. Jonathan Moyo observed that the political economy of Zimbabwe was pregnant with socio-economic conditions that have necessitated military coups elsewhere in Africa. To so many people's surprise the military remained steadfast to their civilian superiors. Jendayi Frazer, (2003:16-22) connotes that Zimbabwe is a peculiar case where the ZANU-PF civilian ruling elite 'faced' many 'serious' challenges and yet there was no military takeover of government. This was mainly because the military elites realised that Zimbabwe's problems emanated from Euro-America and even if the military had intervened, within the realm of domestic politics, it would not necessarily solve Zimbabwe's problems many of which emanate from neoimperialism. If the Zimbabwean military leadership openly decided to ally with the ruling civilian elite what actually motivated them to make such decisions? Frazer (1994: iv) proposed that "African countries whose militaries were born of armed struggle and/or insurrection have-for the most part-avoided the repeated *coups d'états* that have plagued much of Africa. If so, what explains the military visibility, influence and *de facto* veto power over civilian affairs in Zimbabwe? What is unique about the Zimbabwean scenario is the degree to which the central "security" that is the military command structures have remained intact and loyal until November 2017.

How then can one explain the "loyalty" of the military to the civilian ruling elites? Geddes (2010) contends that for all civilian governments to survive, they need to ensure that the military cooperates and yet this is the greatest challenge. Arguably the challenge is that man has been viewed as a 'political animal' and therefore it requires a lot of pragmatism to try to let 'political *animus dominandi*' in the military to remain dormant. Rocky Williams (2002) noted that in almost all African countries, control over the uniformed forces is done through a range of subjective interfaces and partnerships which becomes an expression of these power relations. This he argues is different from country to country and not applicable and uniform to every country. He went further to point out that party-political interpenetration plays a vital role in guaranteeing loyalty and subordination of the armed forces in countries such as Zimbabwe and Namibia.

Arguably 'the Chimurenga ethos' has a bearing in explaining the ZNA's patriotism and loyalty to the ZANU-PF civilian party-state leaders. Hendricks and Hutton (2009: 3) perceive that "the shared experiences of those involved in the armed liberation struggle (the military and politicians) in Zimbabwe informs who 'became' part of the post-colonial security structures and to this day influences how these players interact with each other." It is in the above context that Rupiya (2013) noted that the place and function of the Zimbabwean 'security-sector has created and continues to create' considerable tensions evidenced by the strained civil-military relations since the late 1990s. Morgan

Tsvangirai wrote a letter to President Robert Mugabe in 2005 and also sent copies to the Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan, the Chairman of the African Union and the Chairman of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) complaining that ZANU-PF was seriously enmeshed in a politicisation of the armed forces and the militarisation of politics.” Tsvangirai’s letter was motivated by the military elite’s allegiance to the ZANU-PF party (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006:49-50).

What Morgan Tsvangirai failed to realise is that the Zimbabwean military are an amalgam of the communist and western models. Notably the communist model is different from the Western model in that in the communist model, the military and the politicians’ symbiotic relationship is firmly entrenched in the party. The military are the political muscle that assists the party-politicians to maintain hegemony of the state affairs and its citizens. Pelmutter (1977:324-325) correctly stresses that in communist countries it is not absurd that the military are under the state’s armpit. Through the party, the military participate in politics because it is the natural state of affairs. Because of the conflation of the party and state the military become the guardian of the party and the party’s political ideology (Agbesi 2004:189). This model does not assume the political neutrality of the armed forces as envisaged and encouraged in the western or classic model. In an interview with the state media, Major General Martin Chedondo said:

As soldiers, we will never be apologetic for supporting ZANU-PF because it is the only political party that has national interest at heart. We cannot be seen supporting a political party that is going against the ideals of a nation, which came by as a result of a liberation struggle, which saw many of the country’s sons and daughters losing their lives. As soldiers we must support ideologies that we subscribe to, I for one will not be apologetic for supporting ZANU-PF because I was part of the liberation struggle (Mavinga 2013: 17-23).

The above citation clearly explains why the military elites are hand in glove with some ZANU-PF politicians and will not waiver especially when they are of the opinion that Zimbabwean sovereignty is under threat. Mr Rugare Gumbo, the former ZANU-PF party spokesperson in an interview with the Human Rights Watch (HRW) in 2013 said:

The leaders of the Zimbabwe’s security forces did not just emerge out of the blue, they have history, one of the liberation struggle to overthrow the Rhodesian colonial regime of Ian Smith. You cannot expect them to be nonpartisan and neutral. It would be unfair to say the security forces should be impartial given our history of the liberation struggle. The perception is that the MDC is sponsored by

the British through the Westminster Foundation to effect regime change in Zimbabwe, so our security forces cannot be neutral in light of that (Mavhinga 2013:31).

Josiah Tungamirai was thus correct when he said that “the history of Zimbabwe made it difficult to have an army that is apolitical,” (Alao 1995: 114-115). The same views were corroborated by Mugabe in 2014 when he said “The ZDF...is indeed a confirmation and reflection of the unquestionable credentials of its commanders, officers, men and women who have become the epitome of our unshakable resistance to colonialism” (The Zimbabwe National Army Magazine, First edition 2014: 7). It is in this light that Rupiya posits that the military in 2008 only temporarily intervened to block Tsvangirai’s ascendance onto the throne because they wanted to give the party-state the opportunity to revitalise itself after-which Mugabe was to remain in power.” Military loyalty to the party-state is also because of the political orientation that they received during the liberation struggle, it is still rooted in their hearts and minds. Political ideology and political orientation is truly the “soul of the Zimbabwean revolution” as shown by the first, second and third Chimurenga. Mugabe’s arguments therefore resonated with the military elite because they are highly ideological (Mahuku 2017:213). Warikandwa, Nhemachena and Mtapuri (2017) have argued that there is no army in the world that is apolitical. This is evident in the USA army that plays politics everywhere in the world, including Africa. Warikandwa *et al.* contend that there is an ongoing militarisation in Africa that is dictated by a global secret society that has got a lot of influence on global institutions including economy, politics and law. The global secret society thus controls the militarisation and demilitarisation, securitisation and desecuritisation process in the world” (Ibid 2017: 18).

The military elites embraced the Chimurenga ethos that is skewed to supporting the party-state hence ‘patriotic history’ has become the core of its ideology. Such a revolutionary ideology has been a successful instrument to co-opt critical voices and the security sector institutions without the use of force. Samuel Finer (Odetola 1982:88) contends that the whole *esprit de corps* of the military is founded on the heavy emphasis on national identity which implies loyalty to the civilian command. Nyanhongo, former CIO Director in an interview with Blessing-Miles (2013: 969) first showed him the injuries that he suffered during the Chimoio attack and said “I almost died during that attack. I cannot allow this country to go to people (Tsvangirai) who do not connect to that liberation legacy.” This clearly shows that the military can only be patriotic and not apolitical. The top military officers thus rightly indoctrinate ordinary soldiers in the ZNA because they have to be patriotic and not mercenaries. An example is that of soldiers who were stationed at 3 Brigade in Mutare. They

routinely jogged around residential locations allegedly singing songs that vilified the MDC and its leader Tsvangirai. According to one Mutare resident interviewed by HRW (2013):

Hundreds of uniformed soldiers regularly ‘jogged’ through the city early in the morning around 6:00 am., singing songs denigrating the MDC and its leader Morgan Tsvangirai. One such song that I have heard them sing on a number of occasions has the words: “Handizvikanganwe, zvinobhowa, zvinondifizura; kuseri kwaMorgan kune mabhunu; which in English is, “I will never forget, it annoys me, it incenses me; behind Morgan are (Tsvangirai) are “mabhunu” (a derogatory name for white people).

Notably there is nothing unusual with what the soldiers at 3 Brigade did. Armies all over the world are political, with some even being internationally political. The USA army is doing the same-vilifying and fighting Saddam Hussein of false allegations of possession of weapons of mass destruction in 2003; USA and NATO in Libya in 2011 etc. Tafataona Mahoso in an interview with authors argued that it is imprudent to have a neutral army. He submitted that:

Even in America there is no separation between the civilian leaders and the military. This is confirmed by John Perkins in his book, *The Confessions of an Economic Hitman*. The Americans are much more militarised than us. Our military are professionals and not being apolitical does not mean they are daft, they have a military doctrine and understand politics and diplomacy. The British and Americans want to present us with a façade of views that they want us to adopt and yet they do not practice that in their own backyard. Our military only intervene in political matters when they hear dangerous political ideas being said out, (Mahoso 18th May 2015).

The behaviour of Zimbabwe’s security sector is in tandem with Rebecca L. Schiff’s (1996) concordance theory. Schiff (1996:277-283) argues that there is a triad cooperation of the military, the ruling politicians and the citizenry. The three have a cooperative relationship “that may or may not involve separation of political and military institutions. The concordance theory thus gives premise to the contextual set up in understanding relations between the military and society and this is embedded in a country’s customs, norms, military style and the involvement of the people in the day to day running of affairs of the state as partners. How this is arrived at is entirely dependent on the nature of that society” (Chinyanganya 2015). Thus, the concordance theory is applicable to understanding civil-military relations in Zimbabwe in which the military, the

ruling politicians and the citizenry work together for the survival of the party-state.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006:52) observed that ‘unlike in its southern African neighbours’ Zimbabwean politics has become a “straight jacket that only fits those with nationalist or military background.” Put differently it means that the men in uniform will only support the ascendance into office of someone who participated in the Zimbabwe war of liberation against the Rhodesia Ian Smith’s regime. The Zimbabwe military chiefs were criticised by both national and international opponents of the ZANU-PF party but what is surprising is that the same logic displayed by the military elites is being applied by the Euro-Americans who think that they are the only ones suitable for owning and controlling African economies. Euro-American hypocrisy becomes glaring given that they opine that whilst there must be no criteria for Africans to choose those who must rule them there is criteria in the economic realm on who has to remain in charge and dominant. Similarly, The Euro-Americans set criteria for leadership at the United Nations Security Council – African states are not part of the permanent members of the Security Council.

Shared ideology between the military chiefs and the politicians therefore explains why the military has remained “unobtrusive” albeit the horrendous socio-political and economic crises that ‘bedevilled’ Zimbabwe since 2000. Raftopoulos and Phimister (2004:356) posit that the crisis was embedded in “three overlapping dimensions: that of pan-African and Third-World solidarity in the face of renewed imperialist aggression; the breakdown of the liberation struggle consensus; and the limitations of postcolonial development in the context of globalisation.” What Raftopoulos and Phimister fail to acknowledge is that pan-Africanism and Third-World solidarity were not the sources of the Zimbabwean crises. It cannot be disputed that Euro-America has its own solidarity as expressed in NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation), in the EU (European Union) there is solidarity which is the source of the sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe, and the EU solidarity is thus the source of the crises that bedevilled Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean crises were also a result of the absence of restoration and reparations to African victims of enslavement and colonisation. To cement civil-military relations, President Robert Mugabe rationally and repeatedly argued that America, Britain and their allies were bent on trying to force “a regime change” on Harare (See Tony Blair 2010).

The military elites’ resolved to defend the gains of the liberation struggle against both internal and external enemies. This resulted in them openly supporting the ZANU-PF party and government. The military elites were aware that political leaders had been forced to compromise at Lancaster House negotiations hence the capitulation to the “willing seller willing buyer principle” in trying to redress the land problem. They were also aware that the British were

protecting their kith and kin hence the reason why they were impeding radical land reclamation and restitution. The situation was further compounded by the economic structural adjustment programme that was foisted on Zimbabwe by some Zimbabwean technocrats in league with international financial institutions. The government was therefore waylaid to prioritise other issues at the expense of addressing the land imbalances. Resistance to foreign instituted and forced economic stabilising programmes were spearheaded by the academics (students and lecturers), the workers and urbanites or town dwellers who bore the brunt of IMF/World Bank conditionalities. Blame was placed on the doorstep of the Zimbabwean government. Those who thought that IMF/World Bank economic policies were going to be a success were not only like “people waiting for a train that would never arrive but were standing in the wrong station altogether”; waiting for a train at a bus stop. What was experienced in Zimbabwe is illustrative. The international financial institutions gave emphasis to governance issues and multiparty-ism as one of the conditions for eligibility to access grants and loans. Supporters of SAPs were late to realise that they had been set on a collision path with the masses who were promised improvements in their lives. This resulted in the formation of the foreign funded MDC party that concentrated on issues of human rights and not economic empowerment programmes, including repossession of land. When the military elites and war veterans realised that they were under siege from Britain and its allies in the late 1990s they therefore did not ‘raise a finger’ against the [alleged] mismanagement and abuse of office by the ZANU-PF politicians. They had to defend the party-state against this onslaught by neoempire that wanted to maintain ownership and dominance over Zimbabwean resources. This, thus explains the survival of the ZANU-PF government even during a time of intense economic hardships?

From 2000 the Zimbabwean military openly worked and supported the ZANU-PF politicians and government. The military elite actively worked for regime survival as they vowed that ‘Zimbabwe would never be a colony again’. However, some academics like Sabelo Gatsheni Ndlovu, Brian Raftopoulos, John Makumbe, Daniel Compagnon, Ian Phimster and David Moore have argued that the Zimbabwean military loyalty and partisanship to the ZANU-PF party is a disturbing characteristic of current civil-military relations in Zimbabwe. Ironically, these same neoliberal scholars do not criticise or cry foul when the U.S.A is political and interventionist in African states as was the case in Libya in 2011. The above scholars’ reductionism and bias is underscored by how they have questioned the role of the Zimbabwean military in aiding the ZANU-PF ruling elite to remain in power and yet they turn a blind eye to how the U.S.A military aids the USA hegemony over the entire world. Hendricks (2009:3) observed that post-colonial states in Africa have replicated colonial

regimes especially on their use of state security apparatuses that were meant for the protection of the colonial state. Nationalist leaders who came to power in 1980 are accused of simply ignoring the importance of military reforms to align them with the aspirations of their young nations. As a point of departure, the Zimbabwean military aligned itself with the aspirations of post-independence Zimbabwe which explains why it supported the restitution of land to Black Zimbabweans. The Zimbabwean military elites have resisted the neo-imperial order and have rebuffed the so-called security sector reforms that are called for by “civil” society organisations and their neoimperial funders. Apparently, military reforms in Zimbabwe were undertaken immediately after independence when a new Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) was formed. The new security-sector reforms that are advocated for by the West and the MDC are simply meant to weaken Zimbabwe’s power base. In April 2013 in an interview with the Herald the then Minister of Defence Emmerson D. Mnangagwa, said:

Those who speak of security reforms are driven by the illegal regime change agenda to remove us [ZANU-PF] and install their puppets. They intend to remove the current crop of leadership within the army and replace them with that of their own choice who will pander to their whims (2013).

The Zimbabwean military was thus regarded as very vicious and notorious in defending the government in power. It must be noted that the army is part of the state but can also represent national public good concerns. Rupiya (2011) contends that “Zimbabwe has shown a remarkable degree of security-sector partisanship to the ZANU-PF party and government. Notably the military ‘fangs have become very visible.’ Notably the military ‘fangs became very visible in Zvinavashe’s 2002 outburst, in the 2008 Operation Makavhotera papi (who did you vote for?) 2013 election and their intervention in November 2017 (Mahuku 2017).

Masunungure (2014) contends that from February 2000, “the party and state had become fused and virtually indistinguishable, ‘arguably a phenomenon that had begun during the early years of independence.’ Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006:50) opines that it is during this period that the relationship between the ZANU-PF politicians and the armed forces translated into serious politicisation of the military and the militarisation of politics in Zimbabwe. Mugabe shrewdly ‘sucked in’ the military to defend his political stance by unequivocally declaring that “we are in a state of political war. We are in a war to defend our rights and the interests of our people. The British have decided to take us on through the MDC” (Blair 2002: 250). It was indeed true that the ZANU-PF government and its supporters were at war with empire who queered the Zimbabwean people’s right to reclaim their land. Empire through neo-imperialist machinations dared

Zimbabwean nationalists. Mugabe did not relent but he continued to take all his enemies head-on. According to Holland (2008:101), Clare Short actually fuelled the anti-imperialist sentiments that Mugabe used to his own advantage. His response was “I’ll do what I want and see if you can stop me.” Mugabe’s anger was unstoppable; his response was ‘a reflection of rage’, he no longer cared who he hurt (empire and its supporters) because his aim was to hurt (Ibid: 184). It was a situation that could not be fathomed in ZANU-PF political circles, “Zimbabwe would never be a colony again.” It propelled the military elite into motion and culminated in the much touted military pronouncement by the Zimbabwean security sector elites. Vitalis Musungwa Zvinavashe, the chief of the armed forces, supported by the security heads of different services made a televised declaration:

We [the JOC] wish to make it very clear to all Zimbabwean citizens that the security organisations will only stand in support of those political leaders that will pursue Zimbabwean values, traditions and beliefs for which thousands of lives were lost in the pursuit of Zimbabwe’s hard-won independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interests. To this end, let it be known that the highest office in the land [the presidency] is a straightjacket whose occupant is expected to observe the objectives of the liberation struggle. We will therefore not accept, let alone support or salute, anyone with a different agenda that threatens the very existence of our sovereignty (Statement issued on the 9th of January 2002, Harare).

The Zimbabwean military shrewdly defied all odds and maintained a momentum and resilience of its own. This is against the backdrop that the supposedly kleptocratic ruling elite had failed to respond positively to a continued economic meltdown (Ajulu 2001: 1) that was being propelled by empire. The military elite and the veterans of the liberation struggle came to the conclusion that their sacrifices were under threat from certain ambitious politicians within and outside the party who wanted to take over the reins of power from Mugabe. Moorcraft (2012) commenting on the Zimbabwean military noted that, despite being loyal to ZANU-PF, the military was less involved in politics and concentrated on maintaining internal security as well as participating in military operations abroad. Army Chief of Staff Major-General Chedondo while addressing soldiers who had come to participate at an army shooting competition in Harare ‘advised’ the soldiers that:

The Constitution says the country should be protected by voting and in the 27 June presidential election run-off pitting our defence chief, Cde Robert Mugabe, and Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC-T, we should, therefore, stand behind our

Commander-in-Chief. Soldiers are not apolitical. Only mercenaries are apolitical. We have signed and agreed to fight and protect the ruling party's principles of defending the revolution. If you have any thoughts, then you should remove that uniform.

As already noted, Mugabe had transformed the army's organisational structure and ideological outlook. He had come up with an army that was highly conscious of its heritage through the knowledge of Zimbabwean history and politics. Chitiyo and Rupiya (2005) contend that Mugabe created a national army with the semblance of and along the Maoist Chinese model. This has led some sections of the Zimbabwean population to strongly contend that the military has become "ZANU-PF activists." It appears there is a strong belief amongst the military, politicians and some academics that the guerrilla war in Zimbabwe was essentially a medium spirits and people war and this may have contributed a lot to a Zimbabwean ideology and the military decisions to be the 'dog that did not bark against its own master but against empire.' This fits well into what Ake (2001) referred to as "defensive radicalism," an attempt at mystification. It assumes a radical posture to cover for containing revolutionary pressures and for maintaining the status quo.

It manifests itself in (a) increasing radical rhetoric against imperialism even amongst the most reactionary African leaderships. (b) a verbal commitment to some form of socialism and the rejection of capitalism. (c) policy statements to justify extensions of public ownership. (d) a militant attack on inequality. (e) policy statements explaining curbs operations of foreign capital. (f) the show of being friendly with socialist countries (Ake 2001).

A state must always have a civilian government with a strong military and must be able to control it. Besley and Robinson (2010:655) made a very ingenious contribution on civil-military relations when they submitted that for a government to control the military it must come up with mechanisms that would not make the military to be interested in power. Goldsworthy (1981) noted that while economic co-optation is rare, ascriptive recruitments and promotions of officers are widespread and the most used technique to control the military. Decalo (1999:41) opines that: 'giving the military officers material benefits unites the corporate and individual financial self-interest of the military with those of the civilian authority.'

What is interesting is that some scholars like Omari (2013: 90) have maintained that "a state is a machine with several parts-one of which is the armed forces, ready to be picked up and used by the ruling elite at its discretion." This implies that the military are just 'pawns' in the political dynamics, an

argument that cannot always be sustained. The military in many African countries as the case in Zimbabwe has shown that they are a force to reckon with and not mere pawns. According to the then ZDF commander, General Constantino Chiwenga, the military must always abide to their Chimurenga ideals and support the unwavering principles that were imparted in them by fallen commanders like Josiah Tongogara. During a commemoration of the fallen commander, he said:

to you all, I want to say he was a true hero of the Zimbabwean revolution. A patriot. A man who stood by his principle..... For those of us who got training from him, we salute him. What we can do is exactly what he taught us..... We should never tire or sell out the revolution. Never ever. Never under any circumstance. It does not matter how much you will be offered. It does not matter what you can be promised. Let's keep the legacy of our commander and pass on the baton to the next generation (Sunday Mail 2015/01/02).

Having discussed what motivates the ZNA to remain loyal to the ideals of the liberation struggle, below we explore what really broke the 'camel's back amidst the serious factional purges that led to the historic intervention that removed the Zimbabwean strongman (Mugabe) from power.

The Rise of Grace Mugabe, the ZANU-PF Party and the Military

To borrow from Masipula Sithole's words, politics is a socialisation phenomenon that guides social action. The entrance of Grace Mugabe into mainstream politics was shocking to many whilst others saw it as an avenue to further their own interests. Some saw it as a blessing to the opposition for her entrance fomented the "quick demise and implosion" of the ZANU-PF party. Grace has thus been seen by many as a political whirlwind that assisted in the demise of her husband. Whether ZANU-PF emerged from the 'Grace era' stronger or weaker is beyond the purview of this chapter. The main driver of the problems that later led to the struggles within the struggles in ZANU-PF was the succession issue that the then President Robert Mugabe supposedly failed to address. Succession issues became very glaring in 2004 with the Tsholotsho debacle that resulted in the suspension of some ZANU-PF bigwigs from the party, this was also the beginning of the 'Emmerson Mnangagwa-Jonathan Moyo' feud. Jonathan Moyo was suspended from the party together with others and was unforgiving because he did not pitch up for the Tsholotsho meeting in which plans were underway to support Emmerson Mnangagwa to become vice-president.

Joice Mujuru was elevated to become the first woman vice-President as a way of playing off the 'Mnangagwa-Mujuru' factions. The ZANU-PF constitution was thus unlawfully tempered with at the last minute to ensure that one of the vice-Presidents had to be a woman. At the 2004 ZANU-PF congress Mugabe told the gathering; "when you choose her as vice-President, you don't want her to remain in that chair do you?" (The New Humanitarian 6 December 2004). Many came to the erroneous conclusion that when President Mugabe would decide to retire then Joice Mujuru would become his automatic successor. Matyszak (2015:9) submits that "the Mnangagwa faction had been out-manoeuvred, this was followed by dismissal of party senior cadres who had dared to support Mnangagwa." The same scenario was to be replicated in 2014 when Joice Mujuru was sacked from ZANU-PF.

In 2014 Joice Mujuru had become very powerful and a threat just as Mnangagwa had been in 2004. By 2014 the Mnangagwa faction had gained ground and shrewdly used Grace Mugabe to fight their own war. Matyszak (2015:14) posits that Grace Mugabe was told by the Mnangagwa faction that "once she and her family lost the protection of her husband, the Mujuruites would turn upon her and she would suffer not only loss of her status, but of her farms and her ability to operate her extensive business interests." Grace Mugabe was later to claim that she knew of a sinister plan that "there are people who want to drag me against a tarred road when the President goes" (Matyszak 2015).

The plan that was hatched was to stampede Mujuru and her supporters out of power. The succession issue was once again at the centre of ZANU-PF factionalism and infighting as President Mugabe intimated through his utterances that he was still very fit to remain in office. To salvage herself from such a possible future embarrassment Grace Mugabe entered the Zimbabwean political matrix and because of her vicious tongue that knew no bounds she came to be referred to as "Comrade Stop-It." At a meeting that was held in Mashonaland West, Edna Madzongwe suggested that Grace Mugabe be made the head of the ZANU-PF Women's League, thus on the 25th of July Oppah Muchinguri, Mandi Chimene, Edna Madzongwe and other women in the Women's League met at Grace Mugabe's Mazowe Orphanage and when Grace was asked to lead the league she remarked, "I am overwhelmed and I am shaking right now. I cannot believe this is what you have decided, but this is God's work, and those speaking are the mouth pieces of God" (Matyszak 2015:16-17). Grace later on unconsciously revealed that she was well aware that this was what would happen for she had already been approached by a certain section of war collaborators. The Women's League was to officially accept and name her "their boss" at the Women's conference held on the 15th of August 2014. From then on all hell broke loose and the Mujuruites never knew what hit them. According

to Lewanika (2014) in his paper entitled: Protracted Road to Transition: Dissecting Zimbabwe's Succession Conundrum:

the emergence of Grace Mugabe and her vicious attacks on the lady who constitutionally would be heir apparent, Joice Mujuru, is the manifestation of the resurrection of a historically stated intent by Mugabe to rule till death. It posits that, Grace Mugabe is introduced into the political terrain to stem perceived and real aspirations, especially by Mujuru and her backers to ascend to the presidency during Mugabe's lifetime.

When Joice Mujuru graduated at the University of Zimbabwe on the 12th of September 2014, Grace Mugabe was also capped by President Robert Mugabe the then Chancellor of the University. It is alleged that it had only been three months after she had submitted her application for a PhD (Matyszak 2015: 14). She became "Dr Amai," and started openly showing her contempt for Mujuru. Grace Mugabe began to be politically deified as she openly lashed at Joice Mujuru while addressing rallies in Zimbabwe's ten provinces. This was a period that Matyszak (2015:17) has referred to as "Grace mania"-were praise songs were composed in her name and many vehicles and some ZUPCO buses were decorated with pictures carrying her image. Notably this is not a new political strategy for indeed the same can be said of neo-empire. Praise songs have been composed in neo-empire's name – and we argue here that many, including academics, sing for their suppers in praise of neoempire. Some vehicles and houses have been decorated with Euro-Americans' pictures - even some clothes that are sold in Africa have Euro-American icons including names of their cities, celebrities and so on. Joice Mujuru was portrayed as corrupt, selfish, incompetent, and ambitious and as even using witchcraft to be the leader of ZANU-PF and Zimbabwe. Due to neo-imperial machinations, independent newspapers portrayed Robert Mugabe as selfish, incompetent and unable to control his wife. To neo-empire, the stage had been set for Robert Mugabe's demise.

After the end of her rallies Grace Mugabe called for the resignation of Joice Mujuru. She clearly stated that if Mujuru failed to quit on her own accord then she would be fired. She unashamedly said that President Mugabe had to baby dump Mujuru and if he was hesitant then the Youth and Women's League would do that for him. The first casualty of the Mujuru faction to be expelled was Jabulani Sibanda, the then war veterans chairperson. Jabulani Sibanda (Matyszak 2015:29) without mincing words stated "... all able bodied people should stand up...and block attempts to stage a coup both in the boardroom and in the bedroom." He was arrested for denigrating the president and was also suspended from the party. The ZANU-PF youth wing that was in support

of President Mugabe and calling for a one centre of power advised that the Mujuruites were not supposed to bother themselves to attend the December 2014 party congress or risk being beaten and humiliated. A few days after the congress, Joice Mujuru, Didymus Mutasa, Webster Shamu, Francis Nhema, Olivia Muchena, Dzikamai Mavhaire, Nicholas Goche, Simbaneuta Mudarikwa and Munacho Mutezo were expelled from the party. Many other political heavy weights were to be expelled and thus crumbled Mujuruites political careers like a deck of cards. Before we discuss the fallout between the G40 faction and the Mnangagwa faction that eventually led to the fall of Robert and Grace Mugabe, we make a brief academic detour and explain causes of military coups.

Reasons for Military Coups

According to Huntington and Goodpaster (1977:31), civil-military relations “represent a complex set of inter-relationships, established norms and practices between the armed forces and other social structures.” However such complex relations explain the occurrence or non-occurrence of military revolts or outright coups. It cannot be disputed that it is very difficult to avoid military intervention in politics. While Zimbabwe’s history is not plagued with military coups it has not been insulated from military intervention in the civilian day to day running of state affairs. The intriguing Zimbabwean miracle is that until the debatable “coup not coup scenario in 2017”, the ZNA elites since 1980 have adhered to the dictum that the party commands the gun. Sithole (1998:52) argued that while it is fairly easy to tell reasons for military coups, it is difficult to classify some as coups. He honestly recounted: ‘A colleague less naïve and more knowledgeable than me on these matters said to me...The literature has many theories about coups, but Professor, would you recognise a coup if you saw one?’

Eliot A. Cohen (25 March 2018) posits that a coup d’état is a breakdown of civilian control of the military. According to Luttwark (1969:12) A coup d’état is the unexpected overthrow and capture of power by a small but well organised group that threatens, or uses force to replace those in power. Angela Harkness (2012) went further to point out that such coups are undertaken by members of the army or presidential guard and rarely by soldiers in the air force or navy. Powell and Thyne (2011:194-97) connote that the soul target of coupists is the leader of the state or government. They further state that such an action “must be illegal, which differentiates coups from political pressure that may force a leader to resign. They argue that a coup is an “illegal and overt attempt by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive” (Ibid: 252).

Various explanations have been put forward by scholars to explain the increased radicalisation of the military and the occurrence of military coups. What is intriguing is that an analysis of military intervention in politics to stage a *coup d'état* happens at any time, be it during times of prosperity or during times of political and economic meltdown. This then entails that even governments that entice the military through material gains or lucrative salaries are not immune to coups. The feasibility of a coup is therefore determined by different considerations. Some African leaders were simply hoodwinked to be managers of neo-imperial/neo-colonial economies and have thus encountered a lot of problems and have become authoritarian in the process unwittingly making themselves more prone to military coups. Economic and political decadence manifest themselves in crises which governments might not be responsible for but certainly accelerates (Cohen 1997:84-85). Such crises enrage the man in uniform who have to choose between either defending the civilian government against internal revolts or defending the neo-colonial status quo. If some members of the army have to defend the neo-colonial status quo then there must be divisions or fissures within that country's army.

The military can also execute what is referred to as a 'democratic coup' if it is supported by a country's citizens especially if the motive is to stop a country from degenerating or slipping into a 'Hobbesian state of nature' having been ravaged by outside forces. To avert further economic disaster the man of the 'sword', the soldiers come out of their 'tortoise shells' because they are called to duty by circumstances beyond their own control, a noble cause to wage "a war" within certain limits, the doctrine of the "*temperamenta belli*" (Bull 1977:19). This is what Hutchful (1986:805) referred to as "the corrective military regime" that avails itself to 'resuscitate the politico-economic environment that will have engulfed the country and promote accountability in public offices.' According to Huntington (1968) coups led by non-commissioned officers (NCOs) or junior officers are executed to improve public order and efficiency, or to end corruption (corrective regimes). The leaders of these types of coups depict their actions as a temporary but an unfortunate inevitability. However, it must be pointed out that public order, inefficiency and corruption also have sources outside particular African governments. In this sense, improvements cannot be hoped for merely on account of seizing power from the governments. Nations that have experienced guardian coups usually undergo many changes between civilian and military governments. However Collier and Hoeffler (2004) connote that the incentives for some military coups are greed and grievance and this paradoxically explains why military rule and militarism have gained prominence in many African countries in Africa South of the Sahara.

Zimbabwe Military Intervention in November 2017

Masipula Sithole observed that during times of “crisis,” decision-making gyrates around the military. Zimbabwe was once again on an economic downward trend after the 2013 elections that were won resoundingly by President Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF. Robert Mugabe thanked the military elites for supporting ZANU-PF but relations within the party became very nasty with the growth of yet two other factions in the party. It became an open civil-military conflict with the G40 representing civilians and the Mnangagwa faction, the military and war veterans who took part in the second Chimurenga. However, the Zimbabwean military chiefs remained a key factor especially when Zimbabweans were being torn asunder by factionalism being spearheaded by Grace Mugabe. At first they remained ‘tight-lipped’ but the war veterans now under the leadership of Chris Mutsvangwa became their mouth piece, they could not fold their arms and just leave it to politicians. As already pointed out many opposition political commentators and academics regarded the security sector televised sentiments by Zvinavashe and others as having been targeted at Morgan Tsvangirai. Both the outside world and Zimbabweans in the country were made to believe that the Joint Operation Command are ardent supporters of President Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF.

One Colonel interviewed by authors (20th August 2013) denied that Zvinavashe’s utterances were not some kind of coup. He maintained that what the General was simply hinting at was that the revolutionary ideals must be respected. He argued that “Zimbabweans must have a revolutionary morality, what the ZNA is saying is that we want people who are patriotic, who will be in a position to carry the country forward. Our children must be conscientised so that they know where they are coming from and where they are going and this is why we as members of the army are guided by the liberation ethos.”

Blessing-Miles (2013:829) also argues that Zvinavashe’s 2002 outbursts “have been interpreted in selective ways, and that external factors that played a crucial part in precipitating his intervention have been neglected.” It is a fact that the military elite who participated in the liberation war regard themselves as the ‘guardians of Zimbabwean sovereignty. Secondly Grace Kwinjeh (1999) published a story of a soldier who died in combat and was brought back home to be buried, it is alleged that the soldier’s corpse did not have a head. Third Ray Choto and Mark Chavunduka publicised a story of an alleged military coup. In May 2001, the British Guardian newspaper also reported of a coup plot that incriminated security sector personnel like Air Marshal Perence Shiri. Blessing-Miles opines that the military elite who felt they were under some kind of siege had to respond to ensure that Zimbabwe was not under any kind of threat. General Zvinavashe retorted:

Those said to be coup leaders have no such plans. What is being mentioned about them is not right. There is nothing that is going to happen that way. We are one, we are going to remain united. We know what we are there for. Our responsibility is to defend this country (Blessing-Miles 2013:832).

It must not be overlooked that because of the strained relations that were continuing to worsen between Harare and London, the British government abruptly removed British Military Assistance and Training Team from Zimbabwe in 2001 despite the good relations that had existed before 2000. We also quote Blessing-Miles's citation of the BMATT commander Vere Hayes at length here:

When we left, we were not thrown out by the Zimbabweans. We were removed by Robin Cook [Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs] because there was an election coming up in the UK [in June 2001] and labour [the government] was having British soldiers in Zimbabwe as a political banana skin. It does not matter what you [BMATT] are really doing there, because you are there you will be seen as helping Mugabe and that will play badly for us in the election. That is the reason BMATT was pulled out and it was a difficult time when we left because I thought it was a wrong move and said all along that please call in the fact that we have a lot of equipment here worth about a million of pounds, a lot of vehicles and we have a pretty good relationship with the Zimbabwean military, so we at least need a neat transition to leave honourably, rather than it appearing to the Zimbabwean military that we do not want anything to do with you, so we are up and gone. BMATT had an old relationship with them, you see. But I got a final phone call in March [2001] and was told you're going. We were given about three weeks to get out, which was too short. I went down to see [Constantine] Chiwenga [a Lieutenant General and the head of the army] to tell him we had been ordered to leave. When I did, Chiwenga turned around and said 'I know, I have seen it on television already.' So the UK actually announced it publicly before BMATT was told and had a chance to tell the Zimbabwean military we were leaving. It was not good. It left a bad taste in their mouth after all those years (Blessing-Miles 2013:832).

The Zimbabwean military were hurt by the snub given that this was done at a time when the MDC had dented the ZANU-PF pride during the referendum; the subsequent parliamentary election and now that they were already preparing the 2002 presidential election. Does this then explain why the Zimbabwean military elite decided to ally themselves with the ZANU-PF politicians? Blessing-Miles (2013) correctly observed that JOC saw the rebuff they had suffered at the hands of the British government as a slight and they became

highly suspicious and convinced that they were under siege from Tsvangirai and the West. The military as defenders of Zimbabwean independence allied themselves with the ZANU-PF politicians because both internal and external pressures pushed the military into the 'arms of ZANU-PF political elites. Rather the military is a partisan institution devoted to upholding the ethos and ideals of the liberation war. We must not lose sight of the fact that the ZNA is an amalgam of national liberation movements who fought against the Ian Smith criminal regime and are thus celebrated heroes and heroines of the second Chimurenga.

Blessing-Miles (2013) has it on record that Zvinavashe had actually planned with others [Colonel Lionel Dyke, Mnangagwa] to offer Tsvangirai the position of vice-president after the disputed March 2002 presidential poll. According to Colonel Lionel Dyke:

I said to Zvinavashe that the solution was to give Mugabe a chance to retire properly. 'What if I get permission from the international community for Zimbabwe's constitution to be changed to allow Mugabe to handpick a successor?', I said to Zvinavashe. Zvinavashe said if I can do it, I should do it. So I went around speaking to the [British] Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the American Assistant Secretary for Africa [Walter] Kansteiner. It was interesting, talking to the Brits and Americans, that they were quite happy for ZANU-PF to continue in power as long as Mugabe was not there. I kept relaying my dealings with the Brits and Americans to Zvinavashe. Rex [Nhongo] knew what we were up to. He was thrilled with the plan for Mugabe to leave office but cold on Mnangagwa. Rex and Nhongo were not cosy (2013: 834).

President Mugabe, later on, described the Zvinavashe-Dyke plans as "foolhardy and counter-revolutionary. It is interesting that the Zimbabwean masses, the MDC and ZANU-PF supporters of the Mnangagwa faction including legislators all came out in support of military intervention as they listened more to the military. Sithole (1999:106) observed that "during times of crisis, decision-making inevitably revolves around the military leaders. This is exactly what happened in November 2017. Love of country and not ambition, memories of the liberation struggle, fallen heroes and heroines and not greed and vanity impelled the military leaders to intervene to let Zimbabwe and Zimbabweans stay on course; "revolutionary moralism" is made of sterner stuff. Finer (1988) contends that as public support decreases factionalists become more dependent on the military and therefore increase the armed forces' power or leverage in power contestations.

The conduct and function of the ZDF is defined in law that is, it is guided by the Zimbabwean Constitution and as will be seen in the foregoing the ZDF

commander upheld the Constitution when he made his statement shortly before the military intervened. According to the Zimbabwean Constitution, the man in uniform must be subordinate to their civilian superiors as well as being accountable to them. The National Defence Policy clearly stipulates that civil-military relations connote the “hierarchy of authority between the Executive, Parliament and the Defence Forces” (Hendricks and Hutton 2009). It is therefore the duty of the civilian political ruling elite to come up with a defence policy that is executed by the military. The civilian ruling elite must respect military autonomy by not interfering with the military operational chain of command. The president as commander-in-Chief of Zimbabwe’s uniformed forces has the mandate to:

- Determine the deployment of defence forces
- Determine the execution of military action
- Declare war
- Make peace

In his press briefing the day before the military intervention, the ZDF commander General Chiwenga begun by quoting the preamble of the Zimbabwean Constitution. The military thus became the saviour since Zimbabwe was in an accelerated political and economic decline that had been in motion in the aftermath of the 2013 election. The military was the only institution that could provide a road map to transition. As already noted the situation was further exacerbated by the rise of Grace Mugabe who, with the support of the G40 was trying to work herself into power through exploiting her closeness to her husband. This therefore explains the high visibility of the military in Zimbabwean politics because the military elites view their role as not only of giving military advice, but also as that of setting things right.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013) noted that, during the war, these military leaders had operated as military-cum political units since they were highly politicised and indoctrinated. One retired Colonel in an interview with author averred that since 1980 the military’s role has been twofold, notably it was the deliverer of national independence and also it was the guarantors of that independence. He contended that Zimbabwe’s state-military development is unique in that the national culture that defines Zimbabwe’s political space is not imposed by a central state but is a result of a nexus of “evolutionary, coercive and spontaneous factors” that determine how the military are always geared to defend Zimbabwe’s national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. This therefore explains why, from the late 1970s until now, the military have always been part of the political equation.

What eventually enraged the military elites were Grace Mugabe's continued machinations to succeed her husband. She told 'those with ears to hear during her rallies' that by virtue of her being Zimbabwean, no one would deny her the right to rule Zimbabwe. This had been triggered by Mugabe himself who after he elevated Mnangagwa and Mphoko to be Vice-Presidents categorically stated that they would not be his automatic successors. This brought him into stark conflict with the war veterans who said that Mnangagwa was their preferred candidate to take over from him. Now that Joice Mujuru had been thrown into the historical dustbin the succession race was now between G40 (Grace) and Mnangagwa. Didymus Mutasa in an interview with one local newspaper pointed out that "the quarrelsome first lady is now indisputably in charge of the ruling party and not her nonagenarian husband" (Mufuka and Zenda 2018:164). In one of her rallies Grace Mugabe told her audience that, just as Mnangagwa had left the Chirumanzu-Zibagwe constituency for his wife, Mugabe would also leave the highest political office for her [as his wife] if ever he decided to retire.

The ZANU-PF youths began calling for the Youth and Women's Leagues to support Grace Mugabe. The new slogan became "*munhu wese kuna Amai / everybody support mother.*" Arguably, Grace Mugabe had captured the state. Mugabe was irked by Emmerson Mnangagwa who when he was acting President during Mugabe's annual leave was given a mug by Energy Mutodi emblazoned "I AM THE BOSS." This was interpreted as an affront on the one ZANU-PF centre of power. Just as had happened to Joice Mujuru, Mnangagwa was branded as ambitious by the G40 and therefore working with war veteran renegades who wanted him to become the leader of ZANU-PF and Zimbabwe. Mugabe again employed his *modus operandi* by unleashing his wife to be the "attack dog." Presidential Youth Interface Rallies were arranged by Grace's G40 handlers (Saviour Kasukuwere, Patrick Zhuawo, Jonathan Moyo, Ignatious Chombo, Mandi Chimene among others) in which President Mugabe and Grace Mugabe would address the ZANU-PF party youths in all provinces in Zimbabwe.

As had happened to Joice Mujuru in 2014 these rallies were to be the 'political spring board' to stampede Mnangagwa out of the party as he was castigated and humiliated even in his presence. The military elites were not spared as they were accused by Grace Mugabe of supporting Mnangagwa and plotting to kill Chatunga Mugabe (Matyszak 2015). Grace also told the congregants that even those without liberation war credentials had the right to rule this country. In a rally that was held in Gwanda on the 12th of August 2017, Mnangagwa was served poisoned ice cream (The Herald 2017). It was only after he had recovered that Mnangagwa revealed that he was a victim of ZANU-PF succession politics. Some members of his party wanted him dead. Grace Mugabe later responded in one of her rallies "I am the First lady and Mnangagwa

is nothing. He was employed by my husband. Why should I kill him?” (Mufuka and Zenda 2018: 166). On the 4th of November 2017, some youths attending the rally showed their disdain of Grace Mugabe by booing at her and cheered when Mnangagwa arrived. This prompted Mugabe to remark:

Did I make a mistake in appointing Mnangagwa as my vice president? “*Zvino mukadaro ndinomudonbedzwa mangwana chaiye.*” If I erred I will drop him by the end of day tomorrow. If he and his backers want to form their own party so be it. We cannot have a party of friction and personal insults...So, to the people of Masvingo with their attitude, you can go ahead and form your party because we honestly cannot have this. We cannot be insulted on a daily basis (Mufuka and Zenda 2018:167).

On the 8th of November 2017, Emmerson Mnangagwa was expelled from government and later from the party after one province after another recommended his expulsion. The expulsions were also being meted on Mnangagwa’s supporters especially after Mnangagwa escaped from Zimbabwe into exile via Mozambique. Mnangagwa’s expulsion from the party-state set in motion the military intervention. The Christopher Mnangagwa led war veterans and their supporters, some of whom were the military elites regarded Mnangagwa’s sacking as outright betrayal. He had been Mugabe’s right hand man and after Mujuru’s fall-out, they thought that he would be Mugabe’s successor. The military thought that if they did not intervene then ZANU-PF would be hijacked by the G40 cabal who had never participated in the war and Zimbabwe would become a Mugabe dynasty.

The military intervention was thus necessitated by the desire to ‘smoothly offload’ Mugabe from the throne; while retaining ZANU-PF in power. The ZDF commander General Chiwenga travelled to China shortly after Emmerson Mnangagwa’s escape into exile. According to Gregory Elich (November 2017) Zimbabwean security forces remained on high alert in the wake of Mnangagwa’s threats. Simon Khaya Moyo the ZANU-PF party spokesperson accused the generals and Mnangagwa of treason. Mugabe, Chihuri and the G40 cabal tried to arrest Chiwenga upon his return from China. They sent out a police paramilitary unit to the newly named Robert Gabriel Mugabe airport to arrest the General. The ZNA military intelligence, having become aware of the plot, thwarted it allowing the general to elude arrest. Elich (2017) notes that information passed to him by an official with knowledge of the incident was that “When Chiwenga came, a team of soldiers dressed in National Handling Services (NHS) uniforms got inside the airport. When the police were about to arrest the General, the soldiers blocked the process. When the soldiers took off the decoy NHS uniforms, the police fled after realising that it was the soldiers that had blocked the arrest.

From the moment they started executing their plan, the military were very cautious for it not to be deemed a military coup. They had reasons for this. The

military elites are aware that the international community, the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) do not accept military coups as ways of changing governments. However the military sought to adroitly remove Mugabe from office and replace him with their preferred successor without raising regional or international alarm. The SADC and the AU have clear rules against unconstitutional takeover or change of government. The military thus rolled their armoured vehicles into strategic positions, taking over the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation and Zimbabwe Television and put the president under house arrest on the night of the 14-15 November 2017.

It cannot be disputed that from then on the military leaders were the ones who were in control, directing everything that was taking place. President Mugabe was asked to remove members of the G40 cabal (Jonathan Moyo, Saviour Kasukuwere and Patrick Zhuwao) from government and party. Grace Mugabe was also to be removed from the party. According to Brickhill (2017) the military leaders were the ones who planned and coordinated the military takeover. He maintains that Mr Mnangagwa's whereabouts were not known. However this is very unlikely because a letter that was purported to have been written by Mnangagwa clearly stated that in about a week he was going to come back and rule Zimbabwe. Brickhill's contact who intimated that; "This is no longer a game, gloves are now off, and I can tell you he will be back as promised" (Brickhill 2017). On the 13th of November 2017, General Chiwenga with the support of other military elites in a press announcement reminded all Zimbabweans that they had a special role of guarding and protecting the people of Zimbabwe and the Constitution. Mufuka and Zenda (2018:169-170) argue that General Chiwenga clearly stated that the military were "stakeholders and protectors of the revolutionary ideals, ZANU-PF had been infiltrated by scallywags and adventurers who through their criminal behaviour undermined the revolutionary spirit of the organization and the state." He asked for the reversal of the purges that had been done on those with liberation credentials and he asked for the sacking of Grace Mugabe, Jonathan Moyo, Saviour Kasukuwere and Patrick Zhuwao from the party. When this was not done the military chiefs took over the broadcasting centres closing all roads into the capital city.

Some members of the G40 cabal like Saviour Kasukuwere, Jonathan Moyo and Mandi Chimene fled into exile while some like Ignatious Chombo, Kudzanai Chipanga and Paul Chimedza were arrested but later released on bail. On Thursday, President Mugabe was allowed to undertake his usual duties, meeting the South African delegation who came to assess the situation and to assist in the negotiations. Other civil servants also went to work without any disturbances. The following day he officiated at a graduation ceremony at the

University of Zimbabwe. Though the situation seemed normal it cannot be discounted that the military were prepared to use force if Mugabe continued to resist. However Mugabe acted cleverly when he addressed the nation. To the citizens and the generals' amazement, Mugabe did not resign and simply said he was to reach an understanding with the generals to address their concern and that of the country.

General Chiwenga and other military commanders, together with Father Fidelis Mukonori and Gideon Gono, continued to negotiate with Robert Mugabe on a smooth handover of power. This shows that despite Mugabe being characterised by his enemies as a liberation leader turned tyrant, he still commanded some respect even in the eyes of the military who were 'asking' him to resign. When some members of his party realised that Mugabe was dragging his feet about resigning, a ZANU-PF politburo was organised. In the absence of the supporters of the G40, Robert Gabriel Mugabe was expelled from the party. Chris Mutsvangwa, later on divulged that, the Zimbabwe National Army elites capitalised on the demonstration that was planned by citizens to force Mugabe to resign. Mugabe resisted and said those who were demonstrating were MDC opposition supporters. To force Mugabe to give in, the military elites told Mugabe that they were not going to guarantee his security if the Zimbabwean angry and aggrieved masses decided to march to his blue roof mansion. Elich (20 November 2017) notes that "the generals said they will not shoot the people for him. Instead, they will abandon their posts and leave him to his fate." Emmerson Mnangagwa was elected as the new party leader. Grace Mugabe and other G40 members would be prosecuted. Mugabe was given a 24 hour ultimatum to resign or face impeachment on Tuesday the 21st of November 2017. Mugabe tendered his resignation on the 21st of November and there was jubilation in parliament and amongst citizens when they heard news of the former ZANU-PF strongman's resignation. Mnangagwa was to receive a heroic welcome as Zimbabweans lined the streets to welcome him. He was to be installed state and government leader at a ceremony that was attended by opposition party leaders. Even those who had been stampeded out of the ZANU-PF party like Joice Mujuru came to witness Mnangagwa's ascendance into the highest office in the land.

One disheartening thing about Africa is that despite the fact that coups are no longer a fashionable way of offloading governments from the political scene, they still occur and in some instances are supported by the general populace. In our conclusion we lay the foundation for future analysis on whether the ZNA elites staged a coup in November 2017. Anyangwe (2010:11) submits that the penalty of an illegal forced removal of a sitting head of state or government is that "coup perpetrators have often been subjected to charges of treason...In every country it is a crime." It is worth revisiting the question that was asked

Professor Masipula Sithole by one of his educated mates. 'A colleague less naïve and more knowledgeable than me on these matters said to me...The literature has many theories about coups, but Professor, would you recognise a coup if you saw one?'

After having been asked the question, Sithole (1998:52) recounted how Julius Nyerere of Tanzania had posed the same question to Abel Muzorewa (Do you know what a coup is like?) during the liberation struggle. Muzorewa was under some kind of house arrest in Maputo. The Tanzanian leader was asking this in relation to the way Bishop Muzorewa had lost control on the guerrilla commanders who were now denouncing both Muzorewa (who had been asked to lead the liberation movements in 1972 when the ZANU and ZAPU leaders were incarcerated) and Ndabaningi Sithole. The rise of Robert Mugabe during the liberation struggle has also been referred by some as a coup. Many have also alleged that General Vitalis Zinwashe's utterances in 2002 constituted a coup. Similarly, the actions by the military elites in 2008, when they refused to accept a Tsvangirai win, have also been regarded as a coup. Some have also regarded Grace's state capture as a 'palace coup.' Below we give a summary of basic characteristics of coups.

Ruth First (1970:19) notes that, "the army does not always move monolithically and hence analyses its internal conflict dynamics and its responses to crises." It is thus influenced by the perceptions of a threat. Coups may be bloody or not. Coups are staged by small and at times slightly larger military establishments who sideline the rest of the militia or render those who are not part of the plot useless. The coup conspirators carry out their activities in utmost secrecy and at times under oath. The military seizes state power and this is coined temporary to 'set things' right. They occupy and take control of strategic areas and institutions like parliamentary and executive buildings, broadcasting corporations and national television, the airport and all exits that lead to borders. There will be a media black-out that is only interrupted by a dosage of information by the military on the state of the situation in the country. Movement of people is controlled and directed by the military. All these activities are considered temporary but necessary to make things right.

The majority of the Zimbabwean citizenry applauded the military intervention to correct the untenable political situation being caused by the ZANU-PF factionalism. These do not view what happened as a coup. They see it as an inevitable step to clean the party ushering in a new era in Zimbabwe's history. The Zimbabwe military elites have also maintained that this was not a coup but a power transition that was facilitated by the military. It is a fact that the former ZANU-PF strongman who was first Secretary of the party and head of government was recalled from power because he was now failing to carry out his mandate because of the influence from his wife. This was later followed by

ZANU-PF and MDC legislators who started moving a motion in the National Assembly to impeach him if he refused to willingly tender his resignation. This explains why the military leaders entered into negotiations with President Mugabe and permitted mediators from South Africa and local mediators in the name of Father Fidelis Mukonori, Gideon Gono and George Charamba to assist in the talks that were being carried out.

The army commanders involved in the talks continued to salute President Mugabe as the commander in chief of the ZDF. The ZNA elites used the Zimbabwean Constitution to support their actions; Zimbabweans had to be allowed “to enjoy their freedoms and rights as enshrined in the national Constitution.” Mugabe was thus not lynched out of office but willingly tendered his resignation in conformity to section 96, subsection 1 of the constitution of Zimbabwe. Mugabe did this after having considered the greater good of stepping down. Some have argued that the military intervention was executed not to challenge ZANU-PF’s dominance but to reassert it and when the mission was accomplished the military went back to barracks.

On the other hand Former President Robert Mugabe, Jonathan Moyo, Patrick Zhuwao, and other analysts have maintained that the military intervention in Zimbabwe was a military coup. On Thursday the 15th of March 2018 Mugabe appeared on a televised interview by the SABC. Mugabe described his departure from office as a military coup, he said:

I say it was a coup d’état, some people have refused to call it a coup...we must undo this disgrace we have imposed on ourselves. It was truly a military takeover, there was no movement visible unless the movement was checked and allowed by the army... Emmerson would never have been president without the assistance of the army which makes it a coup (15 March 2018).

Mugabe complained that other sectors of the security sector (the police and the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) were immobilised as they were subjected to beatings and torture. Mugabe also said that he was betrayed by SADC and South Africa who did not intervene when the ZNA leaders coerced him into tendering his resignation. Brickhill (2017) argues that the actions of the ZDF have received popular support but were unconstitutional. It is contended that giving it various inscriptions such as a “soft coup, slow motion coup, coup-not-coup” does not change anything, it was a coup.

Conclusion

Conclusively, what must be noted is that the military elite gave their intervention “the veneer of constitutionality.” Notably, the SADC, the AU and

the international community welcomed Mugabe's departure from the political scene. Even the Zimbabwean courts did not regard Mugabe's departure as a coup. There are members of the opposition parties including the MDC who are now saying it was a coup and yet as noted, they participated in the removal of Mugabe. They participated in the leadership transition political scandal, if it can be referred as such. It was a political corruption transitional strategy that abated a system that they are now calling illegal. The question that arises is that given the Western abhorrence of Robert Mugabe, even if the military had shot their way into state house would the regional and international community have come to Mugabe's aid?

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‘To Plan is to Choose’: Navigating Julius Nyerere’s Economic and Political Thoughts, 1961 – 1980s

Maximillian Julius Chuhila

Introduction

African economic thinking and planning, rather than reality, have been at the centre stage of political architects. Governments and their leaders have dictated policy and planning directions from early African independence days. Soon after independence most African economic and social planning continued in the path of colonial predecessors. Tanzania was one of the countries that tried both approaches, that is, the colonial approach from 1961 – 1967 and the nationalist approach from 1967 – 1980s. These two phases were marked by changes and continuities of colonial approaches. Scholars have divided opinions as to whether the changes engineered by the first President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere were useful or not.

Experimenting on the only pronounced variant of ‘African socialism’ with various catchphrases like ‘self – reliance’, ‘*uburu na kazi*: freedom and work’, ‘*siasa ni Kilimo*: politics is agriculture’, he shifted the urban centred approach into rural centred planning and development. Nyerere’s development policy was envisioned in his mind but unfortunately not properly echoed among his subordinates. In one of his speeches, he expressed his worries on whether the implementation of TANU’s resolutions highlighted in the 1967 Arusha Declaration was properly understood. The discord between the President and subordinates caused planning and development challenges and it hindered the realisation of socialist oriented plans. This chapter examines the continuities and changes in Tanzania’s economic planning and development. It shows the central role of political personalities, governments and policy options towards development. We start to do this by examining the early days of independence, reviewing how colonial planning shaped early development initiatives in the post-colonial period before moving into the nationalist centred approach. To show that planning and development during the period from 1961 through to the 1980s was centred on the thinking and desires of Julius Nyerere, the changeover of leadership in 1985 marked a shift from socialist oriented development into a neoliberal economic trajectory. This chapter shows that Africa’s development planning and implementation depends much on

individuals than institutions. The point here is that regime change goes together with priority change, that is, in Africa, changing a regime amounts to changing the national priorities. At the end of this chapter, we have tried to extend Nyerere's influence beyond the borders of his territory. As a leader with charismatic attraction he managed to influence African political and social discourses throughout his lifetime. He emphasised African freedom, equality, unity and cooperation - his life-long values.

Writing something about a highly acclaimed statesman like Julius Kambarage Nyerere (1922 - 1999) has never been easy for those who attempted it. As a person, a statesman, thinker and author he generated huge interest from all ends, home, Africa and beyond. His political and economic thoughts have continuously been used as references for successes and failures, and sometimes as benchmarks to arrive at some conclusions. In this chapter, I have decided to deal with Nyerere's political thought and how his thinking informed economic discourses throughout his time in power and beyond. There are numerous studies on the biography, achievements and failures of Nyerere as a President with little concentration on the context of the failures and successes. Some scholarly publications have described him as a contradictory leader who would change his ideologies all the time. Nyerere's commitments to improving the wellbeing of humanity was central to his change of approaches. In doing this, he received low support from subordinates and some of them even sabotaged his plans.

This chapter is not a biography but an overview of Nyerere's influence and commitment to economic planning, development and politics. The chapter is based on a review of several of Nyerere's writings, speeches and interviews both in Kiswahili and English. These have been complemented with other secondary sources.

Establishing the Context

Soon after independence African countries had no realistic options to delink from former colonial powers. They inherited colonial planning models based on the advice of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (later called World Bank). The World Bank's recommendations resulted from intensive surveys of the colonies in the 1950s. The economic planning models by the World Bank were in essence colonial and unfit for postindependence Tanzania. Firstly, they continued to recommend the intermediate-transitional plans that were prepared by colonial governments. Second, there was no strong financial base to implement the models in postindependence Tanzania. This meant that Africa continued to suffer economic dependence syndrome. In postindependence Tanzania, the government was forced to continue to rely on

loans and grants from neoimperial powers.

One disadvantage of this reliance on foreign aid was that development initiatives floundered when the aid ceased flowing. In many African countries, transitional planning was followed up with long term planning. The period 1960s-1980s was characterised by one main comprehensive plan divided into four small short-term implementation plans. It was a comprehensive plan because; it comprised nearly all sectors of economic and social welfare of the people. Later, in the mid-1980s Tanzania experienced a new focus in its planning and development that was controlled by the demands of the international organisations influencing policy and development in developed and developing countries at the time. Market oriented economic development and emphasis on technological advancement were pronounced but without clearly changing the main institutional establishments that guided planning and development before 1980s (URT Vision 2025).

Before the implementation of the first Long Term Perspective Development Plan, 1964 – 1980, there was a continuation of British Plans in the Third Year Development Plan 1961/1962 – 1963/1964 (Tanganyika 1961). The realisation of the long-term 1964 – 1980 perspective plan started with the implementation of the First Five-Year Plan aiming to raise the per capital income from 19 pounds to 45 pounds, achieving self-sufficiency in trained manpower and to raise the life expectancy of the people from 35 – 50 years by 1980 (United Republic of Tanzania later URT 1964). The common political slogan during this period was, '*Uhuru na Kazi*: Freedom and Work', to encourage people to participate in different development projects. This probably was good political machinery to enthuse citizens. Through the First Five-Year Plan, Tanzania encouraged and anticipated a high flow of foreign 'investments' and capital intensive projects on major productive sectors of the economy namely industry and agriculture (Kaizer 1996).

Attempts to develop an industrial base were prematurely anticipated, as the conditions for an industrial take-off were not yet in place. Industrial development would highly depend on the performance of the rural sector, which by itself had little to celebrate. In the mid-1960s it became apparent that the anticipations were not materialising and the independence government under President Julius Nyerere was disappointed. This unsatisfying situation inclined the government in 1967 to have a U-turn in the path to development where the main focus shifted from industrial development into rural development. This was to be achieved through the implementation of the Arusha Declaration adopted in February 1967. Through the Arusha Declaration, the government did not give prominence to foreign grants, loans and private 'investments' but rather on rural mobilisation, hard work and using internal resources to further development (Nyerere 1968; Coulson 1979).

The success or failures of *Ujamaa* projects have produced voluminous collections of different kinds of publications and it seems that the idea of *Ujamaa* still attracts the attention of politicians, ordinary people and scholars of contemporary African political thought. Recent publications in this theme include Dibua (2003), Schneider (2004), Hunter (2008), Nugent (2012) and Hunter (2015). The currency and popularity of the *Ujamaa* debates in Tanzania implies that *Ujamaa* had some good elements which are of relevance in the making of contemporary social-economic development in Africa. The biggest problem in Tanzania was that it was Nyerere alone who really preached and walked the talk on *Ujamaa*. The government officials' misunderstandings of *Ujamaa* were evident in the kinds of questions that party members and government officials submitted to Nyerere. Almost all questions were about the conflict of interest between, on one hand, wealth accumulation and, on the other hand, political and public obligations and responsibilities of those who served in government positions. Many of the questions concerned how leaders could maintain their positions while at the same time have some sort of private 'investments' for themselves and families (Nyerere 1967 & 1970). No questions were asked on the way forward in building a socialist country. Nyerere was unhappy with this inclination to private wealth accumulation within ranks of his government's leadership.

Simply put, the 1960s was a period of confusion on planning and development in Tanzania. Tanzania was using trial and error methods in the comprehensive planning. The First Five-Year Plan had provided legal and technical guarantees on private 'investments'. 'Investors' were allowed to repatriate capital and the profits. The government was ready to give foreign 'investors' pieces of land for the construction of industries and the newly established industries were given tax holidays and other incentives (URT 1964). This offer to foreign 'investment' was set to be for five years, 1964-1969. The Arusha Declaration, later to constitute the most popular discourse in the public sphere, was adopted when the First-Five Year Development Plan was in its third quarter of implementation hence disrupting whatever remained for implementation (URT 1969; URT 1976). The declaration came out of the frustrations with private 'investment' that was not forthcoming as anticipated (Brown & Brown 1995). Subsequently, the declaration became a defining guideline in all spheres of life and received mixed reactions in the public domain. Narratives on the public sphere of the socialist ideology can be found in Emma Hunter (2015).

Nyerere and *Uhuru na Maendeleo*: Freedom and Development, 1961 – 1980s

Nyerere's economic thinking imagined a rural society founded on egalitarian

principles originating from an African cultural ethos. This influenced planning and development throughout his presidential tenure. Nyerere was among the very few postcolonial African leaders who strongly believed in *Ujamaa* principles geared at achieving a socialist rural society. Apart from him, other independent African heads of states that openly expressed their views were Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana - with social revolution, Leopold Sedar of Senegal - with negritude, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia - with Zambian humanism. Others saw the socialist ideology with scepticism (Friedland and Rosberg Jr 1964). Although they did not oppose it openly they neither supported it openly nor rejected it outright. The paths to development that were at African leaders' disposal were many but they were also replete with lots of challenges. African leaders needed to choose trajectories with less challenges compared to others. The political thought and ideological origin of African socialism, its nature and course of actions is traced to the meeting held in December 1962 in Senegal. It was from this meeting that the idea of African socialism came out. The only challenge that this convention did not outline was the course of actions towards achieving a socialist ideology in each of the states. As a result, there was lack of common understanding hence the emergence of different blends of socialism, as conceived by individual national leaders. Nyerere's blend of African socialism, known by the popular Kiswahili name '*ujamaa*', remained the most influential African socialist ideology on the continent (Mazrui 1967).

The Dakar conference came at almost the same time when Nyerere was requesting his fellow countrymen to live together peacefully and collectively in order to benefit from the government provision of social services. Benefiting from the conference, his earlier plans of collective living in villages received new impetus for implementation (Kawawa 1975; Magoti 2007). He thought bringing people together and providing them with what the government could offer was the best way to enhance African socialism. Provision of schools, hospitals and clean water to all villagers living collectively was overambitious during this time. The village settlement schemes just coordinated these developments shortly before they collapsed. The village settlement approach which started in 1962 registered little success. This was a disappointment to Nyerere who was determined to make it a success. He, as a result, promulgated the 1967 Arusha Declaration where people were encouraged to democratically form *Ujamaa* villages to live and work together. It was in TANU's 16th General meeting that a bold statement was made to bring people together by 1976 (Kawawa 1975). What came after the introduction of the Arusha Declaration and, especially after the party's 16th General meeting defines Nyerere's social and economic thinking and approaches in improving the rural wellbeing of his people.

Having this kind of thinking was one thing, implementation was another thing and the reality on the ground was yet another thing. Nyerere was a central

figure in his party and government activities. His party and government adopted his thinking and put his ideas into action. This is what the case was for the Arusha Declaration and many other defining speeches that Nyerere gave. Party and government leaders at all levels shied away from openly criticising Mwalimu's ideas but they shuffled their feet in matters of implementation. In this way, Nyerere faced several challenges to make sure his wishes were a true reality. One of the main hindrances to Nyerere's economic and development thinking and direction was hypocrisy and fear amongst his subordinates who were in leadership positions. This was probably the main challenge. Some party and government leaders did not support the Arusha Declaration. So, some of them resigned from their posts, others moved across borders while a large number remained in government but shied away from implementing the declaration (Nyerere 1970). The most dangerous group of leaders comprised those who implemented the declaration but merely to protect themselves from being labelled as deviants in the party. Some would even deliberately wrongly interpret the Arusha Declaration. Under such a situation, it was difficult to accomplish the party and government's plans. Nyerere remained with few committed supporters and many silent opponents to his ideas.

The dissolution, for example, of the Ruvuma Development Association (RDA) in 1969 was one indication of the divisions amongst party and government officials. Nyerere wanted such types of rural development organisations. Government and party elites misinformed the President about the association, leading to its dissolution (Ndomba 2014). For a bottom up development initiative of the sort of RDA, its dissolution was a big blow and a frustration on the part of the President. In 1968 he warned, and throughout the 1960s, he discouraged leaders from forcing people into development programmes but rather encourage them to form self-operating social and economic units. In the same year he gave a self –corrective statement to the effect that the government had previously overstressed on developing infrastructure than developing people into village communities (Nyerere 1968). The change of approach from developing infrastructure to developing people came from the failure of the highly ambitious Euro-modernisation projects that were tried from 1961 to 1967. It was unfortunate that the democratic approach taken by the RDA villages through TANU Youth League initiatives was banned just after seven years of operation. It was banned because it was considered more as a threat than a grassroots project of *ujamaa*-informed development. From 1970s, people were forced into *Ujamaa* villages. In the end, little success was made in the newly formulated villages (Cliffe & Saul 1975; Babu 1981; Young 1982; Lawi 2000; Jennings 2003).

Economic analysts and scholars of the Tanzanian socialist approach view the changes differently. Leander Schneider for instance, interprets Nyerere as

dictatorial and authoritarian in so far as the villagisation is concerned (Schneider 2004). Others (Hunter 2015; Bjerck 2015) view the failure of the project in Tanzania as emanating from the adoption of the Euro-modernisation approach. Schneider fails to recognise Nyerere's ambitions and frustrations in implementing the development programmes. Similarly, it did not acknowledge the mismatch between the President – the *Ujamaa* architect, and the rest of the government/party officials who were the immediate supervisors in the implementation. Had there been an unflawed match, the dynamic nature of Nyerere's overviews on rural development would have taken different trajectories. Nyerere had to be dynamic and change views and ideas in trying to bring about development in Tanzania – he was not by virtue of that authoritarian as some have argued. In fact, he had to push his subordinates, who lacked the zeal, to implement the programme. Reading Nyerere's ideas through his speeches between 1960s and 1970s one will be positioned to properly understand what he went through. *Ujamaa* was originally a voluntary project but later it was implemented through coercion.

Despair was a frustrating reality when things were not moving on. Although this was a challenge, Nyerere still believed the ultimate goal would be achieved despite shortages of skilled personnel, illiteracy and inadequate physical infrastructure networks that characterised the continent as whole (Mkandawire 1998). In 1974 just months before the forced villagisation campaign started Nyerere remarked 'Tanzania is [was] not a socialist society. It is [was] a nation which is trying to create a socialist society' (Nyerere 1974:7). In a similar remark, commenting on the economic and social challenges facing Tanzania in the 1970s, he showed disappointment with attempts to create a socialist society. Nyerere points out that; 'socialists who come to Tanzania expecting to find the living example of their creed are liable to depart bitter and disillusioned. For they will not find a socialist society in existence' (Nyerere 1974:7). His commitment to building a socialist society was bold. His frustration was also obvious. Despite the pitfalls he maintained his trajectory arguing that 'we shall continue to make mistakes in tactics, and in the execution of our policies, thus exacerbating our problems. But we shall continue, as we have begun, trying to create a society in which all citizens work together in freedom, dignity and equality for their common good' (Nyerere 1974:7). He was not drawn back by the challenges and failures rather he struggled to bring desired outcomes.

Nyerere wanted to see his vision prosper. He used various techniques to achieve this. This explains his dynamic way of handling issues pertaining to his views on development, African solidarity and unity. The blueprints in the Arusha Declaration of February 1967, which in principle were difficult to achieve for a young nation, were reviewed unofficially in his 1968 speech 'Uhuru na Maendeleo: Freedom and Development'. The emphasis this time went on

leading villagers into self-planned development projects contrary to coordinated settlements for the government to give social amenities. The outlook changed from developing tangible outcomes to developing people and their consciousness and responsibility. Notwithstanding resource constraints, Nyerere thought developing people's conscience would have good results. In January 1968 in a speech titled 'implementation of rural socialism', Nyerere emphasised the role of planning from below for sustainable development. He advised that the rural socialism document was 'an outline of a policy of inter-linked, self-governing village communities which are of the people, and which therefore cannot be created for them or imposed on them' (Nyerere 1973:5). In this speech he also warned TANU leaders not to bully people to form fake *Ujamaa* communities. To him this would not create *Ujamaa* communities or villages since socialism was an attitude of the mind and not a result of coercion and forced cooperation (TANU 1962).

It was Nyerere's view that for rural socialism to succeed, leaders were necessary. But he observed 'let me emphasise that this leadership I am now talking about does not imply control, any more than it implies bullying or intimidating people. A good leader will explain, teach and inspire' (Nyerere 1973). This was his expectation of leaders. He encouraged his subordinates to lead people into development, which was nothing but improvement of people's wellbeing and comfort. Nyerere is quoted as having said; 'for the truth is that development means the development of people. Roads, buildings, the increases of crop output, and other things of this nature, are not development' (Nyerere 1968). They are not development if they do not directly contribute to the improvements of people's wellbeing and comfort enabling them to have decent existence. Development should facilitate mobility of people, freedom from hunger and better nutrition.

Leadership commitment was a big challenge to the efforts of building a socialist society in Tanzania. Connected to this was the challenge of people's readiness and awareness of what was expected from them by the party and government. Some people became resistant to the Arusha Declaration because the new plans alienated them from traditionally owned land where both economic and socio-cultural practices were undertaken (Lawi 2007). Examples are plenty that many did not want to go this direction. Because it was a plan from top bureaucrats, coercion was used in implementation. It was after the Arusha Declaration in 1967 that TANU produced *Mwongozo wa TANU* in 1971 and 1981 to explain the declaration in a more simple way to the people. Between the first *Mwongozo* of 1971 and the second one in 1981, there were two policy documents issued. The first one was '*Siasa ni Kilimo*: politics is agriculture' issued in 1972 targeting at improved food crop productivity through improved farm inputs and activities (TANU 1972). Peasants opened up farms for agriculture in

areas like Iringa and Tanga. These developments did not last because they were shortly interrupted by the coerced implementation of villagisation lasting from 1974 to 1976. Nyerere assumed that Tanzanians were traditionally egalitarian. In some areas like Kilimanjaro people lived together in close proximity for long time but they were not living *Ujamaa* life. When they were introduced to the idea of *Ujamaa* life, living, working and sharing the produces together, they were sceptical (TANU 1974). They feared to lose their land especially as it was so limited on the mountain slopes. In this case, leaders were to educate them what it meant to live in an *Ujamaa* village. This was what partly brought the compulsory villagisation in the 1970s. Another big challenge under this perspective was the dichotomy between '*Ujamaa*' as a belief in people and *Ujamaa* villages – as people sharing a common *Ujamaa* belief in their minds.

The assumption from the leadership was that when people come together, work together and share whatever product of their communal labour that would entail living in *Ujamaa*. They ignored the repercussions of those who were reluctant to join into such villages. As a result of this ignorance, it was easy to force people into the villages without making them '*wajamaa*' in the entire sense. People would work together so lazily while sparing enough time for private activities. In Iringa, this brought the tragic death of the Regional Commissioner by the name Wilbert Kleruu who went to inspect a progressive farmer on his privately owned shamba on a Christmas day (Chuhila 2013). The progressive farmer had worked on the communal land and used the spare time on his own shamba. Nothing is so clear as to what was the conversation between the RC and the progressive farmer that led to the shooting of the RC. However, it is clear peasants had other pockets of investments away from communal activities. They had side farms where more effort was given than into communal farms. Some peasants sabotaged *Ujamaa* communal works deliberately by boiling seeds, for example, or not working as required. It was also apprehended that in areas where people were forced to work, there were poorer results than in villages formed voluntarily by villagers. Areas such as Songea under the Ruvuma Development Association and Handeni Tanga are acclaimed to have exercised an advanced way of self-mobilisation into *Ujamaa* villages and achieved reasonably greater impact than in areas of complete coercion (Havenevik 1993; Ndomba 2014).

The 1980s Realities

This was the most difficult period in the history of economic planning and development in Tanzania and the African continent at large. It marked the third round of economic planning after the colonial planning, nationalist-rural centred and now liberal economic and political development. It also marked two

decades of Nyerere's disappointments and frustrations when he observed what was going on against the Tanzania he wished to see. Later he strongly criticised the 1990s Zanzibar Resolution saying that it aimed at removing the leadership ethos preventing private accumulation of wealth by political elites. The Zanzibar Resolution in President Mwinyi's view was an improvement of the Arusha Declaration according to the dictates of the time. Mwinyi in his speech to the elders of Dar es Salaam titled *'Twende na wakati: Let us go with time'* hints the importance and relevance of the redefinition of the declaration (Mwinyi 1991). Nyerere was unhappy after the Zanzibar Resolution. He openly criticised it and maintained that he still did not see any irrelevance of the Arusha Declaration in the 1990s. In 1984 for example, Nyerere was asked to reflect on the Arusha Declaration and comment on whether there was anything to be modified. He replied; 'What has gone wrong with the Arusha Declaration is that it is not carried out. It remains relevant and I would not change a comma if I were to rewrite it now' (El Saadawi 2010). It was unfortunate however that the 1980s saw pressures from outside Africa, which made it difficult to continue executing the Arusha Declaration. Tanzania as part of the Global South had little power to resist these changes.

By the 1980s, it was obvious that Nyerere's imaginations of a socialist rural society were challenged at a time when the economy also was shaken. These challenges were probably not indicators of undesirability of his rural based development but probably they could not withstand the pressure of time (Carter 1995). Political elites equally were not singing the same tune with the President - this made follow-up and implementation increasingly problematic. More frustrations came from the Structural Adjustment Programmes. The President decided to step down, as he did not want to implement such directives set by the Bretton Wood agencies/institutions. Bretton Wood institutions included the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that were and are determined to usurp the running of economies in Africa. These institutions became highly involved in the global economic order especially starting from the 1970s. It was these institutions that advised and prepared the SAPs for the "less developed" countries in the 1980s. It was not easy for Nyerere to continue as president working under the prescriptions of the institutions and thus he decided to step down in 1985 (Nyerere 1985a).

Commenting in an interview about his retirement from the Presidency Nyerere said; 'There is a lot of pressure on me but I believe I have to help Tanzania to look to the future and to get away from the fear of 'what happens' I do not like this fear' (El Saadawi 2010:14). This was a remark on the pressure from the public and party leaders who did not want him to step down. They wanted him to continue to serve as President. Then he added; "my enemies and the enemies of Tanzania want me to go because then everything will stop: the

socialism, the unity, and the liberation. 'This is nonsense' (El Saadawi 2010:14). The enemies referred to were his fellow party and government leaders who desired private accumulation of wealth. His retirement was a surrender of his economic and social policies to external dictates that he could not contain at the time. Further, analysis of Nyerere's policies suggests varying opinions (Svendsen 1995; Carter 1995; Brown & Brown 1995; Pratt 1999). The state of the economy in the 1980s necessitated change in economic policies in "third world" countries. With his commitment to a socialist direction, he was a wrong candidate to carry out the reforms. His retirement also marked what some scholars call a transition from proud defiance into shameless beggary. During the 1960s and 1970s Nyerere wanted to distance his government from former colonialists and the capitalists. As a result, although his government policies denounced foreign aid in favour of people, land, good policies and good leadership as drivers for development instead of aid, aid continued to flow in the country (Mukandala 1999). Western providers did this quite strategically to an influential person in the East African region at a period of cold war politics. Aid was given on the basis of acceptance of the SAPs prescriptions that Nyerere rejected in the 1980s (Mkandawire 1998). President Ali Hassani Mwinyi accepted the conditions and by 1990s he was able to seek more financial assistance from international funding bodies and hence starting a new history in Tanzania premised on the liberalised economy.

Nyerere beyond Tanzania

Nyerere's vision and thoughts on human dignity, unity, freedom and human welfare development were not confined to territorial Tanzania. His thoughts and influence spread to the rest of Africa and beyond. In 1962, when giving an inaugural speech as Prime Minister of Tanganyika, Nyerere made it quite clear that the history of colonisation of the continent was the uniting force for continental cooperation and unity. He saw Africa as having passed through similar stages of development and sufferings that in the end made Africans one. Nyerere's stages of African development include the stage of mute and passive sentiment, the stage of defiance and struggle and the constructive stage starting soon after independence (Nyerere 2000). In the first stage Africa was under colonial domination and experienced the travails of colonial dispossession, oppression and exploitation. The second stage marked a period of Africans' self-consciousness and nationalist movements gaining momentum increasingly from the 1950s. During this stage, Africans became more defiant and started to struggle for independence with nationalist movements becoming widespread. The constructive phase became more apparent and relevant to an enhanced continental unity and cooperation than ever before for socio-economic

restructuring of the continent. A pan-African vision and approach of the 1960s and 70s was seen as much more meaningful and applicable. According to Nyerere, the last stage should entail greater unity and cooperation continentally (Nyerere 2000).

Freedom, unity and human development were at the centre of Nyerere's philosophy and imagination of a continent he wished to see during his lifetime. He campaigned and took an active part in all movements geared at bringing unity and improving human welfare (Nyerere 1963; 1979; 1985a). A good example here was Nyerere's decision for Tanzania to become one of the members of the front line states. This was built on his belief that no country was independent and safe if neighbours were under domination and oppression by foreign rulers (Nyerere 1973; 1974). In 1985 in his last speech as a President of Tanzania, twenty-three years after he gave the inauguration speech in 1962, Nyerere acknowledged that he managed to exercise his influence beyond national borders because Tanzanians supported him and because independence was nothing if neighbours were not independent. He pointed for example, 'if the peoples of Mozambique, Angola, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe had not won their freedom, we would be neighbours of apartheid now' (Nyerere 1985b). This earned Tanzania international recognition and respect, as its role in spearheading peace and freedom remains well documented. The UNESCO observed, 'through Mwalimu Nyerere's leadership, Tanzania was the material, political, philosophical and spiritual base for many liberation movements' (UNESCO 2007:2). As a result, Tanzania was chosen to be the centre of Africa's liberation heritage programme, assisted by the United Nations in 2017.

Nyerere remained an advocate of peaceful negotiations on the continent of Africa. His participation in nationalist struggles across his borders and his views of a united Africa made him one of the highly glorified heads of states in Africa. It was Nyerere and Kwame Nkrumah, for instance, who solidified the idea of a united Africa though they had differing opinions on the process to achieve it. The differences ultimately built on the short-lived Monrovia and Casablanca groups¹ that later were dissolved into a continental organisation, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. While Nyerere wanted a stage-by-stage process involving regional blocs, Nkrumah wanted it quickly before independence leaders established themselves and became as selfish as would complicate integration processes (Shivji 2009). However, Nyerere's dynamism also manifested in the way he saw African unity. In the 1990s, Nyerere wished that the constitution of the United States of Africa would have been fast-

tracked, as Nkrumah had proposed in the 1960s. Social, economic and political conditions of the 1990s required more collective actions for the continent.

Many African countries benefited from the independence of Tanzania. Tanzania offered assistance to African liberation movements. African freedom fighters were hosted, given trainings; moral and material support to enable them to organise and fight for freedom in their countries (Othman 2010). Nyerere also offered ideological training to liberation fighters from across the continent. To acknowledge this, Nyerere pointed; *“Kama ni mapepari, tutawaunga mkono; kama si mabepari, tutawaunga mkono; kama ni wakomunisti, tutawaunga mkono; kama ni wajamaa, tutawaunga mkono: if they are capitalists, we shall support them; if they are not capitalists, we shall support them; if they are communists, we shall support them; if they are socialists, we shall support them”* (Nyerere 1974:55). Nyerere valued the sovereignty of independent African states (Nyerere 1973). He also championed the establishment of the OAU’s Liberation Committee in the same year the continental organisation was established. Subsequently the committee had its headquarters established in Dar es Salaam in 1963. It was supposed to plan and operationalise strategies for supporting freedom movements for countries still under colonial domination (Othman 2010; Sahnoun 2010).

Conclusion:

To plan is to choose was the title of the opening speech given by Nyerere to TANU National Conference in Dar es Salaam on 28th May 1969. It was an introductory speech to the conference to detail the various plans, including alternatives and challenges. Nyerere was central in all such plans. His philosophical thinking was a landmark in Africa’s social and economic programmes. Needless to say, Nyerere remains the most influential figure in the Tanzanian public sphere and his role beyond Tanzania is well reflected through his support of African countries struggling to attain independence. He promoted African unity and contributed in various continental peace-building forums. His participation in the freedom movements, Non-Aligned movement, and pan-Africanist movement earned him credit and placed his country well on the continental and global map.

Notes

¹ Monrovia and Casablanca groups were informal associations formed by African heads of states that had shared vision of a pan- African path to prosperity. Nyerere was in the Monrovia group (Gradualist supporters) while

Nkrumah belonged to the Casablanca group (Fast-track supporters). They both joined hands to form a continental platform (O.A.U) in 1963.

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Disclosure in the Extractive Industries of Tanzania: Drawing Lessons from Mwalimu Julius Nyerere's Perspective on Transparency and Accountability

Theobald Frank Theodory & Bashiru Ally Kakurwa

Introduction

Natural resources, both renewable and non-renewable, and ecosystem services are a part of the wealth of nations and major sources of revenue and opportunities for a country to foster its sustainable socio-economic development (OECD 2011). Natural resources contribute towards fiscal revenue, income generation, and poverty reduction. Sectors associated with natural resources use provide opportunities for job creation and they form the basis of livelihoods to the majority of poor citizens. Effective mobilisation of domestic revenue from the extraction of natural resources can also enable a country to improve its infrastructural network and invest in its basic services such as education and healthcare (Toman 2011).

The African continent has immense natural resource wealth. The continent has renewable and non-renewable natural resources, and holds more than half of the world's rare minerals. Its geography entails the world's largest arable landmass, the second largest and longest rivers (such as Congo and Nile rivers respectively), and it has the second largest tropical forests (ACBF 2013). About 30 percent of all mineral reserves globally are found in Africa. The continent's proven oil reserves constitute 8% of the world's stock, while those of natural gas amount to 7%. Minerals account for an average of 70% of total African exports and about 28% of the gross domestic product (GDP). Earnings from gas, oil and mineral discoveries could lead to an increase in governments' revenues of between 9% and 31% in the first 10 years of production in countries like Tanzania, Uganda and Mozambique (AfDB 2015: 6). Owing to this fundamental role of natural resources, they must be managed sustainably. Governments are responsible to put in place enabling policies that will ensure that natural resources foster the long-term economic development, and not merely short-term revenue generation. This depends on the availability of quality institutions which will plan for the future and turn the so-called "resource curse" into an opportunity. The resource curse refers to the failure of many resource rich nations to benefit fully from their natural resources; it refers

to failures by governments in these nations to respond effectively to public welfare needs (NRGI 2015). It should be noted that, without transparency and accountability in managing natural resources, the outcome could lead to conflicts (Okan 2008).

Poor Natural Resources Management in Africa

The costs of poor natural resources management globally are high, disproportionately affecting developing countries and the poor, who are more likely to depend directly upon natural resources for their livelihoods. Poor natural resource management entails failure to manage renewable resources on a sustainable basis and the failure to amass proper rents from resource concessions, thereby allowing most of the gains from resources to go to private actors at the expense of the community (OECD 2011). As a rule, poor natural resource management represents lost opportunities for sustainable socio-economic growth, and costs to environment and human beings. While amassed losses of missed opportunities are difficult to calculate, the costs to poor people and the environment are clearly evident (Gupta 2008).

While the available natural resources in Africa provide exceptional opportunity to foster human and economic development, the continent suffers from the paradox of plenty, meaning that ample endowments of natural resources do not lead to equivalent levels of prosperity, broad based development and resource based industrialisation. One key impediment preventing African countries from realising this potential is poor governance of natural resources (IDEA 2017). Poor resources governance in most of “developing” countries has impoverished communities living in the areas rich of natural resource. This is chiefly triggered by absence of accountability, transparency and sometimes community participation in the management of natural resources. This in turn, has affected the communities living in the extraction areas who do not benefit from extractive activities of natural resources (UN 2012). The global promotion of transparency and accountability for the natural resources such as mining, oil and gas has become widely acknowledged as a suitable solution to weak governance in resources in most developing nations. Advocates of this brainchild argue that, if contracts on extractive activities of natural resources and revenues generated are disclosed publicly, citizens will be able to hold governments and transnational corporations accountable. This will in turn, improve the management of natural resources, lessen corruption, and ultimately solve endless hostilities between transnational corporations and local communities (Theodory 2017). To this end, the benefits will spread beyond the extractive sector hence citizens will be

empowered to demand more equitable and sustainable development (Darby 2010).

Natural Resources Management in Tanzania

Tanzania is a country that is blessed with plenty of natural resources. The country is famously known for its long coastline with attractive beaches, famous game reserves and wildlife parks, forests, minerals, and the three greatest lakes in the African continent - and the Indian Ocean forms most of its borders (Theodory 2015). In particular, Tanzania has about 33.5 million hectares of forests and woodlands with approximately 13 million hectares of this total forest cover constituting protected areas under the forests reserve regime. However, the country has 730,000 metric tons of fishery resources that could be harvested annually without any harm to their re-generational ability (URT 1997). If these resources are well managed and utilised, the lives of the poor communities whose livelihoods depends on natural resources can be easily uplifted.

The management of natural resources in Tanzania, has from the colonial era to the present, been placed in different government departments. For example, forests resources are in the department of forests, wildlife resources are in the Department of Wildlife, with the National Parks being managed by a parastatal organ known as the Tanzania National Parks Authority (TANAPA). Mining is placed under the commissioner for mining, and fisheries under the fisheries department. It is not allowed to utilise one of these resources without any permission from the authorities entrusted to manage those resources on behalf of the government. For example, it is prohibited to undertake any hunting, mining, and human settlement activities within the National Parks (Nshala 2000). The state legislated and placed upon itself the power to oversee the management of the natural resources. This was because at that time of independence, the ruling class in Tanzania was very weak both economically and politically. Therefore, the government decided to strengthen itself and exercise control on the society. It embarked further on gradual concentration of powers to itself so as to nose any source of opposition. Between 1962 and 1964 the government decided to ban “civil” society organisations (CSOs) and managed to control the cooperative movements, which represented the peasants in Tanzania (Mlimuka and Kabudi 1985). In 1967 the government embraced the socialist ideology popularly called the *Ujamaa* that involved massive nationalisation of private property. Then afterwards, the government conducted villagisation program (1973-75), which resulted in the resettlement of about 80% of the population into villages: the aim was to bring them closer to social services. The villagisation program alienated people from their natural resources which played a great role in the improvement of their livelihoods

(Nshala 1997). Natural resources management policy in Tanzania gives the government departments unrestricted powers over these resources to the extent that the heads of those departments believe that the natural resources belong to the government. Thus, the government has the crucial role of protecting this natural heritage for the benefit of the present and future generations of Tanzanians. Unfortunately, there has been mismanagement of natural resources due to increasing incidents of corruption and the exclusion of local communities in natural resources management (Nshala 2000).

The current chapter offers a critical insight on the state of transparency and accountability in managing natural resources in Tanzania. It argues that natural resources should be well managed in order to reduce poverty among the citizens. Drawing from Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere's thoughts on transparency and accountability, this chapter reflects on current reforms in the fifth government. The fifth government tries to infuse Nyerere's perspectives particularly in managing natural resources for national growth. It argues that transparency and accountability in the context of natural resources management are central towards realising nations' socio-economic development. The chapter draws upon published sources and the "gray" literature of unpublished materials and documents, complemented by audio and video clips of most popular speeches of the late Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere. As with any chapter based on secondary sources, its data base is subject to some limitations.

The chapter is divided into three sections. This first section introduces the chapter and provides an overview of the relevance of natural resources to socio-economic development. Section two summarises what the literature says about transparency and accountability. Section three divulges how transparency and accountability are at the heart of sustainable NRM. Section four presents the methodology used to gather secondary information for this chapter. This section is followed by the results and discussions showing what Tanzanians should learn from the late Mwalimu Nyerere. The concluding section briefly summarises the concepts of transparency and accountability as central towards sustainable NRM that benefits the majority.

Transparency and Accountability: Theoretical and Conceptual Issues

In most societies, huge powers are entrusted to public authorities and thus, some assurance has to be provided to the delegators that is, society at large. In most countries delegation of power is not only effective, but also abused. Thus, transparency ensures information is available so as to measure the authorities' performance and to guard against any likely misuse of powers. In this regard, transparency serves to enhance accountability, which means that authorities can be held accountable for their actions (Carstens 2005). Without transparency and

accountability, it is difficult to ensure trust between a government and those whom it governs. This may culminate into social instability hence the environment will not be conducive for socio-economic growth (Gaventa and McGee 2013). Over the past decades, transparency and accountability have emerged as key ways to solve both developmental failures and democratic deficits. In the due process of sustainable growth, there should be effective transparency and accountability, in which the 'leaky pipes' of inefficiency and corruption can be repaired. This is likely to improve management of natural resources and in turn yield greater and more visible results (Mcgee and Gaventa 2010).

Transparency is viewed as a key feature of good governance, and a fundamental requirement for accountability between the governments and citizens though transnational corporations in most countries in the world are not transparent and accountable. Basically, transparent governance implies 'an openness of the government machineries or systems through clear processes and procedures and easy access to public information for citizens. It stimulates ethical awareness in public service through information sharing, which eventually ensures accountability for the performance of the individuals or organisations managing resources (Suk Kim *et al.* 2005). It is however critical to note that, increased transparency in state decision making may facilitate greater accountability to citizens (Mcgee and Gaventa 2010). In the context of NRM, transparency and accountability are indispensable in ensuring openness and empowerment of citizens and in holding leaders accountable. In some countries, natural resources belong to the African public hence citizens have rights to hold accountable leaders who misuse the heritages. For instance, in the Tanzanian context, it is categorically stated that, all natural resources that exist in the country belong to the people of the United Republic of Tanzania, and thus, must be managed in such a way that they benefit the whole Tanzanian society (Sanga 2016). Such a bold excerpt tallies with Nyerere's perspectives when he insisted on the necessity of natural resources benefiting the majority. Nyerere was quoted in the Arusha Declaration and TANU's Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance emphasising that, "*All citizens together possess all natural resources of the country in trust of their descendants*" (Nyerere 1967). The major challenge with NRM in the African context is that transnational corporations have huge influence on the control of natural resources. Transnational corporations use the economic clout to control politics; the IMF and World Bank also control African economies and they dictate to African governments what policies to follow.

In recent years, gigantic reserves of natural gas have been explored in Tanzania. The government, with the support of some development partners, is trying to establish the right approach that would rescue the country from the 'resource curse'. The approach will help avert civil unrest and rent seeking


behaviour (Twaweza 2014). The majority can benefit from natural resources if governments are transparent and accountable.

Transparency and Accountability as the Heart of NRM

While the exploitation of natural resources in Africa is anticipated to transform the prospects of resource nations from abject poverty to development, for some countries this is unlikely to be the case (Warden 2017). The debate on how natural resources benefit the citizens have for ages been kept secret by some governments and multinational companies, leaving the public with no platform to interrogate and hold leaders accountable (NDI 2017). It is from this milieu that, transparency and accountability are increasingly relevant in NRM for economic growth. As it was put forward by former secretary general of the United Nations (UN) the late Mr. Kofi Annan that *“African governments had failed to secure fair deals for their citizens, and that transparency and accountability the twin pillars of good governance must be at the heart of natural resource policies”*. Transparency and accountability are relevant in building trust between citizens and their governments, and this shall ease discussions on how best to manage a country’s natural endowments (Annan 2014). To this end, African governments will improve the lives of the citizens who currently do not benefit from exploitation of natural resources on the continent.

The discussion on transparency and accountability has intensified lately, bringing together civil societies, researchers, companies, community members and governments to round tables. Such roundtable dialogues focus on improving transparency and accountability in the extractive industries. It is however critical to note that despite increased roundtable dialogues, the involvement of citizens particularly those endowed with natural resources remains low. Often, citizens residing in resource rich areas are not aware of contracts, with transnational corporations, regarding the extraction of their resources. The negotiation processes for such deals are kept secret and they are usually finalised under closed door between government and multinational corporations. It should be noted that, transparency and accountability are relevant for the effective functioning of a modern economy aiming to nurture socio-economic development (AERC 2011).

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework



Source: *Author's own construct*

Disclosure in Tanzania's Extractive Sector: Current Practice

Tanzania is gifted with different types of minerals predominantly with both small and large-scale operations conducted by nine major mines: seven for gold and one each for diamonds and tanzanite (URT 2009). In recent years, a big increase has been observed in processes of exploration for natural gas and oil along the coast of Tanzania. The production of natural gas from large proven reserves will ease Tanzania's chronic power shortage that has been a recurrent problem for many years. Conversely, future revenues are severely threatened by the dwindling prices for gold and natural gas. There are ongoing public debates on whether the country receives a 'fair share' from its extractive agreements, and how revenues are being used to the benefit of citizens (TEITI 2014). Tanzania government has been striving to promote transparency in the extraction of minerals, oil and gas resources. Such initiatives are manifested by the state decision to join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) way back in 2009. Transparency in extractive industries gained substantial support from the Fourth President of the United Republic of Tanzania, His Excellence Dr. Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete. Dr. Kikwete reaffirmed Tanzania's vow to the EITI at the 5th EITI Global Conference, held in Paris, France in March 2011, noting that the initiative was aligned to the country's policy of promoting transparency and accountability in the management and use of natural resources. The President, Kikwete said: "We are committed to the EITI process because it is aligned with our policy of promoting transparency and accountability in the management and use of our natural resources. It is

critical for promoting sustainable development and poverty eradication in the country” (IHRB 2016).

Governance systems of natural resources in Tanzania call for governments to engage citizens in the affairs of extractive industries. Several initiatives are underway today to ensure effective transparency and accountability in the extractive industries. For example, the government has established a multi-stakeholder group predominantly for EITI implementation. This initiative has been supported by both private sector and civil society participants since Tanzania was accepted as an implementing country in 2009. Moreover, Tanzania has also adopted the Natural Resource Charter focusing on improving natural resource revenue allocation decisions, so that they can accelerate human development gains (URT 2014). Pertinent to note, Tanzania’s government was a member of the Open Government Partnership that also provided an opportunity to strengthen an approach of openness, transparency and accountability in extractive industries sector (IHRB 2016).

NRM for Sustainable Growth: What Do We Learn from Nyerere?

Julius Kambarage Nyerere, the founding father of this young but fast sprouting nation Tanzania, was born on April 13, 1922 in Butiama district and died on October 14, 1999 in London. Nyerere was a leader of his own kind due to his decision to step down from power in 1985. This decision set the pattern of transition of power from one leader to the next. Four other presidents have ruled the country after Nyerere. As we commemorate 18 years today since the death of Mwalimu Nyerere, there is pretty much to discuss about and learn from this charismatic leader, who was not merely a politician but also a theorist, philosopher and activist (The Citizen 2017).

Drawing back from the time when Tanzania regained its political independence, the country was struggling to build its economic base. The government under the leadership of Mwalimu Nyerere demonstrated its bold commitment in conserving the natural resources that the country was blessed with (Theodory 2015). Realising this potential, Mwalimu Nyerere vowed to protect the natural heritage at any cost. He wanted all natural resources to benefit the entire society and used to catalyse socio-economic growth (Theodory 2016). In so doing, Mwalimu Nyerere championed wildlife conservation and spearheaded tourism development. He worked solemnly to ensure that wildlife protection in Tanzania was a priority issue that required special attention from the government. Mwalimu Nyerere was always emphasising on transparency and accountability in managing natural resources. He did this knowing that corruption practices in many of public and private sectors were jeopardising the natural heritage that God bestowed his country.

Nyerere's commitment and of particular pertinence, his spirit in abhorring corruption practices brought Tanzania among the very few nations globally with notable records in natural resources conservation (Nguya 2006).

Mwalimu Nyerere was much concerned with the plundering of natural resources in Africa executed by several multinational corporations. He accentuated that, African natural resources fell in the trap of the neoliberal reform strategy, which made them floppy, that is, liberalised, marketised and privatised (Chachage 2010). He suggested that it was worthy to leave the available natural resources such as minerals unexploited for ages until when the country is full of capacity to do so. This suggestion seemed relevant as the country was in an economic transition period (Theodory 2016). The following sentiment vindicates Nyerere's daring spirit in protecting the natural heritage of this nation, "*We will leave our mineral wealth in the ground until when we will manage to develop our own geologists and mining engineers*"¹. He was indeed astonished by the widespread perceptions amid the Tanzanians that extraction of environmental resources was only possible by welcoming multinational corporations to "invest" in the African land. Mwalimu Nyerere once asked, "*should a stone that is found in Tanzania only be monopolised by a foreign company?*". This indeed was a patriotic spirit worth to be emulated by every Tanzanian.

Since Tanzania is currently implementing its industrialisation strategy, it would be worthy if all actors at varied scales demonstrate transparency and accountability in managing natural resources. Among other things, there should be transparency of contracts for extractive activities of natural resources for citizens to understand, monitor, and hold their governments and the multinational corporations accountable for their obligations. This will ensure participatory approaches to benefits-sharing between the government, "investors" and the surrounding communities. The spirit of transparency and accountability in upholding the conservation of the natural resources particularly wildlife as promoted by Mwalimu Nyerere is another pertinent lesson for Tanzanians to learn. This spirit has received a new drive particularly this year, when different stakeholders joined hands to support awareness for protection of wildlife such as elephants, rhinos and many other animals at the edge of extinction.

Recently however, the government has upheld accountability by overhauling the extractive sector, aiming at generating more revenues that will help to finance nationwide projects including building of a standard gauge railway, generating sufficient electricity by constructing big dam in the Stiegler Gorge on the Selous park project, strengthening Tanzanian airline, and road infrastructures to mention the few. This deed has strong backup of the President of the Fifth Government, His Excellency Dr. John Pombe Magufuli who exemplarily leads as Mwalimu Nyerere. In his inauguration speech of the 11th

parliament in Dodoma, President Magufuli counted some of the downsides as mega corruption, embezzlement of public funds in government institutions, poor management and sheer wastes of public resources. President Magufuli hates corruption as Mwalimu Nyerere did, he has been reiterating frequently warning that he will not feel shy to fire any of his ministers implicated in corruption scandals as cited in the following excerpt, “*I will not only fire them but ensure other legal steps are taken against them*” (URT 2015). It is on this basis that, President Magufuli didn’t hesitate to fire Mines Minister Professor Sospeter Mwijarubi Muhongo following a separate probe, which found mineral exports understated. According to the presentation made by the probing committees lead by Prof Nehemiah Osoro, it was revealed that Acacia Mining Company exported minerals worth as much as 381trillion Tanzanian shillings (US \$170.2bn) between 1998 and 2017 (Mohammed 2017). The President has proven accountability by making sure that natural resources benefit all Tanzanians, particularly the rural poor communities. He demonstrated transparency when he ordered that the presentation of the report of the probing committee be made public and be live-broadcasted by different television stations countrywide. To this end, president Magufuli is committed to improve people’s living standard by effective utilisation of available natural resources. This intention is appreciated by majorities of Tanzanians as it calls for extraordinary disciplinary measures that were not used in the past few years except in the era of *Ujamaa* government. During Mwalimu Nyerere’s era, transparency and accountability were widely pursued in public sectors, hence the government managed to fulfil its obligations.

Concluding Remarks

Transparency and accountability have progressively become common across a range of issues, and as the ideas have spread, it has become entrenched in different institutions. For the natural resources sector, transparency and accountability became a focal point for action as differing agendas such as anti-corruption, embezzlements of public resources, nepotism and conflict resolution. These concepts are critical elements in good natural resource governance; and along with transparency, they are necessary ingredients for solving irritating curses that come with resource exploitation. Accountability allows government officials to be held responsible for resources that they are entrusted to manage. Effective systems and controls are vital to ensure accountability. Accountable system requires that government officials and officials of TNCs are penalised for misuse and abuse of the state natural resources. As we commemorate 19 years of Mwalimu Nyerere’s death, we should remind ourselves that governance of natural resources is central towards

vigorous economic growth. This will be possible only if every actor at different scales demonstrates transparency and accountability in managing natural resources as Mwalimu Nyerere did. Transparency should be enforced on contracts made between government and multinational corporations aspiring to “invest” in the extractive activities of environmental resources. Citizens should have power to hold leaders accountable if they fail to comply with accepted codes of conduct.

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Julius Nyerere's Perspectives on Natural Resources: A Reflection on the Desired Development Trajectory of Industrialisation in Tanzania

Theobald Frank Theodory

Introduction

Tanzania is blessed with ample natural resources and its economy largely depends on natural resources for present and future generations. The most important natural resources available in Tanzania include minerals, wild animals, wetlands, lakes, rivers and woodlands (URT 1997). The livelihoods of the country's citizens comprising fifty million plus people is highly dependent on the natural resources surrounding them (Mkanta and Chimtembo 2002; UNDP 2012). These resources contribute much in underpinning the economic growth of the country (URT 1997). It is on this basis that sustainable natural resource use in Tanzania is pivotal in achieving the contemporary development targets in the blueprint of industrialisation policy and poverty alleviation. Considering this, the government has recognised that all natural resources found in Tanzania belong to the people of the United Republic of Tanzania, and must be managed in a way that benefits the whole Tanzanian society (Sanga 2016). Thus, achieving targets in the industrialisation policy in Tanzania is essentially dependent on sustainable use of natural resources. Nyerere insisted that the natural resources must benefit the whole of Tanzanian citizens. Thus, Nyerere was quoted in the Arusha Declaration and TANU's Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance asserting that, "*All citizens together possess all natural resources of the country in trust of their descendants?*" (Nyerere 1967).

Nyerere wanted all natural resources to benefit the entire society so that economic growth could be felt by all citizens. In those days, Nyerere was much concerned with the ongoing plunder, of the African natural resources, by several multinational corporations across the African continent. According to him, African resources fell into the trap of the neoliberal reform strategy, which made them LIMP, that is, liberalised, marketised and privatised (Chachage 2010). Nyerere argued that it was worthy to leave the available resources such as minerals unexploited for some years until when the country is full of capacity to do so. Such suggestion was important as the nation was on transition period towards building a vigorous economy. Nyerere once said, "*We will leave our*

mineral wealth in the ground until we manage to develop our own geologists and mining engineers”¹. He went further emphasising that “*should a stone that is found in Tanzania only be monopolised by a foreign company?*” Mwalimu Nyerere said that this was the property of our children.

Nyerere was one of the world’s utmost champions of the conservation of natural resources. He built an unprecedented awareness among Tanzanians on the value of their natural resources. It is on this basis that his efforts have helped much in shaping Tanzania Environmental Policy (URT 1997). His philosophy to protect and cherish Tanzania’s natural resources as a prime national heritage is expressed in the high priority the Tanzanian government has given to conservation of these precious resources. It is obvious that at times, Nyerere seemed to critique capitalists’ ideologies as well as neo-liberal sentiments. Capitalism was responsible for plundering and exploiting African natural resources. Nyerere believed that Tanzania should benefit from its natural resource base (see Chachage 2010).

In cognisance of the relevance of natural resources for economic growth and bearing in mind that Nyerere insisted on the conservation of natural resources, this chapter highlights key opportunities and solutions for harnessing natural resources for economic growth. It explains how such approaches are relevant to the contemporary industrialisation policy as repeatedly stated in the Fifth Phase Government under the patronage of President Dr. John Pombe Magufuli. The first part of this chapter addresses the contextual and theoretical issues as far as natural resources are concerned. It endeavours to explicate the pivotal role that environment and natural resources may contribute in propelling the development. The development of Tanzania will be easily achieved if there are also reforms to the ‘investment’ policy, particularly “investments” on natural resources such as minerals, gas, oil and so on.

Contextual and Theoretical Reflection

Post-Development Perspectives: How Developing Countries Should Develop?

The Post-Development Perspective critiques the Western models of development, arguing that development is always unjust as it never worked, and that developing countries should find their own ways to development. Development needs to be more “people” centred by giving people a space to explain how their communities (and countries) develop and involving them in the process of development (Korten 1995). Development should give people independence so they have real power and choice over their day to day situations. It should be participatory using ‘bottom-up’ approach instead of ‘top down’ approach coming from the West, through governments and then trickling down to the local people (Sen 1987). In the post-development perspective,

development discourse reinforces and legitimises western supremacy over the ‘Third World’, in part through its very meaning or categorisation of the ‘Third World’ as being in need of Western-style development (Storey 2000: 40). Post-development scholars have argued that, rather than breaking away from the colonising attitudes of the past, it is apparent that still there is continuity in the preservation of Western-cantered attitudes, as well as an arrogant confidence in the almost unchallenged validity of Western knowledge including colonial science (Escobar 1995; Nustad 2001; Briggs and Sharp 2004). Usually, ‘development experts’, from the West, proffer “solutions” to non-western societies. The wrong assumption is that Western science and “rationality” are more advanced and sophisticated than other positions (Briggs and Sharp 2004: 3).

With persistent development failure, some post-development theorists and practitioners have interrogated the efficacy of modernisation approaches. They further criticise the approaches for being based on the indiscriminating transfer of science and technology from the Global North to the Global South (Escobar 1995; Briggs and Sharp 2004). Other scholars have questioned conventional approaches as being the best or the only solution to development problems (Cobb 2011; Sillitoe 1998). They argue that indigenous knowledge can be of equal or greater value as compared to Western science. In regard to this argument, conventional science or Western science loses its universal position, and becomes one of a range of rival and challenged knowledge systems (Mohan and Stokke 2000; Homann and Rischkowsky 2001). Western (formal) science also has to be regarded as indigenous or a local knowledge in the sense that it is confined to the Western institutions and has gained universal position and acceptance due to existence of neocolonial power relations as well as the residual colonial legacies that subjugated and marginalised indigenous knowledge. Thus, the current framing and domination of western science is explicated not through proximity to the truth, but as a set of historico-geographical circumstances linked with the geopolitics of power (Escobar 1995a). Thus, post-development matches dependency theory in seeking to disengage the local people from external dependency, taking it further to “development as a power/ knowledge regime”. While the dependency theory focuses on the nation state, post-development focuses on the local, the “grassroots” (Pieterse 1988: 362).

The Role of Natural Resources on Development

Many nations in Africa South of the Sahara region are well endowed with natural resources notably mineral and energy resources. The opportunities for economic and social progress in the region based on its natural resources are therefore huge. This section engages the discourse on the role of natural

resources in economic growth. It is however emphasised that resource endowments in many of African regions may directly or indirectly influence industrial policies that reinforce the linkages of extractive industries to the economy (Buur *et al.* 2013).

Harnessing environment and natural resources is a great transformative opportunity for many countries particularly developing countries. Natural resources, which mostly are the industrial raw materials, serve as the basis for economic growth (UNSDSN 2013). During the 1950s and 1960s when “modern” theories of economic growth first began to be developed, discourses on environment and natural resources were virtually absent. It was held that capital could be amplified by net “investment” as a result of domestic savings and external capital flows. As such, there were potential “limits to growth” recognised in growth theory in that as capital per person grew, the amount of growth in output per person waned until a steady state was achieved. But such limits to growth were not associated to environment and natural resources (Toman 2003, p.1). Besides, technology was added to labour and capital as crucial input to the growth process. Technical development was almost always presumed to be exogenous and not embodied in specific equipment or skills, though more recent variations in growth theory have relaxed this wrong assumption. Output growth could then be prolonged through (presumed) technical advance (Barma *et al.* 2012).

Despite this pre-eminence of discourses on economic growth, the role of environment and natural resources as valuable inputs to the growth process remained outside the realm of growth theory at that time (Toman 2003). Indeed, environment and natural resources catalyse sustainable development and economic growth. The extraction of natural resources such as gas, oil and solid minerals generates the largest source of exports, inward investment as well as potential for government revenues in over 60 “low-income” countries (UNSDSN 2013). The extraction of natural resources is capital intensive, with annual global “investments” about \$1 trillion, hence contributing to the potential for quick infrastructure development and structural transformation in developing economies (Barma *et al.* 2012). As such, the tradition that placed the environment and natural resources outside the realm of growth theory was controverted. From the late 1960s, the role of the environment and natural resources, as determining factors affecting growth, became more broadly valued. Attention to the relationship between the natural and economic worlds originally came from environmental and natural resource economists interested in problems of limits to growth (Toman 2003).

From the late 1970s, development economists started seriously rethinking the neo-classical growth model due to the realisation that macro-economic policy recommendations would be impotent without considering environmental

policy components. It was realised further that economic growth and environmental policy should go hand in hand. The natural environment is fundamental to economic activity and growth, providing the resources we need to produce goods and services, and absorbing and processing unwanted by-products in the form of waste and pollution. It should therefore be noted that, environment is a crucial asset that dominates in managing risks to economic and social activity, helping to regulate disasters, regulating local climate (air quality and temperature), and maintaining the supply of clean water and other resources (Everett *et al.* 2010). Thus, integrating environment and natural resources concerns in economic growth, particularly in attaining targets of the industrialisation policy in Tanzania is of great relevance. African countries south of the Sahara region including Tanzania will easily transform their economies only if the environment and natural resources are placed at the centre of sustainable economic growth.

Despite resource endowments in many African countries, available natural resources within the region have not contributed much in economic growth. The population all over the region is still suffering from abject poverty. The extractions of natural resources in different African countries have not helped alleviate poverty – instead, western countries continue to plunder African resources (Buur *et al* 2013:14). Generally, the resource curse argument holds that many “developing countries” particularly Africa South of the Sahara region are rich in natural resources, but fail to transform the income from their natural resources into sustainable economic growth and industrial development (Ross *et al.* 1999; Stevens 2003). It should be noted that existence of transnational corporations in Africa has contributed to poor economic growth since they evade paying taxes to African governments (Nhemachena and Warikandwa 2017).

Natural Resources and Industrial Development in Tanzania: Nyerere’s Legacy

Tanzania is considered to be among the countries with rich natural resources. It is unfortunate that these resources have not contributed much towards industrial development. Rather, Tanzanians have witnessed among other things, the proliferation of Foreign Direct Investment (FDIs) in the mining sector, including oil and gas in recent years - these are the sectors which could have played crucial roles towards realising targets within the industrialisation policy. For many years, the growth of the industrial sector in Tanzania has been lagging behind expectations. This might be due to economic reforms in Tanzania that went hand in hand with changes in the legal framework and supportive policies in the mining sector. Legal frameworks and policies

mostly operate in favour of multilateral foreign corporations. Examples, include the Mineral Policy of Tanzania (1997), the Mineral Act of 1998, the Mineral Policy of 2009, and the Mining Act of 2010 (Muhanga and Urassa 2013). Furthermore, Tanzanians have observed gigantic stocks of minerals being exported abroad, rather than being used as catalyst for Tanzania industrial development. This is against Nyerere's idea that Tanzania's natural resources should benefit the entire community of citizens. Therefore, while Tanzania is seriously executing its industrialisation policy there should also be deliberate efforts to reform the "investment" policy on extraction of natural resources notably minerals like natural gas and oil. It is difficult to achieve industrial development while the existing "investment" policy, particularly in minerals including natural gas, still operates in favour of foreign transnational corporations.

Apparently, the penetration of FDIs in the mining sector and recently in land "investments" will make it difficult to achieve industrialisation policy goals. It should be noted that, the economic reforms such as Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) and the broader neoliberal climate (Reed 1996; Muganda 2004; Lugalla 1995; Gibbon 1993; Muhanga and Urassa 2013) also impoverished Tanzanian citizens. There is continued transnational corporations' plunder of African resources. Nyerere did not have faith in neoliberalism (Muhanga and Urassa 2013). Nyerere strongly criticised capitalism and its neo-liberal perspectives. He deliberately introduced new statements in the Constitution of TANU of 1962 to achieve democratic and socialist Tanzania. The Constitution provides as follows:

(i) To establish a democratic and socialist form of government which would be devoted to:-

(a) Consolidating national independence and ensuring a decent standard of living for every individual

(ii) To promote thoroughly the ways of increasing the wealth of this country so as to help more people by:

(a) Controlling collectively the means of producing national wealth including the national resources such as land, air, water, power

(b) To promote to the highest level the possible cooperative functions pertaining to the means of production, distribution and exchange

(c) To encourage private enterprises which are run for the benefit of the whole country (TANU Constitution 1962, p. 1-2).

The above statements vindicate the fact that Nyerere was eager to see every Tanzanian benefiting from the available natural resources. Nyerere desired to see natural resources being used as a catalyst for Tanzanian industrial

development. In executing this, he pioneered the *Azimio la Arusha* (Arusha Declaration) with the intention to build a socialist and a self-reliant society. Nyerere strived to intensify democratic and socialist sentiments in Tanzania. This was made possible through the Arusha Declaration in 1967. This declaration put in place the African model of development called *Ujamaa na Kujitegemea*, which formed the basis of African socialism. It was this ideology that later formed the basis of Nyerere's social and economic development policies in Tanzania (Pratt 1976; Pratt 1991; TANU 1967). The Arusha Declaration introduced the nationalisation of all major means of the economy. It was essential to the execution of *Ujamaa* development policy in Tanzania. Nyerere's ideology of *Ujamaa na Kujitegemea* was an attempt to integrate traditional African values with the demands of the post-colonial setting. This was central to attaining self-reliant economy at different scales (Ibhawoh and Dibua 2003).

Holistic Reform Theory (HRT)

The perspectives behind Holistic Reform Theory (HRT) formed the basis for the move to market reforms, which started in the mid-1980s in China. The HRT argues that governments should rid themselves of the waning planned economy and aspire to pursue building a market economy. This calls for a coordinated progress in different areas of the economy, including a competitive market system, concurrent development of autonomous businesses, and macroeconomic management (Caixin Weekly cited in Muhanga and Urassa 2013). This, in fact is what the Fifth Government is trying to do by creating autonomous economy that would be achieved through cutting off unnecessary spending. The HRT argues that the socialist market economy system operates in such a way that market economy is entirely organic. Thus, the tasks must be accomplished one at a time, and they are closely connected to one another, as in any system. This points to the holistic nature of the country's frankness and reform. From 1990s, many scholars extended the HRT to embrace the political and social fields, arguing that market reforms must be carried out together with political and legal reforms (Muhanga and Urassa 2013). This perspective holds a lot of sense in the context of Tanzania's contemporary industrialisation policy that has to go hand in hand with the reform of "investment" policy that would ensure availability of natural resources notably minerals, gas, oil and land for industrial development. In so doing, it will ensure coordinated reforms in the social, political and economic arenas.

The Focus of the Contemporary Industrial Policy in Tanzania

Industrial development has been a substantial part of Tanzania's development plans in the post-independence era. In fact it was anticipated by

policy makers that industries would have to lead the process of transforming the country's economy from low growth and low productivity to high productivity and high growth. Tanzania inherited a very small and undiversified industrial sector at independence in 1961 (Wangwe *et al.* 2014). Since then there are various efforts made and strategies adopted to realise improved industrial development in Tanzania. It should therefore be noted that the evolution of Tanzania's industrial development strategies stretches from the time of independence to date. The current industrialisation policy of Tanzania focuses on deepening the private sector-led industrial growth as a way of changing the national economy, which largely depends on agriculture (The Citizen 2016). The contemporary industrialisation policy of Tanzania is well reflected in various policy documents. These documents range from the Tanzania Vision 2025 that was formulated in 1999, which aimed, among other things, to propel Tanzania from a least developed country to a middle income country whose economy is diversified and semi-industrialised (The Citizen 2016). Similarly, the National Five Years Development Plan 2016/17-2020/21 has firmly underscored the commitment of the government in propelling industrialisation policy. The theme of this development blueprint emphasises, "*Nurturing Industrialization for Economic Transformation and Human Development*" with the overarching objective of enhancing the pace of progress towards the Tanzania Development Vision 2025 (URT 2016: p. i). Industrialisation policy was reflected in the ruling party's 2015 election manifesto and in the President Magufuli's maiden speech in the Parliament on 20th November 2016. It is necessary to unpack the whole industrialisation policy in relation to discourses on natural resources in Tanzania.

Contemporary Desired Industries in Tanzania

The leading debates and plans on the future of Tanzania's economic growth have lately dwelt on industrialisation. This contemporary development ambition is supported by the Fifth Phase Government that emphasises, among others, a strong industrial economic base. Developing an industrialised economy is the main economic project for the Fifth Phase Government. This decisive commitment from the Fifth Phase Government gives many potential advantages entrenched within the industrial economy. Such potentials include, but are not limited to, direct and indirect job creation that will enhance income creation, foreign exchange earnings through exports and foreign exchange saving and so on (Ngowi 2016). Tanzanian President Dr. John Pombe Magufuli, in his strongly worded speech during the inauguration of parliament on 20th November 2015, reiterated the government's commitment to transforming Tanzania's economy to an industrial economy. Drawing from his speech, there

are three types of industries that the Fifth Phase Government is desirous to achieve. These include industries for domestic mass consumption goods; mass employment-creating industries and industries for export goods (The Citizen 2015). The former types of industries are central towards attaining industrial drive in Tanzania that will transform Tanzania's economy from low income country to middle income country. The industries for domestic mass consumption goods include goods like footwear, textile, cooking/edible oil and the like. Goods of such a nature have huge economic advantages entrenched in consumption of domestically produced goods and services. A lot of foreign currency can be saved due to importation of such goods, they create domestic job opportunities, and increase government revenues through taxes and nontax charges (Ngowi 2016). There are some policy issues which need examination given the ongoing transnational corporations land grabs in Africa. In many villages in Tanzania there are living testimonies of transnational land grabs.

On the other hand, the CCM's election Manifesto, among others, aims to achieve and implement the third phase of Sustainable Industrial Development Plan (SIDP) 2010–2020, and attain the industrial sector's contribution in Vision 2015 (Ngowi 2016). CCM's election Manifesto also focuses on construction of agro-processing, middle, large and basic industries and industries that use domestic raw materials. It also aims at bolstering existing industries and increase industrial sector Gross Domestic Product (GDP) contribution from 9.9% in 2013 to 15% in 2020 and have 40% of Tanzania's employment generated from the industrial sector by 2020. However, deliberate efforts should be directed towards mobilising the private sector to “invest” in middle and large industries while ensuring protectionism from foreign industries (CCM Manifesto 2015).

Despite the promising ambition in achieving targets of industrialisation policy in Tanzania, the vital linkage between natural resources and industrial development is not mentioned in the said Manifesto or President's speech. As underscored earlier in this chapter, harnessing natural resource in Tanzania is central towards attaining vigorous industrial development. This is also emphasised in the Tanzania's Five Years Development Plan (FYDP II) that “*investment in harnessing Tanzania's natural endowment is the driving force for sustainable transformation of our country*”. It is notable that sustainable natural resources management in Tanzania is vital in enhancing industrialisation.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter leads to the conclusion that sustainable natural resource use is key to achieving industrial development in any country. Based on the discussions above, it is clear that natural resources are of great relevance in the desired industrialisation. Natural resources provide industrial raw materials.

Thus, the achievement of targets of industrialisation policy will be possible only if there is a clear linkage of natural resources and industrial development in Tanzania. The government should demonstrate positive commitment in reforming “investment policy”, particularly in mining sector, oil and gas as well as land “investments”. It is necessary to ensure that the available resources in Tanzania benefit the ordinary Tanzanians citizens who Nyerere has always prized.

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Interpreting Transitology from Transitional Justice, Decolonisation and Democratisation perspectives: An African Legal Anthropology Viewpoint

Tapiwa Victor Warikandwa & Artwell Nhemaehena

Introduction

Contemporary scholarly discourses have reached a crescendo in advancing the view that post-colonial studies have been and are still dominated by a transitology paradigm whose teleological prejudices lead to faulty inquiry into democratisation, transitional justice and decolonisation in Africa. Grounded on a broad investigation of the post-colonial transitional justice in a decolonising and supposedly democratising Africa, and a comprehensive appraisal of the post-colonial transitional justice and anthropology literature, this chapter seeks to reveal the philosophical flaws implicit in arguments of proponents of transitology and to examine the problematic claim(s) that transitional justice is a fundamental instrument for advancing democratic transitions and promoting international human rights law in post-colonial Africa. In principle, this chapter will critique the compatibility of transitology, transitional justice (underlined by “democracy”) and decolonisation. We will argue that the notions of transitology and transitional justice advance a secularisation hypothesis which promotes a New World Order agenda underlined by order in chaos.

Transitology is generally construed as referring to the study of changes from one political regime to another (Hermet 2000; Dobry 2000); primarily from authoritarian or uncivilised regimes to “democratic” ones (Israel and Mouralis 2014). Transitology therefore presupposes that from the post-World War I and II eras, there have been substantive efforts made towards addressing injustices perpetrated against innocent people through transitional justice (Grosescu 2015: 103). Emphasis in this regard was placed on the use of legal mechanisms to redress past abuses and/or injustices with a view to, “...entrenching democratic stability and the rule of law” (Teitel 2000: 3). At the centre of the transitional justice movement were the efforts of Eastern and Southern Europe as well as Latin America transitologists who sought to address the relationship between democratisation and human rights accountability by governments (Linz 1978; Schmitter 1986; Huntington 1991). Transitional justice therefore accommodates

different disciplines such as political sciences, history, law, psychology, sociology and anthropology.

Issues of the relationship between concepts such as the rule of law, justice and democratisation have become fundamental concepts of transitional justice. It is in this regard that matters of decolonisation become fundamental to the narrative of transitology and transitional justice. This view is informed by the fact that, to date, attempts and related processes aimed at addressing colonially induced past and present injustices, specifically in Africa, have largely been construed from the context of their measured impact on democratic consolidation (Kritz 1995; McAdams 1977; Barahona de Brito *et al.* 2001; Olsen *et al.* 2010; Sikknik 2011). Theories of democratic transition and research related to efforts aimed at addressing historical injustices have often been sponsored by governments, in particular the United States of America, and international organisations such as the European Union, World Bank and the United Nations (Grosescu 2015: 103). These governments and international organisations have sought to develop the best practices and/or solutions for transitional justice, “...in accordance with the political constraints of transition” (Kritz 2008). It must be questioned as to how governments and international organisations which have presided over and have been complicit in or specifically responsible for human atrocities in Africa can be entrusted with the key responsibility of formulating principles of transitional justice and resultantly transitology itself, unless if the agenda is to inflict more pain of the victims of past injustices (Warikandwa, Nhemachena and Mpofu 2017).

This chapter therefore interrogates and/or questions the significance of transitology in developing fair and just transitional justice rules that can address colonial injustices in Africa. An analysis of methodological and theoretical methods that have been relied upon by transitologists and transitional justice scholars will be undertaken. Using a legal anthropology perspective, it will be pointed out that transitology has significant limitations which render it unsuitable to develop transitional justice rules in a decolonising Africa. This is attributed to the fact that, whilst Western political control has on paper given way to African countries’ self-governance, the legacy of Western domination in the political, cultural and economic realms of African societies still remains. Transitology and transitional justice have supposedly provided short lived moments of false promises and inspiration in African societies yet they have dismally failed to transform African political structures and economies to bring about real autonomy, sovereignty and sustainable socio-economic development. Most African countries are still victims of the neoliberal economic order which inhumanely perpetuates colonial injustices and the impoverishment of Africans and evisceration of their moral values. Colonial injustices still perpetuate

regardless of the many toothless truth and reconciliation commissions ushered in as tools for realising democratic transitions in Africa.

Transitional justice, Transitology, and Legal Anthropology: An Overview

Transitology is generally accepted as the process through which “democratisation” can be realised in varying contexts in specific societies (Rousso 2002; Lebow *et al.* 2006), and is considered as a departure from authoritarianism and dictatorial tendencies which were synonymous with the nature of political control exercised by colonial regimes on Africa. Such forms of dictatorship and authoritarianism were also common in post-communist Eastern Europe, Latin America and Southern Europe (Gans-Morse 2004). As such, transitology has become a polarised debate in both political and scholarly spheres owing largely to the inexcusable generalisation and overreliance on a Eurocentric narrative of transitology (Anders 2007). Such an approach negates the role of African history in informing policy makers on how to formulate an appropriate and/or acceptable formula as well as testable hypothesis for realising transitional justice on the continent. As such, for plausible formulas for transitology and transitional justice to be realised, one would assume that anthropology and the law would have to be fused to remedy past injustices, to indigenous Africans, inflicted upon them by colonialists. Anthropologists have often studied and drawn justifiable conclusions on how the law can be used to reshape significant questions of justice. Anthropology of law therefore addresses fundamental ethical issues in the contemporary world in so far as past injustices are concerned. Sadly, the approach implicit in the anthropology of law has often been frustrated by international law and transitional justice (Goodale 2017).

The central claims of the law, its processes, and practices are fundamental legal instruments for shaping society (Kelly 2016). To that end, legal anthropology can be used as a fundamental tool for establishing the relationship between aspects of cultural, social, political and economic life (Ibid). It is also used as an essential tool for ascertaining the meaning and significance of the implications of socio-legal concepts such as transitology and transitional justice in the African context. Legal Anthropology could thus be regarded to be a product of legal concerns of scholars who sought to understand the complex but reasonable legal systems employed by other cultures other than those in the Western countries (Ibid). It is thus not surprising that anthropologists study issues such as property, citizenship and human rights and how such concepts have shaped significant questions of biotechnology, indigenisation and citizenship, transitology and transitional justice, amongst other issues (Von Benda-Beckmann 2008; Von Benda-Beckmann 1979; Von Benda-Beckmann

and Von Benda-Beckmann 1994; Von Benda-Beckmann 2007; Von Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-Beckmann 2013). Anthropology and law therefore provide a comprehensive examination of the methods through which anthropologists interact with, critique and study law (Goodale 2017). Law and anthropology examine structures for governmental action, moral norms and enforceable rules in any given society (Ibid). Regrettably, the value of law and anthropology has been unjustly undermined by sceptical academics who do not consider it as a viable and separate discipline (Collier 1997: 117-130; Geertz 1983: 170; Nader 2002: 72). However, Franz von Benda-Beckman (2008) pointed to the significance of law and anthropology when he observed that:

Scholars and practitioners from a wide range of academic disciplines engage each other in debates about law as one aspect of social and cultural life. In doing so, they simultaneously seek to develop a common language whilst being inevitably shaped by their respective disciplinary and national background. This entails multiple processes of translation, a constant seesaw between disciplines and idioms, straddling reflexivity and normativity that is challenging but ultimately rewarding as it pushes the law as well as the manifold ways of studying it to the limit.

Franz von Benda-Beckman's observation has been given little or no regard in the contemporary African context. Focus is largely placed on transitology and transitional justice, with little or no attention being given to historical events informing past injustices in Africa. Legal anthropology places significance on how history must shape any supposed forms of transition or transitional justice frameworks as may be proposed and deemed acceptable in any society. On the contrary, processes of democratisation which promote transitional justice ideologies advance the view that history can be ignored to allow for transition into a "peaceful future". Grosescu (2015) observed that:

... Within the framework of democratic transition and consolidation, one important question was: how should societies deal with crimes committed by the previous dictatorial regimes in order to ensure justice and democratic stability? Two different answers divided both scholars and political elites. The first one held that retributive justice for past abuses might jeopardise the new democratic project, and that an amnesty might be a more appropriate policy for ensuring a peaceful transition from authoritarian rule. Conversely, the second one argued that the arraignment of former dictatorial leaders would strengthen the democratic values of human rights and the rule of law, being thus an essential part of the democratisation process.

Huntington (1991: 211-231) contended that in order to avoid antagonising the previous regime which violated people's fundamental rights, trials and purges must be avoided. As such, to allow for transition into a new political dispensation, governments must limit trials if doing so endangers democratic socio-political alliances. Such practices have characterised the transition of power in Africa from dominant colonial military regimes or governments to African indigenes. In such instances, power was conditionally transferred to the African indigenes in return for the colonial leaders' amnesty and retention of the spoils of colonialism. The general reasoning implicit in such negotiated political settlements, as advanced by some scholars is that transitions from colonialism to post-colonial dispensations would not require prosecutions which would ensure that those who committed crimes against humanity are brought to justice (Katsikas 2014: 259-287). Instead, in order to avoid instability caused by the unrelenting colonial power, amnesties or just ignoring the past colonial injustices and/or abuses are considered as plausible approaches to achieving peace and democracy (Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003-2004: 5-44). The moral worthiness and legal viability of the approach proposed by Snyder and Vinjamuri (2003-2004) is subject to debate. Warikandwa, Nhemachena and Mtapuri (2017) problematise the notion of paying a blind eye to the past misdeeds of colonialists when they continue to benefit at the expense of the victims. In return, and in a manner that is devoid of *Ubuntu*, the colonialists consistently expect African indigenes to turn a blind eye to their immoral theft of African materialities and the subsequent violation of African indigenes' human rights (Nhemachena, Warikandwa and Nauta 2017; Nhemachena and Warikandwa 2017). In fact, the descendants of colonialists have merely changed the nature of their stranglehold on Africa from a physically violent dispensation to a subtle and structurally violent economic order underlined by a neoliberal economic order.

The neoliberal economic order continues to impoverish African indigenes and regards them as lesser beings not fit to inherit their entitlements. What manner of transition is this? What transitional justice is there to talk about? Whose transitional justice is it anyway? The colonialists who have transitioned to capitalists now call for the need to recognise a contemporary democratic project which is supposedly underlined by the rule of law and letting bygones be bygones. According to this transitional justice perspective, "...states should thus not focus on backward-looking measures, but on forward-looking goals such as the establishment of a constitutional regime, and institutional and economic reform" (Ackermann 1992). Such an approach is consistent with the act of a thief who steals and does not return what he/she unlawfully obtained possession of and subsequently crafted a law to protect such illegal ownership of property. Is this what transitional justice implies? Morality dictates that

returning what you unjustly assumed ownership over is a plausible concept of transition into the future. Sustained theft and dispossession property without returning the same to the victims cannot be qualified as quantifying legitimate transitional justice. It cannot be justice to turn a blind eye to colonial injustices and the gross violation of human rights which were associated with the processes of colonisation (Warikandwa and Nhemachena 2017).

In order to promote African peoples' confidence in the contemporary rule of law ideology, there is need to uphold principles of justice and undermine the culture of Western impunity in matters related to colonial dispossession, violence and contemporary structural socio-economic violence. Disregarding the need to address colonial injustices will buttress the notion of a Western elitist agenda that seeks to undermine African people to the extent of characterising them as lesser legal subjects. Grosescu (2015: 105) observed that:

... theories of democratic transitions, and transitional justice studies inspired by them, adopt a short-term perspective on the post-dictatorial transformations. They do not take into account the fact that, *arrangements that seem to have positive effects in the first phase of transition may have negative consequences in the longer run.*

It therefore is evident that the relationship between democratisation and justice, as inherited from transitology, is excessively inflexible to social phenomena. Instead of addressing social phenomena based on the instructive historical contexts, as is the case with Africa and its colonial past, transitology frequently seeks to justify the unjustifiable "proper solutions" advanced in attempts to address colonial injustices. Little emphasis is placed on providing legitimate, comprehensive and historically informed solutions to colonial injustices in Africa. Such an approach is informed by the western oriented tendencies to, "dehistoricise social facts and to ignore the influence of long-term historical processes" (Grosescu 2015: 105). The downside of this approach is that problems emanating from historical injustices are not addressed in the name of transitology and "transitional justice". The net result of this ill-informed approach is that society rejects such illegitimate and immoral settlement which then leads to social upheavals. Classic examples of social upheavals being prompted by the so-called democratic transition in society are the land reclamation initiatives that took place in Zimbabwe (*Campbell and Another v Republic of Zimbabwe* (SADC (T) 03/2009) [2009] SADCT 1 (5 June 2009); *Von Abo v President of the Republic of South Africa* (CCT 67/08) [2009] ZACC 15; 2009 (10) BCLR 1052 (CC) ; 2009 (5) SA 345 (CC) (5 June 2009); Human Rights Watch, (2002): 1-44)) and the recent march towards expropriation of land without compensation in South Africa (Walther 2017; Hall 2018). History will point out that White farmers held over eighty (80) percent of all prime farmland

in both Zimbabwe and South Africa. The remaining, often barren and unproductive land was then shared amongst the natives. The processes of transitional justice seem to ignore the fact that this pattern of property ownership deprived the rightful owners of what was legally theirs. In total contempt of the rights of the natives, the willing-seller-willing-buyer principle has been employed as a mechanism for facilitating the return of the land violently stolen from African indigenes. Such an approach puts an unjust burden on the victims to buy back what was unjustly seized from them. What is the justice in compensating the perpetrators' violent land theft from Africans and their successors in title for a heinous crime they are yet to account for? Should those that unduly enrich themselves be rewarded? Where is the rule of law in such practices? It is therefore evident that the concept of transitional justice as informed by transitology is greatly flawed, if applied in the African context.

Transitional Justice and Democratisation in Africa

Democratisation is a highly debatable concept within the African context (Larok 2011). The debates against democratisation in Africa emanate from plausible concerns relating to the imposing of Western value systems on Africa. Evidently, democracy should be defined by the societal context within which it is applied. Democracy should be understood as a way of life informed by the cultural values, norms and creeds of a specific grouping of people. It should not be defined by processes of acculturation in which norms and values of an alien society are superimposed on a grouping of people that are regarded as being "inferior" to such supposedly superior alien societies. It must therefore be accepted that different societies in the world have varying cultures, norms and creeds which translates to a unique way of life. It is therefore trite to conclude that Africa, based on its unique history, beliefs and cultural practices, should shape its way of life and democratisation concept underlined by an *Ubuntu* philosophy. Africa must be allowed to develop its unique sense of democracy as informed by its historical context, socio-economic arrangements, and distinguished cultural conditioning.

The notion that Western forms of democracy, as developed in ancient Greece ought to be the hallmark of democracy in Africa, must be dismissed with the contempt it deserves. Often, comparative law has been used as an instrument of lawfare to manipulate African societies to conform to the hypothetically "civilised" western laws and reject their customary norms and practices. Such dangerous forms of acculturation of Africans to destructive Western value systems characterises the concept of transitional justice on the African continent. Transitional justice, as an academic discipline, is largely informed by theories of democratic transition (Grosescu 2015: 105). At the

centre of the transitional justice concept is the Western countries' "...vision of the rule of law ... by a teleological perspective on transitions supposedly bound for democracy" (Ibid). From the context of liberal Western democracies, human rights law is thus used (and not the African principle of *Ubuntu*) to address past injustices in societies. International conventions on crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocides have been crafted by the United Nations (UN) to facilitate the prosecution of any parties that commit the aforementioned infringements on human rights (See for example the UN Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948; the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1967; UN Convention on War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity of 1968; UN Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid; UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 17 July 1998 (last amended 2010)). Interestingly such international conventions, in particular the Rome Statute, have been selectively applied against African countries' leaders which gives the impression that Westerners are biased against African governments (Warikandwa 2017: 91). Such developments fuel arguments to the effect that transitional justice is a Western concept that is being employed to circumvent the accountability of western countries for crimes against humanity and past colonial injustices.

Democracy as a Neoliberal Instrument for Exploiting Africa

Democracy or neoliberal democracy was employed in Europe to fight against absolute rule of monarchs (Larok 2011: 3). The same autocratic monarchs orchestrated the scramble for and colonisation of Africa and championed the theft of African materialities (Nhemachena, Warikandwa, and Nauta 2017). Neo-liberal democracy was advanced during the period of transition from feudalism to capitalism (Lorak 2011; 3). It is pertinent to point out that democracy was perfected during the era of industrialisation in Western countries. Such era was characterised by the exploitation and theft of natural resources from Africa by the West, slave trade, and land theft in Africa (Warikandwa, Nhemachena and Mtapuri 2017). Such neo-liberal democracy resultantly spread all over the world through Western expansionist policies such as colonisation and "investment" activities informed by free market policies (Nhemachena and Warikandwa 2017). Such free market "investment" policies have often given little or no regard to human rights in Africa, with emphasis by the "investors" being placed on profiteering (Warikandwa and Osode 2016: 102; Chidede and Warikandwa 2017; Warikandwa and Osode 2017; Warikandwa and Osode *Law, Democracy and Development* 2014; Warikandwa and Osode *Speculum Juris* 2014; Warikandwa and Osode *Comparative and International Law Journal of*

Southern Africa 2014). The liberal business activities which have led to the impoverishing of past and present African societies are supposedly driven by “democratic” principles. It is therefore not out of place to conclude that liberal democracy-capitalism and resultantly democracy itself are questionable Western practices which have no place in Africa.

For example, as a key feature of democracy, leaders must be appointed subject to free and fair elections being conducted. As such, no leader can rule a country without being given the mandate and/or authority to rule or act in trust of the public. However, Africa has hardly experienced free and fair elections (Abuya 2010; Lepapa 2017). In most instances, elections are rigged in favour of presidential candidates who will assist Western countries exploit a specific African country with relative ease. Legitimate transitions of power are also fraught with challenges. Recently, Mr Emmerson Mnangagwa rose to power in Zimbabwe through a coup which deposed Mr Robert Mugabe from being the country’s constitutionally elected president (Palin 2017). Regardless of the African Union’s stance against illegal power grabs, the world did not intervene in order to address the illegal power grab by Mr Mnangagwa with the unconstitutional assistance of the Zimbabwe National Defence Forces. When the military interferes with constitutional democratic processes, one cannot consider the resultant government legitimate. However, due to the fact that the Western countries and Asia were not comfortable with Mr Robert Mugabe’s plausible and robust indigenisation programme which interfered with the Western and Chinese business interests in Zimbabwe (Chidede and Warikandwa 2017; Warikandwa and Osode 2017), the “smart” yet evidently dirty and immoral coup was sanctioned as a legitimate transition of power. The transition of power was thus justified on the basis that Mr Robert Mugabe had caused untold suffering to Zimbabweans yet the same people who took over from him were the architects of such suffering. To be accepted by the Western countries, Mr Mnangagwa has undertaken to undo all Mr Robert Mugabe’s indigenisation policies in order to attract foreign “investment” in Zimbabwe. As such, a power transition in Africa is only illegal if it does not serve the best interests of the Western countries and China.

Democracy also promotes the doctrine of individual choice through a secret ballot. Larok (2011: 4) points out that:

The assumption here is that with some conditioning, the individual voter has the level of consciousness to decide for society, sometimes even without any consensus on what societal needs are. This tyranny is probably the most un-transparent manner in which societal needs can be responded to, devalue debates, surrenders rights and enslaves minds.

Africa does not place emphasis on individual interests but the best interest of the collective grouping of people. It is Western countries which have the tendency to focus on individual interests at the expense of the masses. This serves as reason why the West and China sanctioned the illegal military coup orchestrated by Mr Mnangagwa in his quest to settle personal differences with Mr Robert Mugabe who had relieved the former of his duties as the Deputy President of Zimbabwe for plotting to oust the latter from power. Mr Robert Mugabe's decision to fire Mr Mnangagwa was meritorious as the latter did topple the former, as stated in the grounds for his dismissal. It is therefore dangerous to presuppose that an individual can make informed decisions in the best interests of the society. It is therefore not surprising the ruling party ZANU-PF's primary elections in preparation for the 2018 presidential elections have been marred with controversy and irregularities (Koni 2018). ZANU-PF leaders (who were part of the coup orchestrated by Mr Mnangagwa and the military) who lost primary elections (Zhangaza, Ndebele and Sibanda 2018; Admin 2018), were clandestinely afforded a re-run in order to enable them to win such elections thereof (Staff Reporter 2018; Gondo 2018). It must be questioned as to how free and fair elections will be conducted under the leadership of the illegal power grab merchants in Zimbabwe. It is evident that Western democracy in Africa creates a good foundation for anarchy which allows the former colonialists to pillage natural resources from Africa. They are evidently not keen on a government that focuses on ensuring that African indigenes benefit from the exploitation of their natural resources (Nhemachena and Warikandwa 2017). This serves as reason why there is a smear campaign against the opposition leader Mr Nelson Chamisa regarding his remarks which suggested that he was going to review all "investment" agreements the Mnangagwa illegal government entered into with China. How can an African leader be vilified for trying to ensure that African indigenes benefit from the exploitation of their natural resources? What manner of democracy is this? Africa certainly is suffering from a political and legal disease caused by an overdose of toxic Western democracy-capitalism which places emphasis on the self and not the collective.

Another democratisation narrative is that multi-partyism in Africa signifies the existence of alternative political ideologies and programmes which lead to societal wellbeing (Lorak 2011: 4). In traditional African societies, there was no multi-partyism as people were led by Kings through a system of kingships. However, this system of Kings was deconstructed by colonial powers as part of their divide and rule strategies in Africa. The traditional African society was characterised by unity and cooperation under one leader. The flawed concept of democratisation erroneously places emphasis on unnecessary differences and celebrates selfish and counterproductive competitive behaviour over cooperation. The net result of the supposed democracy in Africa is that there is

an upsurge of elite rule and tyranny over the majority. As such, state capture is on the rise. Africa has many captured leaders who represent Western interests than the best interests of the African indigenes. The cases of Jacob Zuma in South Africa and lately Emmerson Mnangagwa in Zimbabwe are prime examples. Africa does not need uncle Toms but visionary leaders who grow economies on the basis of home grown solutions underlined by principles of *Ubuntu*. Democratisation does not suit African realities as is the case with transitional justice.

Disempowering Africa through Democratisation

Democracy in Africa has often been connected to free market policies which are implemented in Africa to impoverish the African indigenes in the guise of foreign “investment”. Claude Ake (1994; 1996) accused western countries of working towards globalising Africa’s political culture and market ideology as part of a global homogenisation. This serves as reason why Julius Nyerere’s African socialism was fiercely resisted by the West and dismissed as being archaic, barbarous and anti-developmental (Lorak 2011: 5). Any narrative advanced by African leaders which was and is contrary to the ideology of liberal democracy has led to such leaders being taken out of power in a rancorous manner. This serves as reason why Pan-African oriented leaders such as Patrice Lumumba of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) and Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso were savagely assassinated by western imperialist forces working in collusion with African sell-outs. African scholars have constantly argued that liberal democracy is not ideal for Africa’s realities. For example, Nyamnjoh (2005: 25) has argued that liberal democracy has a hyperbolic emphasis on the self-determining individual, a development which is not realistic in Africa which has an overriding collective spiritual ideology. Nyamnjoh pointed out that:

... Implementing liberal democracy in Africa has been like trying to force onto a body of a fully figured person, rich in cultural indicators of health with which Africans are familiar, a dress made to fit a slim, de-fleshed Hollywood consumer model of a Barbie-doll entertainment icon ... then when the dress fails to fit the African body, instead of blaming the tiny dress or its designer, the tradition has been to fault the popular body for emphasising too much bulk, for parading the wrong sizes, for just not being the right thing. Not often is the experience of the designer or dress maker questioned. Such high levels of insensitivity is akin to the behaviour of a Lilliputian undertaker who would rather trim a corpse than expand a coffin to accommodate a man-mountain or a carpenter whose only tool is a hammer and to whom every problem is a nail ...

The sentiments of Nyamnjoh are echoed by Claude Ake (1996) who observed that:

... the political arrangement of liberal democracy makes little sense in Africa. Liberal democracy assures individualism but there is little individualism in Africa ... it assumes abstract universalism, but in Africa that would apply only to the urban environment, and finally political parties of liberal democracy do not make sense in societies where associational life is rudimentary and interest groups are essentially primary groups ...

It is thus evident that the African system of democracy does not rest on the assumption of individualism or conflict of interest but on the collective approach to democracy, a development which underlines the social nature of human beings and Ubuntu (Ake 1994). Africa thus has its own functional narrative of democracy which regrettably is being unjustifiably undermined by Western notions of democracy. The net result of this approach is that Africa is being disenfranchised and impoverished due to the continued loss of identity and materialities at the behest of Western ideologies (Rodney 1972; Kah 1992; Tandon 2015). The more Africa continues to embrace Western norms and practices for socio-economic purposes the weaker its institutions will continue to be and the more its citizens will continue to be impoverished. African leaders and academic scholars must endeavour to develop a new narrative towards African democratisation and growth initiatives. Sadly, there is hardly any indication to this effect as more African leaders and some academics continue to be used as puppets of the West in return for their stronghold on power and perquisites. This explains why incidences of State Capture are on the rise in Africa.

Decolonisation and Transitional Justice: Two Unlike Poles Which Do Not Attract

Discourses on transitional justice have often paid fairly little attention to the effect of history on transitory in Africa. However, it is evident that, “Historical approaches to memory and transitional justice illustrate the fact that the past can continue to ‘irrupt’ in the present” (Rousso 2002). It is therefore imperative that any forms or narratives of transitional justice in Africa must be connected to the continent’s historical context and not aim at downplaying the atrocities of the past in pursuit of a fallacious reconciliation and transition. Wouters (2014: 408) points out the dangers of attempting to pacify history and its substantive developments when he observed that:

... even in societies that have a strong national consensual regime, memory incidents stay present right under the surface ...Alternative memories were never buried or forgotten but simply dominant or invisible (meaning not easily perceivable).

Wouters' views are augmented by Bevernage (2008: 166) who plausibly observed that, "... the past continues to disrupt the present, simply because historical processes resist 'being frozen' and always contain 'delays, survivals, and unfinished projects'". Therefore, even if the concerns of realising justice based on the historical narratives are often erroneously substituted by Western driven socio-political agendas, in Africa, claims for accountability for past injustices will not simply vanish. The passage of time does not translate to the eradication of Africans' bitterness over colonial injustices. Transitional justice in Africa should thus not place emphasis on the so-called "negotiated settlements" that disregard pertinent issues of restoration for the theft of African materialities by colonialists.

It is surprising that the contemporary constitutional dispensation in Africa sanctions property rights regimes across the continent which retain rights of land and mineral ownership in the hands of colonialists and their successors in title (Warikandwa, Nhemachena, and Mtapuri 2017; Nhemachena and Warikandwa 2017). Such an approach, in the name of realising a "peaceful" transition into the post-colonial dispensation, turns a blind eye to the present truths concerning the suffering of African indigenes owing to the legacy of colonialism. The legacy of colonialism remains embedded in the national borders, trade networks, educational systems, and economies of an underdeveloped African continent (Warikandwa, Nhemachena and Mtapuri 2017). The current regrettable status quo in Africa was facilitated by the so-called transition arrangements for a post-colonial Africa. No justice has been realised for the ordinary African indigenes. This unjust development in which the colonialists and their successors in title continue to benefit from an unjust enrichment facilitated by colonialism has led to calls for decolonisation in Africa. What this implies is that transitional justice ideologies have failed Africa as there has been no marked improvement in their general welfare of ordinary African indigenes in the post-colonial era. Those that have realised an improvement in their standards of living are African politicians and the middle class who are often beneficiaries of the crumbs that fall from the table(s) of their colonial masters. Fanon (1964) observed that: "Every former colony has a particular way of achieving independence. Every new sovereign state finds itself practically under the obligation of maintaining definite and deferential relations with the former oppressor." Transitional justice has been used as a tool for maintaining the relations between former colonies and the colonisers.

Decolonisation thus seeks to unyoke Africa from the injustices of the past without paying a blind eye to the legacy of colonialism. Where transitional justice focuses on negotiated settlements that leave the colonialists and their successors in title benefiting from the unjust transitional arrangements, decolonisation seeks to address the legal injustices through restoration. This serves as reason why the African National Congress led South African government has adopted a policy of expropriation without compensation. Whilst the policy is regarded as a threat to economic stability in South Africa, it allows the victims of colonial injustices to get back what is rightfully theirs (the land and control of the economy). Transitional justice and decolonisation are therefore not complimentary but competing interests which are not complimentary. Africa needs to rethink the Western concept of transitional justice as it has no room in Africa's Pan-African oriented developmental agenda.

The Secularisation Agenda and Transitional Justice

Transitology is premised on the problematic assumption that complete democracies can only be realised if countries adopt liberal policies which are secular (Pfeifer 2013: 6). Secularisation is composed of different facets but can generally be condensed in the conceptualisation that it is a component of modernisation (Shah 2012: 3). Secularisation dangerously assumes that western driven "economic development" would lead to the degeneration of individual religious and belief systems of communities, a development which would lead to the weakening of cultural influences on the overall developmental agenda of a nation (Shah and Philpott 2011: 28). Casanova (2012: 25-26) posited that:

Because in Europe the three processes of secular differentiation, religious decline, and privatisation have been historically interconnected, the tendency has been to view all three processes as intrinsically interrelated components of a general teleological process of secularisation and modernisation, rather than as particular contingent developments.

The above view therefore implies that liberal theories regard modernisation as a, "linear process in which liberal formations such as capitalism, secularisation, and democracy all progress together" (Snyder 2011: 18). As such a monist view exists with regards to the paths to modernisation. Secular modernisation places emphasis on science and rationality as a basis for fuelling a gradual decline of religious, cultural and moral values in order to give way to secular societies and politics (Hayes 2009: 293). It is this conceptualisation of modernisation that has led to transitional justice being used as a tool to usher in a new socio-political dispensation in which the Western countries do not

account for their historical atrocities as they are “enablers” of modernisation. Any attempts at realising retributive justice are regarded as being premodern and therefore an anachronism to the supposedly modern state and empire.

Rawls (1993) argued that all principles and theories of “the good” life belong to the private sphere whilst the political and public sphere must be guided by pure practical reason. The modern African society, due to the influence of Western ideologies of “the good” life is thus characterised by a plurality of beliefs by citizens as opposed to the collective beliefs that shaped their societies in pre-colonial Africa. The negative result of this approach is that African societies no longer share one collective view of what is good. As such, whilst restoration of African materialities is a good objective for the African society, Westernised African minds consider such an approach as being anti-developmental. As such, that which is good for all Africans is now being rationalised and regarded as not being good for the general populace or the public. Such a development signifies how transitional justice dovetails into the secularisation ideology in order to advance the modernisation agenda which will culminate in the realisation of the new world order. The new world order places significance on the interests of a few elites at the expense of the majority. This serves as reason why true transitional justice has been undermined by a globalisation agenda which does not consider retributive justice as a fundamental component of a capitalist society. As such, Africans who suffered at the hands of colonialists must just forget about what happened and focus on the future in the hope that they will have a better life in such future. Secularisation does not promote justice in Africa but only serves as a mechanism to enlarge the Western empire on the African continent.

Using Legal Anthropology to Develop a New Narrative for Justice in Africa

True justice for victims of colonial injustices can no longer be realised in Africa through the use of Western models of transitology such as transitional justice. Regardless of how the Western countries consider transitional justice as a tool for democratisation, it must be accepted that African societies are victims of prolonged periods of conflict and colonially induced social, political and economic injustices, for which a new narrative apart from transitional justice must be sought to address such injustices. Whilst transitional justice has been celebrated as a viable mechanism for addressing past injustices (Kent 2016), it has failed in the African context to achieve its set objectives. African indigenes are eager to realise the resolution of colonially induced injustices. This has led to the adoption of radical economic policies in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, in an attempt to address structural injustices prompted by the colonial regimes which were operating in different African countries. It is in this regard

that we propose that African countries should now look beyond the concept of transitional justice to address colonial injustices and decolonise their institutions and cultures.

Legal anthropology offers a good platform for developing an ideal concept for addressing colonially induced injustices in Africa. A social-scientific study of law characterised by the convergence between law and anthropology (Von Benda-Beckmann 2008), will offer practical solutions to addressing past injustices as opposed to the artificial concept of transitional justice. Africa needs critical legal thinking that is shaped by the telling historical and contemporary influence of fields of social science such as anthropology (Nader 2002). The importance of a legal anthropology approach is that the legal solution adopted to address past injustices such as those inflicted by colonialism will be informed by the findings of humanities scholars who locate their work in practical national and international situations. As such, a critical analysis of the impact of colonial injustices in Africa will inform the ideological undergirding of the legal mechanism to be adopted to address the past injustices. One cannot prescribe Western solutions to African problems. The situation in Western countries differs from that prevailing in Africa. As such, anthropology must inform the law as to what it has to address in so far as colonially induced injustices are concerned. The African narrative can no longer be informed by Western countries whose proposed solutions to the problems they caused in Africa do not provide lasting solutions but create more complex problems such as civil unrest on the continent. Restoration and retribution must be strongly considered as dominant mechanism for realising true transitional justice in Africa. Anything less is a facade and mere window dressing that does not offer lasting solutions to impoverished and marginalised Africans who continue to be victims of a Western driven brutal capitalist agenda.

Conclusion

Transitional justice is still being celebrated and promoted as a viable mechanism for addressing colonially induced injustices in Africa. However, as argued in this chapter, transitional justice is not a sufficient legal or quasi-legal mechanism for addressing the complex legacies of colonialism and post-colonial structural socio-economic violence that is still being inflicted on the impoverished African indigenes. Due to the limited reference to the historical concepts informing Africa's current challenges as informed by colonial injustices, transitional justice is merely a tool of choice for use in prosecuting African leaders and other leaders from developing continents who fall short of Western countries' expansionist agenda. Transitional justice has failed to address historical issues which perpetuate and/or exacerbate the underlying colonial and

capitalist ideologies that promote structural violence in Africa and mask the ongoing structural violence on the continent which is a colonial legacy. There is need to critically reflect on transitology, democratisation and transitional justice as Western concepts aimed at undermining Africans' attempts to redress past and present colonial injustices. Africa and its academic scholars needs to decolonise its legal and social systems in order to develop viable and lasting solutions aimed at addressing the unending effects of the colonial legacy. Legal anthropology could be employed as a plausible mechanism for developing an alternative to the Western façade of transitology, democratisation and transitional justice. We hope that this chapter will promote or evoke critical debates and reflections on transitology and its application in the contexts of decolonisation, democratisation and transitional justice in Africa.

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Tracing recent bouts of globalised Mugabephobia to Robert Mugabe's refusal to be neoimperially penetrated, this book juxtaposes economic liberalisation with the mounting liberalisation of African orifices. Reading land repossession and economic structural adjustment programmes together with what they call neoimperial structural adjustment of African orifices, the authors argue that there has been liberalisation of African orifices in a context where Africans are ironically prevented from repossessing their material resources. Juxtaposing recent bouts of Mugabephobia with discourses on homophobia, the book asks why empire prefers liberalising African orifices rather than attending to African demands for restitution, restoration and reparations. Noting that empire opposes African sovereignty, autonomy, and centralisation of power while paradoxically promoting transnational corporations' centralisation of power over African economies, the book challenges contemporary discourses about shared sovereignty, distributed governance, heterarchy, heteronomy and ontology. Arguing that colonialists similarly denied Africans of their human essence, the tome problematises queer sexualities, homosexuality, ecosexuality, cybersexuality and humanoid robotic sexuality all of which complicate supposedly fundamental distinctions between human beings and animals and machines. Provocatively questioning queer sexuality and liberalised orifices that serve to divert African attention from the more serious unfinished business of repossessing material resources, the book insightfully compares Robert Gabriel Mugabe, Thomas Sankara and Julius Kambarage Nyerere who emphasised the imperatives of African autonomy, ownership, control and sovereignty over natural resources. Observing Africans' interest in repossessing ownership and control over their resources, the book wonders why so much, queer, international attention is focused on foisting queer sexuality while downplaying more burning issues of resource repossession, human dignity, equality and equity craved by Africans for whom life is not confined to sexuality. With insights for scholars in sociology, development studies, law, politics, African studies, anthropology, transformation, decolonisation and decoloniality, the book argues that liberal democracy is a façade in a world that is actually ruled through criminocracy.

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